How the Federalist Papers Propose to Counter the Dangers of a Standing Army without Resorting to Armed Force

One common argument in favor of "Second Amendment solutions" is that our government has enough armed might to establish a military dictatorship, and that the only remedy is for private citizens to be sufficiently armed to be able to fight the army to a standstill.

While it is certainly true that Anti-Federalists at the time the Constitution was being debated saw standing armies as threats to freedom, it is also true that they did not see the proper remedy as an armed citizenry ready to resist.  Anti-Federalists (unaccountably, perhaps, to some gun advocates today) did not think an armed showdown between the army and the people was desirable.  What they wanted was not to have a standing army at all.  Several numbers of the Federalist Papers are devoted to arguing that a standing army can be safely constrained without resort to armed force.  The entries are longer, so I will paraphrase, rather than quoting directly.

The discussion begins in Federalist 24.  Here Hamilton takes the perspective of a hypothetical stranger, visiting the US and listening to the outcry against standing armies.  This stranger, Hamilton says, "would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the legislature."  Hamilton then goes on to point out that, although the President commands the army, only Congress has the authority to create an army in the first place.  He appears to see this, in itself, as a sufficient safeguard, as it was said at the time, putting the sword and the purse in separate hands.  Thus, he seems to be arguing that the real danger is not in standing armies, but in private armies controlled by the executive, not authorized by the legislature.  (What he would think of private armies, controlled by groups of private citizens, without any public accountability is never so much as addressed).

He then goes on to propose that if this hypothetical stranger read the Constitution and realized that it actually gave the legislature sole power to create armies, he would assume that the uproar was caused because up until then, standing armies had been forbidden, either by state constitutions or the Articles of Confederation, and so people were alarmed because the US had never had a standing army before.  But this hypothetical stranger would quickly learn that only two states said that standing armies "ought not to be kept up," and that the others merely said they should not be kept without the consent of the legislature, and that the Articles of Confederation forbids standing armies to states, but not the federal government.  So, Hamilton concludes, the fuss is simply silly.  Hamilton is being a bit disingenuous here.  Since the Articles of Confederation forbade states from keeping standing armies, it hardly mattered whether state constitutions allowed them or not.  Furthermore (as he acknowledges), under the Articles of Confederation, federal troops had to be supplied by the states.  Any time the states started seeing the federal army as a threat, they could easily neutralize it by refusing to supply troops.  The parallel provision under the Constitution says that no appropriation for an army shall be for more than two years, i.e., one session of Congress.*

In Federalist 25, Hamilton makes to essentially contradictory arguments why the national defense should not be left to the states.  He argues both that they would shirk their fair share, and that to do so would lead to arms races between the states.  Both cannot happen, but it does seem likely to assume that if states had been allowed military autonomy, one or the other would have.

In Federalist 26, Hamilton expounds at greater length on the same themes as in No. 24.  He begins by pointing out that in England, during the Glorious Revolution, when England enacted its own Bill of Rights that served as a template for the states, it did not ban standing armies, but any army "unless with the consent of Parliament."  In other words, private executive armies were banned, but no restriction was placed on the legislature.  He then repeats the point made in No. 24 that with two exceptions, the states only forbid standing armies without the consent of the legislature and that those two states (Pennsylvania and North Carolina) do not actually ban standing armies but merely say that they "ought not to be kept up."**

Hamilton then goes on to the importance of the two-year limitation for appropriations:

The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not AT LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent.

Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE TIME to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should resolve to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.

If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great an extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so situated, for such vast augmentations of the military force? It is impossible that the people could be long deceived; and the destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.

It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the people into submission, would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the question again recurs, upon what pretense could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defense of the community under such circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one of those calamaties for which there is neither preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government; it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common defense.

All right then, once again, let us unpack what Hamilton is saying.  He is arguing that because no appropriation for an army can be for more than two years, after each election Congress will have to reconsider whether the army it has funded is worth keeping and either continue or disband it.   He further argues that, since any plan to establish a military dictatorship will take time, there should be an intervening election.  If the army is larger than appropriate, someone will point out the danger, and the people and states will elect a new Congress that will disband it well before it can actually stage a coup.  Notice once again, that he considers raising an army to be just as legitimate to quell a rebellion as to resist and invasion, and that if the only way to defeat an invasion or insurrection is with an army large enough to threaten liberty, it is an evil that cannot be guarded against.  So apparently he does not consider a rebellion on such a scale as presumptive proof that liberty is already in danger, or that a rebellion on such a scale is necessarily a defense of liberty.

Of course, I can imagine today's insurrectionists dismissing such arguments as outdated.  We already have an army large enough to menace liberty; no one (including the insurrectionists themselves) seriously considers disbanding it; our military has become an interest group capable of defending itself, not just by force, but within the political process.  Clearly, then, the safeguards Hamilton proposed have already failed, and recourse to force is the only way to prevent our government from exercising its inherent tendency to establish a dictatorship.

Well, in fact, although the Federalist Papers condemn "insurrection," "rebellion" and "sedition," the do three times affirm the right of revolution, even against the new government being formed.  The obvious question, then, is how one knows the difference.  The Federalist Papers never say.  However, I believe they contain a clue, one that should give insurrectionists pause.  That will be the topic I discuss next.