So, with the need to raise the debt ceiling looming, Republicans have a big question to ask -- should they provoke yet another crisis by once again demanding a ransom? The strategy served them reasonably well the first time, but the last two times it has not gone so well for them. The question, then, is why not. I can see two possible answers.
The first one, to the more procedurally minded, is the first debt ceiling crisis was stand-alone, while the other two had too many distractions. Raising the debt ceiling in and of itself is unpopular, and refusal to raise it tends to poll well. Other Republican tactics to get there way, not so much. So the early 2013 debt ceiling crisis was sandwiched in between tax increase negotiations and sequester negotiations and tended to get overlooked in the shuffle. The later 2013 debt ceiling crisis happened at the same time as the government shutdown, so people tended not to distinguish too clearly between them. (That was why I favored a shutdown). But this next debt ceiling crisis, like the first one, will be stand-alone, so there will be no danger of people conflating it with something else. And the thought that government can raise its debt ceiling at will is just not popular.
The second, for more substantive types, is that concessions Republicans demand in return for raising the debt ceiling tend to be highly unpopular. This makes eminent sense. After all, if Republicans want to do something popular, they have no need to take the economy hostage to get it done; it can easily be achieved by the usual legislative process. When Republicans resort to extraordinary measures, it means they are trying to pass something that stands no chance by ordinary measures. The first time around, public opinion polls showed raising the debt ceiling was unpopular, but as the message slowly sank in just how dangerous refusal to raise it could be, public opinion began to noticeably shift. Every time Democrats and pundits warn of the dangers of refusing to raise the debt ceiling, Republicans dismiss it as mere alarmism. What they may not realize is that the more unpopular the measure they are proposing, the more credible the claims of catastrophe if the debt ceiling is not raised. First of all, if Republicans demand something very unpopular, people are more inclined to think the worst of them and believe they really would threaten to bring disaster on the economy. Second, the more unpopular the measure, the more drastic the threat needed to get it passed. So if Republicans demand something really outrageous, like turning Medicare into a voucher system or Social Security into a 401-k, it seems credible that it would take some pretty drastic threats to get such measures passed.
Republicans may very well think they have the substantive advantage this time. Obamacare is uniquely unpopular right now, so Republicans may very well see holding the debt ceiling hostage to repealing it as a winning issue. Alternately, they can instead demand ending risk corridors which backstop insurance companies that do not have enough young people enrolled, in hopes of inducing a death spiral of ever sicker enrollees and higher premiums. But neither approach is likely to be as successful as Republicans think. Losers under Obamacare have gotten more attention than winners because people having their policies cancelled is more news-worthy than people getting insurance. But if Republicans seriously attempt to repeal Obamacare now, there will be a huge outcry from people whose insurance will be threatened as a result, and suddenly the winners will get a lot more attention. Alternately, Republicans think denouncing risk corridors as a "bailout" for insurance companies will be popular, but Democrats need only paint such a move as an attempt to raise premiums (which it is) and it will quickly prove not to be a winning issue.
In short, I don't think yet another debt ceiling crisis will go well for Republicans, in either procedural or substantive terms.
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