Tuesday, September 18, 2018

The Steele Dossier and the Page Warrant

People arguing that the Steele Dossier was an elaborate Russia/Steele/Clinton campaign/Deep State plot to frame Trump run into the awkward question of why neither the Clinton campaign nor the Deep State ever published the information they allegedly went to such lengths to fabricate.  The usual counter is that even if none of these entities published the dossier before the election, but FBI did use it to obtain a warrant to spy on a member of the campaign.

Actually, Page had left the campaign at the time the FBI applied for the warrant.  This is significant because it means the FBI was not spying on an ongoing campaign.  Spying on a former campaign adviser could ultimately lead to incriminating information on the campaign, so the warrant was politically significant.  But it was not an attempt at real-time information on the political moves of an opposing campaign.

Still, regardless of whether he was part of an ongoing campaign, Carter Page should not have been wiretapped without probable cause, as properly established.  The Republican contention is that the warrant was improper because it was based on opposition research, and because the FISA court was not informed of the source's origins.

The Steele Dossier alleges three main incidents.

First and most notoriously, it alleges that during Donald Trump's November, 2013 visit to Moscow for the Miss Universe pageant, he hired some Russian prostitutes to urinate on the Obamas' bed in the Moscow Ritz Carlton, and that the Russian intelligence filmed the incident and used the film to blackmail Trump.  The only part of this that has been established is that Trump was in Moscow in November, 2013 for the Miss Universe pageant, and that he stayed at the Ritz Carlton.

Second, it alleges that during Carter Page's July, 2016 trip to Moscow to address the New Economic School he met with Igor Sechin, CEO of Rosneft oil company to discuss lifting sanctions on Russia.  In return, Sechin offered, "the brokerage of up to a 19 per cent (privatised) stake in Rosneft."  Page showed interest but remained non-committal.  Page is also alleged to have met with Russian official Igor Divyenkin, who said that Russia had damaging information on Clinton, and broadly hinted that they had it on Trump as well.  This information allegedly came from "a trusted compatriot" of "a close associate" of Sechin.  In other words, it is a third-hand rumor.    (Memo 94, pp. 9-10 and Memo 134, pp. 30-31).  Nonetheless, there is at least some verification here.  Page's trip to Moscow at this time is a matter of public record.  Rosneft really did privatize a 19% interest.  And a close associate of Sechin turned up dead under suspicious circumstances.  (Nothing can be said of his "trusted compatriot.")

Finally, it alleges that Michael Cohen met with a Russian operative in Prague in August or September of 2016 to work on the coverup.  Cohen produced an apparent alibi to this meeting; Robert Mueller is working to break it.

The warrant against Page deals with this second alleged incident.

Republicans appear to be right about one thing at least.  The Steele Dossier really does appear to have been the primary source in applying for the warrant, as evidenced by the application (starting page 15) referring to Steele as "Source #1." 

Keep in mind this does not mean that the Steele Dossier was the primary source in the entire counterintelligence investigation, only that sub-portion of it that involved obtaining a FISA warrant against Page.  This is a distinction that Republicans like to blur, but it is real nonetheless.

Furthermore, the reference to Steele as "Source #1" implies that there are other sources as well, but does suggest that they are less important and are merely used as corroboration of the primary source.  Still, let's give at least part of a point to Republicans on that at least.

Republicans are outraged that the application does not say that the dossier was prepared as opposition research for the Democratic Party.  Democrats have essentially three responses.

First of all Steele was simply doing work for a dirt-digging firm.  He didn't know who the firm's client was.  Thus he didn't actually know that he was working for Trump's political opponents, although it seems most improbable that that Trump's allies would be funding the investigation.

Second, the application (page 16) makes clear that, although "Source #1" did not know who the client was, the FBI speculates that the research was probably being done to "discredit Candidate #1's campaign."  In other words, opposition research by Trump's political opponents.

Third (an rather caustically), although the FBI says that it believes Steele was doing opposition research for Trump's opponents, Republicans seem to be complaining that the application does not specifically name names.  This is remarkably hypocritical, given the uproar they made about inappropriate unmasking.  Apparently only Republicans should be shielded from unmasking.

Finally, although Republicans are outraged that the application relies on a hostile and biased sources, doing so is absolutely routine in warrant applications, and for obvious reasons.  Friends and allies of the target are usually not going to give the sort of information that can be used to establish probable cause.  Truly neutral and impartial parties generally just don't know that much.  Establishing probable cause generally means digging around in some sordid business because that is where the information is.  All of this really should draw a collective duh!

But so far as I understand it, Republicans' response is that if Steele didn't know who is ultimate employer was, then it was the FBI's responsibility to investigate and find out.  While acknowledging that the ultimate employer was most unlikely to be friendly to Trump, they maintain that it might have been a business rival, or a jilted ex-mistress (presumably with a new sugar daddy to pay for the research).  If the animosity had been purely personal or commercial, Steele's memos would have been fine, but knowing that the ultimate employer was a political rival hopelessly taints them.

I really don't see it.  The application goes on to say that Page and Sechin discussed "future bilateral energy cooperation" and lifting sanctions.  It also says that Divyekin discussed the possibility of releasing damaging information on "Candidate #2."  That does not sound like the sort of thing a business or romantic rival would be looking for.  It sounds very much like research for a political rival.  Just how much digging is the FBI expected to do into which political rival, and why does it matter?

What obviously is important is whether any of Steele's allegations have been verified. Milking the rumor mill is fine as the opening of an investigation.  It is not sufficient for a political ad -- or for a news article, or for a wiretap.  For any of these things there must be corroboration.  It was because of the lack of corroboration that the Clinton campaign did not use any of Steele's research during her campaign (must I reiterate again why it makes no sense at all to make such an elaborate fabrication and then not use it?), and why the press did not publish it until after the election and then with great controversy.  But the intelligence community has access to sources not available to the Clinton campaign or the news media.  Were these sources able to give sufficient verification to justify a warrant?

And the only reasonable answer, based on what has been made public so far, is that we simply do not know.  The application begins (pp. 1-2) with a pro forma explanation of who Carter Page and Russia (!) are.  Page 3 is a large, blacked out section of Russian's clandestine intelligence activities.  Page 4 says that Carter Page is foreign policy adviser to "Candidate #1" and is believed to be a target for recruitment by the Russian government to undermine and influence the US election.  This is, once again, a strong hit that it was probably not a commercial or romantic rival who underwrote the research.  And, really, it is appropriate to investigate attempts by a foreign power to undermine and influence an election, even if it is on behalf of the party out of power.

Pages 5-8 address Russian attempts to sway elections, in the US and other countries, in general, and in the 2016 election in particular.  Some chunks are blacked out that presumably deal with how they know Russia is meddling.  Pages 8 (toward the bottom) through 10 (near the top) say that George Papadopoulos and Carter Page are foreign policy advisers for "Candidate #1" and that the FBI believes the Russian government's efforts are being coordinated with Page and perhaps other individuals associated with "Candidate #1's campaign."  Further information (a little more than a page) are blacked out.  Two things here are significant.  First, the application believes that Page, though no longer a member of the campaign, was still coordinating with the Russians, suggesting his association with the campaign had not entirely ended.  Second, the others doing the coordination were "associated with" rather than members of the campaign.  That probably refers to Roger Stone.

Pages 10 through halfway down 13 are about Page's business ties with Russia and are almost entirely blacked out.  Pages 13 through 15 is about Russian spying in 2015.  It is not quite clear why this is significant.  Page was a target for recruitment as a Russian spy in 2013, but the 2015 operation was separate.  What it may have to do with Page is blacked out.

Pages 15 through 18 are the sections dealing with the Steele Dossier and Christopher Steele as "Source #1."  It reports Page's trip to Moscow and address at the New Economic School as matters of open record and discusses Page's alleged meetings with Sechin and Divyekin according to Steele.  It also says that Steele has been a reliable source, that he was and doing dirt digging, and that he did not know who the client was but suspected "Candidate #1's" political rivals.  It also identifies who Sechin and Divyekin are and what "kompromat" is.  It also contains some blacked out information about Steele's ties to the FBI (presumably the work he and Bruce Ohr were doing seeking to flip Russian oligarchs), and on why Steele is considered reliable.  Pages 19 and 20 are blacked out and my contain corroboration.

Page 21 quotes July and August news articles about the Trump campaign's seeming openness to recognizing the Russian annexation of Crimea and lifting sanctions.  Pages 22-24 quote the September 23 Yahoo News article which made most the same allegations as Steele about Carter Page's trip to Moscow.  (Conspicuously absent:  Any talk about a 19% share of privatized Rosneft).  Republicans strongly condemn the FBI for using this article as corroboration of Steele's report, since Steele himself was the source.  Democrats defend it as not being offered as corroboration, but to show that Page denied the meetings.  Actually, the article is offered more as a setup for Page's denials.  There is also a footnote that acknowledges the remarkable similarities between the article and Steele's findings, but says the FBI does not believe Steele was the source of the article.  This mistake was never acknowledged, though later versions of the application mention that the FBI terminated relations with Steele after the October 31, 2016 Mother Jones article sourced to Steele came out.  (The first application dates to before the Mother Jones) article.  Pages 24 through 26 cite various new and other open source denials of the meeting by Carter Page and attempts by the Trump campaign to repudiate Page.

Pages 27 through 31 are blacked out but may contain corroboration of Steele.  Page 32 is boilerplate language saying there is probable cause to believe Page is the agent of a foreign power in violation of criminal statutes.  The rest of the application (total pages 67) is either boilerplate or blacked out.

Conclusion:  The Steele Dossier alleges real and serious crimes. Its origins as opposition research do not taint it and were revealed or at least strongly suggested in the application.  It is the product of milking the rumor mill.  Milking the rumor mill is fine as the starting point of an investigation, but not sufficient to justify a wiretap without further corroboration.  The publicly released portions of the dossier are not enough for a conclusion one way or the other whether there is enough corroboration.

And now Donald Trump has authorized further releases.  His authorized releases are specific -- pages 10 through 12 and 17 through 34.  Pages 10 through 12 appear to address Carter Page's business ties to Russia.  Pages 17 through 20 probably address corroboration or lack thereof of Steele's material.  Pages 26 through 31 follow Trump's and Page's denials of allegations.  I have no idea what they contain.  Pages 33 through 34 probably contain information about why the FBI suspects Page is the agent of a foreign power.

I will make two more comments.  First, I don't trust Trump as far as I can spit.  Presumably the releases he has authorized are selected to make him look good.  Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that he is not disclosing the most dangerous parts of the warrant -- the early parts showing how the intelligence community knows that Russia is trying to sway the election and the later parts that presumably discuss how the surveillance would take place.

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