I was actually wrong about that the authors envision three alternative pathways -- one for each resistance group. While two of the final showdowns are over Trump seeking to defy the 22nd Amendment, they turn out somewhat differently, for reasons I do not fully understand.
One other note for what it is worth. In all cases from the perspective of a non-resistance group, you hear from a "longstanding volunteer," presumably in your group.* They have been a "steady volunteer," but most of their work has been with the resistance. So clearly the authors do not see these groups as mutually exclusive, but merely as matters of emphasis.
For the tax resistance, the authors envision the final confrontation occurring when Trump seek to shut down the electric vehicle industry and force all car manufacturers to stick to internal combustion engines.** Why the tax resistance? The authors envision the auto workers union plans to occupy the factories and keep producing electric vehicles in defiance of Trump. Wouldn't the strike committee make a more logical choice? Apparently the authors had other uses for the strike committee (as we shall see) and so gave the tax resistance this job more or less by default. The tax resistance is joined by mutual aid societies, which makes sense, since someone will have to provide financial assistance to the auto workers during their strike. Also joining are citizen scientists who assist the EPA. This also makes sense, since environmental scientists will presumably understand the importance of preserving the EV industry. Finally veteran organizations and military families. This also makes sense, since the scenario envisions Trump calling in the military to disburse the strikers, so the resistance will need people with ties to the military to keep them from turning against US citizens.
Risk of military confrontation run high as more and more people turn out to support the auto workers. Auto workers refuse to be provoked into violence and the military refuses to move against peaceful protesters. Trump tries to send in the Proud Boys instead, but the military protects the auto workers. Trump ends up looking weak and the Republican power structure (including his own Justice Department) abandons him. He limps out to the end of his term a lame duck, his power gone. In this the authors are influenced by the work of Timur Kuran. Kuran looks at the French, Russian and Iranian revolutions -- all largely the work of street protests and mobs. In all cases, the regime in power seemed solid and entrenched -- and then it wasn't. He suggests that there may be secret, latent resentment of the status quo that goes unexpressed because no one sees anyone else opposing the regime and therefore no one dares to act. But even a very small indication that the regime is not invulnerable may set off chain reaction. Except that this appears to apply to a certain kind of regime -- one that is repressive enough to let popular opposition simmer a long time before it breaks into revolt, but not repressive enough to crush the revolt. It is far from clear whether the US under Trump meets with that description.
It seems more likely -- very likely -- that the showdown will be over Trump trying to defy the Constitution and seek a third term. Protests erupt across the country, Republican governors send in the National Guard, and Texas and Florida even attempt to cancel the election. The authors have the strike committee resist by calling a general strike. And I will admit, a general strike seems like an appropriate response to so extreme and action, so maybe it does make sense to have the strike committee take the lead here, rather than in the electric vehicle scenario. The strike committee is joined by fund raisers for non-profits, which makes sense because, again, strikers will need financial support to remain on strike. Also joining are people providing cultural grounding for the movement. The authors see them as important for getting disparate groups to work together. The underground railroad also joins. Why the underground railroad? The authors suggest, to smuggle in whistle blowers. But whistle blowers have their place in all these showdowns. I am inclined to think that this is like the tax resistance -- they had to fit in somewhere and this was an open slot.
I do sort of like the detail that non-resistance members were aware of the one-minute strikes but never took part, even though the effort would be minimal. It drives home the point that you don't have to do everything -- at least until the final showdown. I suggested that the constitutional convention differs from the other groups in that everyone else can take three days out to attend. But it is even easier to stop work for one minute, yet not everyone does.
The authors offer many scenarios, all involving strikes, economic upheaval, and violence, but all ending with the same outcome. Trump loses the election, incumbents are swept from office in record numbers, and the proposed constitutional reforms are enacted. The authors end in a triumphant note:
Your movement didn’t just win elections — they’ve won pledges to abide by the outcomes of the deep democracy-modeled Constitutional Convention. Its sensible recommendations come from now over 2,000 cities. The federal reforms happen first. New laws affirm that money is not speech and put an end to gerrymandering. The bill for term limits for all federal leaders barely passes — only passing with a controversial exemption for current senators and house members. There is an end to right-to-work legislation and support for card check neutrality. The changes take place, buoyed by a movement that keeps up regular protests and occasional strikes. You continue your work, aware of much more to do. And you feel proud of your role in all of it.
This appears to be the authors' favorite scenario. It is achieved by strikes, with much economic upheaval and hardship, and with violence from rightwing militias. But it is rewarded with a sweeping win and implementation of the measures the authors favor.
They seem less happy about the third scenario.
This version actually focuses less on seeking a third term than on running Eric (Don Junior having all to obviously flamed out) and trying to rig the election. Since the Paperclip Movement is apparently an organization of civil servants pledged to refuse illegal orders, it makes sense they would lead the opposition to an attempt to rig the election. The organization of election workers is an obvious ally. After all, the Paperclip movement is just asking local officials to join in their pledge to refuse illegal orders. The authors have also foreshadowed that the Paperclip Movement will ally with the constitutional convention. “You know those government workers wearing paperclips? That movement is already using our language and guidance for their Constitutional Oath.” So, unsurprisingly, the Paperclip Movement seeks alliance with the constitutional convention as well. They say they want "all of your participants — city workers, police, and others" to take a pledge not to obey illegal orders on the election. I am not quite sure I understand that. I know that election workers are public employees, usually at the county level. Is the constitutional convention also supposed to consist of municipal employees? Nothing else in the book suggests that.
The authors have another problem as well. They set out four categories of activists -- protecting individuals, defending institutions, envisioning what comes after Trump, and resistance. Three out of those four categories have three sub-categories. But envisioning what comes after has only two. Otherwise each resistance group could form an alliance with one member of each other category, for four in each scenario. But instead there are only 11 groups instead of twelve, so someone has to get the short end of the stick. It turns out to be the Paperclip Movement. So, Trump pushes voting restrictions (true) and sends the National Guard to polling places (plausible). Election workers slow-walk the new restrictions. Foreign observers observe. The broader public protects. Or else the governors of Texas and Florida attempt to cancel the election. Election workers hold the election anyhow, and governors eventually back down. (That one is more of a stretch). Either way the election is much like 2020. It comes down to a few swing states that are close. Trump tries to stop counting while his son is still ahead. It takes a few weeks, but Trump narrowly loses and, once again, attempts to overturn the result. If the public remains passive, the army ends up letting Trump stay rather than stage a coup against him. But if large crowds turn out to "help Trump pack his bags," it is still a very close call, but Trump ends up leaving. The new President takes over a "battered, bruised" nation. The coup has been averted "but just by the skin of its teeth."
In short, Trump does not go quietly as he does in the electric vehicle scenario. There is none of the triumphalism of the strike committee scenario. US democracy narrowly prevails, but remains precarious. So, why do the authors show so much less enthusiasm for this scenario than the alternative? Obviously, I don't know. But my guess is that this approach relies too much on government insiders (Paperclip Movement civil servants, election officials, and apparently a variety of municipal officials) for the authors' comfort. Maybe they just like a more "outsider" approach.
I will wrap this series up with a few final thoughts.
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*Not quite. The cultural grounding group is somewhat different.
**That seemed far-fetched to me. It still seems like a stretch in light of Trump's ultimate alliance with Elon Musk. But apparently he has done a good, though more subtle, job of undermining the electric vehicle industry and has an outright vendetta with wind power, so maybe.
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