So, Iraq's parliament has passed a symbolic and non-binding resolution demanding that US troops leave the country, which Trump has vowed to defy. No on knows whether the Iraqi government will actually order US troops out, or whether the US will comply.
Prime Minister Abdul Mahdi says that when General Qassim Suleimani was visiting the country, it was actually on a diplomatic mission, with Iraq mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia in an effort to lower tensions in the Mideast. I have no idea if this is true. If true, that would certainly have been a Good Thing and it is unfortunate that the attempt has now been scuttled. On the other hand, optimism is never a good bet in the Middle East.
Both the Iranian government and Hezbollah have vowed revenge but promised to limit it to military target. I can only say, I hope they keep their promise, but if they think limiting themselves to military targets will prevent escalation, they are sorely mistaken.
Oh, yes, and US ability to fight ISIS has been severely compromised by lack of Iraqi cooperation and Shia militias have warned Iraqi troops to get away from US troop or be targets. US troops are limiting themselves to self-protection. It seems most likely that if the Iraqi government does order our forces out, we will have no choice but to comply, or to invade in force. It is no insult to the quality of our troops to point out that there are only 5,000 of them, that they are hopelessly outnumbered, and things wouldn't go well for them.
Of course, if our troops do leave, that will leave the Iranians attempting to swallow all of Iraq and most likely getting a severe case of indigestion. A whole lot of Iraqis will not like that outcome and many of them have private armies. We are not the only ones who overreach and don't think things through.
Oh, yes, and Iran has declared itself no longer bound by the JCPOA limits on uranium enrichment. It is my understanding that the JCPOA had reduced Iran's breakout time to build a nuclear bomb to about a year. That makes the next year extremely perilous as our leaders are apt to see it as the last chance to wage preventive war before Iran gets the Bomb. And if Iran does get the Bomb, it will presumably be a year or more from now, i.e., after the next election.
A plea to Iran. You have vowed retaliation. The expulsion of US troops from Iraq and restarting a nuclear program sound like very effective retaliation, but not necessarily enough to force retaliation from us. Can't you leave it at that?
Monday, January 6, 2020
Saturday, January 4, 2020
More Information Filters in on the Iran Strike
So we now how at least two accounts of the alleged plan Qassim Suleimani had in the works when he was killed. Reuters says he was planning to step up attacks on US forces in Iraq, and possibly in Syria and Lebanon as well, as a way of distracting from domestic problems. Presumably the upsurge in activities before he was killed was the beginning state.
By contrast Rukmini Callimachi of the New York Times reports that something big appeared to be in the offing -- big enough that Suleimani, the second most powerful man in Iran, had to get approval from Ayatollah Khamenei to do it -- but that we have no idea what it was. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that we were the probably target, but we don't know.
Either way, the obvious question is, have we thwarted the plan, or will it proceed.
It also appears that I was wrong in assuming that so skillful an operation could not have been done rashly or impulsively. Apparently our intelligence services have known about Suleimani's whereabouts for a long time. The New York Times reports that in presenting options for how to respond to escalating Iranian attacks in Iraq, the Pentagon presented killing Suleimani as an extreme option to make its alternatives look reasonable. Initially, Trump chose the lesser option -- strikes on militia groups that had attacked US forces and killed a defense contractor. When Qataib Hezbollah responded by attacking the US embassy, thoughts of Benghazi haunted Trump, and he chose to kill Suleimani -- much to the consternation of military officials.
Let THAT be a lesson for you. Do NOT give extreme options to a President who doesn't know what he is doing and has the attention span and emotional control of a child. The article also offers mixed reports as to whether attacks in US targets in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon were definitely planned, or whether something big (and unknown) was being considered but not yet approved.
Juan Cole also has some interesting insights on whether this will lead the Iraqi government to tell our troops to leave, a possibility the Iraqis had raised after our initial strikes on Qataib Hezbollah sites. Pro-Iranian parties in the Iraqi parliament plan to raise the issue, but Cole is doubtful that it will succeed. Unwelcome as US forces are for many Iraqis, they are protecting the country against ISIS. Iranians would probably be both less effective and even less welcome.
As always, I am not going to speculate except to note one thing. Reports that Suleimani was seeking to ramp up confrontation with US forces say that this was to distract Iranians from their domestic situation, i.e., to wag the dog. In that, he appears to have succeeded beyond his wildest dreams -- though not in the way he intended.
By contrast Rukmini Callimachi of the New York Times reports that something big appeared to be in the offing -- big enough that Suleimani, the second most powerful man in Iran, had to get approval from Ayatollah Khamenei to do it -- but that we have no idea what it was. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that we were the probably target, but we don't know.
Either way, the obvious question is, have we thwarted the plan, or will it proceed.
It also appears that I was wrong in assuming that so skillful an operation could not have been done rashly or impulsively. Apparently our intelligence services have known about Suleimani's whereabouts for a long time. The New York Times reports that in presenting options for how to respond to escalating Iranian attacks in Iraq, the Pentagon presented killing Suleimani as an extreme option to make its alternatives look reasonable. Initially, Trump chose the lesser option -- strikes on militia groups that had attacked US forces and killed a defense contractor. When Qataib Hezbollah responded by attacking the US embassy, thoughts of Benghazi haunted Trump, and he chose to kill Suleimani -- much to the consternation of military officials.
Let THAT be a lesson for you. Do NOT give extreme options to a President who doesn't know what he is doing and has the attention span and emotional control of a child. The article also offers mixed reports as to whether attacks in US targets in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon were definitely planned, or whether something big (and unknown) was being considered but not yet approved.
Juan Cole also has some interesting insights on whether this will lead the Iraqi government to tell our troops to leave, a possibility the Iraqis had raised after our initial strikes on Qataib Hezbollah sites. Pro-Iranian parties in the Iraqi parliament plan to raise the issue, but Cole is doubtful that it will succeed. Unwelcome as US forces are for many Iraqis, they are protecting the country against ISIS. Iranians would probably be both less effective and even less welcome.
As always, I am not going to speculate except to note one thing. Reports that Suleimani was seeking to ramp up confrontation with US forces say that this was to distract Iranians from their domestic situation, i.e., to wag the dog. In that, he appears to have succeeded beyond his wildest dreams -- though not in the way he intended.
More Thought on Iran and Domestic Politics
So, the latest in Iran.
The Iranians are issuing outrageous threats to "thirty-five vital American positions in the region," while Trump threatens to bomb fifty-two sites "at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture" in retaliation.
Once again, forgive me for analyzing this primarily from the perspective of US domestic politics. I realize the the international repercussions are the most important, but I am not qualified to so much as speculate.
From a domestic perspective, although this strike against Iran has not produced a rally-round-the-chief response, Iranian retaliation very well could. It may well be that targeting cultural sites is a war crime, but if Iranians start killing our fellow countrymen, I doubt that most Americans will care. (Twitterati will care, but Twitterati represents a minuscule share of the total population).
At the risk of seeming a bit treasonous, I am inclined to think the Iranians' best bet is to attack the oil. That will hurt economically (and not just us), but without producing the sort of outrage that killing Americans or attacking symbolic targets would do.
Another point to make -- Trump has successfully destroyed any chance of rapprochement with Iran if he loses the next election, so congratulations (I guess). Up until now I had advise to any Democrat winning in 2020 on how to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). There would be no way to openly restore it -- no way to remove the sanctions in exchange for Iran returning to compliance. The Blob would be outraged. There would be grave warnings not to reward Iran for its violations of the JCPOA (our violations would remain unmentioned), and general grave pronouncements that negotiating before the other side has surrendered is appeasement.
Instead, my advice would have to announce an official channel to let humanitarian goods through. If that met with a positive response, begin, as quietly and discretely as possible, to relax secondary sanctions and allow other countries to work around them. Each step should be taken cautiously, awaiting positive response, but in the end we might hope to get to a de facto return to the JCPOA, while keeping the moral satisfaction of leaving sanctions in place.
But I would say this latest escalation has taken any such prospect off the table. There is no going back.
The Iranians are issuing outrageous threats to "thirty-five vital American positions in the region," while Trump threatens to bomb fifty-two sites "at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture" in retaliation.
Once again, forgive me for analyzing this primarily from the perspective of US domestic politics. I realize the the international repercussions are the most important, but I am not qualified to so much as speculate.
From a domestic perspective, although this strike against Iran has not produced a rally-round-the-chief response, Iranian retaliation very well could. It may well be that targeting cultural sites is a war crime, but if Iranians start killing our fellow countrymen, I doubt that most Americans will care. (Twitterati will care, but Twitterati represents a minuscule share of the total population).
At the risk of seeming a bit treasonous, I am inclined to think the Iranians' best bet is to attack the oil. That will hurt economically (and not just us), but without producing the sort of outrage that killing Americans or attacking symbolic targets would do.
Another point to make -- Trump has successfully destroyed any chance of rapprochement with Iran if he loses the next election, so congratulations (I guess). Up until now I had advise to any Democrat winning in 2020 on how to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). There would be no way to openly restore it -- no way to remove the sanctions in exchange for Iran returning to compliance. The Blob would be outraged. There would be grave warnings not to reward Iran for its violations of the JCPOA (our violations would remain unmentioned), and general grave pronouncements that negotiating before the other side has surrendered is appeasement.
Instead, my advice would have to announce an official channel to let humanitarian goods through. If that met with a positive response, begin, as quietly and discretely as possible, to relax secondary sanctions and allow other countries to work around them. Each step should be taken cautiously, awaiting positive response, but in the end we might hope to get to a de facto return to the JCPOA, while keeping the moral satisfaction of leaving sanctions in place.
But I would say this latest escalation has taken any such prospect off the table. There is no going back.
Friday, January 3, 2020
A Little More International Perspective on the Air Strike
Juan Cole has offered at least some insights into Qatiab Hezbollah and where it may go after its leader was killed.
Qataib Hezbollah is part of the al-Fath Alliance in the Iraqi Parliament, which has 48 members. That might not same like much out of a total of 329, but it is the second largest group. (The largest is the "Forward" alliance with 54). Al-Fath is also part of the governing coalition and Qataib Hezbollah is under the nominal command of the Prime Minister.
Cole predicts that al-Fath may start mobilizing angry mobs as well as militias.
This has confused some Americans. Large crowds were protesting Iranian influence in Iraq and corruption. Then large crowds started protesting the US presence. What is going on? The obvious answer is, these large crowds do not contain the same people.
Qataib Hezbollah/the Popular Mobilization Forces/al-Fath are not anything close to a majority (remember, 48 seats out of 329). But they are a significant minority and highly mobilized and determined significant minorities can be formidable, especially if they have their own private army.
Never asked is to what extent the youth demonstrators protesting Iranian influence and corruption speak for a majority of Iraqis. Americans tend to assume that they do, but that is because we like their message.
And in any event, just because the youth demonstrators resent Iranian domination, does not necessarily mean that they welcome US domination. We made that same mistake back in 2003, assuming that just because Iraqis hated Saddam Hussein, they must necessarily love us.
Stay tuned.
Iraqi Airstrike from the Perspective of Domestic Politics
All sense of fairness, perspective, and patriotism combined to require me to wait for a decent interval after the airstrike killing General Suleimani before analyzing it from the perspective of domestic US politics.
And by a decent interval, of course, I mean one day.
So here goes.
My opinion in international terms remains the same. It was a brilliant tactical strike showing the extraordinary skill of our military and intelligence services. Whether it was an appropriate response to head off an imminent terrorist attack, and what the medium- to long-term ramifications are are unknown and unknowable at present. They will be revealed over time.
I must say, though, that I don't agree with people saying this was a rash and impulsive response to the attack on our embassy. An attack of this kind has to be planned out well in advance. My guess is that the drone strikes and the airstrike were part of a pre-conceived plan. That the attack on the embassy occurred during the interval was not part of our plan, but may have stiffened our resolve.
In terms of domestic policy.
First of all, coming in the middle of impeachment proceedings, this necessarily raises Wag the Dog questions. Is Trump escalating against Iran as a matter of national interest, or to distract from his domestic political problems. I have no idea.
On the other hand, the opposite question arises. Has Trump's particularly deranged tweeting recently been a clever attempt to distract people from an ongoing military operation? That would require more foresight and self control that he has generally shown, but you never know.
Second, I continue to believe that Trump knows nothing about policy and does not care to learn, refuses to pay attention to his security briefing, and has the emotional maturity and impulse control of a small child. This nonetheless has not prevented the military and the intelligence services from doing highly competent work.
Third, the very night the strike occurred I saw an article, on of many, speculating that Trump has dementia. This one went further than most, specifically predicting that by next year he will increasingly lose balance and become "uncommunicative." (Not clear what that means). By 2021 he will need a cane and become increasingly wheelchair bound. By 2022 he was start having problems with aspiration (choking). By 2023 he will be bedridden and need 24-7 care. Clearly by that time even Trump's most devoted followers will have to admit he is unfit to govern and the 25th Amendment will come into play. But in the meantime we might be faced with the prospect of a war, or at least a highly delicate international situation that could lead in unpredictable directions, under the leadership of a President whose cognitive abilities are degenerating fast. Not an encouraging prospect!
Finally, I have definite advice to all Democrats on what to say. Praise the tactical brilliance of the strike and then add that no one can know the long-range outcome and we must all hope and pray for the best while preparing for the worst. That is a nice vague statement that can't get you in trouble no matter what happens.
Finally, on a personal level, as the saying goes, two things can be true. (1) I am beside myself with anxiety, wonder what will be next and hating the absolute uncertainty of it, and (2) the countless commentators (expert and pundit alike) speculating on what comes next are driving me nuts!
And by a decent interval, of course, I mean one day.
So here goes.
My opinion in international terms remains the same. It was a brilliant tactical strike showing the extraordinary skill of our military and intelligence services. Whether it was an appropriate response to head off an imminent terrorist attack, and what the medium- to long-term ramifications are are unknown and unknowable at present. They will be revealed over time.
I must say, though, that I don't agree with people saying this was a rash and impulsive response to the attack on our embassy. An attack of this kind has to be planned out well in advance. My guess is that the drone strikes and the airstrike were part of a pre-conceived plan. That the attack on the embassy occurred during the interval was not part of our plan, but may have stiffened our resolve.
In terms of domestic policy.
First of all, coming in the middle of impeachment proceedings, this necessarily raises Wag the Dog questions. Is Trump escalating against Iran as a matter of national interest, or to distract from his domestic political problems. I have no idea.
On the other hand, the opposite question arises. Has Trump's particularly deranged tweeting recently been a clever attempt to distract people from an ongoing military operation? That would require more foresight and self control that he has generally shown, but you never know.
Second, I continue to believe that Trump knows nothing about policy and does not care to learn, refuses to pay attention to his security briefing, and has the emotional maturity and impulse control of a small child. This nonetheless has not prevented the military and the intelligence services from doing highly competent work.
Third, the very night the strike occurred I saw an article, on of many, speculating that Trump has dementia. This one went further than most, specifically predicting that by next year he will increasingly lose balance and become "uncommunicative." (Not clear what that means). By 2021 he will need a cane and become increasingly wheelchair bound. By 2022 he was start having problems with aspiration (choking). By 2023 he will be bedridden and need 24-7 care. Clearly by that time even Trump's most devoted followers will have to admit he is unfit to govern and the 25th Amendment will come into play. But in the meantime we might be faced with the prospect of a war, or at least a highly delicate international situation that could lead in unpredictable directions, under the leadership of a President whose cognitive abilities are degenerating fast. Not an encouraging prospect!
Finally, I have definite advice to all Democrats on what to say. Praise the tactical brilliance of the strike and then add that no one can know the long-range outcome and we must all hope and pray for the best while preparing for the worst. That is a nice vague statement that can't get you in trouble no matter what happens.
Finally, on a personal level, as the saying goes, two things can be true. (1) I am beside myself with anxiety, wonder what will be next and hating the absolute uncertainty of it, and (2) the countless commentators (expert and pundit alike) speculating on what comes next are driving me nuts!
Thursday, January 2, 2020
!!!
And, now an event powerful enough to drive impeachment into the background.
US forces bombed an Iranian convoy in Iraq, killing Iranian General Qassim Suleimani, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Quds, the intelligence service that runs the Iranian secret police and terrorist proxies throughout the world) and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, leader of Qataib Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian militia that attacked the US embassy in Iraq, together with a spokesman for the militia and two others.
According to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Suleimani's forces were planning additional attacks on US troops and diplomats throughout Iraq. If so, Suleimani was extraordinarily rash and arrogant in his actions and certain to overreach sooner or later. (Sooner, it turned out).
So what to make of this? I don't have the slightest idea. Still, a few uninformed comments.
First, clearly this was a brilliant tactical operation, supported by some extraordinary intelligence, so congratulations to our forces for a job well done.
Second, although Suleimani has headed Quds for some 20 years, it seems unlikely that this will be a decapitation strike that brings down the whole organization. Quds, by all accounts, is an entrenched bureaucracy that will be able to replace its leader.
Third, Suleimani's replacement may very well be just as bad, if not worse, but it seems unlikely that he will be as competent. By all accounts, Suleimani was extremely competent. Quds will not collapse or moderate, but it may be thrown into temporary confusion and permanently weakened.
Fourth, I have no idea whether Qataib Hezbollah will survive.
And finally, I do not know enough to even speculate on the long-term ramifications. I have heard everything from this is the beginning of the end of all Iranian influence throughout the region to this will engulf the Middle East in a massive war. (All from experts, by the way). So I will refrain from predictions and watch events unfold.
One inexpert comment, though. In general, optimism is not a good bet in the Mideast.
US forces bombed an Iranian convoy in Iraq, killing Iranian General Qassim Suleimani, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Quds, the intelligence service that runs the Iranian secret police and terrorist proxies throughout the world) and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, leader of Qataib Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian militia that attacked the US embassy in Iraq, together with a spokesman for the militia and two others.
According to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Suleimani's forces were planning additional attacks on US troops and diplomats throughout Iraq. If so, Suleimani was extraordinarily rash and arrogant in his actions and certain to overreach sooner or later. (Sooner, it turned out).
So what to make of this? I don't have the slightest idea. Still, a few uninformed comments.
First, clearly this was a brilliant tactical operation, supported by some extraordinary intelligence, so congratulations to our forces for a job well done.
Second, although Suleimani has headed Quds for some 20 years, it seems unlikely that this will be a decapitation strike that brings down the whole organization. Quds, by all accounts, is an entrenched bureaucracy that will be able to replace its leader.
Third, Suleimani's replacement may very well be just as bad, if not worse, but it seems unlikely that he will be as competent. By all accounts, Suleimani was extremely competent. Quds will not collapse or moderate, but it may be thrown into temporary confusion and permanently weakened.
Fourth, I have no idea whether Qataib Hezbollah will survive.
And finally, I do not know enough to even speculate on the long-term ramifications. I have heard everything from this is the beginning of the end of all Iranian influence throughout the region to this will engulf the Middle East in a massive war. (All from experts, by the way). So I will refrain from predictions and watch events unfold.
One inexpert comment, though. In general, optimism is not a good bet in the Mideast.
Wednesday, January 1, 2020
Impeachment Hearings, Continued
Also Day Three: Alexander Vindman and Jennifer Williams
This was a somewhat unusual pairing in that both parties brought the perspective of Washington; neither was stationed in Ukraine. Also somewhat unusual: I don't really understand the point of Williams' testimony. Vindman is a career military man who was serving on National Security Council (NSC) at all relevant times. Williams is a career diplomat worked for the Office of the Vice President at all relevant times. Both were present during the fatal phone call of July 25.
Vindman also attended the inauguration of President Zelensky. (He played no role in deciding who was to attend). He was also present when Ukrainian National Security Adviser Oleksandr Daniluk visited Washington and met with US national security officials and Gordon Sondland. It was during this meeting that Sondland insisted in investigations of the 2016 election, Burisma, and the Bidens. This led National Security Adviser John Bolton to cut the meeting short. Vindman told Sondland directly that such a demand was improper and reported it to the NSC lawyer. He also was present during the July 25 phone call and reported it to the NSC lawyer. He also testified (and Williams agreed) that a reference in the July 25 transcript to "the company" actually said "Burisma," and that it was most unusual that a US President, asking a foreign government to root out corruption, would mention a specific company. Vindman did not directly address security assistance.
Williams' testimony was mostly supplemental. She was also present on the phone call and thought it unusual to bring up specific individuals or companies. (She agreed that Burisma was specifically named). She attempted to schedule the Vice President's attendance at President Zelensky's inauguration, but had a very narrow window to schedule and was ultimately ordered from above, for unknown reasons, that he would not be attending. She was also present at a meeting in Warsaw between President Zelensky and Vice President Pence in which Zelensky asked about the hold on security assistance and Pence assured Zelensky of US support.
In his cross examination of the witnesses, Devin Nunes raised some questions about Ukraine that seemed quite alarming, if true. The fact that no other Republicans raised the issue led me to suspect that the allegations were false. (More on that later). He also pressed on identifying the whistle blower, until Chairman Schiff cut him off.
Day Four Gordon Sondland
Gordon Sondland testified alone, and properly so, I would say. Sondland was the only witness before the committee who had significant knowledge of events in both Washington and Ukraine. I did not find his testimony to be either as damning as Democrats believed, or as exculpatory as Republicans claimed. Furthermore, Sondland, like Volker, was far enough implicated in the whole scheme to have strong reasons to be self-serving.
Sondland began by acknowledging that he is not a note-taker and was not given access to official documents, so his memory was imperfect. He would also defer to career diplomats who were note takers. Like Volker, Sondland denied being part of any irregular back channel, and he kept all officials back in Washington apprised of what was going on. This was his primary emphasis throught his opening statement and, like Volker, it seems likely his emphasis was self-serving. Like Volker, he also denied knowing that investigating Burisma was code for investigating the Bidens, although he considered it clear in hindsight. Unlike Volker, he did understand "talk to Rudy" as a directive to talk to Rudy. Although he was never told why security aid was suspended, he did come to understand it was conditional on investigating Burisma and 2016. Sondland thus redoubled his efforts to get the Ukrainians to do those investigations, but did not press them to investigate the Bidens.
Sondland was present during the meeting between Ukrainian National Security Adviser Oleksandr Daniluk and members of the US National Security Council. He acknowledged pressing Daniluk on the need for investigations at that meeting, but denied that the demand led to any conflict. He was not present on the July 25 call and did not learn that anything improper happened until the transcript was made public. But he did prep Zelensky to discuss investigations before the call, and worked with him on preparing an announcement after the call. At the multilateral Warsaw conference, he pulled aside Zelensky's adviser Andrei Yermak to tell him that security aid depended on investigations. And at some point he proposed that the prosecutor general announce the investigation, only to be told that it had to be Pesident Zelensky. Probably also significant and consistent with the testimony of every other witness -- no one Sondland talked to favored withholding the military aid.
Sondland's supposedly most damning testimony was:
This was a somewhat unusual pairing in that both parties brought the perspective of Washington; neither was stationed in Ukraine. Also somewhat unusual: I don't really understand the point of Williams' testimony. Vindman is a career military man who was serving on National Security Council (NSC) at all relevant times. Williams is a career diplomat worked for the Office of the Vice President at all relevant times. Both were present during the fatal phone call of July 25.
Vindman also attended the inauguration of President Zelensky. (He played no role in deciding who was to attend). He was also present when Ukrainian National Security Adviser Oleksandr Daniluk visited Washington and met with US national security officials and Gordon Sondland. It was during this meeting that Sondland insisted in investigations of the 2016 election, Burisma, and the Bidens. This led National Security Adviser John Bolton to cut the meeting short. Vindman told Sondland directly that such a demand was improper and reported it to the NSC lawyer. He also was present during the July 25 phone call and reported it to the NSC lawyer. He also testified (and Williams agreed) that a reference in the July 25 transcript to "the company" actually said "Burisma," and that it was most unusual that a US President, asking a foreign government to root out corruption, would mention a specific company. Vindman did not directly address security assistance.
Williams' testimony was mostly supplemental. She was also present on the phone call and thought it unusual to bring up specific individuals or companies. (She agreed that Burisma was specifically named). She attempted to schedule the Vice President's attendance at President Zelensky's inauguration, but had a very narrow window to schedule and was ultimately ordered from above, for unknown reasons, that he would not be attending. She was also present at a meeting in Warsaw between President Zelensky and Vice President Pence in which Zelensky asked about the hold on security assistance and Pence assured Zelensky of US support.
In his cross examination of the witnesses, Devin Nunes raised some questions about Ukraine that seemed quite alarming, if true. The fact that no other Republicans raised the issue led me to suspect that the allegations were false. (More on that later). He also pressed on identifying the whistle blower, until Chairman Schiff cut him off.
Day Four Gordon Sondland
Gordon Sondland testified alone, and properly so, I would say. Sondland was the only witness before the committee who had significant knowledge of events in both Washington and Ukraine. I did not find his testimony to be either as damning as Democrats believed, or as exculpatory as Republicans claimed. Furthermore, Sondland, like Volker, was far enough implicated in the whole scheme to have strong reasons to be self-serving.
Sondland began by acknowledging that he is not a note-taker and was not given access to official documents, so his memory was imperfect. He would also defer to career diplomats who were note takers. Like Volker, Sondland denied being part of any irregular back channel, and he kept all officials back in Washington apprised of what was going on. This was his primary emphasis throught his opening statement and, like Volker, it seems likely his emphasis was self-serving. Like Volker, he also denied knowing that investigating Burisma was code for investigating the Bidens, although he considered it clear in hindsight. Unlike Volker, he did understand "talk to Rudy" as a directive to talk to Rudy. Although he was never told why security aid was suspended, he did come to understand it was conditional on investigating Burisma and 2016. Sondland thus redoubled his efforts to get the Ukrainians to do those investigations, but did not press them to investigate the Bidens.
Sondland was present during the meeting between Ukrainian National Security Adviser Oleksandr Daniluk and members of the US National Security Council. He acknowledged pressing Daniluk on the need for investigations at that meeting, but denied that the demand led to any conflict. He was not present on the July 25 call and did not learn that anything improper happened until the transcript was made public. But he did prep Zelensky to discuss investigations before the call, and worked with him on preparing an announcement after the call. At the multilateral Warsaw conference, he pulled aside Zelensky's adviser Andrei Yermak to tell him that security aid depended on investigations. And at some point he proposed that the prosecutor general announce the investigation, only to be told that it had to be Pesident Zelensky. Probably also significant and consistent with the testimony of every other witness -- no one Sondland talked to favored withholding the military aid.
Sondland's supposedly most damning testimony was:
I know that members of this committee frequently frame these complicated issues in the form of a simple question. Was there a quid pro quo?
As I testified previously, with regard to the requested White House call and the White House meeting, the answer is yes.
Mr. Giuliani conveyed to Secretary Perry, Ambassador Volker, and others that President Trump wanted a public statement from President Zelensky committing to investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election. Mr. Giuliani expressed those requests directly to the Ukrainians and Mr. Giuliani also expressed those requests directly to us. We all understood that these prerequisites for the White House call and the right -- White House meeting reflected President Trump's desires and requirements.
But an opponent of impeachment might respond, so what. Quid pro quo simply means an exchange of value, which is the lifeblood of diplomacy, just as it is the lifeblood of business or politics. The real questions is not whether there was a quid pro quo, but whether there was a corrupt quid pro quo, and this statement leaves room for doubt. Sondland speaks of exchanging a White House visit for investigation of Burisma and the 2016 election, not of exchanging military aid for investigation of the Bidens. And, after all, a president has absolute discretion to decide what foreign leaders he wants to invite to the White House, while the military aid was appropriated by Congress and was mandatory. and Burisma, at least, might be seen as investigating domestic corruption, rather than intervening in US politics. Even the 2016 election cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Alexandra Chalupa might have improperly cooperated with the Ukrainian embassy. But he also made clear that Trump never expressly told him that aid was tied to investigations.*
The supposedly exculpatory statement occurred on September 9 when Sondland asked Trump what he wanted in order to release military aid and Trump said, "I want nothing. I want no quid pro quo. Tell Zelensky to do the right thing." This is entirely unconvincing for two reasons. First, it was spoken after the scandal had become public, so anything Trump might say (even in private) was obviously self-serving. Second, saying you are making no demands, followed by a demand is obviously self-refuting.
The fourth day was a long day, with Gordon Sondland followed by testimony from Laura Cooper and David Hale (no opening statement). Both are career employees, Cooper the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia and Hale the Undersecretary of State for Political affairs. Both witnesses brought the perspective of Washington, not Ukraine.
Anything else they had to say was overshadowed by a bombshell dropped by Laura Cooper. Up until then, Trump's defenders might argue that he could not have used military aid to pressure the Ukrainians because they were not aware of the hold until it appeared in Politico. Cooper revealed that her staff had searched their e-mails and discovered two from the Ukrainian embassy complaining about a hold on security assistance on July 25, the day of the infamous phone call. She did not know how the Ukrainians learned of the hold. Any concerns about the had had been certified by the Pentagon in May. Every agency except the OMB favored release of the aid.
Hale was a witness requested by Republicans. He testified that military aid has been withheld from other countries too, such as Pakistan, Lebanon, and countries in Central America.
This testimony took place at night after Sondland's testimony and, it seems safe to assume, the committee members were tired. Schiff decided to forego his usual 45 minute question and answer sessions the two party leaders on the committee and their lawyers and go directly to 5-minute question sessions. On the whole it was one of the more forgettable sessions, other than Laura Cooper's bombshell.
The fourth day was a long day, with Gordon Sondland followed by testimony from Laura Cooper and David Hale (no opening statement). Both are career employees, Cooper the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia and Hale the Undersecretary of State for Political affairs. Both witnesses brought the perspective of Washington, not Ukraine.
Anything else they had to say was overshadowed by a bombshell dropped by Laura Cooper. Up until then, Trump's defenders might argue that he could not have used military aid to pressure the Ukrainians because they were not aware of the hold until it appeared in Politico. Cooper revealed that her staff had searched their e-mails and discovered two from the Ukrainian embassy complaining about a hold on security assistance on July 25, the day of the infamous phone call. She did not know how the Ukrainians learned of the hold. Any concerns about the had had been certified by the Pentagon in May. Every agency except the OMB favored release of the aid.
Hale was a witness requested by Republicans. He testified that military aid has been withheld from other countries too, such as Pakistan, Lebanon, and countries in Central America.
This testimony took place at night after Sondland's testimony and, it seems safe to assume, the committee members were tired. Schiff decided to forego his usual 45 minute question and answer sessions the two party leaders on the committee and their lawyers and go directly to 5-minute question sessions. On the whole it was one of the more forgettable sessions, other than Laura Cooper's bombshell.
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*Sondland appears to be the only witness to talk to President Trump directly.
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