So we now how at least two accounts of the alleged plan Qassim Suleimani had in the works when he was killed. Reuters says he was planning to step up attacks on US forces in Iraq, and possibly in Syria and Lebanon as well, as a way of distracting from domestic problems. Presumably the upsurge in activities before he was killed was the beginning state.
By contrast Rukmini Callimachi of the New York Times reports that something big appeared to be in the offing -- big enough that Suleimani, the second most powerful man in Iran, had to get approval from Ayatollah Khamenei to do it -- but that we have no idea what it was. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that we were the probably target, but we don't know.
Either way, the obvious question is, have we thwarted the plan, or will it proceed.
It also appears that I was wrong in assuming that so skillful an operation could not have been done rashly or impulsively. Apparently our intelligence services have known about Suleimani's whereabouts for a long time. The New York Times reports that in presenting options for how to respond to escalating Iranian attacks in Iraq, the Pentagon presented killing Suleimani as an extreme option to make its alternatives look reasonable. Initially, Trump chose the lesser option -- strikes on militia groups that had attacked US forces and killed a defense contractor. When Qataib Hezbollah responded by attacking the US embassy, thoughts of Benghazi haunted Trump, and he chose to kill Suleimani -- much to the consternation of military officials.
Let THAT be a lesson for you. Do NOT give extreme options to a President who doesn't know what he is doing and has the attention span and emotional control of a child. The article also offers mixed reports as to whether attacks in US targets in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon were definitely planned, or whether something big (and unknown) was being considered but not yet approved.
Juan Cole also has some interesting insights on whether this will lead the Iraqi government to tell our troops to leave, a possibility the Iraqis had raised after our initial strikes on Qataib Hezbollah sites. Pro-Iranian parties in the Iraqi parliament plan to raise the issue, but Cole is doubtful that it will succeed. Unwelcome as US forces are for many Iraqis, they are protecting the country against ISIS. Iranians would probably be both less effective and even less welcome.
As always, I am not going to speculate except to note one thing. Reports that Suleimani was seeking to ramp up confrontation with US forces say that this was to distract Iranians from their domestic situation, i.e., to wag the dog. In that, he appears to have succeeded beyond his wildest dreams -- though not in the way he intended.
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