a sanctified and noble way." He argues that conservatives and people of the lower class are more willing to accept gut-level moral intuitions, even if they cannot give a rational, harm-based explanation for them. And he warns that liberals come across as snobbish, or at least clueless if they reject people's moral intuitions.
Well, sure, I think it is obvious that moral decisions are made at the gut level. I also agree that the idea that a degree in ethics makes you inherently more moral that a person without such a degree is offensive. And I think that to ignore people's moral intuitions and attempt to make moral decisions on purely "rational" basis can reach monstrous conclusions, like, say, killing a socially useless predatory lender in order to use her money for the greater social good. I am less sure that this is simply a question of conservatives/less educated people make intuitive moral decisions; liberals/more educated people make purely rational ones. This may be generally true, but I think there are also times when different groups simply have different moral intuitions. For instance, the intensity and absolutism of liberal opposition to torture suggests that it is the sort of thing that comes from the gut. And Dorothy Sayers' Gaudy Night turns on the question of whether a professor should be fired for falsifying an obscure bit of historical research that has no practical impact on anyone. Yes, say the women professors, even if it means he can no longer support his wife and children. His wife, by contrast, sees this as an outrage. How can they deprive them of their livelihood all over some meaningless bit of trivia that never hurt anyone.
But let us accept his generalization. Haidt goes on to argue that two universal moral values refraining from harming others, and some concept of fairness, roughly defined as reciprocity. These are values equally shared by liberals and conservative. But, Haidt argues, a society that relied only on those values would be a remarkably cold and shallow society. (And, although he does not add it, it would be much like an Ayn Randian libertarian society that liberals find so distasteful; one that equates freedom with atomization and regards individuals' obligations to each other as purely negative -- don't commit crimes or breach your contracts). He argues that there are three other important values that liberals don't relate to as well as conservatives -- loyalty to one's in-group, respect for authority, and purity/sanctity, a category that can cover anything from chastity to respect for sacred symbols to disgust at violation of a taboo. He implies, but does not add, another value -- personal autonomy.* This is an immensely important value in American culture, much esteemed by both liberals and conservatives, although conservatives are more likely to see it in economic terms and liberals in social terms. It is not generally much regarded in traditional societies.
He then goes on to discuss ways in which liberals might start adopting these values as their own. He is rather brief on this matter, but it deserves more discussion. I have two points to make here, that I hope to develop in more detail in my next few posts.
One is that I don't think liberals are quite as tone deaf as he thinks. Contrary to what he suggests, most liberals are appalled at the libertarian vision he paints of a society based solely on harm, fairness, and personal autonomy. It is the society of Ayn Rand, or Margaret Thatcher saying, There's no such thing as society. No doubt part of liberal's aversion to such a society is the fear that it would leave the weaker members vulnerable to the stronger. But I think there is more. Liberals, just like conservatives, long for a closer knit society where people care for each other and feel more obligation than just to refrain from harming each other.
Consider, for instance, an easy example Haidt takes. The family dog is hit by a car and killed. The family had no role in killing their dog. They therefore harm no one in eating it. Everyone felt revulsion at the act, but college student were able to overcome their revulsion and accept the act as "rational." You might come up with a utilitarian argument against eating the dog, mostly that it would upset other family members. But what if the whole family agreed? The answer lower-class respondents usually gave was some variant on, "Your dog is family and you just don't eat family."** I am guessing that most liberal and college people, even if they did not come up with this argument on their own, would happily seize on it as expressing exactly what they were trying to say in explaining their disgust. Exploring these other values may help liberals understand more clearly their horror and revulsion at the libertarian society, and see what alternative there are besides government programs.
But my other point is less optimistic. Simply put, there are trade-offs here. Not everyone agrees on what in-group they should be loyal to, what authority deserves respect, or what is sacred. Nor does anyone agree when members of one's in-group or authority figures no longer deserve respect. In a pluralistic society, these can be immense problems. Furthermore, there are trade-offs here. Loyalty to one's in-group may undermine one's ability to be fair to outsiders. Respect for authority may mean turning a blind eye when that authority acts unjustly. One person's sacred symbols may infringe on another's.
Haidt concludes by saying:
The Democrats would lose their souls if they ever abandoned their commitment to social justice, but social justice is about getting fair relationships among the parts of the nation. This often divisive struggle among the parts must be balanced by a clear and oft-repeated commitment to guarding the precious coherence of the whole. America lacks the long history, small size, ethnic homogeneity, and soccer mania that holds many other nations together, so our flag, our founding fathers, our military, and our common language take on a moral importance that many liberals find hard to fathom.
I worry that the proposals he makes, by ignoring those trade offs, my mean sacrificing our soul for political gain. More on that in the next few posts.
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*It is my understanding that he has since updated his moral taxonomy to include this value.
**I suppose this is a matter of in-group loyalty.
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