The Federalist Papers Condemn Armed Rebellion

Supporters of the insurrectionist school of the Second Amendment do not quote the Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and 16, giving Congress partial authority over the militia.  Nor do they quote the Constitutional Convention on the subject, which consists of a debate whether Congress or the states should have ultimate authority over the militia.  What they do like to quote are the Federalist Papers, which do, indeed, affirm the right of revolution three times.  But they also regularly condemn "insurrection," "rebellion," or "sedition" as evils to be suppressed.

First, the Federalist Papers on the danger of insurrection, rebellion or sedition, and the need to suppress them:

Federalist Paper 21 lists among the defects of the Articles of Confederation that it does not allow for outside assistance against domestic rebellions:

The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing of this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply a tacit guaranty from considerations of utility, would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion from the like considerations. The want of a guaranty, though it might in its consequences endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence as the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.

Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged [Shays Rebellion], evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of Connecticut or New York?

This seems like an unduly harsh description of debt-strapped farmers resisting dispossession, but it does make a very clear point.  The Founding Fathers did not share a basic assumption of today's insurrectionists.  They did not assume that government was the sole threat to liberty, and that there could never be a threat from people offering armed rebellion.

Federalist Paper 27 argues that there will be no need to fear that the federal government will have to be administered by military force.  Among its reasons, it argues that it is a government that does not have the normal bureaucratic mechanism for governing (which the federal government did not have under the Articles of Confederation), but does have an army will be constantly tempted to govern by military force. The Letter also says that:

The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment and to inspire the LATTER, than that of a single State, which can only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the Confederacy than to that of a single member

This, incidentally, was not intended to condemn a defect, as today's insurrectionists might expect.  It was intended to commend a strong central government as a good deterrent to political violence.

Federalist Paper 28 goes on to address this subject at some length:

THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible principle of republican government), has no place but in the reveries of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.

Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the national presumption is that they would be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents; and if the general government should be found in practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support.

If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders within that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New York had been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for success in such an enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force for the execution of her design? If it must then be admitted that the necessity of recurring to a force different from the militia, in cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the national government might be under a like necessity, in similar extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the abstract, should urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend; and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations and frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of petty republics?

It would be hard to find viewpoint further removed from Jefferson's famous remark that the tree of liberty must be periodically refreshed by the blood of patriots and tyrants!  While Jefferson sees occasional (or not so occasional) insurrections as a good thing that keeps government honest, Hamilton such insurrections as "the continual scourge[ ] of petty republics."  And, it must be emphasized, Hamilton's was decidedly the majority view.

Well, one may say, that's Hamilton, who's skepticism about the people's ability to rule themselves was well-known.  But Madion says much the same in Federalist Paper 43.  After noting the federal government's uncontroversial power to protect states against invasion, he adds:

Protection against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature. [Referring to Shays Rebellion].  At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the force, to subvert a government; and consequently, that the federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given to the one without communicating the wound to the other. Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power, than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the necessity of exerting it.

Is it true that force and right are necessarily on the same side in republican governments? May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election! May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below the level of men [i.e., slaves]; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States, not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be if such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free governments; if a project equally effectual could be established for the universal peace of mankind! Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the compass of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which no possible constitution can provide a cure. Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. ''

Let us unpack this a bit.  " Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion to the friends of government."  Apparently Madison believes that federal intervention to suppress an insurrection against a state government can be appropriate even when the number of people supporting it is roughly comparable the the number opposing.  "Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election!"  Madison is clearly saying that a minority of the population, if it has superior military training and organization, may prevail over the majority by force.  Apparently he does not share the implicit view of today's insurrectionists that only government can be a threat to freedom, and that people who offer armed resistance to government are necessarily pure of heart.  In fact, he thinks a minority willing to resort to violence might seize power by force and oppress the majority.  He is also willing to suppress insurrections by a majority disenfranchised by property restrictions on the vote, or by slaves, a viewpoint even the rest of us might find offensive.  He even believes that "an insurrection pervading all the States, and comprising a superiority of the entire force" may still not be "a constitutional right," but an evil beyond remedy, though fortunately unlikely to happen.  (Admittedly, he also seems to imply here that sometimes such a rebellion might be "a constitutional right."  He makes not attempt to determine when it would or would not be so).

Next:  How the Federalist Papers propose to curb the dangers of a standing army without the resort to armed force.