Republicans, Day One

I suppose I really shouldn't do this, but here is Goat Rodeo's Day Five of the impeachment hearings.  This was Saturday and was the Republicans' initial presentation, a mere three hours.  But I do want to get this out of the way before hearing the rest of the Republican presentation, because from my understanding today's presentation was not as rational as Saturday's.

So what would I say about Saturday's presentation?

Well, it wasn't bad, exactly.  And by "not bad," I mean didn't go full on Devin Nunes.  It didn't descend into ranting or blatant partisanship, or paranoid conspiracy theories.  It didn't defame Joe Biden.  It did normal defense lawyer stuff -- tried to poke holes in the prosecution's argument.

The defense was based on the phone call transcript.  Trump's lawyers argued that the House Managers were selectively quoting the call, and ignoring context, and that, taken in context, the call was quite innocent.  The trouble was that to do so, the lawyers had to, um, selectively quote and ignore context.

Trump, they argue, was concerned about two things -- burden sharing and corruption.  As for burden sharing, he mentioned it at the beginning when he said that Germany was not paying its fair share in aid to Ukraine, and Ukrainian President Zelensky agreed.  That is not actually true, the the EU contributing more than twice as much as the US and Germany nearly as much, but mere facts are not important to Trump who assumes that even one dollar aid is excessive, so maybe half a point there.

As for corruption, the call never so much as mentions it, although it does mention the Bidens.  Trump's lawyers also argued that Trump was legitimately interested in all foreign interference in the 2016 election and wanted it investigated.  The trouble with that is, once again, that Trump never so much as mentioned the marginally respectable theories of Ukrainian interference.  These theories define "interference" so broadly as to include an editorial or Facebook comment and make some decidedly strained assumptions about the origin of information, but they are at least somewhat reality-based.  But Trump did not ask for investigations of whether disclosure of payoffs to Paul Manafort were false; he didn't ask Zelensky to investigate whether any Ukrainians were sources for Fusion GPS; he didn't ask for investigation into the Ukrainian embassy in Washington's communications with Alexandra Chalupa.  No, he asked Zelensky to find the "server" that was hacked.  And that is downright tinfoil hat territory. Trump's lawyers avoided the subject.

They focused, instead, on the absence of any mention of military aid in the phone call, and friendly discussions of a future meeting.  That could be taken as evidence that the phone call was innocent. But only if one ignores the testimony and e-mails of Kurt Volker and Gordon Sondland making clear that they were coaching Zelensky before the phone call of the need to investigate "Burisma and 2016."* 

They also focused on the Ukrainians never mentioning the cutoff in military aid before the cutoff was announced in Politico as proof that the Ukrainians were not aware of the cutoff and that military aid therefore could not have been used as a source of pressure.  They did what any defense lawyer would do -- minimized and searched for inconsistencies in testimony by Laura Cooper and Catherine Croft** that the Ukrainians appeared to have known about the holdup before then.  They also ignore the apparently unanimous consensus of the executive branch that there was no justification and the aid should be released.  Nor does it do to say that Trump, as head of the executive branch, could override it.  The aid was appropriated by Congress.  The Impoundment Control Act forbids the President from not spending money Congress has duly appropriated.  There are some exceptions, but they require specific justifications and procedures, and notification to Congress, none of which was done. 

And they implausibly took at face value both Trump's and Zelensky's assurances that there was no pressure and no quid pro quo.  Particularly Trump's statement, "I want nothing.  No quid pro quo.  Tell Zelensky to do the right thing," sounds very much like an admission of quid pro quo. 

As to obstruction of Congress, the Republicans argued that the President was not required to comply with impeachment subpoenas because the House as a whole had not voted to hold an impeachment inquiry; merely one committee was holding an inquiry.  This argument, too, required ignoring a whole lot of context.  In particular, it required ignoring the fact that Trump had been making blanket denials of all Congressional subpoenas before Congress initiated impeachment hearing, and suing to block third party subpoenas, arguing that Congress had no authority to demand records except as part of an impeachment inquiry.  When Congress opened and impeachment inquiry, he argued that it had no right to demand records because the inquiry was opened the wrong way.  And when Congress asked what it would have to do to get cooperation, the response was, drop the impeachment.  Oh, yes, and Trump lawyers are arguing in court that the courts have no authority to decide a dispute over whether Congress can subpoena the executive.  So, yes, the charge of obstruction of Congress is more than justified.

And they impugned Adam Schiff's character and motives.  They raised Schiff's claims that he had "more than circumstantial" evidence of collusion between Trump and the Russians, which really are problematic.***  They also pointed out that the whistle blower spoke to a Schiff aide, and possibly to Schiff himself, before filing the complaint.  It does seem a safe assumption that, even if the whistle blower did not talk to Schiff directly, Schiff's aide did pass on the message.  That would mean that when Schiff started making loud demands for the whistle blower complaint, he knew more than he let on and was being disingenuous, which is a legitimate complaint.  Still, it also appears that a Devin Nunes aide was in regular contact with Giuliani and his henchmen.  It seems a safe assumption that Nunes' aide passed their information on to his boss (it would be a serious rogue operation requiring a different kind of investigation if he did not), and so Nunes also knew a great deal more than he let on during the hearings.  If we are going to call Schiff as a witness, Nunes or his aide should also be called.

And I will say, this is not the craziest theory of a case I have ever heard a lawyer present. 

I once saw a case of a cash register attendant brutally hacked to death with a hoe, with blood splattered all over the store.  A local transient was ruled out as a suspect when lab tests revealed no blood on his clothes.****  Public Defenders, defending a suspect who was found later, tried to argue that the transient might have done it.  Central to the argument was that the clothes were tested several days later and the blood might have disappeared during that time, even though the clothes were not washed.

I also saw a police brutality case in which a man had been shot three times in the back.*****  The police officer argued that the shots took place during a struggle at close range, with cop seizing the victim form behind and the victim firing over his shoulder.  The trouble with this argument -- there was no gunpowder residue on the victim's clothes, which should have been found if he was shot at such close range.  So the police officer's lawyers argued that it might have fallen off when the paramedics cut the victim's clothes off.

I imagine overworked prosecutors and public defenders make arguments like this all of the time.  But a President who can afford top-notch lawyers should do better.

________________________________________________
*Both men denied any knowledge that Burisma was code for the Bidens, even though (1) everyone else seemed to have figured it out, and (2) Rudy Giuliani directly linked the two to Volker.
**Croft for some reason did not testify publicly, so I was not aware of her.
***And, just for the record, the Mueller Report did satisfy me that there was no ongoing conspiracy between Trump and the Russians, even as Trump sought to exploit their actions.  I do not believe there was such evidence and Mueller simply missed it.  What convinced me of this was when Trump finally surprised everyone by winning the election, the Russians madly scrambled to establish some sort of channel of communications.  If there had been an ongoing conspiracy, such a channel would have already existed.
****Actually, there was a little on the knee of his pants, but it was a different blood type from the victim.
*****Just to be clear, the victim survived the shots.  However, he was extremely drunk at the time of the incident and did not remember what happened.

Reflections on the Democratic Side of the Impeachment

How fast things disappear on Google!  Some Republican (Newt Gingrich, I believe), tweeted that the fact that the Democrats in the impeachment are represented by Adam Schiff and Jerry Nadler while President Trump is represented by Ken Starr and Alan Dershowitz says all we need to know.  To which our side says, "Yep!"

I have been listening to condensed versions on Lawfare's Goat Rodeo in the belief that listening to or reading the whole thing.  It has its drawbacks.  In particular, it lacked the "heads on pikes" comments that excited such controversy.  Still, there is enough to comment on, and I want to fully comment on what the Democrats had to say before moving on to the Republican side. 

Actually, the trial began with debate between both sides about what the rules would be, so we got to hear from Team Trump, but not from either Starr or Dershowitz.  Instead we heard from Jay Sekulow and Pat Cipollone.  They weren't bad, exactly.  Certainly, they refrained from Devin Nunes' substance-free ranting and open paranoia.  But I found their arguments either too abstract to mean much, or somewhat disingenuous.  In particular, they raised the example of Obama Attorney General Eric Holder, who was held in contempt for failure to produce documents and favorable cited various Democrats condemning the action.  The cases are not comparable.  Holder turned over some 7,600 pages of documents, but claimed executive privilege over another 1,300.  Trump, by contrast, refused to turn over any documents whatever.  Sekulow and Cipollone argued that investigators could go to court to order their release.  House Managers argued that the documents could be held up in litigation for years, and that the Trump Administration was even arguing in another case that courts had no jurisdiction to hear such disputes.

Next came three days of the Democrats making their case.  It was rather mind-numbing, but here are my comments:

First point, I didn't find it as riveting as the the witness testimony before the House.  The witnesses were giving new information.  House Managers were merely setting forth what the witnesses had already said.  It got redundant fast.

Next point: Adam Schiff is very good.  And by good, I mostly mean clear, concrete, and specific.  That may say as much about my opinion as about any of the speakers, but there it is.  In my view, the case is best made by avoiding generalities like "corrupt," or "cheat" or "foreign interference."  Schiff was very good at explaining the particular acts that were done and what in particular was wrong with them.  For instance, when various Democrats kept saying that Trump was trying to argue that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the election, Schiff clarified.  By "interference," Trump did not mean hostile editorials or Facebook posts.  He specifically asked the Ukrainians to find the Democratic server which was hacked.

Next: No one else, either the other Democrats or Sekulow or Cipollone was as good.  In particular, Val Demings really needs to use less exclamation points.  There was nothing really wrong with what she said, but I found the over-dramatic tone detracted from her content. 

I did think the Democrats did a generally good job on debunking some of Team Trump's arguments.  They pointed out in detail why Biden's threat to withhold aid unless the Ukrainians removed their prosecutor was not comparable to Trump threatening to withhold aid unless the Ukrainians investigated the Bidens, i.e., the difference between acting on behalf of US interests and on personal interests.  They also explained that the prosecutor Biden had removed was not, in fact, investigating Burisma, and that replacing him would make Biden's son more, not less, likely to be held to scrutiny.

And the Democrats did an excellent job on explaining just how unprecedented and just how dangerous Trump's absolute stonewalling of the investigation was, and of appealing to Senate Republicans' institutional interests in maintaining oversight over the executive branch.

I did think there were some things the Democrats could have emphasized more.  (Unless they did and it was cut out).  I would have liked for them to have discussed just how common it is for retired politicians, family members of politicians, and other bigwigs to serve on corporate boards of directors and do almost nothing except be on the masthead.  I would have liked them to point out that the practice, though perhaps sleazy, is perfectly legal and could be abolished only by telling corporations how to choose their directors, and are we sure we want to do that.  I would have liked them to go into more detail about Trump's complete lack of interest in corruption in any country except Ukraine, and in any instance in Ukraine except Burisma.  And I really wish they had commented on and played Fiona Hill's comments that Ukraine was by no means the only country whose leaders made unflattering comments about candidate Trump, yet none of the others were such targets of Trump's ire.

And, incidentally, I think the Democrats may have set a trap for themselves with a distinct contradiction.  In insisting that Russia, not Ukraine "interfered" in the 2016 election, Democrats clearly set a high bar for "interference," i.e., hacking and disclosure.  Yet in saying the Trump wanted Ukraine to "interfere" by announcing an investigation of the Bidens, they were setting a much lower bar.  That is a distinct weakness for Republicans to exploit.

And I have a further comment on the "heads on pikes" comment that was cut out.  Persuasive argument, we are told, is supposed to appeal at three levels -- logos, ethos, and pathos.  Logos is an appeal with facts and logic.  Ethos is a moral appeal to do the right thing.  And pathos is an emotional appeal.  The "heads on pikes" argument was largely an appeal to pathos, with some ethos put in.  And in today's polarized atmosphere, that is hard to do.

When I say that Schiff was very "good," meaning concrete and specific, I basically mean he was very good at logos.  Events, rules, precedents, comparisons, historical analogies and the like are logos.  The core of a legal case is (supposed to be) based in logos.  And particularly in these polarized times, logos sets up what we can at least hope to be a common core of facts beyond challenge.

Ethos is more difficult.  I think Schiff and other Democrats made a fair start at it when they argued that all members of Congress, of both branches and both parties, will sometimes need documents from the executive branch, either for information in making legislative decisions, or to hold some President accountable.  Arguing about keeping foreign powers from meddling in our domestic politics I think would strike some chords.  But arguments about the need for elections to be fair and that seeking an investigation of the Bidens was "cheating" is unlikely to have the same appeal to Republicans as it does to Democrats and for an obvious reason.  It is asking Republicans to make it easier for Democrats to win, not a very appealing argument!

But pathos is the hardest of all.  Because being loyal to one's team and standing up for its leader is a very powerful piece of pathos for Republicans.  And any attempt to excite passion is going to be an attempt to excite passion against Trump.  And "heads on pikes" remark or not, that is going to meet with immense resistance.

All of which leads to one final point.  Regardless of how good a case the Democrats made, it may well be swept away as soon as the Republicans start talking.  Brett Kavenaugh is a classic example.  First Christine Blasey Ford spoke up and her testimony was powerful -- at the level of logos, ethos, and pathos alike.  People all across the political spectrum were impressed by her testimony, and it briefly appeared that it might have an impact.  But as soon as Kavenaugh spoke up with his blatantly partisan rant, any possible impact was lost.  Kavenaugh was appealing to pathos, and only to pathos --- in particular, to partisan passion.  It was a very polarizing speech, inspiring enthusiasm by Republicans and outrage by Democrats.  And, since Republicans were in the majority, it won the day.

I fully expect something similar from Donald Trumps lawyers.

Two Contrasting Portraits of War in Shakespeare

I belong to a Shakespeare reading and discussion group and greatly regret not having the opportunity to attend both of the two most recent discussions -- Troilus and Cressida, and Henry V. They make a fascinating (and ironic) study in contrasts on the subject of war.

Troilus and Cressida is set during the Trojan War and borrows part of the plot of the Iliad.  Despite the ancient setting, the play has a very strong feeling of the Middle Ages.  This should not be surprising, since the story of Troilus and Cressida originates in the 14th Century.  I interpret the play as mourning the end of Medieval chivalry in favor of modern notions of total war.

The Trojans embody the chivalric ideal.*  The play opens with Troilus, staying home from battle, too lovesick to fight.  Fighting is treated as a thing men do when the mood strikes them and not a matter of duty to protect Troy.  Men wear a token from their lady and dedicate their heroic deeds in her honor.  Hector is the truest embodiment of the ideal.  During a truce, he challenges any Greek champion to duel in single combat, to show who is braver, and whose lady is more beautiful and of higher character.  He spares all who yield, never strikes an opponent when he is down, and even gives pause to let the other fighter catch his breath.

Troilus is a young idealist in his model.  He also follows the chivalric ideal in that he loves a lady, praises all her virtues and excellences, and wears her token, a sleeve.  Paris also comes across as a very nice guy.

The Greeks are moving in the modern direction.  Their army has been bogged down for a long time and they are growing impatient.  Achilles has been refusing to fight and mocking the leaders.  Ulysses (Odysseus) proposes that the Greeks send Ajax forward as their champion instead to goad Achilles into action.  Certainly neither Achilles nor Ajax meets the ideal of chivalry at all.  Ajax is described as a "mongrel, beef-witted lord" with "no more brain than I have in mine elbows," and he acts like a brute and thug.  Achilles has fallen into arrogance, mocks his superiors, and almost certainly has a gay relationship with Patroclus.  Nor does Ulysses' scheme to manipulate these two seem knightly.

But above all else is Thersites.  Thersites appears as a character in the Illiad, a common soldier, deformed and repulsive, but he speaks the truth to power.  Shakespeare's Thersites is even more repulsive, and supremely vile and scurrilous in his language, but he sees through everyone else's failings and speaks truth to power, albeit in repulsive, disease-ridden terms.  His dismisses Achilles and Ajax with, "Hector have a great catch, if he knock out either of your brains: a' were as good crack a fusty nut with no kernel." And "If Troy be not taken till these two undermine it, the walls will stand till they fall of themselves."  He dismisses the whole war with:

Here is such patchery, such juggling and such knavery! all the argument is a cuckold and a whore; a good quarrel to draw emulous factions and bleed to death upon. Now, the dry serpigo [a skin disease] on the subject! and war and lechery confound all!

In assessing his commanders he says:

Here's Agamemnon, an honest fellow enough and one that loves quails; but he has not so much brain as earwax: and the goodly transformation of Jupiter there, his brother, the bull,--the primitive statue, and oblique memorial of cuckolds; a thrifty shoeing-horn in a chain, hanging at his brother's leg,--to what form but that he is, should wit larded with malice and malice forced with wit turn him to? To an ass, were nothing; he is both ass and ox: to an ox, were nothing; he is both ox and ass. To be a dog, a mule, a cat, a fitchew, a toad, a lizard, an owl, a puttock, or a herring without a roe, I would not care; but to be Menelaus, I would conspire against destiny.

And his curses are revolting:

Now, the rotten diseases of the south, the guts-griping, ruptures, catarrhs, loads o' gravel i' the back, lethargies, cold palsies, raw eyes, dirt-rotten livers, wheezing lungs, bladders full of imposthume, sciaticas, limekilns i' the palm, incurable bone-ache, and the rivelled fee-simple of the tetter, take and take again such preposterous discoveries!

Even in Troy, one catches hints that chivalry is not all it seems.  When Troilus proclaims his love for Cressida in extravagant terms, Cressida's uncle Pandarus interjects in the most prosaic and cynical terms.  He brings them together and watches over, a leering voyeur. 

The Greeks observe the chivalric ideal of courtesy during the duel, but Ulysses has no illusions about Cressida's character and arranges for Troilus to see her transfer her allegiance to Diomedes and give him the sleeve.  The shock causes Troilus to abandon chivalry for total war.  He tells Hector:

TROILUS
Brother, you have a vice of mercy in you,
Which better fits a lion than a man.

HECTOR
What vice is that, good Troilus? chide me for it.

TROILUS
When many times the captive Grecian falls,
Even in the fan and wind of your fair sword,
You bid them rise, and live. 

HECTOR
O,'tis fair play.

TROILUS
Fool's play, by heaven, Hector.

HECTOR
How now! how now! 

TROILUS
For the love of all the gods,
Let's leave the hermit pity with our mothers,
And when we have our armours buckled on,
The venom'd vengeance ride upon our swords,
Spur them to ruthful work, rein them from ruth.

HECTOR
Fie, savage, fie! 

TROILUS
Hector, then 'tis wars.

Hector is alarmed by his brother's tone and says he should not fight today, but Troilus goes out, hunting for Diomedes with Cressida's sleeve.  Troilus' warning to disregard chivalry and fight to win proves true -- when Hector rests at the end of the day and takes his armor off, Achilles ambushes and kills him.  And we end knowing that Troy is doomed without Hector to defend it and Troilus abandoning all chivalry and only craving revenge.

Troilus and Cressida is a deeply cynical play, particularly because Thersites' cynical comments go unanswered, including his outrage that the war should be fought all over "a cuckold and a whore."  We see Medieval chivalry give way to modern total war before our eyes.  And yet the question remains, to what extent did Shakespeare actually believe in the chivalric ideal?  Did he see it as a noble and glorious thing of the past, tragically lost in these modern, degenerate days?  Or as a mere literary convention, never practicable in the real world?  Someone in our class pointed out that Shakespeare was a contemporary of Miguel Cervantes, and that Troilus and Cressida was roughly contemporary with Don Quixote, which thoroughly skewered the knightly romance (already generally seen as old-fashioned and rather foolish) as utterly absurd in the real world.

While I cannot say what Shakespeare thought of this subject, I can say that he was not blind to the harsh realities of Medieval warfare.  These are quite accurately presented in Shakespeare's great patriotic play, Henry V. 

Both plays begin with a chorus setting the general story.  In Troilus and Cressida, the chorus merely explains that the scene is in Troy and recounts the familiar story.  In Henry V, the chorus describes the grandeur and epic scale of the story he wants to present, and apologizes for the limits of the stage.  It seems fair to say that these things did not have the same reality to Shakespeare when writing about an ancient war in a distant and exotic land as when writing about a comparatively recent war in familiar lands.  Troilus and Cressida had elements of a fairy tale; Henry V is absolutely real to the author and his audience.

There are no one-on-one duels in Henry V, no fights to prove the worthiness of one's lady, no lady's favor that a knight wears on his crest to dedicate to her.  Two men (one of them the king in disguise) do were gloves on their hats, but only as a challenge to start a fight.  The incident that is the immediate pretext for war is every bit as frivolous as stealing Helen.  Henry claims to be the rightful King of France.  The French offer him a chest containing tribute not to attack.  And it turns out to contain -- tennis balls.  This insult furnishes the immediate pretext for war.

The harsh realities of war are portrayed in unsparing terms.  We hear about sieges, cannons, undermining (i.e., digging under the city walls to plan explosives) and other practical matters of war that go unmentioned in Troilus and Cressida.  Henry warns the city of Harfleur against holding out after it becomes clear there are no reinforcements:

Take pity of your town and of your people,
Whiles yet my soldiers are in my command;
Whiles yet the cool and temperate wind of grace
O'erblows the filthy and contagious clouds
Of heady murder, spoil and villany.
If not, why, in a moment look to see
The blind and bloody soldier with foul hand
Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters;
Your fathers taken by the silver beards,
And their most reverend heads dash'd to the walls,
Your naked infants spitted upon pikes,
Whiles the mad mothers with their howls confused
Do break the clouds, as did the wives of Jewry
At Herod's bloody-hunting slaughtermen.
What say you? will you yield, and this avoid,
Or, guilty in defence, be thus destroy'd?

Never do we hear such graphic terms when Troilus anticipates the fall of Troy.

Harfleur surrenders.  The English army, hungry and stricken with dysentery, makes a forced march to Calais.  Henry warns his soldiers to commit no outrages against the countryside and executes one for looting from a church.  They await fearfully for the coming battle.  Common soldiers know all too well that theirs are the lives on the line when the fighting starts, while the nobility will only be captured, held in honorable confinement, and ransomed.  Some common soldiers even dare grumble against the king:

But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in battle, shall join together at the latter day and cry all 'We died at such a place;' some swearing, some crying for a surgeon, some upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the debts they owe, some upon their children rawly left. I am afeard there are few die well that die in a battle; for how can they charitably dispose of any thing, when blood is their argument? Now, if these men do not die well, it will be a black matter for the king that led them to it; whom to disobey were against all proportion of subjection.

Again, this is quite graphic imagery.  There is none of Thersites' vulgarity here, but it portrays the real horrors of death and wounds in a way that Troilus and Cressida never does.**  The English, half-starved and exhausted from the march, face a French army that is fresh and outnumbers them five to one.  The French urge the English to leave while they still can.  Henry replies that even if his army is slaughtered, so many bodies will breed a plague and conquer France even in death!  (Gross!)  Battle ensues.  Both sides commit war crimes.  Henry orders the execution of French prisoners after they surrender.  The French attack the baggage train and kill boys to young to fight.  Henry does not even have the mitigation of killing in hot blood -- he first orders the execution of French prisoners before learning that under age boys have been killed.

In the battle itself we see no one-on-one duels between great lords, only a fight between common soldiers.  At the end of the battle, all is in confusion and at first the English don't even know who won.  They only realize they have won when the French herald approaches asking leave to retrieve their dead to bury.  Horses have fallen as well as knights, "[T]heir wounded steeds/Fret fetlock deep in gore and with wild rage/Yerk out their armed heels at their dead masters/Killing them twice."

When the war is over, most of the companions of Henry's youth have been killed.  Pistol, the sole survivor, finds that his girlfriend has died "of a malady of France."  He is left to make his living pimping and stealing.  He is scarred from a beating for insubordination, and plans to claim the scars were gotten in combat and pass himself off as a war hero.  The French desperately desire peace:

Her [France's] vine, the merry cheerer of the heart,
Unpruned dies; her hedges even-pleach'd,
Like prisoners wildly overgrown with hair,
Put forth disorder'd twigs; her fallow leas
The darnel, hemlock and rank fumitory
Doth root upon, while that the coulter rusts
That should deracinate such savagery;
The even mead, that erst brought sweetly forth
The freckled cowslip, burnet and green clover,
Wanting the scythe, all uncorrected, rank,
Conceives by idleness and nothing teems
But hateful docks, rough thistles, kecksies, burs,
Losing both beauty and utility.
And as our vineyards, fallows, meads and hedges,
Defective in their natures, grow to wildness,
Even so our houses and ourselves and children
Have lost, or do not learn for want of time,
The sciences that should become our country;
But grow like savages,--as soldiers will
That nothing do but meditate on blood,--
To swearing and stern looks, diffused attire
And every thing that seems unnatural.
Which to reduce into our former favour
You are assembled: and my speech entreats
That I may know the let, why gentle Peace
Should not expel these inconveniences
And bless us with her former qualities.

Peace is concluded, with the current French king to rule to the end of his days.  His son is declared illegitimate, and Henry marries his daughter and is declared his heir.  As the chorus acknowledges, it is all in vain.  Henry will die young and leave a baby to succeed him.  All his victories will be reversed and England will fall into civil war.

So the obvious question remains.  Why is it the chest-thumping, flag-waving patriotic play Henry V so much more graphic and honest in its portrayal of the horrors of war than the deeply cynical anti-war play Troilus and Cressida?  Some have suggested that Shakespeare really disliked war, and that his dislike of war comes through even in a supposed celebration of it.  Or that Henry V is only a patriotic play on the surface, and that it is far more critical of Henry and his wars than it appears at first glance.  But the question remains -- why so much more a graphic portrayal of a war the author at least pretends to support than one he opposes.  Not even Shakespeare's portrayal of civil war in his other history plays is so grim.

My guess is that two things are at work.  One is that some of the horrors of war were deeply embedded in the popular narrative of Henry's victory.  Victory is exciting in proportion to how much it overcomes the odds.  Henry's victory at Agincourt gains its power, not only from the English being outnumbered by the French, but also by their weakened condition, from hunger, disease, and forced march.  Just as we honor George Washington, not for the victorious battles he fought (he didn't), but for enduring cold, hunger, and disease and still holding his rag-tag barefoot army together, so would Shakespeare's contemporaries honor Henry for his victory over hunger, disease, and fatigue as well as an outnumbering army.  And after all, these aspects of war should be remembered.  Every war prior to the 20th Century had more soldiers die of disease from squalid conditions than were killed in battle.

The other is that sometimes imagination is just no match for reality.  Even for a writer of Shakespeare's genius, details come a lot easier when you are writing about something you really know.  Shakespeare knew the grim details of the Battle of Agincourt.  Troilus and Cressida, Shakespeare was essentially writing about an imaginary war.  The details just weren't there.

___________________________________________________
*West Europeans in the Middle Ages, and well after, knew their Greek legends mostly as filtered through the Romans.  The Romans claimed descent from the Trojans and were therefore biased in their favor.  This bias persisted in Shakespeare's time.
**Although, interestingly enough, the Iliad bombards the reader with so many graphic descriptions of death in battle that the mind goes numb to it.

What Is It With Right-Wing Men and Beards?

Are beards making a comeback?  I seem to be seeing a lot of them on prominent men, especially among right wing men.

Ted Cruz has grown a beard.

Ted Cruz without beard

Ted Cruz with beard

A vast improvement in his looks, by the way, but probably anything to cover any part of his face would help.



Donald Trump, Jr. has grown a beard.

Donald Trump, jr. without beard

Donald Trump, Jr. with beard

Eric Trump has grown a beard.

Eric Trump without beard

Eric Trump with beard

Jerry Falwell, Jr. has a beard

Jerry Falwell, Jr.

Jerry Falwell, Sr.

No picture of Falwell, Jr. without a beard, so maybe this is not new.  His father never had a beard.



Even Alex Jones has grown a beard. 

Alex Jones without beard

Alex Jones with beard

His appearance, however, cannot be salvaged, even with a beard covering part of his face.  Still, I think there is some improvement.




So what is going on here?  Is there some change in fashion underway I don't know about.  And why have only right-wingers gotten the memo?

More on Lev Parnas

Look, I get that everything Lev Parnas says should be taken with a substantial quantity of salt.  His unsupported word should never be accepted.  Instead, we should insist on corroboration of all his claims. 

And some we have.  We have corroboration that Rudy Giuliani made clear he was acting as Donald Trump's personal lawyer and not in any official capacity, in the form of a letter from Giuliani saying so.  We have corroboration that the impetus for firing Marie Yovanovitch came from Ukrainian Prosecutor General Victor Shokin and not from Giuliani or his associates, in the form of texts from Shokin saying so.  We have texts corroborating that Parnas was in regular contact with Devin Nunes' aid, which raises at least a reasonable inference that Nunes knew what was going on and just wanted to preserve plausible deniability.  And we have texts corroborating Parnas associates at least claiming that they were stalking Yovanovitch.  The parties claim they were joking and/or led on by the other.  No doubt further investigation will shed some light on this.

On the other hand, what Parnas says about contacts with Ukrainian oligarch Dmytro Firtash, or the alleged role of Mike Pence or William Barr should await confirmation before we believe him.

But I whole-heartedly believe at least part of this Daily Beast article.  Not so much the specific allegations about back door diplomacy in Venzuela,* or attempts to protect Firtash from extradition, or any other specific conspiracy.  Those, by all means, should be treated as subjects for further investigation, but not to be believed without corroboration.  But what I do believe is the general paranoid among Giuliani and his associates:

[Parnas] said they also angled to get Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to force at least two people out of his own orbit: former journalist Serhiy Leshchenko and then-national security adviser Oleksandr Danylyuk. The reason? In Parnas’ words, they were “Soros people.”

. . . . . . . . . 

“Soros became Enemy Number One, and it was understood that Soros infiltrated the U.S. government and State Department over a certain period of time,” Parnas said.

“He employed different prosecutors in different states, different congressmen, and the biggest thing was they thought Victoria Nuland was his person in the State Department and then let him control Eastern Europe by naming ambassadors and stuff, and then opened up this anti-corruption-type of system to cover up, actually, his corruption. That’s what we were running with.”

. . . . . . . . . 

“The consensus was that the reason Trump had the Russiagate and everything that was happening was because Soros and the Democrats controlled certain U.S. embassies in Eastern Europe, particularly the Ukrainian one, and were able to help with the Manafort stuff and all other kinds of stuff that basically caused problems in the Trump World,” he said. . . . In retrospect, Parnas said, the Soros focus grew out of an atmosphere he described as cult-like.

We have ample verification of this based on public statements made by Team Giuliani and others.  Go ahead and read the thread.  Short version:  everyone and everything who opposes Trump is part of a vast conspiracy orchestrated by George Soros.**  The author of the thread ends by saying:

Republicans have basically pulled off a major con to get it covered as "a Ukrainian ambassador wrote a critical op-ed" and "Biden got the prosecutor general fired while his son worked for Burisma."

 That last is maybe about half-true.  It seems fair to say that Republicans can be divided into two groups -- ones who believe all this, and ones who don't.***  The significant part of the Daily Beast article is that Team Giuliani is part of the former group.  When they say this stuff on Fox, they aren't just telling lies to fool the gullible rubes, they actually believe it themselves.  There was ample evidence of that to begin with; the article merely confirms it.  Sean Hannity at least appears to believe it.  Another who believes it is Donald Trump himself. 

Congressional Republicans (with the possible exception of Devin Nunes) know better, but they don't dare contradict the big guy, so we hear a lot about Ukrainian interference really just consisting of a hostile op-ed and stories about payoffs to Manafort.  That is an attempt to avoid offending the base by not contradicting Trump but also not to sound too ridiculous to the general public by not spouting insane conspiracy theories.

So which are worse, Republicans who are lying (or at least letting lies stand) to fool the gullible rubes, or ones who actually believe that.  Which is worse, to be such a knave, or such a fool.  And in the end, I would say I prefer the ones who are knowingly lying.  At least they can be rational if it is in their best interest.

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*Probably a good idea, actually.
**Who turns 90 this year.  I am genuinely curious to see what these guys come up with when Soros dies.
***Actually, there is a third category of Republicans who haven't come down firmly in either camp.  Willian Barr is one such example.  While he seems to accept the findings of the Mueller report that there was large-scale Russian interference in the election, he also appears to believe that the decision to investigate the Trump campaign at all was sinister.

On Congress

I don't recall when I first became aware of The Broken Branch by Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann.  The book laments how Congress has transformed over the years.   Power has been centralized from committees into the leadership.  Rank-and-file members do much less work than in the past, sometimes spending only three days a week in Washington.

Justin Amash has echoed the complaint, saying "On ordinary legislative matters, most members of Congress don’t think anymore. They just follow whatever they’re told by their leadership."

I found this most interesting and a bit nostalgic.  You see, I went to college during the heyday of Congressional decentralization.  And wouldn't you know, in my political science class we had a book from leading political scientists of the day lamenting the fragmentation of power in Congress and its decentralization, first from the leadership to the committees, and now to the sub-committees, and even individual members.  Lobbyists were quoted complaining that they could no longer rely on appeals to party loyalty, but had to persuade members on the merits, with high-quality materials.  And members of Congress worked grueling hours and looked back longingly, not just to the early days of the Republic when Congress was not even in session most of the year, but as recently as the 1950's when hours were at least manageable. 

Our professor spoke approvingly of when Congress was ruled by "whales" and all the little "minnows" swam where they were directed.  His heroes were Sam Rayburn (speaker of the House) and Lyndon B. Johnson (as Senate Majority Leader).  He spoke with admiration of "the Johnson treatment" with which Johnson browbeat holdouts into submission. 

And I will say it makes sense that it makes sense that if decision making is centralized in the leadership, there is less for the rank-and-file to do; while if decision making is decentralized, the rank-and-file will have to work a lot harder.  As for the rest, Sam Rayburn and Lyndon B. Johnson were before my time, but they would be impressive indeed if they could hold their caucuses together as well as Nancy Pelosi and Mitch McConnell.*  Once again, "whales" rule and "minnows" swim where they are told.

Which way is better?  I really don't know enough about Congress in the days of Rayburn and Johnson to say.  Certainly my instincts are for decentralization.  Ornstein and Mann warn that when the leadership crafts bills without proper hearing by committee, the quality of legislation suffers.  I can't say how that worked out in the Rayburn/Johnson days.  But of this I am confident.  Congress was less rigidly partisan then than it is now.  Cooperation with a President of the opposing party (or oversight of a President of one's own party) had not become unthinkable.  Whatever the case then, today centralization is simply a symptom of partisanship.

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*Other Speakers of the House, such as John Boehner and Paul Ryan have been notably less effective.

How Republicans in Congress Reign in Trump

Everyone take for granted that Republicans will unanimously vote to acquit when the Trump impeachment comes before them.

But at least three Republican Senators have expressed support for a War Powers Resolution to forbid a war with Iran without approval from Congress, and others may join.

And it has been pointed out by astute observers such as Ross Douthat (it will take forever for me to find) that this is by no means unique.

Douthat has pointed out that Republican Senators have occasionally defied Trump on matters of personnel.  Although the Republican Senate has spared Trump the public humiliation of rejecting one of his nominees, they have been known to discretely let it be known that certain nominees will not pass and allowed Trump to quietly withdraw them.  Senate Republicans rejected both Stephen Moore and Herman Cain as clearly unqualified to serve on the Federal Reserve.  They have also rejected Ken Cuccinelli as Director of the US Citizenship and Immigration Service, although Trump has evaded that by appointing him Acting Director.  And there is a reason that Michael Flynn and John Bolton served as National Security Adviser -- the job does not require Senate confirmation, and both men were considered unconfirmable. 

Republicans in Congress have also quietly thwarted Trump on matters of policy.  They never did build his wall, for instance.  And, after a disastrous failed attempt to repeal Obamacare, they have shown no interest in reviving the subject, for all their leader's urging.

The reason for this (Douthat and others have pointed out), is that personnel and policy are secondary matters to Trump.  Where Republicans in Congress have never defied Trump is in any attempt to hold him personally accountable for countless acts of corruption, because they know that is what Trump really cares about. 

In effect, Trump and Congressional Republicans have an unspoken bargain in place -- he supports Republican priorities and picks Federalist Society judges in exchange for looking the other way on personal corruption. That is the essence of a corrupt quid pro quo.

Is There a Sale on Exclamation Points Somewhere? Because I May Run Out

So, the Democrats have releases some of Lev Parnas' documents and the results can only be called stunning.

The big reveals:

It is clear from Parnas' hand scrawlings on hotel stationery that the goal was to get dirt on Biden, particularly a public announcement of the investigation, and nothing else.  That fits in the category of shocking but not surprising.  We all knew that.

Also shocking but not surprising is Rudy Giuliani's May 10, 2019 letter to President-Elect Zelensky:

The first paragraph, emphasizing that Giuliani is Trump's private lawyer, not acting in an official capacity is not wrong, exactly.  It properly points out that these things are different.  And there is nothing wrong with the President having a private lawyer, especially when he is under investigation.  But it is altogether wrong for the President's private lawyer to be involved in policy making.  This blurs the exact distinction that the first paragraph makes.  The second paragraph is a conventional expression of courtesy and basically meaningless.  The third paragraph is the real meat of the matter, saying that he has something to discuss that is not fit to put in writing.  Again, we all knew that.

What is new are the revelations about Ambassador Marie Yovanovich.  During the impeachment hearings, Yovanovich was the only witness other than Gordon Sondland to testify alone.  This presumably meant someone found her testimony to be important although I found it to be among the least significant because Yovanovich did not actually witness any of the relevant events.  It would appear I was wrong.  Also wrong was the widespread assumption that Giuliani was behind the drive to fire Yovanovich.  It appears the initiative lay with Prosecutor General Yuri Lutsenko, who texted,

“it’s just that if you don’t make a decision about Madam [Yovanovitch], you’re placing into doubt all of my statements. Including about B.”  There we have the very embodiment of a corrupt quid pro quo -- fire an ambassador who is putting too much pressure on my and I will give you dirt on your rival. 

Nothing came of that particular deal.  Yovanovich was fired and Zelensky elected at about the same time, and Zelensky replaced Lutsenko as Prosecutor General.  And Lusenko never did give any dirt on the Bidens.  Still, this revelation counts as both shocking and surprising.

But the most shocking revelation of all also deals with Yovanovich and is surprising, but not quite as surprising as one  might wish.  It appears that Robert Hyde, a Republican candidate from Connecticut was surveilling and stalking Yovanovich -- or worse.  Hyde claims that he was joking and has never been to Kiev.  Since that last is easily checked, presumably it is true.  But his texts sound deadly serious.  And it is possible that he hired some goons in Kiev to do the stalking for him and was passing on news of their reports to Parnas.  (Parnas would not have access to Hyde's communications with these hypothetical goons).  Hyde is apparently paranoid, to the point that he was involuntarily committed for nine days.  He also stalked as staffer and had a restraining order entered and his guns (6 guns, 800 rounds of ammunition) confiscated.  This records can go either way on his likelihood of stalking Yovanovich.

The mainstream press is to square to accuse him of anything worse than "surveillance" or "stalking."  Some of his texts suggest -- something a whole lot worse.

She under heavy protection outside Kiev.
My guy thinks maybe FSB [the Russian security service]
The guys over asked me what I would like to do and what is in it for them
She’s talked to three people. Her phone is off. Computer is off.
She’s next to the embassy.
They know she’s a political puppet.
They will let me know when she’s on the move
They are willing to help if you/we would like a price.
Guess you can do anything in the Ukraine with money… what I was told.
Update she will not be moved special security unit upgraded force on the compound people are already aware of the situation my contacts are asking what is the next step because they cannot keep going to check people will start to ask questions

If you want her out, they need to make contact with security forces

Hey brother do we stand down??? Or you still need intel be safe
She had visitors
Its confirmed we have a person inside
Hey broski what are we doing tell me what's the next step

Look, I'm trying not to be paranoid here.  I've been paranoid about this crows before, read the worst possible interpretation into everything they do and frequently found I had gone way too far and it was really much less than it appears.  So I am going to do my best to give these guys the benefit of the doubt.  I suppose all of this could just be about spying on her.  Or maybe digging for dirt on her.  But it sure sounds like a physical threat of some kind.

And what suggests these aren't just the fantasies of some big talker is her testimony at the hearing:

Around 1 o'clock in -- in the morning, she called me again and she said that there were great concerns. There were concerns up the street and she said I needed to get on the -- home -- come home immediately. Get on the next plane to the U.S.

And I asked her why. And she said she wasn't sure, but there were concerns about my security. I asked her, my physical security, because sometimes Washington knows more than we do about these things.

And she said, no, she hadn't gotten that impression that it was a physical security issue. But they were concerned about my security and I needed to come home right away.

Clearly Yovanovich was not aware of any physical danger, and did not mention being threatened with anything worse than firing by tweet.   Hyde's texts says, "[P]eople are already aware of the situation" and refer to upgraded security.  It seems likely that embassy security knew there was some sort of stalking but did not know the stalkers' intentions.

Some people have even made much of Trump's statement on the July 25 phone call that "Well, she's going to go through some things."  I really don't believe that was a threat, though.  Yovanovich was back in the US by then, teaching at Georgetown University, with no sort of threat in sight.

Still, the whole thing is really, really shocking, even if it is less surprising than it should be.  It does not rise to the level of shooting someone in the middle of Fifth Avenue.  But for the first time, I am beginning to think that wasn't just hyperbole.

What Sort of Honest Amoralism Would I Favor?

So, I have proposed a foreign policy of "honest amoralism" and at the same time said there are some things I am not willing to do.  What sort of "honest amoralism" do I have in mind?

What I mostly have in mind is a policy of making alliances based on mutual interests, with the country and not the regime.

What do I mean by this?

Well, let's go back to our old friend Jeane Kirkpatrick.  In arguing how hard democracy is to build, she was not arguing against toppling regimes that displease us.  She was arguing for propping up every friendly government threatened with rebellion by its own people.  She argued that if revolution was successful, the result could only be worse; witness China is worse then Taiwan (then a military dictatorship) and North Korea was worse than South Korean (then a military dictatorship). 

She is on to something there, but not what it appears.  Take for instance, we allied ourselves with Joseph Stalin during WWII because he was fighting Hitler. 

At least, that is one way to look at it.  I prefer to say that we allied ourselves with the Soviet Union in repelling an unprovoked German invasion.  Theoretically, our willingness to oppose the invasion should not have depended on the government of the country invaded.  Allying ourselves with Stalin did not have to mean supporting him against his domestic rivals, or buying his self-serving stories that everyone he executed was really a Nazi spy.*

Likewise, it seems a safe assumption that no matter what government is in power in Taiwan, it will not want to be invaded by the mainland or even "peacefully reunified" on mainland terms.  Assuming we agree, this is fruitful ground for an alliance.  We did not have to worry what kind of government Taiwan had, or accept Chiang Kai-shek's ridiculous claims that his was the true government of China and some day he would return and liberate the mainland.  We could simply protect Taiwan from mainland invasion and leave the form of government to the Taiwanese.

South Korea was a bit more difficult because for a time there was a significant pro-North Korean opposition, but ultimately the chances of anyone taking power who would actually want to be invaded by North Korea were not all that great.

And today, it seems safe to assume that very few people in Ukraine like being invaded by Russia.  Assuming we agree, that is fruitful ground for an alliance, regardless of the government in power.

That being said, we do have to hold our allies to certain standards.  Those standards should be at a minimum be that we can ally with the country, rather than the government.  It would mean, for instance, not allying with a government fighting a civil war because that would force us to take sides in its domestic government.  And not allying with a government was a large disloyal population willing to collaborate with a hostile power.  That simply means a civil war brewing, and we should stay out.

And of course if any country is starting to make a genuine democratic transformation (as Taiwan and South Korea ultimately did, and has Ukraine may be doing now), we should offer any help we can.  But the impetus must come from within.

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*I realize that many people did, in fact, support Stalin against his domestic rivals and did buy the story about all his rivals being German spies, but that was not necessary.

What Are Iran's Chances of Democratic Transformation?

There is a vibe in Iran that feels different this time.  It isn't like the failed Green Revolution in 2009.  That was just an attempt to get the government to respect the results of an election.  It was put down, but the protesters lived to fight another day -- they contested the next election and won.

And it isn't like the protests up till now, which have been mostly economic.

This is a aimed at the government in all aspects.  The government is apologizing and begging for forgiveness.  This has the feel of 1979.

It could also be crushed.  Gaming out a democratic transformation now could be the classic case of counting your chickens before they are hatched.

But if this current revolt does overthrow the Iranian government, what are the chances that it will make a real democratic transformation? 

As a preliminary matter, revolutions are extremely dangerous, for two reasons at least.  One is that a revolution means the destruction of the state.  When you destroy the state, it leaves a power vacuum to be filled.  Whatever fills that vacuum is unlikely to be nice.

The other reason is that, even if a revolution manages to set up a functioning state on the quick, people who stood united in opposing the old government can have very different ideas about what should take its place.

A few things offer promise.  One is that, bad as the Iranian government is, it is not on the same scale as Iraq under Saddam Hussein or Libya under Qaddafi (or Saudi Arabia, for that matter).  It allows some limited dissent and contested elections -- with candidates approved the the ayatollahs, and with a theocracy/secret police holding much of the real power and the elective government's power strictly limited. But still, there are contested elections and not the one-candidate elections one sees in a one-party state.

I have long dismissed the importance of a democratic facade when the real power lies elsewhere.  But reading an article (one I can no longer find, that doubtless white washes the Iranian government), I did see how even a democratic facade might have some value.  Iranians, the presumed whitewash article said, talk freely about politics.  When you start discussing the subject, everyone else wants to join in.  They frequently disagree and argue.  All of this suggests that maintaining the democratic facade might be useful training for a real democracy.  It teaches people that government is their business, and that disagreement is normal and acceptable.  If the lesson sinks in, this could be immensely useful.

Or, in the words of Jeanne Kirkpatrick, maintaining the facade of democracy may have brought Iran to the point where:

[A] substantial number of citizens think of themselves as participants in society's decision-making and not simply as subjects bound by its laws. Moreover, leaders of all major sectors of the society must agree to pursue power only by legal means, must eschew (at least in principle) violence, theft, and fraud, and must accept defeat when necessary. They must also be skilled at finding and creating common ground among diverse points of view and interests, and correlatively willing to compromise on all but the most basic values.

Finally, we should give some thought to Daniel Zimblatt.  Zimblatt's sobering warnings is that democratic breakthroughs, however inspiring, rarely bode well for the future.  That is because the "people" who are triumphant during a democratic breakthrough invariably turn out to be only part of the people.  The old forces of the status quo have not vanished; they are merely in temporary eclipse and will return.  The most successful democratic transitions are ones that take place quietly and without drama. 

By Zimblatt's analysis, the key to whether Iran can  make a successful democratic transformation is whether it develops a solid democratic conservative party.  And by a democratic conservative party, he means one representing the pre-democratic status quo of power and the old ruling class.  Only if the old ruling elite can find ways build an electoral appeal, develop a vested interest in democratic institutions, and learn (eventually) to accept defeat and how to act as a loyal opposition.  If permanently shut out of power, the ruling elite has the resources to break the democracy and create a new, less open and less flexible kind of dictatorship.*

In the case of Iran, the old ruling class that must somehow be incorporated into a new democracy and find a way to act as a democratic conservative party are the clerical theocracy, and the Revolutionary Guards (i.e., the organization lead by Soleimani).  What are the chances?**

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*This also means giving amnesties to a lot of people who don't deserve them simply because they are powerful enough to make trouble given the chance.  This is certainly unjust and creates a lot of resentment, but it is preferable to the alternative.
**And in the case of Iran, another factor is at work -- the United States.  Will we lift the sanctions (at least to some degree) or won't we?  It is not hard to imagine that if the new Iranian government gives amnesty to the worst members of Soleimani's organization and tries to find a place for it in the new order, the answer will be no.  And Iran will be given an intolerable ultimatum -- tear yourself apart getting rid of this organization, or have your economy crushed forever.

Iran and the Modified Bush Doctrine

This thread by Iranian American Yashar Ali has been circulating, taking liberal commentators to task for not mentioning the massive anti-government protests in Iran.  It is circulating in many Twitter accounts I follow, and followed by many liberal mea culpas for not being sufficiently enthusiastic, so the accusation is not wholly just.  But it is not wholly unjust either.*  Juan Cole's Informed Comment, which I have hitherto seen as a valuable source on the Middle East, has not mentioned them.  Daniel Larison, a major anti-interventionist whose weekend content is light, has made four posts this weekend, none dealing with the Iran protests.**  Talking Points Memo has many (appropriate) criticisms of Trump's justification for killing General Soleimani, and one article mentioning that Iran shot down the plane, but no mention of the protests.

My opinion of all those publications has declined.  But, like many of the commenters following Yashar Ali's thread, I have a certain guilty inability be be cheered by the Iran protests.  Am I being purely partisan here?  Partisanship probably enters into it, but I don't think that is all.  I was alarmed by Trump's saber rattling with North Korea but didn't hesitate to applaud when he agree to meet with North Korean leaders.  I recognize that sometimes escalation is a necessary prelude to peace, although that particular escalation was unusually scary.

For the sake of this post, I will follow conventional wisdom and assume that Iran is on the threshold of democratic transformation, although this may or may not turn out to be true.

So part of my problem is Trump's blatant hypocrisy in making clear that he care nothing about democracy anywhere except Iran and Venezuela.  Let us all applaud his call on the Iranian government to to kill protesters.  But he has been utterly indifferent to the fate of protesters in Hong Kong, or anywhere else.

But a certain amount of inconsistency in applying a moralistic policy is inevitable.  What really bothers me, I guess, is that if Donald Trump achieves a successful democratic transition in Iran, it means the bully has won. 

Simply put, Donald Trump's approach has been to crush the Iranian's economy and make clear that he will not relent for anything less than either unconditional surrender or regime change.  Short of that, no concession will meet with a favorable response.  He has not limited himself to a complete economic embargo on Iran, he is using all the powers of the US to punish every other country and business that does business with Iran.  He is seeking to crush, not just their oil industry, but their metals industry, ship-to-ship transfers, and all other trade.  He goal is to completely cut Iran out of the world economy.  Theoretically, there is an exemption for humanitarian goods like food and medicine, but by punishing every bank that does business with Iran and not carving out any channel to trade in humanitarian goods, he has prevented even that.  This not only exposes all Iranians to privation (which one might find some way to justify), but cuts desperately sick people off from medical care.  All the while claiming to have the Iranian people's best interests at heart.  The message to the Iranian people has been -- if you want medical care for your sick relatives, get off your duffs and overthrow your government.  And no one in the Administration cares much much what replaces the current regime, in the belief that whatever happens, Iran will emerge from regime change too weakened to be much of a threat.  And they are claiming to be champions of the Iranian people.

So, I do see this as the behavior of a brutal bully, and I hate to see the bully win.  And it goes beyond Iran. Trump has just threatened that if Iraq orders US troops to leave, which it has the clear sovereign right to do, he will shut down its government account with the New York Federal Reserve, effectively killing its currency.

When I discussed the value of "honest amoralism," the amoralism I was discussing was far from total.  I do believe that there are some things our country morally should not do.

When George W. Bush announces the Bush Doctrine of "preemptive war," he was essentially arguing that the US has the right to invade any country it wants, any time it wants, for any reason it wants, and that we would begin with Iraq.***  I opposed the invasion for a number of reasons, but first among them was a sense of moral outrage over the doctrine that we were allowed to invade any country at will

The Bush Doctrine proved to be too expensive and burdensome.  Upon invading Iraq, we ran into an insurgency, and over time the war lost its domestic support.  This did not discourage interventionism, but shifted it to the form of aerial war, special forces, and arming and training proxies.  Large commitment of ground troops lost its popularity.

Well, Trump appears to have found a sort of modified Bush Doctrine.  In this case, we reserve the right to crush the economy of any country that opposes us.  Because we effectively control the world financial system, we can cut any country out of it and ruin its economy, at essentially zero cost to ourselves.  To cut a country off from the world economy used to require a naval blockade, which also called for a serious commitment of money and manpower, and was a clear, recognized act of war.  Instead we now have the financial blockade which is equally effective, but essentially cost-free, and not a recognizable act of war because there are no visible forces at work.

And I oppose the Modified Bush Doctrine for the same reason I oppose the Bush Doctrine -- it is a degree of arrogant imperialism I cannot countenance.  And that is why I regret the prospect of it having a good effect.

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*What is wholly unjust is many right wingers claiming that the mainstream media will not cover the protests.  When I google "Iran protests" I see plenty of accounts by CNN, NBC, the Washington Post, NPR, the BBC, etc.
**I can guess what he would say, though.  He generally opposes revolutions, and with some justification.
***I don't count Afghanistan.  We clearly had a good reason, widely recognized, to invade Afghanistan.

Trump, Ukraine, and Foreign Policy: Should We Adopt a Policy of Honest Amoralism?

The New Yorker has a much quoted article about Yuri Lutsenko, the former Prosecutor General who appears to be feeding Rudy Giuliani many of the bizarre stories he keeps spouting, and who was instrumental in ousting Marie Yovanovich as US ambassador.  Many have cited it as revealing what utterly corrupt and sleazy people Giuliani was working with. 

That was honestly not my primary impression from the story.  My primary impression was that it painted a far from flattering portrait if the Obama Administration and its policy toward Ukraine. 

Just to be clear, Yuri Lutsenko was not the corrupt prosecutor Joe Biden wanted to force out.  That was Viktor Shokin.  Lutsenko was Shokin's replacement. 

As a rough back story, since the fall of Communism, Ukraine has had two factions, one pro-Western and the other pro-Russian, but both holdovers from Soviet times, and both deeply corrupt and authoritarian.  Lutsenko was of the pro-Western faction.  He played a major role in organizing (failed) anti-government demonstrations in 2000, and in organizing the Orange Revolution in 2004, which toppled the pro-Russian government in favor of a pro-Western government.  When pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych won the election in 2010, he imprisoned Lutsenko for a time, releasing him in response to international pressure.  He also played a major role in the 2014 revolution in Ukraine, which toppled the pro-Russian government in favor of the pro-Western faction led by Petro Poroshenko (and led to the Russian invasion).

But none of this actually made him, or the pro-Western faction in general, honest or democratic.  Rather, it was more a contest between our thugs and Russia's thugs, with the US desperately wanting to make our thugs into something they were not.  The article recounts in some detail US attempts to make Poroshenko's faction over into something like a western-style system and running into resistance from principals who wanted nothing of the kind.  As part of the process, Joe Biden forced Shokin out at prosecutor general and Lutsenko took his place, but soon proved just as corrupt.  Lutsenko's allegations that US Ambassador Marie Yovanovich gave him a do-not-prosecute list does appear to have some basis in fact. Yovanovich did urge Lutsenko not to use fighting corruption as an excuse to settle scores with his political opponents and did descend to a level of micro-management that Lutsenko understandably resented.  The alleged list apparently consisted of a number of anti-corruption activists that Lutsenko expressly reserved the right to prosecute. 

The article also points out that, although there is no evidence that either Joe or Hunter Biden ever made corrupt use of Hunter's role on the Burisma board of directors to shield Burisma from prosecution, such protection nonetheless happened more subtly.  Clearly the US had great power over Ukraine, and Ukrainian prosecutors did not dare move against a company that had a US Vice President's son on the board of directors, even though nothing was said or even hinted at.*  (Hunter denied knowing about the prosecution when he took the job). 

The end of the article does discuss Giuliani's attempt to get dirt on the Bidens from Lutsenko and even pressing him to prosecute them.  It is certainly not flattering to Giuliani who comes across as a peddler of insane conspiracy theories.

But neither is the article flattering to the Obama Administration or to career diplomats.  They come across like members of the Women's Christian Temperance Union caught in gangland war between rival bootleggers, trying to figure out who the good guys are, and lecturing them about their conduct and the evils of the Demon Rum.  And to be clear, I do not believe the Obama Administration was solely to blame.  It was acting in concert with the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Furthermore, although the article did not address the issue, there is every reason to believe that other administrations have behaved similarly, and other countries have been on the receiving end.

And it is enough to make me wonder whether Trump has a point in calling (frankly) for a more amoral approach to foreign policy.  Certainly Trump's amoralism has served him well in his dealings with tyrannies.  The Chinese are set to actually prefer Trump to any of his rivals, despite his trade war, because he shows no interest in meddling in their system of government or in pressuring them to do anything they see as threatening to the regime.  All he cares about is money, which is easy to bargain over.  And since there is no doubt that there will be tyrannies out there for the foreseeable future, and since we will somehow have to deal with them, maybe there is something to be said for the amoral approach.

Our last President to advocate for an honest amoralism in foreign policy was Richard Nixon, together with Henry Kissinger, and Nixon/Kissinger are generally seen as successful in foreign policy, though not without flaws.  Nixon and Kissinger essentially saw the world as a gigantic chess game between the great powers, with small countries as the chessmen.  Morality no more entered into the equation than it would enter into a game of chess; only the balance of power mattered.  Nixon and Kissinger were highly successful in dealing with great power tyrannies.  They opened relations with China (long overdue), successfully pursued detente with the Soviet Union, and play the Communist powers off against each other, but kept it from escalating into all-out war.  Where they were less successful was in dealing with small countries, who invariably refused to accept their role as chessmen, but kept showing a will of their own.

Between Nixon and Trump, all our Presidents have pursued a policy of what might be called hypocritical moralism.  That is to say, they all claimed concern for democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc, but invariably subordinated moral concerns to strategic ones.  In general, Republicans were more openly (some might say more honestly) hypocritical, treating moral concerns as weapon to bash our enemies while making no attempt to apply such standards to our allies.  Democrats have made some half-hearted attempts at consistency, criticizing allies and pressing them to improve their behavior, but invariably setting such concerns aside when a real strategic concern was at stake. 

And just to be clear, I do not believe that a policy of pure moralism could ever be made to work in the real world.  A more honest approach to moralism would be to come out an admit that, although it is a goal, it is not our highest priority and will be overridden when a higher priority comes into play. 

More to the point, though, a policy of moralism has real costs.  Invariably, it means meddling in a country's internal affairs and demanding that governments take actions that they consider incompatible with survival, or at least with some other essential goal.  And this opens us up to manipulation, as it has numerous times in the past.  Whether we are fighting Communism or Islamic terrorism or (currently) "corruption," this creates an incentive for political leaders to label their opponents as Communists or terrorists or corrupt in order to get us to take sides in normal political rivalries.  How many charlatans have finagled our support by claiming to be "democrats" or "reformers" -- a task made easier by our tendency to equate "democracy" and "reform" with support for US interests.

It is all enough to give amoralism real appeal.  But not the amoralism of Donald Trump.  For one thing, Donald Trump is not pursuing an honest amoralism, but a hypocritical amoralism. That is to say, although he claims to make respect for national sovereignty a priority and to have no desire to dictate morality to other countries, he somehow manages to make exceptions for Iran and Venezuela. Hypocritical amoralism, it turns out, is even harder to swallow than either honest amoralism or hypocritical moralism.  Furthermore, Trump's amoralism goes beyond mere amoralism into outright anti-moralism.  In other words, he doesn't merely get along with tyrants; he actually seems to prefer tyrannies to democracies, and shows great enthusiasm for semi-authoritarian leaders who are actively undermining democracy.**  And finally, Trump's policy is not merely one of amoralism, but of corrupt amoralism.  Unable to distinguish between the national interest and his own personal interest, Trump keeps doing things like asking foreign governments to investigate is political rivals and (we suspect) to do him economic favors.

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*And it seems safe to assume that Ukrainians also knew how to read between the lines when Donald Trump responded to a request for military equipment with a request for a "favor."
**Nixon and Kissinger showed some of the same failing.  In many ways, they preferred dealing with a dictatorship to a democracy invariably refused to be a mere chessman doing what its government wished.  A democracy had numerous actors with wills of their own.  Nixon and Kissinger saw the world as immensely complex, but they never fully recognized just how complex.