Drumroll! And Now for Volume V, Starting With the Juiciest Parts

 

Volume V is by far the longest of the Senate Intelligence Committee's reports on the 2016 election -- over 900 pages, and longer than all the other volumes combined.  Volume V deals with "Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities," which is really a euphemism for saying it is about what the Trump campaign was doing while Russia was interfering.

Significant parts of Volume V are also blacked out.  It is always good to remember when something is blacked out that what is hidden is never as juicy as your imagination fills in.  That is especially important in this case, because the report invites some very juicy imaginings indeed.  And it starts with the juiciest part of all -- Paul Manafort and his secret communications with Konstantin Kilimnik, presumed agent of the GRU a/k/a Russian Military Intelligence. 

Or, more accurately, it begins (pp. 1-26) with an introduction. The introduction explains the difference between its counterintelligence focus and the criminal focus of Mueller investigation. A criminal investigation determines whether there is enough admissible evidence to allow a jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an action expressly prohibited by law. A counterintelligence investigation considers all evidence, admissible or not,* and considers whether the evidence points to counterintelligence threat, whether or not the threat includes a crime.  The introduction also stresses the bipartisan nature of the investigation, to the point that witnesses being interviewed by committee staff could not tell which party the staffers worked for.  

The Committee only investigated events prior to the Trump inauguration in order to avoid issues of executive privilege.  This was on the assumption that only the Obama Administration would have standing to assert privilege over its own actions, which the Committee anticipated that it might.  In fact, the Committee found, Obama officials were quite cooperative.  The Trump Administration, by contrast, was highly obstructive and kept asserting executive privilege over actions that took place before it took office.  The Committee (p. 6) stated that they did not anticipate this obstruction, although I have my doubts as to whether this surprise was truly bipartisan. The Trump Administration also raised many dubious claims of attorney-client privilege.  This being the Trump Administration, it is hard to tell whether they actually had something to hide were simply interpreted any sort of investigation as a personal vendetta.  Either way, the obstruction does not reflect well on the Trump Administration and really should not have come as a surprise.

Oleg Deripaska

Now, on to the juiciest part.  The discussion of Paul Manafort extends from page 27 to page 169, with significant portions blacked out.  Manafort had done work since 2004 for Oleg Deripaska, a Russian oligarch, and for numerous pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs. Manafort served as an advisor to pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych of the Party of Regions.  This work came to an abrupt end in 2014 when Yanukovych's government was overthrown.  At this point, Manafort found himself unemployed, with large debts to Deripaska, with large amounts owed to him by the Party of Regions, which had no capacity to pay him. (See pp. 34-37, 44-47, including discussion of the Party of Regions' lack of a budget to pay Manafort and resort to collecting from oligarchs). Manafort nonetheless continued to be involved in Ukrainian politics on behalf of the remnants of the pro-Russian party in a vain attempt to get paid so he could pay off his debts to Deripaska (pp. 49-51).  About that time, Manafort offered to serve -- for free -- for the Trump campaign, an offer that should have raised an immediate suspicion of corrupt motive.  The report comments that the Trump campaign hired Manafort with no known vetting, p. 28, treating the offer to work for free as all that was needed, p. 54.

Manafort's translator was Konstantin Kilimnik, a former employee of the GRU (see pp. 40-42).  While the Mueller Report (p. 129) contents itself to say that "the FBI assesses [Kilimnik] to have ties to Russian intelligence," the Senate Intelligence Committee (p. 28), states flatly, "Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer."  Moreover, Volume V (p. 29) says that the Committee obtained information suggesting that Kilimnik may have been "connected" to the hack and leak operation.  This is followed by three paragraphs that are fully blacked out.  (And, FWIW, one paragraph appears to be about three lines, one about seven and a half lines, and one just under six lines). These three, highly tantalizing paragraphs, are followed by a paragraph that may be even more tantalizing for being (mostly) not blacked out:

While this information suggests that a channel for coordination on the GRU hack-and-leak operation may have existed through Kilimnik, the Committee had limited insight into Kilimnik' s communications with Manafort and [approximately one line redacted], all of whom used sophisticated communications security practices.

The Committee assesses that Kilimnik was likely serving as a channel between Manafort and the Russian intelligence services and represented "a grave counterintelligence threat" (p. 30).  In simple English, it appears that the Russians has a spy in the Trump campaign -- his campaign manager, no less.  Certainly Manafort behaved like a spy.  He communicated in person as much as possible and used encrypted applications and coded language for electronic communications, purchased pay-as-you-go phones, and found ways to share e-mails without sending them.  Although not mentioned, in the report, Manafort also had three passports.  Volume V (p. 31, footnote 90), quotes Kilimnik as saying that when he and Manafort worked in Ukraine, they routinely assumed they were being surveilled, so Manafort was used to that life.

Upon being chosen as Trump's campaign manager, Manafort asked Kilimnik to carry messages to three pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs letting them know and suggesting that he might be useful to them if Trump were to win.  He also asked Kilimnik to carry a message to Deripaska offering to brief him, presumably in hopes of persuading Desipaska to drop his lawsuits against Manafort's companies (pp. 58-60). He also continued to correspond with Kilimnik about current Ukrainian politics (p. 61).

Paul Manafort

Manafort was hired by the Trump campaign as convention manager in March, 2016.  Manafort and Kilimnik met when Kilimnik visited the US on May 5-7, 2016, purportedly for a wedding (pp. 67-70).**  In any event, Manafort and Kilimnik definitely met in New York and discussed Ukrainian politics.  It was at this time that Manafort began sending Kilimnik regular polling data. Rick Gates, Manafort's aide who testified against him, did not know the reason for the polling data, but speculated it was to convince his Russian and Ukrainian creditors that Trump really could win the election and that Manafort would be in a position to exercise influence on their behalf (p. 71). The Committee was unable to determine what happened to the polling data, nor were they able to access the content of the messages sent. Volume V goes on to say (pp 73-74) that Kilimnik seemed to have inside information about the campaigned, followed by one paragraph about the choice of Mike Pence and three paragraphs that were blacked out (5 1/2 lines, 7 lines, and 4 lines FWIW). 

And, of course, there was the August 2 meeting set forth in some detail in the Mueller report (pp. 74-76). The Committee was not able to determine what Kilmnik did with the polling data, but it did find one piece of information that could be a reflection of Kilimnik's actions after the August 2 meeting, though they could not tell if it was related to the polling data.  The relevant paragraph is so fully blacked out that one cannot tell the number or length of lines, but it appears to be five or six lines, not indented p. 82).  All of this appears to have been linked to a plan to end the war in Ukraine by severing the eastern parts of the country.***

The report then addresses whether Kilimnik was "connected" to the hack and leak operation, over about four and a half mostly redacted pages (pp. 85-89).  Unredacted portions include a reference to the preceding (redacted) material, to transferring the John Podesta e-mails to Wikileaks, to hacked and leaked conversations between US diplomats in 2014, and to "Cyper Berkut," a GRU persona that has hacked and leaked information on behalf of the Russian government.

Far more shocking and titillating is a statement (p. 89) that, "Manafort's involvement with the GRU hack-and-leak operation is largely unknown."  This is the first suggestion in any reputable source to so much as hint that Manafort had any role in the hack and leak whatever. Volume V then states that Manafort and Kilimnik were in contact throughout the hack and leak operation, but the Committee had no evidence that they discussed it.  

"Two pieces of information, however, raise the possibility of Manafort's potential connection to the hack-and-leak operations."  Naturally, those two pieces are blacked out, or nearly so.  One involves two and a half lines blacked out, followed by an indented portion of about seven lines, blacked out.  Next comes a reference to Jeffrey Yohai, former husband of Manafort's daughter, Jessica, which is distinctly odd.  Jessica appears to have married a man just like her father -- a California real estate developer and chronic fraudster, sentenced to nine years for repeated frauds, and suspected of witness tampering and intimidation. But I know of nothing linking him to Russian intelligence.  

The other piece of evidence is a quote, about eight lines long, origin and contents redacted.  The Committee says that it was unable to corroborate the report's account of [redacted], presumably referring to allegations about Manafort, but was able to corroborate most other aspects of the report (pp. 90-91).  This is followed by a redacted footnote of about 15 and a half lines.

The remainder of the report on Manafort is less juicy, with the possible exception of the redacted parts, which are extensive.  Manafort was apparently slated to be kicked upstairs even before the so-called "black ledger" of payments from the pro-Russian Ukrainian party came to light.  Once the payments were published, it was no longer possible to to make a face-saving arrangement for Manafort to stay on as a figurehead.  He had to go, and was replaced by Steven Bannon (for the nuts) and Kellyanne Conway (for the mainstream) as co-managers.  He nonetheless stayed in regular contact with the campaign, giving it advice, and also stayed in contact with Kilimnik, working on a plan to end the war in Ukraine by creating an "autonomous zone" in the Russia-occupied areas led by Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian leader who Manafort had worked for.  There is also an tantalizing note that just before Manafort was fired, Kilimnik sent an e-mail to a (presumably American) journalist that he was in almost daily contact with Manafort and that Manafort was creating a parallel party structure, although he was not clear whether Manafort would have time to complete it (p. 92).****

There is also a section (pp. 106-120) about various persons, including Deripaska, Kilimnik, and Manafort, implausibly attempting to blame Ukraine for the hack and leak.  I never realized before just how much continuity there was between the Trump/Russia investigation and the first impeachment.

Finally, there is an extended, and largely redacted, section (pp. 137-169) about Manafort's ties to the Russian intelligence services.  Or more, accurately, to Desipaska's indirect ties to the Russian intelligence services, his associates Viktor Boyarkin and Konstantin Kilimnik's roles as direct agents of Russian intelligence, and Manafort's association with all three.  Their activities are mostly blacked out, but appear to be international (Thailand, Montenegro, and Guinea are all mentioned, but most of the account is blacked out).  There are about a page and a half blacked out about Desipaska's "connections" to the hacking operation (pp. 157-158) and also some suggestions (p. 165) that Manafort did not know if Kilimnik was a Russian spy, did not trust him, and would occasionally lie to him to see where the lie spread.

So, to repeat from the beginning, what is hidden is never as juicy as what you imagine.  But this report sure is an invitation to imagine some very juicy things indeed.

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*Inadmissible evidence is not limited to evidence that was inadmissibly obtained, but also includes a lot of gossip, hearsay, speculation, and the like.
**Kilimnik also visited the US in April, but the Committee found no evidence that he met with Manafort on that visit. As for the wedding, the Committee was unclear.  Kilimnik did not attend a wedding at any time the Committee was able to trace his movements, but they were not able to trace all his movements.  The Committee offered as possibilities (1) Kilimnik may have attended a wedding some time they were not able to trace him, (2) wedding may have been some sort of code word, or (3) attending a wedding may have been an innocuous excuse to be in the US.  Take your pick.  
***The obvious question in the light of hindsight is whether this would have been a good idea.  Would it have staved off the 2022 Russian invasion or merely whetted Putin's appetite for more?  I suppose there is no way to tell.
****Also significant -- Manafort told he FBI he had briefed Trump about his work in Ukraine in case the subject came up, but did not go into detail because Trump did not seem interested.