All Elections Matter

One of the things that distinguishes the US from any other country is our extraordinary number of elective offices -- almost 500,000!  No other country anywhere in the world has anything approaching that number of elective offices.* In a midterm election year it often seems that there is some sort of election taking place in the country every week -- an exaggeration, but not all that much of an exaggeration if one counts special elections.

And here is the thing to keep in mind -- all those offices matter.  Much of the day-to-day business of governing takes place at the local level.  Local officials control law enforcement, school, road maintenance, land use regulations, etc.**  Many have argued that Democrats' great mistake when Obama was elected was to put all their eggs in the Presidential basket -- to assume that once we elected a President, everything else would fall into line.  That is not just a serious misunderstanding of the nature of government in the US, it is an ultimately authoritarian outlook.  It assumes that power flows from the top down and that the person at the top can dictate terms for everyone else.  

Putting all our eggs in the Presidential basket proved a disaster.  Republicans won sweeping victories at all other levels.  Democrats have learned some things from the experience and focused more on Congress and Governors.  Democrats are only beginning to start seriously competing in state legislatures and state Supreme Courts.  But that, too, still focuses on the tip of the governmental iceberg. It ignores the vast array of local governments that account for the great majority of elective offices (see below).

Not only do we have an immense number of elective offices, but all of those offices are important.  Governors certify election results.  They also decide whether to put their State Police at the disposal of ICE (I'm look at you, Texas and Florida).  Secretaries of State (usually elective) certify election results and set regulations governing elections.  Attorney Generals (usually elective) can sue to block Trump's latest outrage -- or not.  State legislatures set laws governing elections.  They also pass laws mandating or forbidding sanctuary policies.  They can pass Medicaid expansion -- or not.  They can move at least to some degree to fill the gaps Federal funding and regulatory cuts have left -- or not.  

Counties in the US

And that is just at the state level.  County Clerks (usually elective) actually run elections and count the votes.  There have been isolated cases of resistance to certifying results.  Expect more.  Where state sanctuary laws are silent or ambiguous, decisions can be made by county sheriffs (usually elective), city councils, and city police chiefs (usually hired by the elective government).  Don't forget, counties in the US are generally geographic, rather than demographic, units.  This means that most counties are rural and (presumably) elect Republican officials.  

My focus has been here has been on elections and sanctuary laws, but a local government can affect a wide variety of other issues, from data centers to school curriculum to school transgender policies (not my cup of tea, but important to others on our side).  

In short, it can seem frivolous to focus on local offices and policy when our democracy is at stake.  But local offices and policy are democracy.  Much of it is dull and mundane, but such is life.  Furthermore, these local offices are the "bench" that the party draws from to recruit candidates for higher office.  Democracy is safe only if Democrats learn to stop ceding vast parts of the country to Republicans and become competitive everywhere.  The scale is daunting. But the time to start is now.  Because if we wait, it will be too late.

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*And, yes, I understand that a country as large as the US will necessarily have more elective offices than a smaller country.  But US citizens choose from a longer ballot than voters anywhere else.
**At we approached the 2024 elections and a Donald Trump victory seemed inevitable this was my one source of hope.  Political power in the US is extremely diffuse.  Local government offers an immense number of points of resistance.  The Federal Government's super power is the money it dispenses.  The best way I could think to prepare for Trump was to audit budgets and plan for how to get by if federal funds were cut off.

Recent Supreme Court Decisions for Trump, Also in Ascending Order of Importance

 

So much for the Supreme Court decisions that went against Trump.  What about the ones in his favor?

Going from least to most important:

West Virginia v. BPJ

This one allowed states to bar transgender athletes from girl's and women's sports. Democrats have usually kept quiet on this one. And my response is, fine!  It may not be a fashionable view on my side of the aisle, but there are biological and medical differences between males and females that current medical technology cannot overcome.  One of our side's arguments that there is no need for rules because the numbers are so small.  But the numbers are not zero.  The cases in controversy involved actual individuals in that situation.  Another argument is there is no need for a national rule, and it should be locally decided.  Which is fine.  The Supreme Court does not say that states must ban transgenders from female sports, only that they may.  And they left undisturbed a prior decision that bars employment discrimination against transgenders on the perfectly reasonable ground that employment and sports are different.  The dissent would not impose a categorical rule but would require schools to decide on a case-by-case basis.   The majority allows decisions on a case-by-case basis but does not require it.  Fine by me.

National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission

This case struck down a longstanding rule limiting the ability of political party organizations to coordinate with and spend money on individual candidates, so long as donations to parties are not earmarked for one particular candidate and are properly disclosed.  The basis of this ruling is First Amendment freedom of speech.  I am somewhat ambivalent on this one.  The immediate effect would be to give the Republican Party an advantage in spending on its candidates, since it has larger (much) war chest than the Democrats.  I do not think it is too cynical to believe that this fact may have played into the Supreme Court's decision.  On the other hand, the decision comments, and I agree, that a lot of our current problems are the result of the weakening of political parties and their takeover by interest groups.  A stronger party structure would probably have screened out Graham Platner, for instance.  On the Republican side, a stronger party structure might have stopped Ken Paxton or Victor Marx.  To say nothing of you-know-who.  Weakening of parties and their takeover by interest groups has undermined democracy  in other countries.  Activists have a longstanding tendency to see themselves as the voice of the people simply because they are not political insiders.  But political insiders are often closer to the median voter than activists.  Party hacks are also less likely to see opponents as enemies and policy disputes as existential struggles.

At the same time, I can see other objections here.  One is that US democracy really is facing an existential struggle and ordinary rules do not apply.  Another is that our parties are weakened past all recovery.  And finally, the Supreme Court now is saying that our politics may be improved by allowing closer coordination between candidates and parties.  But how long before they decide that the First Amendment also compels coordination between candidates and interest groups?  Just for the record, I don't think our political parties are unsalvageable, at least not yet.  The reason activist are so angry at party hacks is that party hacks still have significant power.  On the other hand, I do think we are facing an existential crisis that saying this will work out well in the long run is useless if our democracy is overturned in the short run.  And I don't trust this Supreme Court as far as I can spit.

Markwayne Mullin v. Al Otro Lado

This case ruled that asylum seekers have no right to apply for asylum until they physically enter the US.  The practical upshot of this is that the Trump Administration can kill asylum altogether by closing the border and physically keeping out people who otherwise had a good claim.  The majority stuck to the polite assumption that this was merely a policy of "metering" -- requiring asylum seekers to enter the country at a manageable pace.  The dissent pointed out that in reality, it is used to prevent any asylum applications whatever.

Look, some sort of "metering" is going to be necessary to prevent the sort of all-out border chaos that brought Trump to power in the first place.  In his first term, Trump's ultimately successful approach to border control was the "remain in Mexico" policy, requiring asylum seekers to wait in Mexico while their claims were processed.  The results were brutal.  Asylum seekers waited in squalid conditions, often without adequate food or shelter, preyed upon by roving gangs. But, so far as most Americans were concerned, out of sight, out of mind.  

My view when Biden came to power was that he should keep this policy but make it more humane by offering some sort of protection and basic sustenance to people waiting -- enough to avoid a humanitarian crisis, but not enough to encourage people to show up who did not have a valid claim.  Instead, he ended Remain in Mexico without putting anything in its place, resulting in an uncontrolled flood of entries.  In an effort to control the border, Biden attempted an alternative -- allowing people to apply for asylum from third countries and be admitted in an orderly fashion if approve.  Naturally this was unsatisfactory to hardcore MAGA types who regarded any immigration as unacceptable.  It came too late for more moderate types and was easy to conflate with the border chaos.  If Democrats ever again have the opportunity to make immigration policy, it seems to me that the only way to balance the need for border control with basic humanitarian concern is to allow for application from outside the country.  This may require changing existing law.

Allowing the President to halt the entire asylum system by physically blocking applicants violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the law.  It is, however, the sort of power the Supreme Court would willingly entrust to a hypothetical future Democratic Administration because they are most unlikely to use it. And it is not the Supreme Court's worst opinion in the recent batch because it merely ratifies the existing situation.  At least it does not make things worse than they already are.

Mullin v. Doe

Worse than the Supreme Court's ruling the President can blow up the entire asylum system, which at least merely ratified what was already in place, was their ruling that he can also kick out anyone with Temporary Protected Status (TPS).  The majority explained by way of background that long before the relevant statute was enacted, Presidents had been granting relief from deportation to people from countries that were experiencing a major humanitarian crisis.  The status was also revocable at will and not subject to any oversite whatever.  Finding that this gave the President too much unbridled discretion, Congress enacted a statute setting forth specific procedures to be followed.  The Secretary of Homeland Security must consult with the relevant agencies about conditions in the country, review their findings, make a decision and publish it in the Federal Register.. At the same time, the statute declares TSP findings to be unreviewable.  What are we to make of that?

The majority held that unreviewable means that following the necessary steps is really optional.  If a Secretary of Homeland Security (Kristi Noem, say) skips the necessary review there is nothing anyone can do about it.*  The dissent argued that even if the final decision is unreviewable, the court can order the Secretary to go back and at least comply with the mandatory procedures.  I am not sure how useful this is if the Secretary can do the mandatory review of records and then simply ignore the evidence!  The plaintiffs -- Syrian and Haitian refugees -- argued that Trump violated their equal protection rights under the Constitution because he was excluding them because of their race.  The majority said nonsense, Trump simply doesn't like the law that protects immigrants whose home country is unsafe and decided to ignore it.  So apparently a Republican President is free to disregard any law he dislikes.  Clarence Thomas, in a concurring opinion, said that non-citizens have no constitutional rights, and that the Equal Protection Clause only applies to states and the federal government is free to do all the racial discriminating it wants to.  (No wonder some people see him as self-hating!).  The dissent pointed out some of the things Trump has actually said about Haitians -- comments so vulgar the majority could not bring itself to repeat them.

And then, of course, there are the real-world consequences of the decision, which the majority prided

itself in ignoring.  The Supreme Court gives the green light to stepped-up ethnic cleansing.  No Haitian is now safe.  And the harm is not just to Haitians living in the US.  Our home health and nursing homes in Florida and Ohio have come to rely heavily on Haitian labor.  I have thought for some time that nothing would make Trump's ethnic cleansing more unpopular than the sight of ICE raiding nursing homes and arresting people who change granny's diapers.  So why isn't there a huge outcry over this?  Granted, seniors in nursing homes are not a powerful interest group.  But what about the nursing home industry?  What about family members of seniors in nursing homes?  What about the AARP?  Why aren't any of these groups screaming bloody murder?

Still, bad as this decision is, it could worse.  For one thing, it seems compatible with the Supreme Court believing a Democrat might be President again some day.  No doubt they think this power can be safely entrusted to a Democrat because they would never use it.  It is also a matter of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional mandate.  Other executive actions are still subject to judicial review.  The statute really did say that the Secretary of Homeland Security's determinations are unreviewable.  What can be enacted by statute can (hypothetically) be overturned by statute.  Incredibly, the House of Representatives has actually passed legislation extending Haitians' protected status.  Hypothetically the Senate could pass it too.  Needless to say, it seems vanishingly unlikely given (a) the super-majority requirements of the filibuster and (b) that Congress will be out of town during August, will spend September trying to avert a government shutdown, and then will take off during October to campaign.  But I suppose it could come up for a vote if the AARP, the nursing home industry, and others raise a big enough stink.  And if Florida and Ohio Senators (all Republicans) support such legislation, maybe they will give enough other Republicans a permission structure.  Needless to say, Trump would never sign such legislation, but he doesn't have to.  He can simply let it become law without his signature.

Alas, all of this seems most unlikely, and the consequences of mass deportations will be devastating, both for Haitians and for the US.  But still this was not the worst decision.

Trump v. Slaughter

This is the one that threatens to overturn the rule of law altogether, and that strongly suggests the Supreme Court never expects a Democrat ever to be President again.  

Congress has created a number of multi-member regulatory commissions, including the Federal Trade Commission, that it requires have a mixed number of Democrats and Republicans and shields from being fired by the President.  In the case of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), there are five members -- two Democrats, two Republicans, and a chair chosen by the President. By picking the chair, the President's party is able to have a majority.  Members serve seven-year terms and cannot be removed by the President except for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."  All nominees must be Senate-approved.  This arrangement, it must be noted, goes back to 1914.

The Constitution gives the President power to appoint heads of executive departments, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.  It is silent on who has authority to fire the heads of executive departments.  The First Congress vested that power solely in the President and, despite some attempts to limit that power, it has generally been accepted as belonging solely to the President until the FTC was created in 1914.  The Supreme Court first ruled on the issue in 1926 -- twelve years after the creating of the FTC -- by upholding the President's unrestrained power to fire federal executive officials.  However, in 1935, the Supreme Court carved out an exception in the case of multi-member commissions exercising quasi-judicial powers.  The Supreme Court's primary concern at the time, it should be noted, was limiting President Frankin D. Roosevelt's power to fire Hoover appointees.  Since then, Congress went on to create numerous other independent, multi-member agencies required to be bipartisan and limiting the President's power to fire members.

The Supreme Court swept all of this aside and gave the President unlimited power to fire members of such commissions.  In favor of this decision, the Supreme Court argued that all executive power vests in the President, the FTC is an executive agency, and its power must therefore vest in the President.  It also offered various historical arguments -- the Founders vested all executive power in a single official despite bad experience with King George; the states had attempted having executive councils in place of a single official and it did not work well; despite the Constitution's silence on who had power to fire executive official, the first Congress vested that power in the President alone and subsequent Congresses refrained from changing the rule for a long time, so the original statute is incorporated in the Constitution.  And Chief Justice Roberts left open that possibility that at least some non-executive officials can be protected from being fired by the President.  The Supreme Court has made fairly clear that it does consider rules protecting the Federal Reserve from being fired by the President to be constitutional, a position that Roberts reiterates.  He also mentions non-Article III federal judges, i.e., specialty judges who do not have life tenure.

Limiting the decision to multi-member boards is bad enough.  It means that the President can fire any member of such a board whose actions displease him.  The obvious example is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), where Chariman Brandon Carr makes a regular practice of threating the licenses of television stations that run news that displeases Donald Trump.  Slaughter authorizes Trump to fire all other members of the FCC and replace them with Brandon Carr clones, and even to issue directives to the FCC to pull licenses of such stations and fire anyone who refuses to comply.  And it just might get worse.  

The opinion is studiously silent on whether any Civil Service protections from firing pass constitutional muster, even though the Supreme Court has upheld such protections since 1886.  Even if the Court has not removed Civil Service protections, one multi-member commission is the one that decides whether removals of government employees comply with Civil Service protections.  Slaughter now authorizes Trump to fire any member of the Merit Systems Protection Board who rules against him, thereby seriously undermining Civil Service protections to begin with.  But at least such decisions are subject to judicial review.  Slaughter invites challenge as to whether the Constitution allows any civil service protections at all.  While the article I am citing focuses primarily on how undermining or eliminating Civil Service protections the danger is much worse.  It means that Trump can order public employees to take illegal actions and fire everyone who refuses.  Since the President's power of pardon federal crimes under the Constitution is absolute, and since the Supreme Court has already given (Republican) Presidents immunity from prosecution for public acts, this decision poses a mortal threat to the rule of law.  And, even worse, it invites challenge to see whether the President can fire judges who are not life tenured.  

And here is the most alarming part of all.  The Supreme Court originally upheld multi-member commissions protected from firing to restrain the power of a Democratic President.  The Roberts Court has now removed that rule in order to enhance the power of a Republican President.  It seems unlikely that they would entrust a Democrat with such a power, any more than the Court was willing to do so in 1935.  And I do not see any way the Supreme Court can hedge in order to uphold such firings by a Republican and reject them by a Democrat.

That can only mean that the Supreme Court is confident that Trump has successfully rigged the system to ensure that no Democrat can ever by President again.

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*Presumably they would not have upheld the rule if she had failed to publish, or how would anyone know it was a rule at all? 

OK, I Lied

 

OK, I lied.  I wanted to get my posts on What if Trump Wins wrapped up before the Semi-quincentennial, since the book seems to assume that our make-or-break moment will happen by then.  I said my goodbye.  But there is one thing I just can't stay away from -- what the authors envision as an alternative.  

They recommend four courses of action and comment that these may not be so distinct after all:

• Protect people being targeted
• Defend existing institutions
• Envision what comes after Trump or, alternately, build new institutions
• Strategic civil disobedience

I briefly considered how these categories overlap, in particular, the extent to which nearly all are actually building new institutions that the authors presumably would like to see outlive Trump.  My own conclusion was that the need for resistance would end if Trump is defeated, but the non-resistance activities would continue and (hopefully) become new institutions.  A few categories that authors do not classify as resistance also would probably not be expected to survive Trump.  That is a strong sign that these activities lap over into resistance.

But after I finished the series, another thought occurred to me.   Clearly Trump won because a lot of people are not satisfied with our institutions are they are.*  Which of these activities would have been worth doing even if Trump had lost.

Protect people being targeted.

If Trump had lost, there would still be people in need of help ant protection. The authors are proposing building institutions to do just that.  Would these institutions be needed if Trump has lost?

Mutual aid society.  The authors propose a mutual aid society that allows an elderly couple who can't afford to pay for a wheelchair ramp get one build by volunteers and pay it forward by offering music lessons.  It offers communal meals and assists immigrants scattered by ICE raids.  Is this something the authors would consider worth doing if Trump had lost?  My guess is hopefully the ICE raid would not have happened if Trump had lost, but the wheelchair ramp and communal meals would still worthwhile regardless of who is in the White House.  And regardless of who is in the White House, it is worthwhile build up such groups in one's local community so they have the opportunity to help out with disasters like fires, do communal tree planting, and visit seniors in retirement homes.  And regardless of who holds the White House, it is worthwhile for such organizations to build a national network so that communities experiencing disasters beyond their resources, like fires and floods, can get help from other communities. 

Joint emergency fund raising.  The authors correctly anticipate that Trump will massively cut funds for non-profits, and recommend that non-profits join forces to raise funds and pool resources, with a focus particularly on small, local non-profits that do not have large, high profile national fundraising networks.  Sounds like a good idea.  Would it be a good idea even if federal funds had not been cut?  I would say yes.  It is never a good idea to put too many eggs in one basket, including the federal basket.  The authors offer another reason why this would be a good idea, regardless of who is in the White House.  Governments (local governments included) and large foundations have slow, cumbersome vetting processes that are particularly burdensome to small organizations.  The authors see the need for a funding source that can move quickly, even if it leads to mistakes and mis-spent resources.  Although they do not say so, presumably the authors would want the joint fundraising network to rely on a non-profit's general reputation in the community instead.

Underground Railroad.  The authors envision an underground railroad moving immigrants and whistle blowers to safety.  (Where?)  Is this something that would be valuable if Trump has lost?  I am inclined to say no.  If Trump had lost, immigrants and whistle blowers would not be in the sort of danger they are in now.  The four categories are not so distinct, and this protects people and engages in resistance -- a resistance we would not need if Trump has lost.

Defend Existing Institutions. 

I believe and the authors foresaw that Trump poses an unprecedented threat to our institutions.  There are always people in need of help regardless of who is in the White House, so the difference is one of degree, rather than kind.  By contrast, the threat Trump poses to our institutions would not exist if he were not there.  So, defending institutions would have a lot less urgency if he had lost.  But at the same time, our institutions can always use bracing and improving.  And yes, I understand that Trump's appeal is largely because people have lost faith in our institutions.  Maybe if our institutions worked better people would like them more.

Organize veterans and their families.  There are already lots of organizations for veterans and their families.  The authors presumably intend some sort of organization to emphasis the need for the military to stay out of partisan politics and refuse unlawful orders.  And I do agree that a lot of our military rank and file are much too Trumpy.  Still, I just don't see the same danger if Trump had lost and am inclined to think this sort of thing laps over into resistance and would not be appropriate if Trump had lost.

Help the EPA as a citizen scientist.  Trump's attacks on regulatory agencies in general and the EPA in particular were wholly foreseeable, and the authors foresaw it.  I Trump has lost, the EPA would be in a lot better condition.  But still, it would be overstretched and could use the help of citizen scientists doing environmental testing and offering guidance on where the problems are.

Map of counties in the US

Elections.  On the one hand, there is really nothing wrong with our election system.  People are losing faith in elections, in large part, because of Donald Trump's bad faith attacks.  On the other hand, some degree of distrust is longstanding.  One of the reasons appears to be that elections are administered and votes counted at the county level. Each state is divided into counties mostly by geographical size, rather than by population.  The result of this is that vote totals are reached a lot faster in less populated counties, which tend to vote Republican, than in more populated counties that tend to vote Democrat, so Democrats show a regular tendency to overtake Republican in vote totals and Republicans believe the fix is in.  I am not sure what can be done about this, other than a vast expansion of vote-counting capacity in more populous counties, which would also be resented.  But voter education is one thing that might at least somewhat increase people's confidence in elections.  Certainly the authors believe that being able to demonstrate the "safety, security, and responsiveness of the election infrastructure" ahead of the election would be worth something.  So, if Trump had lost would it be worthwhile to build a nation-wide clearinghouse where election officials can see what grants are available and pre-qualify?  Obviously, yes.  In fact, the authors base this suggest on a survey and recommendations made during the Biden Administration.

Envision what comes after Trump.

These are the reforms that the authors favor.  They would presumably favor exactly the same reforms if Trump had lost, although the impetus for them would presumably be less.

Cultural grounding.  This one is also a bit vague.  It involves "healing circles" and musicians, body workers, poets, and healing practices.  The authors shed more light in this in the closing thoughts video, expressing the view that ultimately it is shifts in our overall culture that determine our future.  That seems reasonable.  And it would be equally important to make regardless of who is in the White House, even if dealing with Trump means greater urgency.

Constitutional Convention.  It seems a safe assumption the proposed reforms are things that have been circulating long before Trump came to power.  Suggestions include eliminating money from politics, limiting terms for judges and senators, ending secret holds and the filibuster, breaking apart the two-party system (how?), and creating a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.  These sound popular (except, perhaps, for that last).  The real-world consequences are hard to predict.  If you favor these reforms, you would probably favor them regardless of whether Trump came to power or not. Even the convention format is an option regardless of who is in the White House, though dealing with Trump might serve as a spur to action.

The authors also appear to advocate educating participants in other democratic processes as part of the convention.  They want to teach the public that democracy requires education and participation as well as representation.  And they want to teach participatory budgeting, which means first listening and learning, second making and discussing proposals, and finally voting on proposals.  The authors envision almost as many people turning out to the convention as to an election.  Although the book does not say so, presumably the authors envision people applying these lessons in other areas of their lives.  And all I can say is that I certainly agree that it would be valuable to teach people how our system of government actually works and how to listen and engage in rational debate.  Our country would be a whole lot better off for it.  I just don't know how feasible it all is.

I think the authors need to face the fact that there is a limit to how much democracy most people can stomach.  Democracy requires participation, after all, and most people have lives -- families, jobs, interests, and other things they would rather be doing.  And the activists who really want to devote their lives to participating often had beliefs well out of step with the general public, and often don't realize that.

Resistance.

This is the part that is clearly geared to our democracy being in danger and is generally not appropriate under more normal circumstances (such as if Trump had lost).

Paperclip Movement.  While it is somewhat unclear what this is, it appears to be a semi-secret organization of civil servants pledged not to obey any illegal or unconstitutional order.  We have -- or at least had -- a wide range of safeguards in place that were supposed to do this anyhow, such as civil service protections or whistle blower protections.  It is quite alarming how quickly Trump has managed to cast these aside and is treating the government as his own private police.  Maybe such and organization would be useful now, maybe not.  But if Trump had lost I think we could continue to rely on existing protections and such an organization would not be appropriate.

Strike committee.  The authors envision a general strike to keep Trump from stealing the election.  Desperate times call for desperate measures.  But the authors generally do seem to see the strike committee as long-term institution.  At least they endorse "a movement that keeps up regular protests and occasional strikes."  Um, I disagree.  The use of strikes as a tool of political pressure can lead to messy disruptions and ultimately rightwing backlash.  Yes, I understand that desperate times can call for desperate measures, and that planning and preparation is needed.  But I would not favor a strike committee if Trump has lost.

Tax resistance.  No.  We are getting into Sovereign Citizen territory here.  I would oppose it even in response to Trump except under the most extreme circumstances.  It would definitely not be reasonable or appropriate if Trump had lost.

In short:

I believe the non-resistance proposals all in one way or another are creating new institutions that would be valuable (though less urgent) if Trump had lost.  The resistance part is best seen as a response to Trump's threat to democracy and not appropriate under more normal circumstances -- either if he had lost or if he is defeated.  And I regard the underground railroad and anti-Trump military/veteran organizations as partaking enough of resistance that I prefer to reserve them for serious peril and not for more normal circumstances.

And now I really need to quit this habit.

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*Which is not to say I necessarily think these things could prevent future Trumps.  I think it is clear that a certain percent of his followers are simply bigots who can't stand the demographic changes our country is experiencing and want to reverse them.  Others are entitled assholes who can't stand the idea that rules apply to them.  But some are soft supporters who were just upset about the economy and others, I think, feel alienated by a sense that they are isolated and powerless, surrounded by huge institutions that don't care about them and that are out of their control.  I think some of these measures just might blunt economic hardship or give people a better sense of control in their lives.

What if Trump Wins: My Final Thoughts

 

In short What if Trump Wins believes there are four constructive responses:

• Protect people being targeted
• Defend existing institutions
• Envision what happens after Trump
• Strategize forms of resistance

The authors offer several alternatives for each category, presumably not intended to be exhaustive.  They favor national networks of all these options, but recognize that national networks are made out of local chapters, so a local focus is also valid.  And they believe that whether our democracy survives will depend on whether the resistance groups and the non-resistance opposition can join forces when the ultimate showdown occur.  And they assume that make-or-break moment will happen before the semi-quincentennial -- July 4, 2026, a date less than a week away!

Thinking it over I am not sure there is a single make-or-break moment.  Rather, there may be times when democracy fails or lives to fight another day.  The authors

implausibly propose a make-or-break moment over attempts to shut down electric vehicles.  And they optimistically assume that this one dramatic defeat will break Trump's power.  I think that our democracy really has survived one potentially fatal moment -- when Trump considered sending the Army into Minneapolis but ultimately backed down in the face of public outrage.  That convinced Trump to stop dramatic immigration blitzes and to get ICE off the front pages, which is all fine and good, but it is not the end of our peril by any means.*

But it is the other scenario, the attempt to stay in power after the 2028 election that I can't let go of.  

It is not so far from my own fantasy on that score.  My fantasy goes something like this.  The Democrat wins the election for President in 2028.  Trump orders the military to seize the ballot boxes.  The military refuses the unlawful order.  The Pentagon effectively goes on sit-down strike.  He gives similar orders to the Department of Justice.  The DOJ also goes on sit-down strike.  Then he gives the order to ICE and Border Patrol.  We all know they won't refuse.  But they are just not numerous to subjugate a country of over 300 million.  People turn out in the streets in mass.  Democratic governors call out the National Guard to protect ballot boxes, and then to protect the state capitols as they certify the results.  Congress does not dare set foot in Washington, DC, so the Governor of Maryland offers the Maryland capitol and calls out the Maryland National Guard to protect Congress.  Neighboring states send in their National Guards, and huge crowds turn out.  Congress certifies the Democrat.  The Democrat names Secretaries of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security and heads of ICE and Border Patrol ahead of his inauguration.  The Senate hastens to confirm.  On January 20, under the protection of the National Guard of several states and the crowds in the street, the Democrat is sworn in as President.  His heads of Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, ICE, and Border Patrol are sworn in immediately after.  The President orders ICE and Border Patrol to stand down, and orders the Army and federal police to stand up if Trump attempts to stay in power.  Trump flees.  I would not want this to happen because the necessary show of force is easy for Trump's supporters to portray as a coup, but at least it has a satisfying finality and ends in Trump's defeat.

But that is over two years away.  I agree with the authors that out democracy is unlikely to survive two more years of Trump's unchecked power.  The authors' chronology just doesn't work.  If you don't join the resistance Trump consolidates power by July 4, 2026.  How is that supposed to work?

But it can be made to work if instead of an attempt to rig the 2028 election, we see an attempt to rig the 2026 midterms.  The midterms rate a single mention in the book -- something you worry about if you decide to protect elections.  But the attempt to steal the midterms -- through gerrymandering, the SAVE Act, executive orders on mail-in ballots, and truly alarming developments.  And we are in the home stretch now, with the midterm just over four months away.  The attempt will undoubtedly intensify over the next four months.  We don't know yet whether it will succeed, much less what Trump will do if the attempt fails.  

The chronology for What if Trump Wins works much better if it is about an attempt to rig the midterms.  The resistance can approach the non-resistance early in 2026 with warnings of such a plan.  If the non-resistance declines to join forces, we could have the resistance crushed by July 4, the rigged election go through, and Trump end the last embers of independence in Congress and use the same mechanism of rigging elections to rig the 2028 elections and all elections in the future.  It seems all too plausible.

The problem is what if we defeat the attempt?  Then what?  As with ICE backing down in Minnesota, it will not be the decisive triumph of democracy.  It will just mean that democracy lives to fight another day.

Consider my scenario.  Suppose the Army and the Justice Department refuse illegal orders to stage a coup in 2026.  Trump will still have two more years to subvert them.  Even if we suppose that Congress impeaches Trump for the coup attempt, which he will certainly deserve, what difference will it make?  There is simply no way that Republicans in the Senate would vote to convict.  And even if they did, JD Vance would be next in line, and it is far from clear he would be any better.  Pete Hegseth would still control the military.  Todd Blanche would still control the federal police.  And as for Homeland Security, the less said the better.  It would just mean two more years to learn from past mistakes and get the bugs out of the system for 2028.  

As for What if Trump Wins, well, maybe they could hold onto hope that the failed coup will reduce Trump to a lame duck, even if he stays in power.  I wish I could be so optimistic.

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*I expect immigration to be back on the front pages soon if ICE seriously attempts mass deportations of Haitians.

What if Trump Wins: Strategize Acts of Disobedience

 

Category	Activity
Protect people being targeted	Mutual aid society Fundraising for nonprofits Underground railroad
Defend existing institutions	Outreach to veterans/families/military Citizen scientist to assist EPA Find grants to strengthen elections
Envision what comes after Trump	Cultural/psychological grounding Constitutional convention
Resistance	Paperclip movement among civil servants Strikes Tax resistance

Finally, What if Trump Wins encourages strategizing resistance -- subject to some qualifications.  One is that you should refrain from violence or the threat of violence.  The other (as discussed before) is that sooner or later the showdown will probably come.  The authors believe that democracy will survive or not survive depending on whether the resistance and non-resistance wings of the opposition are able to join forces.  The authors suggest a class in civil disobedience and offer their basic premise -- power flows from the bottom up.  No ruler can do it on his own.  The ground level bureaucracy does the real work of governing.  Target the pillars of support and you can bring down the would-be autocrat.  The authors make three suggestions (presumably not intended to be exhaustive):  symbol of resistance, strike committee, or tax resistance.

The Paperclip Movement.

This is the least clear of the options being offered.  It begins by proposing that you create a widespread symbol of resistance -- a paperclip.  Apparently, that was used as a symbol of resistance in Nazi-occupied Denmark, and it seems to fit with Trump's dismissal of bureaucrats as "paper pushers."  Anyone can wear a paperclip.  The authors imagine the idea going viral.  Paperclips appear in people's social media feeds.  Popular songs are written about paperclips.  Flag-colored paperclips and rainbow paperclips become popular.  People wear paperclips on CNN.  

Once again, notice the assumption here.  The authors assume that people can display the symbol of resistance openly and without fear.  And, thus far at least, the assumption seems accurate.  We have any number of symbols of resistance.  The "No Kings" logo. A whistle to blow and warn people about ICE.  The Portland Frog.  Cute inflatable animal costumes.  There are plenty of symbols of resistance out there.

But imperceptibly, the authors start making clear that the Paperclip Movement is more than just people wearing paperclips as a symbol of resistance.  The authors appear to be thinking of a movement in the civil service roughly equivalent to their proposed military movement -- an organization of civil servants pledged to refuse to obey any unlawful orders.  The authors are unclear on any number of things.  Is the Paperclip movement limited to the federal government, or can state and local officials joint as well?  What is the role of private citizens in the movement?  Are they limited to wearing paperclips in solidarity, or do private citizens join in meetings, organization, etc?  None of that is spelled out, and I find the jump from symbol to organization to be disconcerting.

Be that as it may, although there are many symbols of resistance, nothing like the Paperclip Movement has emerged among civil servants.  Civil servants are exercising a different kind of resistance.  They are quitting.  The Department of Justice civil rights division and Minneapolis office have been hit particularly hard.  And these resignations have answered the paradox that has so long plagued civil servants when a dictator begins subverting the civil service -- stay, hope to mitigate the worst measures, and risk becoming complicit; or resign, and allow the subversion to proceed unchecked.  The answer is that if only a handful of civil servants resign, they merely smooth the way for the subversion.  But if resignations become widespread enough, they can seriously undermine the would-be dictator.  And, it appears, bring a lot of talent to the opposition.  That does undermine one of the would-be dictator's pillars of support, though perhaps not in the manner the authors had in mind.

Strike committee.

The authors envision beginning with a one-minute strike in late 2025, with plans for a 15-minute strike two months later.  I am not sure anyone would even notice a one-minute strike, but who knows.  The authors see strikes as more muscular and effective than protests.  But so far they just haven't happened.  During the height of Operation Metro Surge, Minneapolis had a one-day general strike.  But it was not able to duplicate the effort a second time.  In the meantime, Minneapolis did sustain repeated, massive marches and protests.  There is simply no sign that the country is ready to, or capable of, a widespread general strike.  Instead, Trump opponents are focusing on the supposed 3.5 percent rule -- the idea that bringing 3.5% of the population onto the streets will make things change.  (It seems to have worked in Minneapolis).

Tax resistance.

The authors propose a widespread refusal to pay taxes so long as Trump is in power.  Needless to say, this is illegal.  It also has not happened.  In fact, ironically, there has actually been some muttering on the right about refusing to pay taxes because of all the fraud purportedly being found.  

In short, resistance thus far has consisted of two main things.  One is protests, in hopes of bringing down the regime through the 3.5 percent rule.  The other is resistance to ICE, usually in the form of tracking, warning, filming, protesting, and some civil disobedience in the form of attempting to block ICE vehicles.

Government response to resistance.

If you pick a non-resistance option, the authors give the option of scaling up or not.  Either way, they anticipate that you will be able to keep on without interference from the state.  The underground railroad has to maintain operational security, obviously.  The authors recommend that anyone protecting institutions practice digital security if they want to scale up.  But none of these activities in the author's scenarios meet with an actual crackdown by government.  And all are operating peacefully and in the open by the semi-quincentennial when the resistance had been beaten and arrested.  (What becomes of the non-resistance opposition after the crackdown is not discussed).

For the resistance, the question is not whether to scale up or not, but how Trump will respond.  The authors envision that he might simply ignore the resistance or limit himself to angry tweets.  But he might crack down, either by indicting the leaders, or by having the IRS seize the organization's assets.  In other words, the authors see it as possible that even the resistance wing of the opposition may be able to operate in the open without danger for a significant time.  

They anticipate (reasonably) that any indictment will be error-ridden and "very flimsy" even in the case of the tax resistance, which is clearly illegal.  They further assume that only a handful of leaders will be arrested, and that the government will back down when large numbers of rank-and-file members demand to be arrested as well.  "Liberal pundits" (note the assumption that an independent media continues) say that this is merely an attempt to distract the public from a "shaky" economy, whiplashed by his changing policies and a sinking approval rating.  That certainly seems plausible as well.  In fact, the economy has been shaky, though far from disastrous, as a result of erratic policies, Trump's approval ratings have fallen, and independent media have continued to operate.  What is notable is that the economy and Trump's approval ratings are mentioned only in the context of the resistance wing, even though it was highly foreseeable that (1) these two things would rise and fall together and (2) Trump's presidency will probably rise or fall based on these two things.  It is also notable that so far Trump has attempted to prosecute both (a few) individual opponents and (a few) opposition organizations.  Thus far, the independent judiciary has severely limited such prosecutions.

The authors seem to regard use of the IRS as more formidable that abuse of the criminal justice system.  Certainly that was my fear because there were fewer procedural safeguards.  The authors envision the IRS freezing resistance organizations' assets and temporarily immobilizing their website, database, and organizational infrastructure.  The tax resistance, being clearly illegal gets hit hardest, with the IRS seizing its computers, files, and even coffee pots.  They envision the organizational infrastructure being much harder to salvage with the tax resistance than the other organizations.  In all cases, the propose that the IRS attempts to move "quietly," but a whistle blower alerts the organization, which alerts the New York Times, which creates a major spectacle, so again the authors assume an independent media.  

But none of these change the ultimate outcome.  The single theme underlying every such narrative is that details may differ, but that is not so important.  What is really important is whether the resistance wing of the opposition joins forces with the wider public.  If this fails, the resistance is crushed and Trump consolidates power.  And here the authors are oddly specific in their timeline.  They envision a one-minute strike in late 2025, with a 15-minute strike planned in two months.  If the strike committee does not join forces with the broader public, the authors imagine a specific date -- February 21 (presumably 2026) when the larger strike fails. Crackdown follows.  As for the tax resistance, they envision its growth sputtering out after tax day -- April 15 (again, presumably 2026), which seems like a reasonable assumption.  No specific date for the Paperclip Movement.  But invariably the authors assume that if the resistance and non-resistance do not join forces, the resistance will be crushed and Trump will consolidate power by the semi-quincentennial -- July 4, 2026.  And that is just over a week away!  

Well, I don't think the final showdown has come about yet.  But I do think that the next four to six months will determine whether democracy is defeated, or whether it lives to fight another day.  I thought the authors had two alternative scenarios as to what the final showdown would be.  Looking it over in more depth, I was wrong.  They have three.  Coming up next.

What if Trump Wins: Defending Existing Institutions

 

Category	Activity
Protect people being targeted	Mutual aid society Fundraising for nonprofits Underground railroad
Defend existing institutions	Outreach to veterans/families/military Citizen scientist to assist EPA Find grants to strengthen elections
Envision what comes after Trump	Cultural/psychological grounding Constitutional convention
Resistance	Paperclip movement among civil servants Strikes Tax resistance

Defend existing institutions:

The introduction on defending institutions is really quite similar to the introduction on protecting people being targeted.  Instead of immigration raids, cut to healthcare spending, and rising hate crimes, this section has funds pulled from public schools, far right judges appointed, threats to independent media, and purges of the federal workforce.  Some of these targets, like the federal workforce, are governmental.  Some, like judges and schools, are also governmental, but outside normal executive function.  And some, like independent media, are clearly non-governmental.  It all sounds accurate enough, to say nothing of attacks on targets the authors never even thought of, such as elite law firms, universities, and tech companies.  While the damage to the vulnerable is less immediate and obvious than immigration raids and healthcare cuts, the damage to the social fabric is absolutely real and, over the longer run, highly damaging and disarm the institutions that might reign Trump in.   

But what can we do about it?  In the real world, most of the defense of institutions is taking place in the courts, out of reach of the general public.*  The authors make three suggestions -- organize veterans and their families, supplement federal regulators with scientific testing, and protect elections.  As mentioned before, I was surprised at the focus on governmental institutions -- the Deep State if you will -- when it seemed to me that Trump poses a threat to all institutions, governmental or not.  And the vast flourishing of non-governmental organizations is what makes America truly great.  But thinking it over more, I do believe that maintaining the independence of the "deep state" is vital to preserving the rule of law.  So by all means, let us sign up to preserve it.

Organize veteran familes

The authors postulate that the military is being pulled two ways -- between higher officers who are old-style institutionalists, but also bound to obey orders, and the rank-and-file who are more pro-Trump.  They have officers "slow walk" plans to leave NATO, generals fired and even a first lieutenant (!) named Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  We haven't got to the first lieutenant yet, but Pete Hegseth is clearly purging the top ranks and thwarting promotion of anyone who is not white and male.  We also have the military committing war crimes on the high seas and in bombing Iran.  

In any event, the authors propose that you talk to veterans and their organizations and families about the need for the military to stay out of partisan politics and the fearful danger that they might be called on to fire on US citizens.  They imagine a lot of quiet persuasion taking place outside the public eye, like talking to a colonel's wife about how to keep her husband from getting too Trumpy.  And non-commissioned officers expose rightwing extremists in their ranks planning to use a rightwing militia attack on Black business as cover "for more extreme efforts," whatever that means.  (Once again those rightwing terrorists make an appearance).

In protecting people being targeted, the authors offer the choice of staying small, nimble, and local; scaling up on a local level; or going national.  For institution, they offer only the options of staying "small, nimble, and quiet" or becoming larger and open.  In the military instance, there are excellent reasons to stay quiet.  "Being quiet allows you to have some intimate conversations with people inside the military you might miss if you are more open."  A very realistic concern in this case.  Becoming more open appears to mean going onto social media and attracting volunteers.  It calls for taking classes in digital security to avoid doxing.  But the outreach remains private.  The only real difference the authors propose is that if you go public, you can refer the colonel's wife to a network instead of just giving her personal suggestions.  The basic need to stay quiet remains.

I am assuming this proposal is based on calls for retired generals to denounce inappropriate or unlawful acts by Trump.  While there have been occasional reminders that soldiers do not have to obey unlawful behavior, retired military officers have been disturbingly quiet.

Citizen scientists:

Team Trump is both relaxing regulatory standards and firing so many regulators as to obstruct enforcement of even the most relaxed standards.  He is particularly protective of pollution from coal.  All of this is spot-on, of course, and highly predictable.  Citizen scientists can do their own environmental testing to supplement an overtaxed EPA and give it guidance in setting priorities.  As in other cases, the authors try to be realistic by starting small -- testing proves serious hazards from a coal fired plant, and it is made to pay a small fine.  As work begins to scale up, climate-change-caused fires put in another appearance.  This time you are able to do real-time tracking that is vital to the public's health and safety.

The authors treat the decision whether to stay small or scale up similarly to the military -- staying small allows you to have intimate conversations you might otherwise miss; going public requires digital security to avoid doxing.  But really, this work seems a lot less dangerous than outreach to the military.  I suppose some EPA employees might face retaliation if word gets out that they are receiving input from citizen scientists. But this just isn't subversive in the same way that military outreach is.  The decision whether to stay local or scale up here is treated similarly to how it is treated with mutual aid.  Stay local and you can persuade your town to rewrite its ordinances to block expansion of some factories and plant more trees.  Scale up, and you can attract participants across the country and get funding and interns from a university.  

Incidentally, this is one of the very few cases other than the elections section that mentions local government.  In the emergency fundraising section, local government puts in a brief appearance for being too sluggish in offering loans to people whose businesses burned down.  In the section on news stories, state and local government step up to enforce anti-discrimination laws when the federal government refuses.  And there are sanctuary jurisdictions and states that mobilize the National Guard against immigration.  But local government only really comes into focus into the elections section, and necessarily so.  US elections are administered at the county level.

Protect elections:

This is obviously very important.  Indeed, the survival of democracy rests upon it.  If the book's 11 options were my real-life choices, this is the one I would choose.  Election workers have faced scrutiny, pressure, and even threats on Trump's say-so.  The authors descend into specifics here.  They recommend a Protect Our Elections report and threats to election workers in Washoe County, Nevada.  One major problem is a lack of funding.  Public funding has been cut and some states have banned private funding.  (Certainly, the senior attorney at my office views private funding with extreme suspicion and makes cracks about "Zucherbucks.").  So, you search for grant money, which apparently is out there, though wholly uncoordinated.  How that is reconciled with a ban on private funding is not addressed.  But, once again, the story starts small as you obtain a $500 grant for the local office.  You go to work on finding what grants are out there and assembling the information into digestible form.  Thanks to the grants, election infrastructure strengthens.  Workers can improve trust by explaining the election infrastructure safety, security, and responsiveness ahead of the election instead of after.  Climate-change-caused fires make another appearance, this time destroying mail-in ballots, but you are able to replace them quickly.  

Scaling up once again requires digital security but attracts more volunteers.  I was at first dismissive of the need for security.  This is not a secretive, semi-legal campaign of potential subversion like the military outreach.  It is wholly legal and appropriate.  That was uncommonly naive of me.  In light of recent cries of election fraud and FBI raids on voting rights groups, this is actually quite potentially dangerous work.  Unlike other cases, the authors appear to see scaling up as clearly the better course.  Staying local means passing around a spreadsheet of grant opportunities and makes for a modest strengthening of the local infrastructure.  Going national means setting up a nationally known clearinghouse of grant opportunities and a website where applicants can pre-qualify.  (This recommendation comes specifically from the Protect Our Elections report).  This differs from, say mutual aid or environmental activism in that it deals entirely in knowledge, which can be frictionlessly spread nationwide.  However, non-presidential elections are mentioned only in passing (mention that the midterms are coming up, ballots having to be replaced) and says nothing whatever about the outcome of any non-presidential election.

I will make a few more comments about the helping and protecting sections.  The protect people sections all begin with immigration and move on.  None of the defend institutions actions discuss immigrants at all.  Times rightwing militias burning buildings come up -- four, in all three protect people scenarios and the military outreach scenario.  Number of times climate-change-related fires come up -- also four, in the mutual aid society, joint emergency fundraising, environmental protection, and elections sections.  No militia attacks on voters, though, perhaps surprisingly.

Now on to envisioning the future and offering resistance.  Rightwing militias and climate-change-related fires will drop out.

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*The authors recognize as much, having Trump's attempts to replace 50,000 to 100,000 federal employees delayed by the courts but eventually go through.