Look, I know I am late to the game, but the political motive in the latest Obamacare lawsuit is obvious.
Put briefly, Congress repealed all penalty for not having health insurance. A number of Republicans then sued to have the the individual mandate declared unconstitutional because it was no longer a tax, but an intolerable intrusion. And, since it had been previously argued that the entire law stood or fell on the individual mandate, they called for the entire law to be struck down.
This legal argument was taken seriously by basically no one.
And so, most alarmingly, the district judge accepted it and struck down the entire law. The effect would have been to shut down the exchanges where some ten million people buy health insurance, roll back a Medicaid expansion covering some 10 million people, and remove protections for people with pre-existing conditions. In other words, as one Republican consultant put it, it made as much sense politically as diving head-first into a wood chipper.
Nonetheless, Donald Trump is determined to erase the Obama legacy, and if Obama was against diving headfirst into wood chippers, then Trump as to be for it. Of course, the losing side appealed, and, in the face of all common sense, Donald Trump insisted that his Justice Department argue in favor of the decision.
The assumption was that the Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) would either uphold or strike down the decision. The loser would then appeal to the Supreme Court, which would hear the case in the summer of 2020.
In other words, the summer before the election, the American people would witness the Trump Administration argue in favor of stripping 20 million people of their health insurance and remove protections for pre-existing conditions. Short of something disastrous actually happening, this is one of the most effective ways to commit electoral suicide. The question would not be whether the wood chipper would get Donald Trump, but how much of the Republican Party he would drag along with him.
And so the three-judge panel in the Fifth Circuit stepped in to save Donald Trump from himself. By a 2-1 vote, they declared the individual mandate unconstitutional and kicked the case back to the district judge to reconsider his ruling and determine, in detail, what must stand and what must fall.
The obvious goal here is to postpone argument in front of the Supreme Court until after the 2020 election and thereby keep Donald Trump from diving headfirst into a wood chipper.
Friday, January 10, 2020
Thursday, January 9, 2020
A Follow Up Point
The real point was always the deleted e-mails, and Trump's certainty that the reason they were deleted was that they contained something terribly incriminating.
And sure enough, he is concealing conversations with Rudy Giuliani that almost certainly contain something terribly incriminating.
Trump is a master of projection.
How to Troll an Impeachment
I usually avoid "but her emails" jokes these days because honesty compels me to acknowledge that nothing disastrous has happened during the Trump presidency. And while he has led us close to disaster many time, I am confident that he will continue to pull back in the end for fear of offending his base.
But I do keep making "but her emails" jokes whenever it turns out (predictably) that Trump is even worse at cyber security than Hillary.
You may recall that Hillary's offense in sending State Department messages on a private server was two-fold. Not using a properly secured device made her vulnerable to hacking by hostile intelligence services. And not using her official server allowed her to evade disclosure laws.
Conor Friedersdorf pointed out the absurdity of making this grounds to vote for Trump:
Absurdly, many seem to have convinced themselves that Trump, who won’t release his tax returns, as every presidential candidate has for decades, will be better on transparency; that a man whose finances we don’t even know, who used his charitable foundation to illegally funnel money to an attorney general investigating him for fraud, will be better on conflicts of interest; that an erratic man who blurts all manner of things out on Twitter and has shady ties to Vladimir Putin will somehow be a more trustworthy guardian of classified information.
Fast forward to a Washington Post article on Donald Trump's careless electronic security practices.
Donald Trump regularly communicated with Rudy Giuliani on an unsecured cell phone, vulnerable to foreign hacks. If the Russians did hack in (the article warns), they could use the information to fine-tune their propaganda strategy and manipulate Giuliani's dealings in Ukraine, steering him to who-knows-what crazies. He also gave out his private cell number to foreign leaders and others, and continues to make unsecured cell calls.
That addresses the issue of electronic security. What of disclosure laws?
John F. Kelly, then White House chief of staff, and intelligence officials made a concerted attempt in 2017 to get Trump to use secure White House lines, even after the president had retreated to the residence in the evenings, officials said. But when Trump realized that this enabled Kelly to compile daily logs of his calls, and the identities of those he was speaking to, Trump became annoyed and reverted to using his cellphone, officials said. “He was totally paranoid that everyone knew who he was talking to,” a former senior administration official said.Of course, I am not suggesting that Congress impeach based solely on a newspaper story. But let them investigate and find out the full extent of Donald Trump's lax electronic security habits and evasion of disclosure laws. And then draw up a third article of impeachment designed to be as trollish as possible.
Describe all Trump's lax uses of electronic security, especially his private cell phone, and his evasions of public records laws. Painstakingly explain all the statutes these violated. Compare them with Hillary's offenses and explain why they are so much worse. Quote as many speeches, investigations, reports, and other comments for the record, from Trump and other Republicans, explaining why these are the most heinous crimes ever committed by and candidate in the history of our Republic, and why Hillary should definitely be in jail for them. Remind everyone how many Trump rallies led chants of "Lock her up" for the use of a private server.
I realize there is a risk to all this. It creates the impression that Hillary's cyber offenses really were as bad the Trumpkins suggest. But this can be limited by emphasizing how much worse Trump's offenses are than the ones he saw as grounds for imprisoning his opponent.
Of course I don't think this will persuade Republicans to impeach, let alone convict. That that is not the point of trolling. The point is just to make them squirm.
On Attempts by Congress to Reign in the President
So, the House has voted to reign in the President's authority to engage in military activity against Iran. This legislation may very well not even reach a vote in the Senate. It if does, it will presumably have to pass the 60-vote threshold, which it won't. If by some miracle it passes the Senate, the President will veto it and Congress will lack to votes to override his veto.
This legislation was undertaken under the War Powers Act, which once upon a time I believed in. The War Powers Act was passed in the wake of the Vietnam War. Congress, alarmed that Presidents had deployed 300,000 troops to Korea and 500,000 to Vietnam without a declaration of war, passed the War Powers Act in 1973 in an effort to prevent such wars in the future.
The War Powers Act requires the President to give notice within 48 hours of introducing the US military into "hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” The President must end such activities within 60 days unless Congress gives the authorization to continue. And we have all seen how effective that was.
Presidents have regularly challenged the War Powers Act as an unconstitutional restraint on the President's power as commander-in-chief, while opponents of war and executive power have challenged unilateral executive military actions as violations of Congress's power to declare war. And it is almost a cliche to point out that we have not had a declaration of war since WWII despite having fought several large-scale wars since.
I used to support the War Powers Act. But since then I have given up on it, not because I think it is unconstitutional, but because it ignores political and military reality.
Congress has sole authority to create the military, and to un-create (or at least shrink) it. Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 of the US Constitution gives Congress the power "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." The purpose of forbidding any appropriation for more than two years was to keep the army from becoming a self-funding monstrosity outside of civilian control. Congress can also make rules governing how the military operates, i.e., create a code of military law that the armed forces must follow.
The President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and makes day-to-day strategic and tactical decisions, a matter that Congress is clearly not suited for. But how far does this power extend?
And the ultimate answer, not based on constitutional principles, but on real world outcomes, is that if Congress gives the President an army, there is very little it can do to keep him from using it however he pleases.
We have had five declarations of war in our history -- the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, WWI and WWII. We have had (by my estimate) five major, undeclared wars since -- the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Afghan War and the Iraq War. (Others may count differently).
But we have been having undeclared military operations since Jefferson sent the Marines to the shores of Tripoli. We have had a very long series of undeclared interventions in Central America and the Caribbean, and a few in Mexico. We participated in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in China. We fought a long insurgency in the Philippines. And doubtless we engaged in many undeclared overseas military operations that I don't know about.
The point here is, once Congress gives the President a military, there is very little it can do to prevent him from using it as he pleases. The reason we had an actual declaration of war on those five occasions was simple -- we didn't have enough forces fight them. The President had to go to Congress to request an expansion of the military large enough to fight the war he wanted, and the best way to convince them to give the army was to ask for a declaration of war.
Once we started having a standing military at all times that was large enough to fight major wars, Presidents proceeded to use it. Most made at least a show of asking Congress for approval, but approval was never hard to get when the war fever got going and anyone who questioned it was dismissed as unpatriotic.
All of which leaves us in a quandary. Giving up our military is not really an option. But preventing the President from using it as he pleases has not proven practical. I am still looking for an answer.
This legislation was undertaken under the War Powers Act, which once upon a time I believed in. The War Powers Act was passed in the wake of the Vietnam War. Congress, alarmed that Presidents had deployed 300,000 troops to Korea and 500,000 to Vietnam without a declaration of war, passed the War Powers Act in 1973 in an effort to prevent such wars in the future.
The War Powers Act requires the President to give notice within 48 hours of introducing the US military into "hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” The President must end such activities within 60 days unless Congress gives the authorization to continue. And we have all seen how effective that was.
Presidents have regularly challenged the War Powers Act as an unconstitutional restraint on the President's power as commander-in-chief, while opponents of war and executive power have challenged unilateral executive military actions as violations of Congress's power to declare war. And it is almost a cliche to point out that we have not had a declaration of war since WWII despite having fought several large-scale wars since.
I used to support the War Powers Act. But since then I have given up on it, not because I think it is unconstitutional, but because it ignores political and military reality.
Congress has sole authority to create the military, and to un-create (or at least shrink) it. Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 of the US Constitution gives Congress the power "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." The purpose of forbidding any appropriation for more than two years was to keep the army from becoming a self-funding monstrosity outside of civilian control. Congress can also make rules governing how the military operates, i.e., create a code of military law that the armed forces must follow.
The President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and makes day-to-day strategic and tactical decisions, a matter that Congress is clearly not suited for. But how far does this power extend?
And the ultimate answer, not based on constitutional principles, but on real world outcomes, is that if Congress gives the President an army, there is very little it can do to keep him from using it however he pleases.
We have had five declarations of war in our history -- the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, WWI and WWII. We have had (by my estimate) five major, undeclared wars since -- the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Afghan War and the Iraq War. (Others may count differently).
But we have been having undeclared military operations since Jefferson sent the Marines to the shores of Tripoli. We have had a very long series of undeclared interventions in Central America and the Caribbean, and a few in Mexico. We participated in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in China. We fought a long insurgency in the Philippines. And doubtless we engaged in many undeclared overseas military operations that I don't know about.
The point here is, once Congress gives the President a military, there is very little it can do to prevent him from using it as he pleases. The reason we had an actual declaration of war on those five occasions was simple -- we didn't have enough forces fight them. The President had to go to Congress to request an expansion of the military large enough to fight the war he wanted, and the best way to convince them to give the army was to ask for a declaration of war.
Once we started having a standing military at all times that was large enough to fight major wars, Presidents proceeded to use it. Most made at least a show of asking Congress for approval, but approval was never hard to get when the war fever got going and anyone who questioned it was dismissed as unpatriotic.
All of which leaves us in a quandary. Giving up our military is not really an option. But preventing the President from using it as he pleases has not proven practical. I am still looking for an answer.
In Shooting Down the Airplane, Iran Shot Itself in the Foot
So, it appears that the Ukrainian airplane that crashed in Iran was shot down by a surface-to-air missile. This should not be surprising. The crash in the middle of a political and military crisis seemed like an extraordinary coincidence, so it should hardly come as a surprise that it was not a coincidence.
Thus far no one* is suggesting that the Iranians did it deliberately, and I am inclined to agree, for two reasons. One is that shooting down passenger jets is a sensitive topic for Iranians. The US shot down an Iranian passenger jet in 1988. It was in the middle of a war zone, the sort of crisis decision that is easy to get wrong -- and we did. On the other hand, the US government conducted a thorough investigation and acknowledged the mistakes made (even as it argued that those mistakes were understandable) and, although it never formally apologized, expressed regrets for the mistake and paid damages. Needless to say, Iran is unlikely to be as honest in its assessments.
I wish I could believe this episode would make Iran a little more understanding of our actions in 1988 -- not going so far as to excuse us, perhaps, but seeing how anyone could have made them. But I don't think this will happen any more than the 1988 incident made us any more understanding of the 1983 Soviet shoot down of a Korean plane.**
I knew that shooting down passenger jet was a sensitive topic to Ukrainians because a Malaysian airplane was shot down in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatists. What I did not realize was that the Ukrainian air force also mistakenly shot down a passenger jet in 2001 although, to their credit, they apologized for the mistake.
I hope it is not insensitive to this terrible tragedy to give some thoughts to the political ramifications. It seems to me that a whole lot of people were marveling at Iran's political brilliance in its air strikes on the US bases in Iraq. They refrained from killing anyone and were therefore not too provocative, but showed such pinpoint accuracy as to serve as an obvious warning. The Iranians also gained by rallying the population in outrage over the killing of their general and keeping some support in Europe in hopes of saving the JCPOA. All that squandered with one careless act!
Presumably the unity that followed the killing of Suleimani will dissipate fast if Iranians find out that their government killed 82 of their fellow countrymen -- and by shooting down a passenger plane, no less. (I don't know how well the government will be able to suppress this news, but it is getting harder these days). Europeans who were willing to work with Iran in a desperate attempt to salvage the nuclear deal may feel differently after the Iranians killed so many of their countrymen. They would probably forgive the mistake if only the Iranians owned up to it, but we all know that won't happen. And firing missiles into Iraq, even if the missiles didn't actually kill anyone, has understandably offended a lot of Iraqis.
The good news (I guess) is that no one seems to want to use this to escalate the crisis -- at least not yet.
And one more comment. It appears I was too credulous in believing the Administration when it said a major attack was in the offing. Members of Congress shown the evidence all agree there was nothing to support it.
_______________________________________
*Well, probably someone way off in the fever swamps is saying it, but I don't care to go hunting that far. No one in the Trump Administration or any reputable source is saying it, and that is enough for me.
**The Korean plane had wandered into a militarily sensitive area at the same time as a spy plane. The Soviets appear to have confused the two planes -- a less excusable mistake, but still a mistake.
Thus far no one* is suggesting that the Iranians did it deliberately, and I am inclined to agree, for two reasons. One is that shooting down passenger jets is a sensitive topic for Iranians. The US shot down an Iranian passenger jet in 1988. It was in the middle of a war zone, the sort of crisis decision that is easy to get wrong -- and we did. On the other hand, the US government conducted a thorough investigation and acknowledged the mistakes made (even as it argued that those mistakes were understandable) and, although it never formally apologized, expressed regrets for the mistake and paid damages. Needless to say, Iran is unlikely to be as honest in its assessments.
I wish I could believe this episode would make Iran a little more understanding of our actions in 1988 -- not going so far as to excuse us, perhaps, but seeing how anyone could have made them. But I don't think this will happen any more than the 1988 incident made us any more understanding of the 1983 Soviet shoot down of a Korean plane.**
I knew that shooting down passenger jet was a sensitive topic to Ukrainians because a Malaysian airplane was shot down in Ukraine by Russian-backed separatists. What I did not realize was that the Ukrainian air force also mistakenly shot down a passenger jet in 2001 although, to their credit, they apologized for the mistake.
I hope it is not insensitive to this terrible tragedy to give some thoughts to the political ramifications. It seems to me that a whole lot of people were marveling at Iran's political brilliance in its air strikes on the US bases in Iraq. They refrained from killing anyone and were therefore not too provocative, but showed such pinpoint accuracy as to serve as an obvious warning. The Iranians also gained by rallying the population in outrage over the killing of their general and keeping some support in Europe in hopes of saving the JCPOA. All that squandered with one careless act!
Presumably the unity that followed the killing of Suleimani will dissipate fast if Iranians find out that their government killed 82 of their fellow countrymen -- and by shooting down a passenger plane, no less. (I don't know how well the government will be able to suppress this news, but it is getting harder these days). Europeans who were willing to work with Iran in a desperate attempt to salvage the nuclear deal may feel differently after the Iranians killed so many of their countrymen. They would probably forgive the mistake if only the Iranians owned up to it, but we all know that won't happen. And firing missiles into Iraq, even if the missiles didn't actually kill anyone, has understandably offended a lot of Iraqis.
The good news (I guess) is that no one seems to want to use this to escalate the crisis -- at least not yet.
And one more comment. It appears I was too credulous in believing the Administration when it said a major attack was in the offing. Members of Congress shown the evidence all agree there was nothing to support it.
_______________________________________
*Well, probably someone way off in the fever swamps is saying it, but I don't care to go hunting that far. No one in the Trump Administration or any reputable source is saying it, and that is enough for me.
**The Korean plane had wandered into a militarily sensitive area at the same time as a spy plane. The Soviets appear to have confused the two planes -- a less excusable mistake, but still a mistake.
Tuesday, January 7, 2020
Impeachment Hearings: Swamp versus Deep State
As we all know, Donald Trump ran on a promise to "drain the swamp" in Washington, D.C. He and his supporters regularly blame his troubles on the "deep state." So the question is, are the deep state and the swamp the same thing?
What got me thinking about this was the impeachment hearings. At the impeachment hearings, Gordon Sondland stood out, not just because he was not a note taker and therefore dependent on notes taken by the others, or because he was the only witness who had actually talked to Trump. He was also the only witness who was not a career federal employee.* Instead, he was a hotelier who had gotten his appointment by making a million dollar donation to Trump's inauguration.
"Deep state," so far as I can tell, means all career federal employees. It presumably does not mean foot soldiers signed up for a single term of enlistment because they are not careerists, but it does include the military brass, as evidenced by Trump's denunciation of military brass as "deep state" when they tried a Navy SEAL for war crimes. There is room for some doubt whether the "deep state" includes rank and file career federal employees (military or civilian), especially ones who support Trump. But certainly any career federal employee far enough up the hierarchy to have any real authority or discretion would be "deep state." That would include all the impeachment witnesses except Sondland.
So, Sondland was the only impeachment witness who was not part of the deep state. But is he also the only one who is not part of the swamp?
I have yet to hear anyone rigorously define the "swamp." I did follow Kevin Drum's Swamp Watch, keeping track of which members of the original Trump cabinet were members of the swamp. (Answer: most). By his definition, all Washington insiders were swamp. This included career federal employees and anyone who in the present or past held any federal office, elective or appointive, military or civilian. It would presumably also include lobbyists, but they proved too toxic to handle. (And probably didn't want to give up their lucrative gigs to slum it in government).
Drum also defined state governors as part of the swamp, but not state Attorney Generals. I can't say I follow his logic there.
He did not classify business and industry leaders as part of the swamp because they were not part of DC politics, but made an exception for Wall Street, presumably because Trump implausibly ran against it. He also included Rex Tillerson, not because the Exxon CEO is part of the swamp, but because he got the job on the recommendation of Robert Gates and Condolezza Rice, former office holders now working as consultants:
____________________________________
*Some of the others were retirees who had gone back to work for the government, but all the others had made a career at it.
What got me thinking about this was the impeachment hearings. At the impeachment hearings, Gordon Sondland stood out, not just because he was not a note taker and therefore dependent on notes taken by the others, or because he was the only witness who had actually talked to Trump. He was also the only witness who was not a career federal employee.* Instead, he was a hotelier who had gotten his appointment by making a million dollar donation to Trump's inauguration.
"Deep state," so far as I can tell, means all career federal employees. It presumably does not mean foot soldiers signed up for a single term of enlistment because they are not careerists, but it does include the military brass, as evidenced by Trump's denunciation of military brass as "deep state" when they tried a Navy SEAL for war crimes. There is room for some doubt whether the "deep state" includes rank and file career federal employees (military or civilian), especially ones who support Trump. But certainly any career federal employee far enough up the hierarchy to have any real authority or discretion would be "deep state." That would include all the impeachment witnesses except Sondland.
So, Sondland was the only impeachment witness who was not part of the deep state. But is he also the only one who is not part of the swamp?
I have yet to hear anyone rigorously define the "swamp." I did follow Kevin Drum's Swamp Watch, keeping track of which members of the original Trump cabinet were members of the swamp. (Answer: most). By his definition, all Washington insiders were swamp. This included career federal employees and anyone who in the present or past held any federal office, elective or appointive, military or civilian. It would presumably also include lobbyists, but they proved too toxic to handle. (And probably didn't want to give up their lucrative gigs to slum it in government).
Drum also defined state governors as part of the swamp, but not state Attorney Generals. I can't say I follow his logic there.
He did not classify business and industry leaders as part of the swamp because they were not part of DC politics, but made an exception for Wall Street, presumably because Trump implausibly ran against it. He also included Rex Tillerson, not because the Exxon CEO is part of the swamp, but because he got the job on the recommendation of Robert Gates and Condolezza Rice, former office holders now working as consultants:
So Tillerson pays Gates and Rice for “consulting,” whatever that means, and they in turn recommend him to Trump for the State Department. Welcome to the swamp, ladies and gentlemen.Much the same goes for Sondland. He is clearly not part of the "swamp" in the sense of being part of DC politics, but he got his appointment by making a million dollar contribution to the Trump inauguration, a perfectly legal and longstanding, bipartisan form of corruption that is almost a standard way of doing business. That's not part of the deep state, but it sure sounds swampy to me.
____________________________________
*Some of the others were retirees who had gone back to work for the government, but all the others had made a career at it.
Impeachment Hearings: A Very Strange Questions from Devin Nunes
At the impeachment hearings, each party had 45 minutes for the party's leading member on the committee and its counsel to ask questions. For Democrats, that meant Adam Schiff (committee chair) and Daniel Goldman, Democratic counsel. For Republicans, that meant Devin Nunes (ranking minority member on the committee) and Steve Castor, Republican counsel.
Schiff and Goldman were more or less interchangeable, working together in building their case.
Nunes and Castor were distinctly different. Castor did a normal job of knocking the Democrats' case down. Nunes, by contrast, wandered off in some very strange, conspiratorial directions.
There was some overlap. Both pointed out that the former prosecutor general's investigation of Burisma seemed to end when he was paid a bribe. (Suspicious circumstances, but not proven). Both pointed out that Paul Manafort was fired as Trump's campaign manager after Ukrainians revealed that he had received payoffs recorded in the black ledger. Both pointed out that various Ukrainians said mean things about Trump during the campaign, which made him unfavorably disposed toward them.
Only Nunes created the distinct impression that there was a sinister conspiracy involving the Democrats in general and Biden in particular. Some of it was fairly easy to see through. When he talked about "transfers" of three million dollars to Hunter Biden that implied secret transfers and money laundering. In fact, if Hunter's salary on the Burisma Board of Directors was $50,000 a month, that would be $600,000 per year. Over a period of five years that would, in fact, be three million, though what he was being paid to do is another matter.
But there was one other allegation that was truly eye-catching. Nunes asked the witnesses if they were aware that Vice President Biden made three phone calls pressing for Ukraine to replace Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin right after his office raided the president of Burisma's house. Everything I had heard up till then had dismissed the possibility that Joe Biden was trying to shield his son from investigation when he pressed to change prosecutor because the investigation of Burisma was dormant at the time. If, in fact, Biden's interest in changing prosecutor general began right after a raid on the owner of Burisma's house, that is rather a different matter. So this fits into the category of "important, if true." The first clue that it was not true is that none of the other Republicans raised the purported raid.
We now have in investigation by Glenn Kessler, fact checker for the Washington Post as to what actually took place.
The owner of Burisma was Mykola Zlochevsky, and he was in exile as all relevant times. The prosecution was, indeed, dormant at the time of Biden's intervention, presumably as the result of a bribe. The Prosecutor General's office seized Zlochevsky's property on February 2, 2015. In November, the Ukrainian parliament passed a statute raising the standard of proof for seizure of assets. In December, 2015, jurisdiction was transferred to the National Anti-corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). During the transfer, Zlochevsky appealed the seizure and on December 25, 2015, the court ordered the assets unseized. The order was published on January 27, 2016, prompting a public outcry. So the Prosecutor General sought to reinstate the seizure, which was done on February 4, 2016.
Both Nunes and Lindsey Graham made clear that the suspect phone calls took place in 2016, i.e., not after the original seizure, but after the seized property was re-seized. Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was fired in March, 2016. The call readouts show Biden pressing for fighting corruption and calling for the firing of Shokin, but make no mention of Burisma which was, after all, only one of many instances of corrupt business dealings.
No raid took place. The suggestion of a raid was apparently a misunderstanding of the seizure of assets in the courts.
The owner of Burisma was Mykola Zlochevsky, and he was in exile as all relevant times. The prosecution was, indeed, dormant at the time of Biden's intervention, presumably as the result of a bribe. The Prosecutor General's office seized Zlochevsky's property on February 2, 2015. In November, the Ukrainian parliament passed a statute raising the standard of proof for seizure of assets. In December, 2015, jurisdiction was transferred to the National Anti-corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). During the transfer, Zlochevsky appealed the seizure and on December 25, 2015, the court ordered the assets unseized. The order was published on January 27, 2016, prompting a public outcry. So the Prosecutor General sought to reinstate the seizure, which was done on February 4, 2016.
Both Nunes and Lindsey Graham made clear that the suspect phone calls took place in 2016, i.e., not after the original seizure, but after the seized property was re-seized. Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin was fired in March, 2016. The call readouts show Biden pressing for fighting corruption and calling for the firing of Shokin, but make no mention of Burisma which was, after all, only one of many instances of corrupt business dealings.
No raid took place. The suggestion of a raid was apparently a misunderstanding of the seizure of assets in the courts.
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