Recent Supreme Court Decisions Against Trump, in Ascending Order of Importance

 

So, what do I make of the recent spate of Supreme Court decisions?  A mixed bag, some not so bad, some truly alarming, some important and some unimportant.  I generally share the view that they decided against Trump on small things and for him on the things that matter.  But let's dive in.

Against Trump, in ascending order of importance

Watson v. Republican National Committee.

This decision upheld a statute (in Mississippi) that allowed mail-in ballots that arrive up to five days after the election to be counted so long as they are postmarked by election day.  Our side is celebrating this as a big victory.  I honestly don't think it is all that important.  Nice to have, sure, but not all that essential. Many states require mail-in ballots to be postmarked by election day, and their elections seem to work well enough.  Allowing late-mailed ballots to be counted is a major factor in California's delays in counting votes.  Yes, I know Republicans' claims of fraud are in bad faith, and that if California counted its votes faster, they would just find some other excuse.  But the long delays in knowing election outcomes in California really is a problem.  If I could trade this decision going Trump's way for some other decision going against him, I would gladly do it.*

Trump v. Carroll

The Supreme Court declined to hear Trump's appeal of the civil verdict against Trump accusing him of rape.  On the one hand, this seems like a small matter.  On the other hand, the Supreme Court has already given Republican Presidents and all-out license to crime.  I suppose we should be glad it has at least declined to immunize them from civil liability, at least for actions before they were elected.  Let's be grateful for small favors.

Trump v. Cook

The Supreme Court stayed the removal of Lisa Cook from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.  It did not permanently bar her removal, merely kept her in office pending determination.  It held that (1) the government had not shown it was substantially likely to prevail on the merits; (2) the requirement that removal must be "for cause" does not mean that "for cause" is within the President's absolute and unreviewable discretion; (3) they declined to define "for cause" except to say that the national bank must be shielded from political influence; (4) staying removal pending determination of whether sufficient cause exists is necessary to shield the Fed from political influence; (5) some sort of (ill-defined) notice and opportunity is required to determine whether "cause" for removal exists; (6) the Constitution allows members of the national bank to be so shielded.  They then kicked the case back to lower courts to determine whether removal was "for cause."  

Look, if you want to be cynical -- and I do -- Supreme Court expansions of Presidential power should be read under two considerations (1) would they entrust this power to a Democratic President, and (2) would they entrust this power to the President if they believed no Democrat would ever hold the office again.  If the answer is yes to both, the Supreme Court is holding open the possibility that a Democrat might be President again some day.  If the answer is yes to one and to two, it means they are confident that Trump has rigged the system to lock in permanent power for Republicans and you should be alarmed.  Something similar applies to restrictions on Presidential power.  In this case, power to shape monetary policy looks like something the Supreme Court wants to deny to any President of either party.  If the elective government can control monetary policy, the result is always the same.  They will avoid difficult fiscal decisions by using monetary policy to finance expenditures -- in simply English, they will finance operations by printing money, with resulting inflation.  The temptation applies even to Republicans who say they want massive cuts in spending but never seem to follow through.**

Trump v. Barbara

Upheld the rule that all persons born in the US are citizens, even if their parents are temporarily or unlawfully present, with the exception of children of foreign diplomats or other people present as agents of a foreign government.  Chief Justice Roberts defended this position by saying it is a longstanding rule of common law.  (Conservative jurists traditionally see common law as something sacred an inviolable, though apparently they make an exception in this case).  This ruling merely upholds a longstanding rule that has been around longer than anyone  alive today, but man, oh man, oh man, oh man, right wingers are freaking out about this one.  They appear to be taking the defeat on ballot counting in reasonably good grace, but their freakout over upholding a longstanding rule on birthright citizenship is a wonder to behold!  I can only assume it is an attempt to intimidate.  It also makes clear just how much bigotry underpins much of Trump's following.

Chatrie v. US

This one has not attracted all that much attention.  It has been mentioned as attention as the others, although it has occasionally been mentioned as a victory for privacy advocates.  But actually, thinking it over, it may be the thin end of a very large wedge.  The amount of data tech companies can sweep in on basically anyone, any time, is by itself alarming.  But at least tech companies don't have the power to arrest you and engage in the other types of coercion available to the state. We need rules constraining government's use of all that data out there, and we need it in a hurry.  The first step in that direction was apparently the case of Carpenter v. US, holding that tracking cell phone location is a search requiring a warrant.  Chatrie expanded that rule to so-called "geofence location" -- a request for information on which cell phone were within a certain radius of a certain location within a certain timeframe.  Police seeking to use this technique to solve a crime (in this case, a bank robbery) follow a three-step process.  First they get a geofence warrant for anonymous information about who was in the area of the crime around the time of the crime.  Next, the police seek more extensive, but still anonymous, information about a subset of the phone signals collected.  Finally, they narrow the information down to a small number of suspects and ask for their personal information.  

The Court held that all of this was a "search" requiring a warrant, and that the limited duration of time did not make it any less of a "search."  The owner of a cell phone does not waive the right of privacy by sharing location information with a third party (the service provider).  But searches are not banned by the Fourth Amendment, only "unreasonable" searches.  In this case, after all, there was a clear crime, and a warrant.  The Supreme Court punted on that issue and sent it back to the Court of Appeals to determine what sort of warrant meets the standard of "reasonable."

But the point is, they decided that there does have the be a specific crime, a warrant, some sort of individual and particularized suspicion and not a general dragnet.  Compare that to overall ICE trawling operations.  Maybe, just maybe, this gives us a tool to fight back.

Next up: Decisions for Trump, also in ascending order of importance.

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*There may be thin end of the wedge arguments here, that the Supreme Court would use requiring ballots to arrive on election say as preliminary to a general attack on voting by mail.
**The cuts that have been made so far, though extremely damaging to specific programs do not touch the actual bulk of the budget -- Social Security, Medicare, and military spending -- and therefore do not cut spending in any meaningful way.

OK, I Lied

 

OK, I lied.  I wanted to get my posts on What if Trump Wins wrapped up before the Semi-quincentennial, since the book seems to assume that our make-or-break moment will happen by then.  I said my goodbye.  But there is one thing I just can't stay away from -- what the authors envision as an alternative.  

They recommend four courses of action and comment that these may not be so distinct after all:

• Protect people being targeted
• Defend existing institutions
• Envision what comes after Trump or, alternately, build new institutions
• Strategic civil disobedience

I briefly considered how these categories overlap, in particular, the extent to which nearly all are actually building new institutions that the authors presumably would like to see outlive Trump.  My own conclusion was that the need for resistance would end if Trump is defeated, but the non-resistance activities would continue and (hopefully) become new institutions.  A few categories that authors do not classify as resistance also would probably not be expected to survive Trump.  That is a strong sign that these activities lap over into resistance.

But after I finished the series, another thought occurred to me.   Clearly Trump won because a lot of people are not satisfied with our institutions are they are.*  Which of these activities would have been worth doing even if Trump had lost.

Protect people being targeted.

If Trump had lost, there would still be people in need of help ant protection. The authors are proposing building institutions to do just that.  Would these institutions be needed if Trump has lost?

Mutual aid society.  The authors propose a mutual aid society that allows an elderly couple who can't afford to pay for a wheelchair ramp get one build by volunteers and pay it forward by offering music lessons.  It offers communal meals and assists immigrants scattered by ICE raids.  Is this something the authors would consider worth doing if Trump had lost?  My guess is hopefully the ICE raid would not have happened if Trump had lost, but the wheelchair ramp and communal meals would still worthwhile regardless of who is in the White House.  And regardless of who is in the White House, it is worthwhile build up such groups in one's local community so they have the opportunity to help out with disasters like fires, do communal tree planting, and visit seniors in retirement homes.  And regardless of who holds the White House, it is worthwhile for such organizations to build a national network so that communities experiencing disasters beyond their resources, like fires and floods, can get help from other communities. 

Joint emergency fund raising.  The authors correctly anticipate that Trump will massively cut funds for non-profits, and recommend that non-profits join forces to raise funds and pool resources, with a focus particularly on small, local non-profits that do not have large, high profile national fundraising networks.  Sounds like a good idea.  Would it be a good idea even if federal funds had not been cut?  I would say yes.  It is never a good idea to put too many eggs in one basket, including the federal basket.  The authors offer another reason why this would be a good idea, regardless of who is in the White House.  Governments (local governments included) and large foundations have slow, cumbersome vetting processes that are particularly burdensome to small organizations.  The authors see the need for a funding source that can move quickly, even if it leads to mistakes and mis-spent resources.  Although they do not say so, presumably the authors would want the joint fundraising network to rely on a non-profit's general reputation in the community instead.

Underground Railroad.  The authors envision an underground railroad moving immigrants and whistle blowers to safety.  (Where?)  Is this something that would be valuable if Trump has lost?  I am inclined to say no.  If Trump had lost, immigrants and whistle blowers would not be in the sort of danger they are in now.  The four categories are not so distinct, and this protects people and engages in resistance -- a resistance we would not need if Trump has lost.

Defend Existing Institutions. 

I believe and the authors foresaw that Trump poses an unprecedented threat to our institutions.  There are always people in need of help regardless of who is in the White House, so the difference is one of degree, rather than kind.  By contrast, the threat Trump poses to our institutions would not exist if he were not there.  So, defending institutions would have a lot less urgency if he had lost.  But at the same time, our institutions can always use bracing and improving.  And yes, I understand that Trump's appeal is largely because people have lost faith in our institutions.  Maybe if our institutions worked better people would like them more.

Organize veterans and their families.  There are already lots of organizations for veterans and their families.  The authors presumably intend some sort of organization to emphasis the need for the military to stay out of partisan politics and refuse unlawful orders.  And I do agree that a lot of our military rank and file are much too Trumpy.  Still, I just don't see the same danger if Trump had lost and am inclined to think this sort of thing laps over into resistance and would not be appropriate if Trump had lost.

Help the EPA as a citizen scientist.  Trump's attacks on regulatory agencies in general and the EPA in particular were wholly foreseeable, and the authors foresaw it.  I Trump has lost, the EPA would be in a lot better condition.  But still, it would be overstretched and could use the help of citizen scientists doing environmental testing and offering guidance on where the problems are.

Map of counties in the US

Elections.  On the one hand, there is really nothing wrong with our election system.  People are losing faith in elections, in large part, because of Donald Trump's bad faith attacks.  On the other hand, some degree of distrust is longstanding.  One of the reasons appears to be that elections are administered and votes counted at the county level. Each state is divided into counties mostly by geographical size, rather than by population.  The result of this is that vote totals are reached a lot faster in less populated counties, which tend to vote Republican, than in more populated counties that tend to vote Democrat, so Democrats show a regular tendency to overtake Republican in vote totals and Republicans believe the fix is in.  I am not sure what can be done about this, other than a vast expansion of vote-counting capacity in more populous counties, which would also be resented.  But voter education is one thing that might at least somewhat increase people's confidence in elections.  Certainly the authors believe that being able to demonstrate the "safety, security, and responsiveness of the election infrastructure" ahead of the election would be worth something.  So, if Trump had lost would it be worthwhile to build a nation-wide clearinghouse where election officials can see what grants are available and pre-qualify?  Obviously, yes.  In fact, the authors base this suggest on a survey and recommendations made during the Biden Administration.

Envision what comes after Trump.

These are the reforms that the authors favor.  They would presumably favor exactly the same reforms if Trump had lost, although the impetus for them would presumably be less.

Cultural grounding.  This one is also a bit vague.  It involves "healing circles" and musicians, body workers, poets, and healing practices.  The authors shed more light in this in the closing thoughts video, expressing the view that ultimately it is shifts in our overall culture that determine our future.  That seems reasonable.  And it would be equally important to make regardless of who is in the White House, even if dealing with Trump means greater urgency.

Constitutional Convention.  It seems a safe assumption the proposed reforms are things that have been circulating long before Trump came to power.  Suggestions include eliminating money from politics, limiting terms for judges and senators, ending secret holds and the filibuster, breaking apart the two-party system (how?), and creating a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.  These sound popular (except, perhaps, for that last).  The real-world consequences are hard to predict.  If you favor these reforms, you would probably favor them regardless of whether Trump came to power or not. Even the convention format is an option regardless of who is in the White House, though dealing with Trump might serve as a spur to action.

The authors also appear to advocate educating participants in other democratic processes as part of the convention.  They want to teach the public that democracy requires education and participation as well as representation.  And they want to teach participatory budgeting, which means first listening and learning, second making and discussing proposals, and finally voting on proposals.  The authors envision almost as many people turning out to the convention as to an election.  Although the book does not say so, presumably the authors envision people applying these lessons in other areas of their lives.  And all I can say is that I certainly agree that it would be valuable to teach people how our system of government actually works and how to listen and engage in rational debate.  Our country would be a whole lot better off for it.  I just don't know how feasible it all is.

I think the authors need to face the fact that there is a limit to how much democracy most people can stomach.  Democracy requires participation, after all, and most people have lives -- families, jobs, interests, and other things they would rather be doing.  And the activists who really want to devote their lives to participating often had beliefs well out of step with the general public, and often don't realize that.

Resistance.

This is the part that is clearly geared to our democracy being in danger and is generally not appropriate under more normal circumstances (such as if Trump had lost).

Paperclip Movement.  While it is somewhat unclear what this is, it appears to be a semi-secret organization of civil servants pledged not to obey any illegal or unconstitutional order.  We have -- or at least had -- a wide range of safeguards in place that were supposed to do this anyhow, such as civil service protections or whistle blower protections.  It is quite alarming how quickly Trump has managed to cast these aside and is treating the government as his own private police.  Maybe such and organization would be useful now, maybe not.  But if Trump had lost I think we could continue to rely on existing protections and such an organization would not be appropriate.

Strike committee.  The authors envision a general strike to keep Trump from stealing the election.  Desperate times call for desperate measures.  But the authors generally do seem to see the strike committee as long-term institution.  At least they endorse "a movement that keeps up regular protests and occasional strikes."  Um, I disagree.  The use of strikes as a tool of political pressure can lead to messy disruptions and ultimately rightwing backlash.  Yes, I understand that desperate times can call for desperate measures, and that planning and preparation is needed.  But I would not favor a strike committee if Trump has lost.

Tax resistance.  No.  We are getting into Sovereign Citizen territory here.  I would oppose it even in response to Trump except under the most extreme circumstances.  It would definitely not be reasonable or appropriate if Trump had lost.

In short:

I believe the non-resistance proposals all in one way or another are creating new institutions that would be valuable (though less urgent) if Trump had lost.  The resistance part is best seen as a response to Trump's threat to democracy and not appropriate under more normal circumstances -- either if he had lost or if he is defeated.  And I regard the underground railroad and anti-Trump military/veteran organizations as partaking enough of resistance that I prefer to reserve them for serious peril and not for more normal circumstances.

And now I really need to quit this habit.

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*Which is not to say I necessarily think these things could prevent future Trumps.  I think it is clear that a certain percent of his followers are simply bigots who can't stand the demographic changes our country is experiencing and want to reverse them.  Others are entitled assholes who can't stand the idea that rules apply to them.  But some are soft supporters who were just upset about the economy and others, I think, feel alienated by a sense that they are isolated and powerless, surrounded by huge institutions that don't care about them and that are out of their control.  I think some of these measures just might blunt economic hardship or give people a better sense of control in their lives.

What if Trump Wins: My Final Thoughts

 

In short What if Trump Wins believes there are four constructive responses:

• Protect people being targeted
• Defend existing institutions
• Envision what happens after Trump
• Strategize forms of resistance

The authors offer several alternatives for each category, presumably not intended to be exhaustive.  They favor national networks of all these options, but recognize that national networks are made out of local chapters, so a local focus is also valid.  And they believe that whether our democracy survives will depend on whether the resistance groups and the non-resistance opposition can join forces when the ultimate showdown occur.  And they assume that make-or-break moment will happen before the semi-quincentennial -- July 4, 2026, a date less than a week away!

Thinking it over I am not sure there is a single make-or-break moment.  Rather, there may be times when democracy fails or live to fight another say.  The authors

implausibly propose a make-or-break moment over attempts to shut down electric vehicles.  And they optimistically assume that this one dramatic defeat will break Trump's power.  I think that our democracy really has survived one potentially fatal moment -- when Trump considered sending the Army into Minneapolis but ultimately backed down in the face of public outrage.  That convinced Trump to stop dramatic immigration blitzes and to get ICE off the front pages, which is all fine and good, but it is not the end of our peril by any means.*

But it is the other scenario, the attempt to stay in power after the 2028 election that I can't let go of.  

It is not so far from my own fantasy on that score.  My fantasy goes something like this.  The Democrat wins the election for President in 2028.  Trump orders the military to seize the ballot boxes.  The military refuses the unlawful order.  The Pentagon effectively goes on sit-down strike.  He gives similar orders to the Department of Justice.  The DOJ also goes on sit-down strike.  Then he gives the order to ICE and Border Patrol.  We all know they won't refuse.  But they are just not numerous to subjugate a country of over 300 million.  People turn out in the streets in mass.  Democratic governors call out the National Guard to protect ballot boxes, and then to protect the state capitols as they certify the results.  Congress does not dare set foot in Washington, DC, so the Governor of Maryland offers the Maryland capitol and calls out the Maryland National Guard to protect Congress.  Neighboring states send in their National Guards, and huge crowds turn out.  Congress certifies the Democrat.  The Democrat names Secretaries of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security and heads of ICE and Border Patrol ahead of his inauguration.  The Senate hastens to confirm.  On January 20, under the protection of the National Guard of several states and the crowds in the street, the Democrat is sworn in as President.  His heads of Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, ICE, and Border Patrol are sworn in immediately after.  The President orders ICE and Border Patrol to stand down, and orders the Army and federal police to stand up if Trump attempts to stay in power.  Trump flees.  I would want this to happen because the necessary show of force is easy for Trump's supporters to portray as a coup, but at least it has a satisfying finality and ends in Trump's defeat.

But that is over two years away.  I agree with the authors that out democracy is unlikely to survive two more years of Trump's unchecked power.  The authors' chronology just doesn't work.  If you don't join the resistance Trump consolidates power by July 4, 2026.  How is that supposed to work?

But it can be made to work if instead of an attempt to rig the 2028 election, we see an attempt to rig the 2026 midterms.  The midterms rate a single mention in the book -- something you worry about if you decide to protect elections.  But the attempt to steal the midterms -- through gerrymandering, the SAVE Act, executive orders on mail-in ballots, and truly alarming developments.  And we are in the home stretch now, with the midterm just over four months away.  The attempt will undoubtedly intensive over the next four months.  We don't know yet whether it will succeed, much less what Trump will do if the attempt fails.  

The chronology for What if Trump Wins works much better if it is about an attempt to rig the midterms.  The resistance can approach the non-resistance early in 2026 with warnings of such a plan.  If the non-resistance declines to join forces, we could have the resistance crushed by July 4, the rigged election go through, and Trump end the last embers of independence in Congress and use the same mechanism of rigging elections to rig the 2028 elections and all elections in the future.  It seems all too plausible.

The problem is what if we defeat the attempt?  Then what?  As with ICE backing down in Minnesota, it will not be the decisive triumph of democracy.  It will just mean that democracy lives to fight another day.

Consider my scenario.  Suppose the Army and the Justice Department refuse illegal orders to stage a coup in 2026.  Trump will still have two more years to subvert them.  Even if we suppose that Congress impeaches Trump for the coup attempt, which he will certainly deserve, what difference will it make?  There is simply no way that Republicans in the Senate would vote to convict.  And even if they did, JD Vance would be next in line, and it is far from clear he would be any better.  Pete Hegseth would still control the military.  Todd Blanche would still control the federal police.  And as for Homeland Security, the less said the better.  It would just mean two more years to learn from past mistakes and get the bugs out of the system for 2028.  

As for What if Trump Wins, well, maybe they could hold onto hope that the failed coup will reduce Trump to a lame duck, even if he stays in power.  I wish I could be so optimistic.

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*I expect immigration to be back on the front pages soon if ICE seriously attempts mass deportations of Haitians.

What if Trump Wins: Come Together, Right Now, Over Me

So, we come to the final confrontation.  Whether democracy stands or falls depends on whether the resistance and non-resistance wings of the opposition join forces.  I previously said that the authors envisioned two alternate showdowns -- Trump trying to shut down an electric vehicle plant and Trump defying the 22nd Amendment for a third term.

I was actually wrong about that the authors envision three alternative pathways -- one for each resistance group.  While two of the final showdowns are over Trump seeking to defy the 22nd Amendment, they turn out somewhat differently, for reasons I do not fully understand.  

One other note for what it is worth.  In all cases from the perspective of a non-resistance group, you hear from a "longstanding volunteer," presumably in your group.*  They have been a "steady volunteer," but most of their work has been with the resistance.  So clearly the authors do not see these groups as mutually exclusive, but merely as matters of emphasis.

Tax resistance and the electric vehicle plant

For the tax resistance, the authors envision the final confrontation occurring when Trump seek to shut down the electric vehicle industry and force all car manufacturers to stick to internal combustion engines.**  Why the tax resistance?  The authors envision the auto workers union plans to occupy the factories and keep producing electric vehicles in defiance of Trump.  Wouldn't the strike committee make a more logical choice?  Apparently the authors had other uses for the strike committee (as we shall see) and so gave the tax resistance this job more or less by default.  The tax resistance is joined by mutual aid societies, which makes sense, since someone will have to provide financial assistance to the auto workers during their strike.  Also joining are citizen scientists who assist the EPA.  This also makes sense, since environmental scientists will presumably understand the importance of preserving the EV industry.  Finally veteran organizations and military families.  This also makes sense, since the scenario envisions Trump calling in the military to disburse the strikers, so the resistance will need people with ties to the military to keep them from turning against US citizens.  

Risk of military confrontation run high as more and more people turn out to support the auto workers.  Auto workers refuse to be provoked into violence and the military refuses to move against peaceful protesters.  Trump tries to send in the Proud Boys instead, but the military protects the auto workers.  Trump ends up looking weak and the Republican power structure (including his own Justice Department) abandons him.  He limps out to the end of his term a lame duck, his power gone.  In this the authors are influenced by the work of Timur Kuran.  Kuran looks at the French, Russian and Iranian revolutions -- all largely the work of street protests and mobs.  In all cases, the regime in power seemed solid and entrenched -- and then it wasn't.  He suggests that there may be secret, latent resentment of the status quo that goes unexpressed because no one sees anyone else opposing the regime and therefore no one dares to act.  But even a very small indication that the regime is not invulnerable may set off chain reaction.  Except that this appears to apply to a certain kind of regime -- one that is repressive enough to let popular opposition simmer a long time before it breaks into revolt, but not repressive enough to crush the revolt.  It is far from clear whether the US under Trump meets with that description.

Look, I really would prefer to see the Trump regime weakened enough stop being a threat and lose in the normal course of electoral politics than an all-out confrontation over whether elections are still binding.  But I am not hopeful it will turn out that way.  The closest we have come to this sort of scenario has been ICE surges and popular resistance -- most dramatically in Minneapolis, but in Los Angeles and Chicago as well.  In Los Angeles there were actual riots and Trump mobilized the National Guard.  Mercifully, both sides quietly backed away.  In Chicago, he was on the verge of calling up the National Guard but was blocked by the courts.  In Minneapolis, Trump was seriously considering sending in the army, but ultimately backed down in the face of public outrage.  All of this shows that Trump is far from complete consolidation of power.  And it has persuaded him to stop doing ICE blitzes, which is all to the good.  But it has not made him a lame duck.  The latest candidate for turning Trump into a lame duck is his failed war in Iran.  Losing a war has been the downfall of many a dictator.  But, again, it has not happened thus far.

The strike committee and the 22nd Amendment

It seems more likely -- very likely -- that the showdown will be over Trump trying to defy the Constitution and seek a third term.  Protests erupt across the country, Republican governors send in the National Guard, and Texas and Florida even attempt to cancel the election. The authors have the strike committee resist by calling a general strike.  And I will admit, a general strike seems like an appropriate response to so extreme and action, so maybe it does make sense to have the strike committee take the lead here, rather than in the electric vehicle scenario.  The strike committee is joined by fund raisers for non-profits, which makes sense because, again, strikers will need financial support to remain on strike.  Also joining are people providing cultural grounding for the movement.  The authors see them as important for getting disparate groups to work together.  The underground railroad also joins.  Why the underground railroad?  The authors suggest, to smuggle in whistle blowers.  But whistle blowers have their place in all these showdowns.  I am inclined to think that this is like the tax resistance -- they had to fit in somewhere and this was an open slot.  

I do sort of like the detail that non-resistance members were aware of the one-minute strikes but never took part, even though the effort would be minimal.  It drives home the point that you don't have to do everything -- at least until the final showdown.  I suggested that the constitutional convention differs from the other groups in that everyone else can take three days out to attend.  But it is even easier to stop work for one minute, yet not everyone does.

The authors offer many scenarios, all involving strikes, economic upheaval, and violence, but all ending with the same outcome.  Trump loses the election, incumbents are swept from office in record numbers, and the proposed constitutional reforms are enacted.  The authors end in a triumphant note:

Your movement didn’t just win elections — they’ve won pledges to abide by the outcomes of the deep democracy-modeled Constitutional Convention. Its sensible recommendations come from now over 2,000 cities. The federal reforms happen first. New laws affirm that money is not speech and put an end to gerrymandering. The bill for term limits for all federal leaders barely passes — only passing with a controversial exemption for current senators and house members. There is an end to right-to-work legislation and support for card check neutrality. The changes take place, buoyed by a movement that keeps up regular protests and occasional strikes. You continue your work, aware of much more to do. And you feel proud of your role in all of it.

This appears to be the authors' favorite scenario.  It is achieved by strikes, with much economic upheaval and hardship, and with violence from rightwing militias.  But it is rewarded with a sweeping win and implementation of the measures the authors favor.  

They seem less happy about the third scenario.

The Paperclip Movement and President Eric Trump

This version actually focuses less on seeking a third term than on running Eric (Don Junior having all to obviously flamed out) and trying to rig the election.  Since the Paperclip Movement is apparently an organization of civil servants pledged to refuse illegal orders, it makes sense they would lead the opposition to an attempt to rig the election.  The organization of election workers is an obvious ally.  After all, the Paperclip movement is just asking local officials to join in their pledge to refuse illegal orders.  The authors have also foreshadowed that the Paperclip Movement will ally with the constitutional convention.  “You know those government workers wearing paperclips? That movement is already using our language and guidance for their Constitutional Oath.”  So, unsurprisingly, the Paperclip Movement seeks alliance with the constitutional convention as well.  They say they want "all of your participants — city workers, police, and others" to take a pledge not to obey illegal orders on the election.  I am not quite sure I understand that.  I know that election workers are public employees, usually at the county level.  Is the constitutional convention also supposed to consist of municipal employees?  Nothing else in the book suggests that.

The authors have another problem as well.  They set out four categories of activists -- protecting individuals, defending institutions, envisioning what comes after Trump, and resistance.  Three out of those four categories have three sub-categories.  But envisioning what comes after has only two.  Otherwise each resistance group could form an alliance with one member of each other category, for four in each scenario.  But instead there are only 11 groups instead of twelve, so someone has to get the short end of the stick.  It turns out to be the Paperclip Movement.  So, Trump pushes voting restrictions (true) and sends the National Guard to polling places (plausible).  Election workers slow-walk the new restrictions.  Foreign observers observe.  The broader public protects.  Or else the governors of Texas and Florida attempt to cancel the election.  Election workers hold the election anyhow, and governors eventually back down.  (That one is more of a stretch).  Either way the election is much like 2020.  It comes down to a few swing states that are close.  Trump tries to stop counting while his son is still ahead.  It takes a few weeks, but Trump narrowly loses and, once again, attempts to overturn the result.  If the public remains passive, the army ends up letting Trump stay rather than stage a coup against him.  But if large crowds turn out to "help Trump pack his bags," it is still a very close call, but Trump ends up leaving.  The new President takes over a "battered, bruised" nation.  The coup has been averted "but just by the skin of its teeth."  

In short, Trump does not go quietly as he does in the electric vehicle scenario.  There is none of the triumphalism of the strike committee scenario.  US democracy narrowly prevails, but remains precarious.  So, why do the authors show so much less enthusiasm for this scenario than the alternative?  Obviously, I don't know.  But my guess is that this approach relies too much on government insiders (Paperclip Movement civil servants, election officials, and apparently a variety of municipal officials) for the authors' comfort.  Maybe they just like a more "outsider" approach.

I will wrap this series up with a few final thoughts.

___________________________________________
*Not quite.  The cultural grounding group is somewhat different. 
**That seemed far-fetched to me.  It still seems like a stretch in light of Trump's ultimate alliance with Elon Musk.  But apparently he has done a good, though more subtle, job of undermining the electric vehicle industry and has an outright vendetta with wind power, so maybe.

What if Trump Wins: Strategize Acts of Disobedience

 

Category	Activity
Protect people being targeted	Mutual aid society Fundraising for nonprofits Underground railroad
Defend existing institutions	Outreach to veterans/families/military Citizen scientist to assist EPA Find grants to strengthen elections
Envision what comes after Trump	Cultural/psychological grounding Constitutional convention
Resistance	Paperclip movement among civil servants Strikes Tax resistance

Finally, What if Trump Wins encourages strategizing resistance -- subject to some qualifications.  One is that you should refrain from violence or the threat of violence.  The other (as discussed before) is that sooner or later the showdown will probably come.  The authors believe that democracy will survive or not survive depending on whether the resistance and non-resistance wings of the opposition are able to join forces.  The authors suggest a class in civil disobedience and offer their basic premise -- power flows from the bottom up.  No ruler can do it on his own.  The ground level bureaucracy does the real work of governing.  Target the pillars of support and you can bring down the would-be autocrat.  The authors make three suggestions (presumably not intended to be exhaustive):  symbol of resistance, strike committee, or tax resistance.

The Paperclip Movement.

This is the least clear of the options being offered.  It begins by proposing that you create a widespread symbol of resistance -- a paperclip.  Apparently, that was used as a symbol of resistance in Nazi-occupied Denmark, and it seems to fit with Trump's dismissal of bureaucrats as "paper pushers."  Anyone can wear a paperclip.  The authors imagine the idea going viral.  Paperclips appear in people's social media feeds.  Popular songs are written about paperclips.  Flag-colored paperclips and rainbow paperclips become popular.  People wear paperclips on CNN.  

Once again, notice the assumption here.  The authors assume that people can display the symbol of resistance openly and without fear.  And, thus far at least, the assumption seems accurate.  We have any number of symbols of resistance.  The "No Kings" logo. A whistle to blow and warn people about ICE.  The Portland Frog.  Cute inflatable animal costumes.  There are plenty of symbols of resistance out there.

But imperceptibly, the authors start making clear that the Paperclip Movement is more than just people wearing paperclips as a symbol of resistance.  The authors appear to be thinking of a movement in the civil service roughly equivalent to their proposed military movement -- an organization of civil servants pledged to refuse to obey any unlawful orders.  The authors are unclear on any number of things.  Is the Paperclip movement limited to the federal government, or can state and local officials joint as well?  What is the role of private citizens in the movement?  Are they limited to wearing paperclips in solidarity, or do private citizens join in meetings, organization, etc?  None of that is spelled out, and I find the jump from symbol to organization to be disconcerting.

Be that as it may, although there are many symbols of resistance, nothing like the Paperclip Movement has emerged among civil servants.  Civil servants are exercising a different kind of resistance.  They are quitting.  The Department of Justice civil rights division and Minneapolis office have been hit particularly hard.  And these resignations have answered the paradox that has so long plagued civil servants when a dictator begins subverting the civil service -- stay, hope to mitigate the worst measures, and risk becoming complicit; or resign, and allow the subversion to proceed unchecked.  The answer is that if only a handful of civil servants resign, they merely smooth the way for the subversion.  But if resignations become widespread enough, they can seriously undermine the would-be dictator.  And, it appears, bring a lot of talent to the opposition.  That does undermine one of the would-be dictator's pillars of support, though perhaps not in the manner the authors had in mind.

Strike committee.

The authors envision beginning with a one-minute strike in late 2025, with plans for a 15-minute strike two months later.  I am not sure anyone would even notice a one-minute strike, but who knows.  The authors see strikes as more muscular and effective than protests.  But so far they just haven't happened.  During the height of Operation Metro Surge, Minneapolis had a one-day general strike.  But it was not able to duplicate the effort a second time.  In the meantime, Minneapolis did sustain repeated, massive marches and protests.  There is simply no sign that the country is ready to, or capable of, a widespread general strike.  Instead, Trump opponents are focusing on the supposed 3.5 percent rule -- the idea that bringing 3.5% of the population onto the streets will make things change.  (It seems to have worked in Minneapolis).

Tax resistance.

The authors propose a widespread refusal to pay taxes so long as Trump is in power.  Needless to say, this is illegal.  It also has not happened.  In fact, ironically, there has actually been some muttering on the right about refusing to pay taxes because of all the fraud purportedly being found.  

In short, resistance thus far has consisted of two main things.  One is protests, in hopes of bringing down the regime through the 3.5 percent rule.  The other is resistance to ICE, usually in the form of tracking, warning, filming, protesting, and some civil disobedience in the form of attempting to block ICE vehicles.

Government response to resistance.

If you pick a non-resistance option, the authors give the option of scaling up or not.  Either way, they anticipate that you will be able to keep on without interference from the state.  The underground railroad has to maintain operational security, obviously.  The authors recommend that anyone protecting institutions practice digital security if they want to scale up.  But none of these activities in the author's scenarios meet with an actual crackdown by government.  And all are operating peacefully and in the open by the semi-quincentennial when the resistance had been beaten and arrested.  (What becomes of the non-resistance opposition after the crackdown is not discussed).

For the resistance, the question is not whether to scale up or not, but how Trump will respond.  The authors envision that he might simply ignore the resistance or limit himself to angry tweets.  But he might crack down, either by indicting the leaders, or by having the IRS seize the organization's assets.  In other words, the authors see it as possible that even the resistance wing of the opposition may be able to operate in the open without danger for a significant time.  

They anticipate (reasonably) that any indictment will be error-ridden and "very flimsy" even in the case of the tax resistance, which is clearly illegal.  They further assume that only a handful of leaders will be arrested, and that the government will back down when large numbers of rank-and-file members demand to be arrested as well.  "Liberal pundits" (note the assumption that an independent media continues) say that this is merely an attempt to distract the public from a "shaky" economy, whiplashed by his changing policies and a sinking approval rating.  That certainly seems plausible as well.  In fact, the economy has been shaky, though far from disastrous, as a result of erratic policies, Trump's approval ratings have fallen, and independent media have continued to operate.  What is notable is that the economy and Trump's approval ratings are mentioned only in the context of the resistance wing, even though it was highly foreseeable that (1) these two things would rise and fall together and (2) Trump's presidency will probably rise or fall based on these two things.  It is also notable that so far Trump has attempted to prosecute both (a few) individual opponents and (a few) opposition organizations.  Thus far, the independent judiciary has severely limited such prosecutions.

The authors seem to regard use of the IRS as more formidable that abuse of the criminal justice system.  Certainly that was my fear because there were fewer procedural safeguards.  The authors envision the IRS freezing resistance organizations' assets and temporarily immobilizing their website, database, and organizational infrastructure.  The tax resistance, being clearly illegal gets hit hardest, with the IRS seizing its computers, files, and even coffee pots.  They envision the organizational infrastructure being much harder to salvage with the tax resistance than the other organizations.  In all cases, the propose that the IRS attempts to move "quietly," but a whistle blower alerts the organization, which alerts the New York Times, which creates a major spectacle, so again the authors assume an independent media.  

But none of these change the ultimate outcome.  The single theme underlying every such narrative is that details may differ, but that is not so important.  What is really important is whether the resistance wing of the opposition joins forces with the wider public.  If this fails, the resistance is crushed and Trump consolidates power.  And here the authors are oddly specific in their timeline.  They envision a one-minute strike in late 2025, with a 15-minute strike planned in two months.  If the strike committee does not join forces with the broader public, the authors imagine a specific date -- February 21 (presumably 2026) when the larger strike fails. Crackdown follows.  As for the tax resistance, they envision its growth sputtering out after tax day -- April 15 (again, presumably 2026), which seems like a reasonable assumption.  No specific date for the Paperclip Movement.  But invariably the authors assume that if the resistance and non-resistance do not join forces, the resistance will be crushed and Trump will consolidate power by the semi-quincentennial -- July 4, 2026.  And that is just over a week away!  

Well, I don't think the final showdown has come about yet.  But I do think that the next four to six months will determine whether democracy is defeated, or whether it lives to fight another day.  I thought the authors had two alternative scenarios as to what the final showdown would be.  Looking it over in more depth, I was wrong.  They have three.  Coming up next.

Why Did He Do It?

 

So, given just how much of a humiliating surrender we have taken in the war with Iran, the obvious question is why Trump agreed to it.  I can think of several possibilities.

They hope sanction relief will moderate Iran

One possibility is that our overall sanctions relief may be seen as a bet that if we stop treating Iran as a pariah, it will stop acting like a pariah and rejoin the community of nations and act like just another country.  Stranger things have happened, after all.  Nixon going to China and all that.  And let's face it, China really did, over time, stop acting like a pariah and become more like any other country.  But its moderation has had its limits and China remains an adversary.  

My main reason for doubting that this is Trump's motive is simple enough.  It just seems more far-sighted and better thought out than he seems capable of.  

Trump has fallen "in love" again

Trump does seem to have a chronic attraction to authoritarians of all kinds, from Putin to Xi to Kim Jong Un.  Why should Iran be any exception?  It did cross my mind that we had better not let him talk to the ayatollahs or he might end up following the usual pattern.  He is sure acting like he has fallen under their spell, and this without even any in-person meetings.  Presumably he has gotten regular reports going both ways and possibly phone conversations.

It is all about oil prices

The high oil and gas prices resulting from the war were scaring Trump and hurting him in domestic politics.  He may be calculating that if he can just bring down gas prices, his popularity will recover and no one outside of a few news junkies will care about our humiliating defeat.  My guess is that this is his primary motivation, and that the calculation will probably prove to be correct.

Trump just got bored and wanted to move on.

Also a possibility we cannot rule out.

What if Trump Wins: Envision What Happens After Trump

 

Category	Activity
Protect people being targeted	Mutual aid society Fundraising for nonprofits Underground railroad
Defend existing institutions	Outreach to veterans/families/military Citizen scientist to assist EPA Find grants to strengthen elections
Envision what comes after Trump	Cultural/psychological grounding Constitutional convention
Resistance	Paperclip movement among civil servants Strikes Tax resistance

The next useful option suggested by What if Trump Wins is to envision what comes after Trump.  After all, the authors point out, simply reacting to what Trump does gives him the entire initiative and lets him set the agenda, which creates an obvious advantage for him.  Trump won because people were not happy with the way things were going.  To defeat him, we have to offer a positive agenda.

Actually, I am not entirely convinced.  Trump won because people were upset about inflation and chaos at the border.  If he continues to break Rule Number One of Smart Authoritarians (only take unpopular actions if they advance your power), we may be able to defeat him simply by promising "change."  Nonetheless, we do need a positive agenda for what comes after Trump if we want to avoid breaking into hopeless factional fighting and if we want to prevent a future Trump from threatening democracy.

In every other category, the authors offer three options.  Here they offer only two -- offer cultural grounding to the movement or hold a constitutional convention to propose amendments.  This means there are only eleven categories instead of twelve and causes some unevenness when the groups team up at the end, but let that go.

Provide cultural grounding for the movement.

I found it interesting that the authors saw this as useful, given that they generally warn against limiting yourself to self-expression, such as posting on social media and marching in the streets. At the same time, there is no doubt that a movement of this type needs cultural grounding in the form of songs, art, symbol, and the like.  It is also true that if activists do not practice self-care, they will burn out and end up achieving nothing.  The authors envision "cultural grounding" as including healing circles for mutual aid societies supporting immigrants under attack, and psychological support for whistle blowers being protected by the underground railroad, as well as music, body work, poems, and healing practices.  As this account may suggest, it also means being in contact with many different groups opposing Trump who may not be aware of each other.  And it may mean bringing them together and coordinating them.  This makes support work very important indeed!

This category also differs from the others in that the authors do not offer the alternatives of scaling up or not.  Instead, the strike committee invites you to a meeting in which they plan a large-scale strike to protest Trump's plans to stay in office past his second term.  You, the culture worker, do not really have a role in planning the strike, just keeping everyone grounded and keeping them from rushing into action unthinkingly.  Your actions in grounding and working together may save the strike committee from splitting into factions all going off in different directions and unable to achieve anything.  Important, indeed!  And I assume that in real life there are people doing something very much like this.  

Constitutional Convention:

Just to be clear, our Constitution's provision on amendments says:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress. . .

In other words, amendment by constitutional convention requires request by two-thirds of the states and ratification by three-fourths of the states.  Which is to say, the "convention" will simply be offering suggestions that are in no way legally binding.  But they can create serious political pressure -- really the only use of such pressure the book offers. 

The convention starts in Philadelphia (site of the original Constitutional Convention), in which people express their commitment to the Constitution and offer changes to protect against future Trumps -- most particularly, amendments to make clear that corporations are not people and money is not speech.  Other reforms are discussed (it does not say which ones) and the organizers propose tens of thousands of conventions to be held across the country.  Civil servants from the Paperclip Movement pledge to support them.

So, once again, you are offered the alternatives of running a local convention or setting up conventions across the country.  As with (most of) the other alternatives, going national is essential to be truly effective, but a national network is made up of local chapters, so those are important too.  The authors show a distinct ideological agenda here, with all of the conventions following the same format (presumably learned at the pre-convention) and coming up with similar measures, probably pushed by the convention sponsors.  Under the general format, the convention will last three days.  The first day will be dedicated to learning about the Constitutions, the second day to making proposals, and the third day to voting on them.  The last day is like a science fair, with people walking around and hearing debates about various proposals. Some people attend online.  On a large electronic board, people see results coming in from other towns.  

The authors anticipate that there will be wide agreement on eliminating money from politics, setting term limits for senators and judges, ending secret holds and the filibuster, "breaking apart" the two-party system (how?) and creating a pathway to citizenship.  Other proposals such as dealing with crime, guns, and future immigration, are more controversial and are saved for later conventions (or, perhaps, for the usual political process).  The authors envision your local convention having turnout comparable to "some elections."  They also envision national leaders traveling across the country setting up numerous conventions.  (You set up 43).

I have some questions here.  I previously questioned whether people would actually care about the abstract, procedural issues raised here, as opposed to something with more immediate impact on their lives.  But I suppose after spending a day learning what is in the constitution and why it focuses on procedural issues, people may start thinking in different terms.  I am also going to suspect a certain amount of manipulation by the organizers to get the results they want.   I am also curious about the three days.  Are they set over a three-day weekend (Labor Day, maybe), or three successive Saturdays?  Either way, that would seem to exclude service workers who regularly work on Saturdays and holidays.  But let that go.  

I am also interested in whether all these conventions are taking place at the same time.  The part about simultaneous conventions and electronic boards following what is happening in other cities certainly seems to suggest that.  The organizer going from one city to another setting up conventions seems to suggest they happen on different dates.  Several alternatives present themselves.  Maybe the traveling organizer is pre-planning conventions all set to take place on the same day.  Or maybe holding tens of thousands of simultaneous conventions in a country with a population of over 300 million is not feasible and there are multiple coordinated conventions at different times.  The authors are not clear, perhaps intentionally.

Well, to state the obvious, that had not happened.  There have been coordinated marches and protests, but nothing like these coordinated conventions.

Also, I find it interesting that the authors assume these conventions can operate in the open and not be harassed by either the government or rightwing militias.  That seems accurate, based on the protest marches that have taken place without incident.  Even in the most brutal phase of the crackdown in Minneapolis, crackdown coexisted with large-scale protests that were not disrupted.  The authors are assuming tens of thousands of towns, and turnout comparable to some elections (it does not say which ones!).  Like large-scale protests, that is just more people that government can hope to arrest, although it might target the organizers.  That mostly has not happened so far, except where ICE is concerned, but recently there have been alarming developments.

Finally, I started to say that one of these things is not like the others.  Running a local convention takes only three days; the other activities the authors suggest are ongoing.  But that is not actually true.  Presumably setting up a local convention is enough to keep you busy.  You would have to rent a venue, buy refreshments, advertise, set up a social media account and possibly a website, circulate your plans, perhaps design and print brochures, etc. etc.  Still, it does seem reasonable to assume that other people opposing Trump could take three days out from their work to attend.

And when the convention is over, the planners will find their work done and perhaps join some other group.  Yes, granted, they will be tired at the end and want to take a well-deserved break.  But Trump will still be in power and still wreaking havoc, so after the local convention planners have had time to recover, maybe they will want to join one of the other groups.