A Comment on the Supreme Court

 I know it is not a popular thing to say on my side of the aisle, but I am okay with the recent rulings coming out of the Supreme Court.  If you believe (and I do) that a strong democratic conservative party is essential to the health of democracy, then it is important to give some thought to what a democratic conservative party means.

And let's face facts.  A democratic conservative party won't always agree with us on all the issues.  Disagreements of this kind are normal  Democracy does not always mean that we will get our way.  A democratic conservative party is not a liberal party or even liberal-lite.

So what is a democratic conservative party?  I would say that it is a party that agrees on certain democratic structures, rules of the game, and individual rights and contests power within those structures and rules. First and foremost, that means accepting defeat and living to fight another day.  It means not trying to overturn election outcomes one doesn't like.  It means applying the rules of the game in an even-handed way. And yes, there is room to challenge the rules, to change them and contest them.  And yes, there is a certain amount of hypocrisy by all players on procedural matters.

But clearly, for instance, it is not compatible with being a true democratic conservative party to concentrate all power in the hands of state legislatures gerrymandered to ensure one-party rule regardless of the vote.  It is not compatible with stripping away all power from any actor who might challenge gerrymandered state legislatures -- whether statewide elected executive officials, judges, local authorities, initiative and referendum, or the federal government. It is not compatible with changing the rules every time you lose an election.  It is not compatible with using the power of the state to punish disfavored views.  And so forth.

But it is compatible with a wide range of opinions on appropriate levels of spending or government services, or on crime, or abortion, or affirmative action, and so forth.

And so it was with the Supreme Court.  the Supreme Court rejected the Independent State Legislature theory -- that state legislatures have the power to set (federal) election rules, unrestrained by governors, state courts, or even state constitutions.  It rejected the idea that states can sue to force the President to deport more immigrants, saying that government has limited resources and cannot possibly catch everyone who is in violation of our laws, and therefore has to have authority to set priorities. And it upheld our libel law making it difficult but not impossible for public figures to recover.  And all of these uphold the overall structure of democracy and democratic rules of the road.

But it rejected affirmative action.  And allowed website designers to refuse to publish certain messages. And it limited the President's ability to forgive student loan debt without an act of Congress. All of which simply means that the the Supreme Court is taking the conservative view on matters of policy. And really, affirmative action, the scope of religious exemptions, and loan forgiveness are the sorts of policy issues that we can in good faith disagree on, so long as the disagreement take place in the proper democratic framework.

So What Do We Make of THAT?!

So what do we make of THAT?  Paul Manafort, who served as the Trump campaign manager from June to August was, if not a Russian spy, a remarkably good imitation of one.  From May until August, he sent a steady, encrypted, stream of polling data and possibly other briefings to his translator, Konstantin Kilmmik, judged to be a Russian spy.  The communications were so well encrypted that neither Robert Mueller nor the Senate Intelligence Committee was able to figure out exactly what was sent, much less what became of the data.

The Committee has several pages, mostly redacted discussing the possibility of Kilmink's -- and even Manafort's -- "involvement" or "connection" with the hack and leak operation  Again granting that what is hidden is never as juicy as what the imagination fills in, and that it is wildly irresponsible to speculate, let me give some wildly irresponsible speculations.  First of all, to my untrained eye "involvement" and "connection" are not synonyms.  At least to my untrained understanding "involvement" implies some sort of participation, probably at a very minor or tangential level.  More central participation would be covered by a term like, "participated in" or "took part in."  At an absolute minimum, "involvement" would suggest advance knowledge of the hacks.  "Connection" could simply mean having some sort of tie to one of the participants, or even a tie to someone with a tie to a participant.  It seems wildly improbably that Manafort was in any way a participant in what appears to have been a highly secret and closely held operation.  As for whether he had some sort of direct or indirect ties to the participants, this can easily lead to playing a game of six degrees of separation, and that way lies paranoia.  

Paul Manafort

On the other hand, the Committee may be using "involvement" or "connection" to mean advance knowledge. It appears to believe that Kilimnik had advance knowledge and may be speculating whether Kilimnik passed this information on to Manafort, a thing the Committee has no direct evidence of.  Its redacted section may refer to Manafort behaving in a way that suggested advance knowledge.  It should also be noted that the GRU breached the DNC in April, 2016, that Kilimnik and Manafort met in person in May, and that the hack became public knowledge June 14, 2016. So possibly Trump's campaign manager may have known about the hack and started sending polling data to a representative of the organization responsible for the hack a month before the hack became public knowledge.  

The next and obvious question is what Kilimnik wanted with the polling data.  Neither the Mueller investigation nor Senate Intelligence Committee found any indication. Quite probably, Manafort himself did not know.  Operations of this type tend to be on a don't-ask-don't-tell basis.  Manafort was used to such things.  Rick Gates, Manafort's aide who testified against him, did not know the reason but speculated that Manafort may have been providing the information to prove that Trump had a chance of winning, and that Manafort could be useful in a Trump administration.  That could very well explain Manafort's motives, but why did Kilimnik, and whoever Kilimnik was reporting to, want the  information?  Were the solely interested in Trump's prospects?  There have been suggestions that the polling data may have been passed on to the Troll Farm to help them target their ads.  I suppose this is possible, although the trolls seem to have gotten quite a good understanding of how to navigate US politics by interacting with actual Americans. Nor is there any evidence, so far as I know, tying the Troll Farm to the hack and leak.  Another possibility, which I will discuss at greater length when commenting on the next section, is that the GRU may have used polling data to guide its direct release of information.  

And the other major question is what did Trump know and when did he know it.  So far as we can tell, he knew nothing whatever about these activities.  Manafort seems to have been a rogue player, acting for his own personal motives.  His motive appear to have been financial -- Manafort was in heavy debt to Deripaska and hoped that Deripaska would write off the debt if the data proved useful.  Nor is there any evidence that Trump willfully turned a blind eye on all of this.  Certainly that was my first thought.  If Trump's campaign manager was stealing polling data and using it for his own personal gain, one would expect Trump to be furious over the betrayal.  Or maybe not.  Maybe I am just not thinking like a patrimonialist.  Manafort, after all, offered his services to the Trump campaign for free.  But Trump could hardly expect Manafort, who was under serious financial pressure, to forego compensation altogether. Presumably he expected Manafort to make up the difference later on his own by influence peddling.   Maybe Trump, on learning of what had happened, decided that after all, data theft didn't hurt him any and was a small price to pay for Manfort's free services, and his silence.  

Alternately, it is possible that the Trump and Republicans in general never expressed outrage over Manafort's betrayal because, ensconced in their right wing media bubble, they never heard about it.

Look, I succumbed to paranoia over Trump and Russia once before and I really don't want to make the same mistake twice.  But Volume V is a positive invitation to, replete with invitations to connect the dots and play six degrees of separation.

And the following chronology seems -- troubling:

April 12, 2016    GRU successfully hacks the DNC server, starts making plans to release the contents

April 26, 2016    Joseph Mifsud, believed to be a Russian agent, approaches George Papadopoulos saying that the Russians have damaging information on Hillary in the form of "thousands of e-mails."

May 5-7, 2016    GRU agent Konstantin Kilimnik visits the US and meets with Paul Manafort.  After he leaves, Manafort starts sending regular briefings and campaign polling data.

Granted, this was about when the campaign season got started in earnest.  The timing could be related only in the sense that the campaign season was getting seriously underway.  But it still makes you wonder.

Drumroll! And Now for Volume V, Starting With the Juiciest Parts

 

Volume V is by far the longest of the Senate Intelligence Committee's reports on the 2016 election -- over 900 pages, and longer than all the other volumes combined.  Volume V deals with "Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities," which is really a euphemism for saying it is about what the Trump campaign was doing while Russia was interfering.

Significant parts of Volume V are also blacked out.  It is always good to remember when something is blacked out that what is hidden is never as juicy as your imagination fills in.  That is especially important in this case, because the report invites some very juicy imaginings indeed.  And it starts with the juiciest part of all -- Paul Manafort and his secret communications with Konstantin Kilimnik, presumed agent of the GRU a/k/a Russian Military Intelligence. 

Or, more accurately, it begins (pp. 1-26) with an introduction. The introduction explains the difference between its counterintelligence focus and the criminal focus of Mueller investigation. A criminal investigation determines whether there is enough admissible evidence to allow a jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an action expressly prohibited by law. A counterintelligence investigation considers all evidence, admissible or not,* and considers whether the evidence points to counterintelligence threat, whether or not the threat includes a crime.  The introduction also stresses the bipartisan nature of the investigation, to the point that witnesses being interviewed by committee staff could not tell which party the staffers worked for.  

The Committee only investigated events prior to the Trump inauguration in order to avoid issues of executive privilege.  This was on the assumption that only the Obama Administration would have standing to assert privilege over its own actions, which the Committee anticipated that it might.  In fact, the Committee found, Obama officials were quite cooperative.  The Trump Administration, by contrast, was highly obstructive and kept asserting executive privilege over actions that took place before it took office.  The Committee (p. 6) stated that they did not anticipate this obstruction, although I have my doubts as to whether this surprise was truly bipartisan. The Trump Administration also raised many dubious claims of attorney-client privilege.  This being the Trump Administration, it is hard to tell whether they actually had something to hide were simply interpreted any sort of investigation as a personal vendetta.  Either way, the obstruction does not reflect well on the Trump Administration and really should not have come as a surprise.

Oleg Deripaska

Now, on to the juiciest part.  The discussion of Paul Manafort extends from page 27 to page 169, with significant portions blacked out.  Manafort had done work since 2004 for Oleg Deripaska, a Russian oligarch, and for numerous pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs. Manafort served as an advisor to pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych of the Party of Regions.  This work came to an abrupt end in 2014 when Yanukovych's government was overthrown.  At this point, Manafort found himself unemployed, with large debts to Deripaska, with large amounts owed to him by the Party of Regions, which had no capacity to pay him. (See pp. 34-37, 44-47, including discussion of the Party of Regions' lack of a budget to pay Manafort and resort to collecting from oligarchs). Manafort nonetheless continued to be involved in Ukrainian politics on behalf of the remnants of the pro-Russian party in a vain attempt to get paid so he could pay off his debts to Deripaska (pp. 49-51).  About that time, Manafort offered to serve -- for free -- for the Trump campaign, an offer that should have raised an immediate suspicion of corrupt motive.  The report comments that the Trump campaign hired Manafort with no known vetting, p. 28, treating the offer to work for free as all that was needed, p. 54.

Manafort's translator was Konstantin Kilimnik, a former employee of the GRU (see pp. 40-42).  While the Mueller Report (p. 129) contents itself to say that "the FBI assesses [Kilimnik] to have ties to Russian intelligence," the Senate Intelligence Committee (p. 28), states flatly, "Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer."  Moreover, Volume V (p. 29) says that the Committee obtained information suggesting that Kilimnik may have been "connected" to the hack and leak operation.  This is followed by three paragraphs that are fully blacked out.  (And, FWIW, one paragraph appears to be about three lines, one about seven and a half lines, and one just under six lines). These three, highly tantalizing paragraphs, are followed by a paragraph that may be even more tantalizing for being (mostly) not blacked out:

While this information suggests that a channel for coordination on the GRU hack-and-leak operation may have existed through Kilimnik, the Committee had limited insight into Kilimnik' s communications with Manafort and [approximately one line redacted], all of whom used sophisticated communications security practices.

The Committee assesses that Kilimnik was likely serving as a channel between Manafort and the Russian intelligence services and represented "a grave counterintelligence threat" (p. 30).  In simple English, it appears that the Russians has a spy in the Trump campaign -- his campaign manager, no less.  Certainly Manafort behaved like a spy.  He communicated in person as much as possible and used encrypted applications and coded language for electronic communications, purchased pay-as-you-go phones, and found ways to share e-mails without sending them.  Although not mentioned, in the report, Manafort also had three passports.  Volume V (p. 31, footnote 90), quotes Kilimnik as saying that when he and Manafort worked in Ukraine, they routinely assumed they were being surveilled, so Manafort was used to that life.

Upon being chosen as Trump's campaign manager, Manafort asked Kilimnik to carry messages to three pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs letting them know and suggesting that he might be useful to them if Trump were to win.  He also asked Kilimnik to carry a message to Deripaska offering to brief him, presumably in hopes of persuading Desipaska to drop his lawsuits against Manafort's companies (pp. 58-60). He also continued to correspond with Kilimnik about current Ukrainian politics (p. 61).

Paul Manafort

Manafort was hired by the Trump campaign as convention manager in March, 2016.  Manafort and Kilimnik met when Kilimnik visited the US on May 5-7, 2016, purportedly for a wedding (pp. 67-70).**  In any event, Manafort and Kilimnik definitely met in New York and discussed Ukrainian politics.  It was at this time that Manafort began sending Kilimnik regular polling data. Rick Gates, Manafort's aide who testified against him, did not know the reason for the polling data, but speculated it was to convince his Russian and Ukrainian creditors that Trump really could win the election and that Manafort would be in a position to exercise influence on their behalf (p. 71). The Committee was unable to determine what happened to the polling data, nor were they able to access the content of the messages sent. Volume V goes on to say (pp 73-74) that Kilimnik seemed to have inside information about the campaigned, followed by one paragraph about the choice of Mike Pence and three paragraphs that were blacked out (5 1/2 lines, 7 lines, and 4 lines FWIW). 

And, of course, there was the August 2 meeting set forth in some detail in the Mueller report (pp. 74-76). The Committee was not able to determine what Kilmnik did with the polling data, but it did find one piece of information that could be a reflection of Kilimnik's actions after the August 2 meeting, though they could not tell if it was related to the polling data.  The relevant paragraph is so fully blacked out that one cannot tell the number or length of lines, but it appears to be five or six lines, not indented p. 82).  All of this appears to have been linked to a plan to end the war in Ukraine by severing the eastern parts of the country.***

The report then addresses whether Kilimnik was "connected" to the hack and leak operation, over about four and a half mostly redacted pages (pp. 85-89).  Unredacted portions include a reference to the preceding (redacted) material, to transferring the John Podesta e-mails to Wikileaks, to hacked and leaked conversations between US diplomats in 2014, and to "Cyper Berkut," a GRU persona that has hacked and leaked information on behalf of the Russian government.

Far more shocking and titillating is a statement (p. 89) that, "Manafort's involvement with the GRU hack-and-leak operation is largely unknown."  This is the first suggestion in any reputable source to so much as hint that Manafort had any role in the hack and leak whatever. Volume V then states that Manafort and Kilimnik were in contact throughout the hack and leak operation, but the Committee had no evidence that they discussed it.  

"Two pieces of information, however, raise the possibility of Manafort's potential connection to the hack-and-leak operations."  Naturally, those two pieces are blacked out, or nearly so.  One involves two and a half lines blacked out, followed by an indented portion of about seven lines, blacked out.  Next comes a reference to Jeffrey Yohai, former husband of Manafort's daughter, Jessica, which is distinctly odd.  Jessica appears to have married a man just like her father -- a California real estate developer and chronic fraudster, sentenced to nine years for repeated frauds, and suspected of witness tampering and intimidation. But I know of nothing linking him to Russian intelligence.  

The other piece of evidence is a quote, about eight lines long, origin and contents redacted.  The Committee says that it was unable to corroborate the report's account of [redacted], presumably referring to allegations about Manafort, but was able to corroborate most other aspects of the report (pp. 90-91).  This is followed by a redacted footnote of about 15 and a half lines.

The remainder of the report on Manafort is less juicy, with the possible exception of the redacted parts, which are extensive.  Manafort was apparently slated to be kicked upstairs even before the so-called "black ledger" of payments from the pro-Russian Ukrainian party came to light.  Once the payments were published, it was no longer possible to to make a face-saving arrangement for Manafort to stay on as a figurehead.  He had to go, and was replaced by Steven Bannon (for the nuts) and Kellyanne Conway (for the mainstream) as co-managers.  He nonetheless stayed in regular contact with the campaign, giving it advice, and also stayed in contact with Kilimnik, working on a plan to end the war in Ukraine by creating an "autonomous zone" in the Russia-occupied areas led by Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian leader who Manafort had worked for.  There is also an tantalizing note that just before Manafort was fired, Kilimnik sent an e-mail to a (presumably American) journalist that he was in almost daily contact with Manafort and that Manafort was creating a parallel party structure, although he was not clear whether Manafort would have time to complete it (p. 92).****

There is also a section (pp. 106-120) about various persons, including Deripaska, Kilimnik, and Manafort, implausibly attempting to blame Ukraine for the hack and leak.  I never realized before just how much continuity there was between the Trump/Russia investigation and the first impeachment.

Finally, there is an extended, and largely redacted, section (pp. 137-169) about Manafort's ties to the Russian intelligence services.  Or more, accurately, to Desipaska's indirect ties to the Russian intelligence services, his associates Viktor Boyarkin and Konstantin Kilimnik's roles as direct agents of Russian intelligence, and Manafort's association with all three.  Their activities are mostly blacked out, but appear to be international (Thailand, Montenegro, and Guinea are all mentioned, but most of the account is blacked out).  There are about a page and a half blacked out about Desipaska's "connections" to the hacking operation (pp. 157-158) and also some suggestions (p. 165) that Manafort did not know if Kilimnik was a Russian spy, did not trust him, and would occasionally lie to him to see where the lie spread.

So, to repeat from the beginning, what is hidden is never as juicy as what you imagine.  But this report sure is an invitation to imagine some very juicy things indeed.

___________________________________________________

*Inadmissible evidence is not limited to evidence that was inadmissibly obtained, but also includes a lot of gossip, hearsay, speculation, and the like.
**Kilimnik also visited the US in April, but the Committee found no evidence that he met with Manafort on that visit. As for the wedding, the Committee was unclear.  Kilimnik did not attend a wedding at any time the Committee was able to trace his movements, but they were not able to trace all his movements.  The Committee offered as possibilities (1) Kilimnik may have attended a wedding some time they were not able to trace him, (2) wedding may have been some sort of code word, or (3) attending a wedding may have been an innocuous excuse to be in the US.  Take your pick.  
***The obvious question in the light of hindsight is whether this would have been a good idea.  Would it have staved off the 2022 Russian invasion or merely whetted Putin's appetite for more?  I suppose there is no way to tell.
****Also significant -- Manafort told he FBI he had briefed Trump about his work in Ukraine in case the subject came up, but did not go into detail because Trump did not seem interested.

Senate Intelligence Committee Reports Volumes III and IV: US Government and Intelligence Community

 So, on to Senate Intelligence Committee Russia Report Volume III and Volume IV.

Volume III

Volume III recounts the U.S. government's real time response to Russian election interference and finds it inadequate. At 53 pages, it is the shortest volume. The report found that Obama Administration hampered in its response by a highly politicized environment, concern that warnings would undermine public confidence in election results, fear that Russia might be able to manipulate vote totals, incomplete information, and limited time, and that these prevented an effective response.  The Administration was navigating uncharted waters.  Nothing of this kind had ever happened before.  And one party, after all, stood to benefit from the Russian intervention and therefore had a strong incentive to disbelieve in it and reject effective response.

Most Administration officials said they learned of the Russian hack of the DNC when they read about it in the Washington Post. (p. 5).  The intelligence community appears to have been aware of at least some sort of hack, but it is not clear whether they understood who was making the attempt (pp. 5-8).  

As soon as the hack became publicly known, the GRU (Russian military intelligence, Fancy Bear) created a front identified as "Guccifer 2.0" to claim credit as an individual. Cyber security experts almost immediately saw through Guccifer 2.0.  Guccifer immediately published some of the hacked documents and claimed to have sent others to Wikileaks for publication (p. 9).  Nonetheless, the intelligence community (IC) and policy makers generally saw the hack as intelligence gathering, rather than election interference -- undesirable, of course, but still within normal behavior. The general public became aware that something more was happening on July 22, 2016, when Wikileaks started releasing hacked information right ahead of the Democratic Convention.

But that alone did not truly alarm the Obama Administration and convince them that the hack was a serious threat.  Volume III, pp. 11-13 states that another piece of intelligence convinced the Obama Administration that there was a serious threat. The intelligence was so alarming that the Administration leapt into action within an hour or two. The intelligence was so sensitive that initially only nine executive officials other than the President and National Security Advisor were briefed.  At first, only top ranking intelligence officials were included and ever the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were excluded, although they were later let in (p. 14).  The House and Senate Intelligence Committees were not informed, but the Gang of Eight* were individually briefed throughout August and into early September.

The intelligence tip was also so sensitive that report blacks it out, so we do not know what it was.  But we can make a good guess.  In early August, 2016, Obama received an extremely classified report from the CIA that a confidential source in the Kremlin had reported that the hack and leak operation was ordered by Putin personally with the goal of electing Trump.  Compare the linked story with the report (pages 11-16), the overlap in dates and personnel, and see if Volume III could be referring to anything else.**

Volume III then goes over the perceived constraints (set forth above).  Very much contributing was Donald Trump's insistence in 2016, as in 2020, that the election was "rigged" and that if he lost it would be proof of fraud. Public claims by the Intelligence Community that Russia was in the tank for Trump would only strengthen the impression of a "deep state" plot.  Official also feared that if they exposed Russia's actions, the Russians might retaliate by hacking into state databases and either disrupting the election or altering votes.  The Administration therefore limited itself to admonishing the Russians and offering anti-hacking assistance to state election officials without explaining what the offer was about.  The Russians were unmoved, while state officials generally saw the offer and unwanted federal "interference."  Republican members of the Gang of Eight (including Senator Richard Burr, the Senate Intelligence Committee Chair portrayed above) were deeply distrustful. Only after the election did the Intelligence Community officially attribute the hacks and leaks to the Russian government and begin expelling Russian diplomats. 

Volume III concludes with additional opinions from the Republican members (pp. 47-49) rather hypocritically berating the Obama Administration for its weak-kneed response, and from Democrat Ron Wyden saying that the full Intelligence Committees should have been notified as to what was happening.

Volume IV

Volume IV takes up about where Volume III leaves off.  It is a review of an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) completed after the election on December 30, 2016.  The overall report is favorable. It finds the ICA reviewed numerous sources, followed accepted analytic tradecraft, was free of political interference, and was well supported in its conclusions. The ICA had no policy recommendations, but this is standard practice in the intelligence community.  There was some criticism of open source analysis and historical analysis as weak, and some criticisms of the FBI, but overall Volume IV appears to endorse the ICA in its methodology and conclusions.

It is not possible for the general public to say much more about Volume IV, because, although at 158 pages Volume IV is the second longest report, the vast majority of it is blacked out.  Volume IV (p. 11) give the date that CIA Director John Brennan learned about Operation Crossfire Hurricane (the FBI investigation of the Trump Campaign), but the date is blacked out.  Volume IV also described in excruciating and unredacted detail (pp. 38-46) the feud between the FBI and CIA as to whether to include the Steele Dossier.  The FBI wanted to include the Steele Dossier as part of the report, while the CIA considered the  dossier worthless and contrary to their own human intelligence. The FBI did not want to be accused of hiding anything and finally compromised by including the Steele material in a two-page annex.  The NSA (National Security Agency, signals intelligence) played no part in the dispute. Probably somewhat significant -- Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper said that he first learned of the Steele Dossier on December 15 (p. 42).

Going over the report section by section, Volume IV generally endorses its conclusions except to say that its analysis of historical context was weak and the FBI failed to provide some sort of important material (blacked out). Almost not other details are shown.  

It is hard to tell, but Intelligence Community may not have been aware of the Troll Farm's activities at the time the report was written.  Reviewing the section saying the Russian attack was multifaceted, there were five sections, cyber espionage against political organizations, public disclosures, cyber intrusions on state election systems, propaganda, and another section that is blacked out entirely.  The report goes over these one by one, but does not have a section on the last, completely covered, category.

Finally, there is an opinion section by Senator Wyden that does some justified crowing that these reports clearly show that Russian interference was not a hoax.  What a shame that we, the public, are not allowed to see the proof!  Wyden also calls for paper ballots as backup to safeguard against election hacking, which has mostly been done.

Next up:  Volume V, the biggie.  That one will undoubtedly take multiple posts.

_______________________________________________

*Both party leaders in each house and the chair and ranking minority member of both intelligence committees.

**The WaPo story, it should be noted, had been published over two years before the report.  It is my understanding that the secret spy has been successfully exfiltrated and was later identified. Another possibility were reports by friendly foreign intelligence services of a suspicious volume of contacts between Trump associates and Russian figures, which appear to have come in about the same time.

Senate Intelligence Committee Report, Volume II: Russia's Use of Social Media

 

Well, this is what you get for procrastinating.  I am finally getting around to posting about the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on Russian interference in the 2016 election and already Special Prosecutor John Durham has come out with his report on the investigation.  That will be next, after the Senate Committee report.  In fact, it should be an interesting counterpoint to the Senate Committee and the Inspector General.

But on to the Senate Intelligence Committee Reports.  Volume II (85 pages) deals with Russian activity on social media. 

Its findings are decidedly depressing for anyone who is confident that if free speech is unrestricted, the truth will out.  Rather, it offers actual, empirical evidence for the old saying that the lie is halfway round the world while truth is still putting its boots on.  It quotes an MIT study (p. 10) that tracked over 125,000 news stories on Twitter, shared by three million people over 11 years:

Falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political news than for false news about terrorism, natural disasters, science, urban legends,. or financial information.

The study also found that false stories were 70% more likely to be retweeted than true stories, and that true stories take about six times as long to reach 1,500 people on Twitter as false stories.  This was exacerbated by the frequent use of bots.

The reason for this should not be so hard to understand.  Unfortunately, our brains are not all that well equipped for recognizing truth, flattering delusions to the contrary.  Our brains tend to glom on to things that are simple, unequivocal, catchy, and meet our preconceptions.  Lies can easily be crafted to do these things.  Truth is under no such obligation.  

The report goes on to comment that commercial actors have been manipulating social media for a long time, but with relatively innocuous intent of selling things. The techniques the Russians used in the US in 2016 were ones they had been perfecting had home for many years.  Of course, the Russian government has used propaganda since Soviet times (or earlier), but its propaganda was crude by today's standards. At least two factors have given the Russian government of the 21st century an advantage over its 20th century predecessor.  One is the invention of the internet and later social media, which allows much greater diffusion of propaganda.  The other is that while Communist propaganda had ideological constraints and had to provide a consistent message, present-day Russia had no such constraints and will support any viewpoint so long as it is divisive. 

The report (pp. 15-20) found several consistent characteristics of Russian media tactics: high volume and multiple channels to overwhelm the audience; merging overt and covert operations, as with hack and leak; speed in putting out (false) information; automated accounts and bots, and paid trolls.  The report also emphasized Russian propagandists' complete lack of commitment to ideology in favor of divisiveness for its own sake. Russian propagandists have found that introducing radical viewpoints with no widespread support tends to fall flat. Rather, the more effective approach is to exploit existing divisions and resentment to tear a society apart. 

And on the subject of tearing a society apart, the report also noted that black people were targeted more than any other demographic, often under the guise of anti-police brutality activism and imitations of Black Lives Matter.  This posed a problem for Russian intelligence.  While Black people were the most alienated part of American society and most easy to exploit with social divisions, they were also the least likely to support Donald Trump. So Russian propagandists worked on encouraging Black people to despair and not to vote at all.

Yvgeny Prigozhin

The most interesting part of the report dealt with the Internet Research Agency (IRA)* popularly known as the Troll Farm.  The Troll Farm was run by our friend, Yvgeny Prigozhin, now of Wagner Group infamy. He also operated a troll farm in St. Petersburg.  The report (p. 25) quotes a news article on the operation, which had some 400 employees, working two 12 hour shifts, in nearly 40 rooms.  Originally target toward domestic audiences, the Troll Farm branched out into international operations, including the US.  Employees had a quota per shift of five political posts, and 150 to 200 comments. Leaked materials (p. 26) revealed that trolls were supposed to post on news articles 50 times a day, have at least three Facebook and ten Twitter accounts, with quotas as to the number of subscribers.  The non-political posts were essential to lure in unsuspecting followers and build rapport and trust with people so that scattered political comments would be convincing.  Trolls were expected to constantly create new content and penalized for copying previous posts.  One employee (p. 27) described working for the Troll Farm as feeling very much like working for the Ministry of Truth in 1984.  

The English language language section was the most prestigious.  Trolls obviously had to have strong English language skills and were briefed in US holidays and directed to synchronize with US time zones. Trolls were also trained in what was and was not grounds for blocking for various publications, and to read tens of thousands of comments to learn to fit in.  Interestingly (p. 29) they were specifically forbidden from saying anything about Russia, based on the belief that most Americans just don't talk about Russia. The goal, instead, was to seize on any divisive issue in the US and use it foment divisions.

As discussed before, most Troll Farm content in the US was apolitical and intended to establish trust.  Russian trolls posted in right-wing and left-wing forums and advocated all different political positions so long as they were (1) divisive and (2) anti-Hillary. (Left-wing posts supported either Bernie Sanders or Jill Stein of the Green Party, or else encouraged not voting at all).  Right-wing content was pro-Trump.  After the election, left-wing trolls posted strongly anti-Trump comments that had been absent before the election.  (pp. 32-35).  There was also a spike in activity, particularly on the left, just before Wikileaks released the John Podesta e-mails (pp. 36-37).  The report speculates that this may have been a sign that the trolls had advanced notice, but has no evidence to support this.  Trump primary opponents were also targeted (p. 37). Troll activity increased, rather than decreased, after the election and was geared toward stirring up opposition to Trump (p. 42). 

The report (pp. 43-62) then goes on to give an extended and (to me at least) rather dull account of the different ways that Russian trolls used different social media platforms.  I will forbear to go into detail.  Two larger points are significant. For one, manipulating social media for advantageous posting is older than Russian trolls.  It has been done by commercial actors, mostly for the relatively harmless purpose of selling their product.  Presumably legitimate political actors have used similar forms of manipulation, although the report does not go into it.  But ultimately, social media was designed for part-time, amateur posters.  Full time, professional posters of this type were not anticipated.

I may also have been wrong in saying that the Senate Intelligence Committee did not address the hack and leak operation, considering the Mueller indictment and report to have said all that needs saying.  In fact, Volume II does have a section (pp. 63-70) devoted to Russian military intelligence a/k/a the GRU, a/k/a Fancy Bear's social media activities to spread their hacked documents.  What it says remains unknown to the general public, however, because most of this section is blacked out.

Although the existence of the Troll Farm was reported in the US in 2015 (pp. 25, 72), no one in the US, either government or private citizen, appears to have been aware of its activities in the 2016 election until after the election was over. The report offers various doomsday scenarios of ever more sophisticated forms of micro-targeting and more sophisticated fakes, ever more difficult to detect (pp. 73-75).  But it is the Committee's recommendations that are most . .  interesting . . .  in the clear light of hindsight.  

The Committee, alarmed at the possibility of more trolling activities or spread of hacked information, urges greater information sharing between the public and private sectors.  Social media companies should also cooperate more closely with each other and share information on how to spot fake accounts.  The Committee also recommends warning users of such efforts. (p. 79).  The report encourages Congress to pass laws establishing formal procedures for information sharing between government and tech companies (p. 80), the executive branch to develop a plan for notifying targets of foreign plans to interfere in an election (p. 81) and campaigns to be judicious in what sources they quote (p. 82).

But here is the thing.  If social media companies are on the lookout for disinformation campaigns of this type, invariably they will sometimes get it wrong. That is exactly what the Twitter Files are all about.  Long story short, Hunter Biden left his laptop at a Delaware computer shop and never bothered to reclaim it.  Under Delaware law, the laptop and its contents then became the property of the owner, to do with as he pleased.  What the owner pleased was to turn the laptop over to the FBI for possible criminal activities, and to keep copies for himself and share them with Rudy Giuliani.  Giuliani passed the contents on to the New York Post, which ran a story hinting at corruption.  In response, 51 retired intelligence officials signed a letter saying that story looked like Russian disinformation.  Twitter and Facebook both (temporarily) blocked the story, although it remained accessible on Google and other internet searches.  Neither company was acting at the direction of the FBI, but both had had previous conversations with the FBI about the dangers of Russian hacks and disinformation and saw the laptop as an example of what to look out for.

It was never very convincing. Hunter Biden's laptop seems like a most unlikely target for either hacking or planting false information.**  In fact, there does not appear to have been any significant foreign interference of any kind in the 2020 election.  This looks very much like an example of generals fighting the last war and getting it wrong. 

But it has led to a world class freakout by right wingers, whose view now appears to be that any contact whatever between government officials and social media, except as part of a criminal investigation, is government censorship and should be banned. Can anyone doubt that that, too, will lead to further problems down the line if Republicans manage either to enact it as law or intimidate social media companies to refrain from all communication with government without a warrant.  Overcorrection for past mistakes is all too common and leads to overcorrections of its own.

If only Republicans could be persuaded to read the Senate reports and see that there were, in fact, past mistakes that called for correction.

____________________
*To people of my generation, IRA will always stand for Irish Republican Army, so I am avoiding the acronym.
**To use Hunter Biden's laptop struck me as an Underpants Gnomes approach to disinformation.  Step 1: Plant disinformation on Hunter's laptop.  Step 2: ???  Step 3: Exposure!

Senate Intelligence Committee Report: Volume I, Russian Attacks on Election Infrastructure

Senate Intelligence Committee

And, in turn, all the previous posts about Trump-Russia are meant as a lead-up to the real story here -- the Senate Intelligence Committee Report on their investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 election.  Trump supporters, trying to downplay or even deny Russian interference, dismiss the report as the "last resort" of people who believe in Russian interference.

It is nothing of the kind. While the House Intelligence Committee degenerated into partisan bickering between Adam Schiff and Devin Nunes, the Senate Intelligence Committee worked together in a remarkable serious, bipartisan fashion to investigate Russian interference and left no doubt that the interference was real.  As for any cooperation between Trump and Russia, the report raised more questions than it answered -- but some of the questions were quite disturbing.

The Committee released its report(s) in five volumes over a year's time.  The fifth and final volume, dealing with contacts between the Trump campaign and the Russians, is by far the largest (more than all the other volumes combined)* and has attracted by far the most attention.  But the other volumes amply establish Russian interference and deserve at least some attention.

Interestingly enough, no volume deals with the details of the hacks and the transfer of information to Wikileaks, although there is some discussion of the subject in Volume V.  Perhaps the Committee thought that the Mueller investigation had the final word on the subject, both in its indictment and its final report.

But the Senate Intelligence Committee does comment on other aspects of Russian interference.  Volume I addresses Russian attacks on state election infrastructure.  Volume I is too technical to hold the interest of your average person, but it does include some notable comments.

First, it does not identify any states, except for Illinois, which appears to be the first state to realize it was targeted.  The other states investigated are simply identified as State 1 through State 22.  (Presumably the Committee did not want to reveal details of specific states' weaknesses).  Sorting through redacted sections, technical discussion, minutia, and hypotheticals, a few things do stand out.  

First, whenever the intruder was identified, it was determined to be the GRU, a/k/a Russian Military Intelligence, a/k/a Fancy Bear.  The report does not detail a single attack by the SVR a/k/a Russian Civilian Intelligence, a/k/a Cozy Bear.  This is significant because, although Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear (a/k/a GRU) both hacked the DNC servers, Cozy Bear limited itself to intelligence gathering.  All election interference was the work of Fancy Bear.  Although Cozy Bear got there first, it never released any of the hacked material.  Fancy Bear began to do so in quite a short period of time.

Second, although the hacks were the work of the same agency that engaged in election interference, none of the state-level hacks made any attempt to interfere in elections.  The hacks were not directed toward vote counting, but rather toward voter registration and voter lists (p. 22).  The first known hack took place in June, 2016 in Illinois and successfully breached the voter registration database.  "Russian cyber actors were in a position to delete or change voter data, but the Committee is not aware of any evidence that they did so."  (p. 22).  The report discussed at some length things that Russian Intelligence could have done with voter registration data to disrupt the election, but notes that none were done.

Speculating on Russian motives, the Committee says:

Russian intentions regarding U.S. election infrastructure remain unclear. Russia might have intended to exploit vulnerabilities in election infrastructure during the 2016 elections and, for unknown reasons, decided not to execute those options. Alternatively, Russia might have sought to gather information in the conduct of traditional espionage activities. Lastly, Russia might have used its activity in 2016 to catalog options or clandestine actions, holding them for use at a later date. Based on what the IC knows about Russia's operating procedures and intentions more broadly, the IC assesses that Russia's activities against U.S. election infrastructure likely sought to further their overarching goal; undermining the integrity of elections and American confidence in democracy.

(p. 35) 

 Third, there was serious distrust and friction between the federal Department of Homeland Security and state-level voting agencies. State agencies tended to resent federal "interference" and see it as an attempt at a federal takeover.  States often received incomplete information, sometimes no more than certain IP addresses to look out for, among thousands pinging them.  Many did not learn they were targeted by Russians until after the election was over.  DHS often communicated with state officials responsible for cyber security, but not with election officials.  And DHS officials knew very little about how state elections worked.  Some were just reading spreadsheets they had been given.  (pp. 49-51).  

Nonetheless, Volume I also reported that cooperation between DHS election officials was improving.  Hence the boast by Chris Krebs, head of cyber security for DHS that the 2020 elections were the most secure ever and DHS Undersecretary Ken Cuccinellis attempt to qualify that remark by saying that it referred to cyber security only.

All of which leads to the final and most obvious point.  Volume I emphasizes the potential vulnerabilities of the US election system and the various ways it might be attached through cyber hacking.  All of this becomes highly significant in the 2020 election, when various Trump supporters alleged all manner of vulnerabilities real and imagined.  One wonders if any of them had read this report. Looking at the reports through the perspective of the 2020 election serves as a painful reminder of the adage that generals always start by fighting the last war -- and find out just how much has changed.

________________________________________________
*To be specific:
Volume I, Russian attacks on election infrastructure, 67 pages
Volume II, Russian use of social media, 85 pages.
Volume III, US government response, 54 pages
Volume IV, intelligence community assessment, 158 pages
Volume V, counterintelligence, with a focus on the Trump campaign, 966 pages.
Wow!

Trump and Russia, a Counterfactual

 

Let me begin with a confession.  I did go off the deep end with Trump and Russia.  It was the publication of the Steele Dossier that set me off..  I was not as bad as some people, but when I speak of the mainstream media going down a rabbit hole, it is hard for me to tell to what extent the media were going down the rabbit hold and to what extent I was reading things into that. And when I blame all of this on the Steele Dossier, I am not sure how much other people's reaction was driven by the Steele Dossier, and how much I was projecting my own reaction.

So with that out of the way, let me try a few counterfactuals.  First of all, in the clear light of hindsight, it was a mistake for Buzz Feed to publish the dossier.  But would it have made a difference if they had not published it?  I am guessing no. There were little hints here and there before the election, not to mention the Mother Jones article that revealed the existence of the dossier.  Even without the Buzz Feed allegation, I would expect that most of the contents would eventually have leaked out, though more in the form of a drip, drip, drip than a gusher.

What if the Democrats had stuck to open source information about Trump's business ties to Russia and not hired Steele in the first place?*  Well, the FBI counterintelligence probe would still have taken place.  The FBI began its investigation before learning of the Steele Dossier (although after Steele started reaching out to the FBI).  The initial form of the investigation (open source search, decision to focus on Manafort, Page, Papadopoulos, and Flynn, and sending informants wearing a wire to talk to campaign officials) would probably have been much the same.  The agents involved in the investigation wanted to wiretap Page even before hearing from Steele.  Maybe they would have been able to get a warrant without Steele; maybe not.  But at that point the FBI investigation would largely have run dry because it was severely constrained by the need to conceal its existence.  Maybe the FBI would have closed shop at this point, unable to decide anything.  Maybe they would have continued sending out informants to talk to campaign personnel.  Maybe they would even have placed an informant in the campaign.

The Gang of Eight (parties leaders of both houses of Congress and chair and ranking minority member of the intelligence committees of both houses) would still have been briefed, about the counterintelligence investigation, but without anything as sensational as the Steele Dossier, merely some vague suspicions. Maybe that would have been enough for Harry Reid (one of the Eight) to drop dark hints that something more sinister was happening, maybe not.  Certainly Trump would still have been told he had been the target of a counter-intelligence investigation shortly prior to his inauguration, but without the sensational allegations of the Steele Dossier.  Doubtless it is true that he would not have taken kindly to the news, but he probably would not have been as outraged as he was in learning about the dossier.  Undoubtedly Trump supporters would have found some ground for outrage -- that Trump was investigated at all, maybe. If Carter Page had been wiretapped even without Steele's memos (possible), that would have been grounds for outrage. And certainly the FBI had ended up placing informants in the campaign itself,* that would have been a major grounds for outrage.

Would Trump still have fired James Comey, leading to the Mueller investigation?  That is hard to say, given that Trump's requests to drop the Flynn investigation were a major impetus for firing Comey. But still, attempts to quash the ongoing Russia investigation were probably the primary reason for Comey's firing.  So it would really be a question of whether the Russia investigation would have continued without the Steele Dossier.  I am inclined to believe that it would have continued simply because the early investigation had been so crippled by the need to conceal its existence, and being in the open would have allowed a much more thorough investigation. So Comey would probably still have been fired and the Mueller investigation would probably still have proceeded. I would guess there would have been less paranoia on the part of Trump's foes, but the mere knowledge that the FBI took seriously the possibility of a conspiracy between Trump and Russia would have been enough to inspire significant paranoia.

What would have happened if the DNC had headed the FBI's warnings that it was a target for hacking seems straightforward enough.  The DNC had already been hacked by Russia's civilian intelligence agency ("Cozy Bear"), so it would not be possible to keep Cozy Bear from learning some things.  But Cozy Bear limited itself to intelligence gathering and never disclosed what it learned.  Russia's military intelligence ("Fancy Bear") hacked much later (in April, 2016) and began disclosing information almost at once. If the DNC had been more alert, it might have blocked the Fancy Bear hack, and there would have been no suspicion of collusion because there would have been nothing to collude with.

But my favorite counterfactual speculation about Trump/Russia is, what if people had learned what Trump was really up to in more or less real time.  Let's omit fake rumors like the Steele Dossier and suppose that people had learned during the campaign about what was actually going on.

The Washington Post ran an article on Trump's business ties to Russia that was generally accurate, but incorrectly said that plans for a Trump Tower in Moscow "never moved past preliminary discussions."  In fact, negotiations for a Trump Tower in Moscow had been well underway and ended only when news of the Russian hacks came out days before the article. Trump and Cohen lied about the negotiations, which, as one Trump defender commented, was a good reason to vote against him, but not a crime. Suppose some sharp investigative reporter had revealed that Trump actually was negotiating a heavily subsidized Trump Tower in Moscow and lying about it, even as he pushed for a pro-Russian policy.  Would it have mattered?  I doubt it, for the simple reason that Trump did cease negotiations once the Russian hacks became known and could thereby have proclaimed himself a patriot who refused to work with any foreign power that targeted our elections.

What if the public had become aware during the campaign that Junior, Jared, and Manfort met with some Russian business associates and a Russian lawyer suspected of ties to the intelligence services, promising dirt on the Clinton campaign? Suppose it also became known that the "dirt" was mostly about the author of sanctions on Russian officials and actually had nothing to do with the Clinton campaign?  Recall that this meeting took place five days before the Russian hacks became public knowledge. Certainly, nothing in the meeting so much as hints at the hacks, but it would at least have shown that the Trump campaign was willing to accept help from the Russian and would have put Trump's "Russia, if you're listening" remark into a different light.  

The paranoid might have taken the meeting as a preliminary to real, and much closer, coordination and looked for follow up.  No such follow up occurred, but it is fair to ask whether the Trump campaign's demonstrated willingness to to accept Russian help informed Fancy Bear's subsequent actions in releasing the e-mails. 

Or suppose that after Trump made his "Russia, if you're listening" remark and dismissed it as a joke, some intrepid investigative reporter had learned that Trump really was sending people out to cruise the dark web looking for the missing e-mails, unconcerned with whether he was dealing with Russian spies.  (He never found anything).

There was speculation even at the time that Roger Stone had inside information when he said on August 21 that it would soon be "John Podesta's time in the barrel" and on October 7 Podesta e-mails came out.  Stone said at the time that it was merely a lucky guess and he made a lot of other predictions that did not come true.  Suppose it had come out that he really did have a secret back channel to Wikileaks and was passing message on the the Trump campaign?  Since Stone was not a member of the campaign, his role was scandalous and indecent, but not actually illegal.

Would these things -- all scandalous and indecent, but not illegal (except possibly the Trump Tower meeting) -- have made a difference in the election outcome?  For any one, taken by itself, probably not. But suppose all had been revealed over the course of the campaign?  Suppose in May it were revealed that Trump was pursuing a Trump Tower in Moscow and lying to the public about it? Then in June, suppose we had found out (as we did), that the Russians had hacked the DNC, even though it was generally assumed to be purely intelligence gathering. Suppose in July it came out that Junior, Jared and Manafort had met with Russians to ask for dirt on Hillary days before the hacks became public?  Might there at least have been speculation whether this openness to Russian assistance had played a role in Russia's decision to release information to Wikileaks?  Supposed in August, in addition to Manafort's payments from the pro-Russian party in Ukraine, it had also came out that Trump didn't just say, "Russia, if you're listening," but actively sent Flynn and others out to cruise the dark web for Hillary's e-mails, unafraid of dealing with hostile intelligence services?  Suppose in September, instead of Harry Reid's false insinuations that something bigger was going on, and instead of the false Yahoo story about Carter Page, one of Roger Stone's intermediaries had come forward to say Stone had an inside line to Wikileaks and was passing tips on to the campaign?  

All of these, after all, would have been true.  None, except the Trump Tower meeting, would have suggested a secret line of communications. But then again, nothing in the DNC or Podesta e-mails suggested illegality either.  And instead of the shotgun sort of unrelated scandals that Trump encountered, there might have been a drip, drip, drip of revelations about a disturbing closeness to Russia. Would that have been enough to convince the Trump-curious that his loyalty was in question?  Would it have persuaded people who didn't care for Trump but couldn't stomach Hillary to stay home or vote third party?  Of course, there is no way to know.

The other question is whether revelations of this sort would have been enough to waken the paranoid and convince people that there was more going on than met the eye?  On the one hand, clearly yes, some people are always eager to believe the worst.  But would that sort of paranoia have gone mainstream and had a role in the respectable press that had rejected the wilder rumors about all previous Presidents?  In the absence of the Steele Dossier, maybe not.

But above all else, imagine the shock that would have reverberated if New York Times reporters had learned, as they did on October 16, that Trump was under counterintelligence investigation for his ties to Russia, and, instead of deferring to the FBI, had revealed that bombshell some time between October 16 and October 28.  After all, some people were outraged by Hillary because she was under investigation by the FBI.  Suppose they had found out that Trump was also under investigation?  Revelation of the counterintelligence investigation would certainly have made Trump/Russia a serious subject.  And yes, it would have been a fruitful field for paranoia, even in the absence of the Steele and Alfa Bank allegations.

It would also no doubt have increased the pressure by the FBI for Director James Comey to make his announcement that the FBI was reopening its Clinton investigation.  But my guess is that it would have blunted the effect of that investigation.  Why?  Well, as it was, the FBI announced the reopening of the investigation.  Clinton's ratings took an immediate, devastating hit.  It was only after the announcement Slate made its announcement about the Alfa Bank server and Mother Jones revealed the existence of the Steele Dossier.  These blows failed to land because they looked (probably correctly) like desperate flailing by a losing campaign.

So supposed the reopening of the FBI investigation of Clinton had followed right after the New York Times revealed that Trump was also under investigation.  My guess was that, too, would have looked like desperate flailing by a losing campaign.  Wikileaks has shot its bolt with the Podesta e-mails and had no further ammunition.  And if any false rumors, like the Alfa Bank story or the Steele Dossier had come out, they would have looked like further evidence behind the FBI's counterintelligence investigation.

In short, my guess is that Hillary would have won. Everyone would promptly have forgotten about Trump-Russia in light of the Clinton e-mails scandal and any other scandals a Republican Congress could have ginned up.  If further investigation had revealed that there was really no "there" there, 

Doubtless Hillary would have lost in 2020 -- probably by a landslide in light of the disasters of that year.  But presumably the Republicans would have shied away from Trump and gone with a more normal candidate.