What if Trump Wins: Come Together, Right Now, Over Me

So, we come to the final confrontation.  Whether democracy stands or falls depends on whether the resistance and non-resistance wings of the opposition join forces.  I previously said that the authors envisioned two alternate showdowns -- Trump trying to shut down an electric vehicle plant and Trump defying the 22nd Amendment for a third term.

I was actually wrong about that the authors envision three alternative pathways -- one for each resistance group.  While two of the final showdowns are over Trump seeking to defy the 22nd Amendment, they turn out somewhat differently, for reasons I do not fully understand.  

One other note for what it is worth.  In all cases from the perspective of a non-resistance group, you hear from a "longstanding volunteer," presumably in your group.*  They have been a "steady volunteer," but most of their work has been with the resistance.  So clearly the authors do not see these groups as mutually exclusive, but merely as matters of emphasis.

Tax resistance and the electric vehicle plant

For the tax resistance, the authors envision the final confrontation occurring when Trump seek to shut down the electric vehicle industry and force all car manufacturers to stick to internal combustion engines.**  Why the tax resistance?  The authors envision the auto workers union plans to occupy the factories and keep producing electric vehicles in defiance of Trump.  Wouldn't the strike committee make a more logical choice?  Apparently the authors had other uses for the strike committee (as we shall see) and so gave the tax resistance this job more or less by default.  The tax resistance is joined by mutual aid societies, which makes sense, since someone will have to provide financial assistance to the auto workers during their strike.  Also joining are citizen scientists who assist the EPA.  This also makes sense, since environmental scientists will presumably understand the importance of preserving the EV industry.  Finally veteran organizations and military families.  This also makes sense, since the scenario envisions Trump calling in the military to disburse the strikers, so the resistance will need people with ties to the military to keep them from turning against US citizens.  

Risk of military confrontation run high as more and more people turn out to support the auto workers.  Auto workers refuse to be provoked into violence and the military refuses to move against peaceful protesters.  Trump tries to send in the Proud Boys instead, but the military protects the auto workers.  Trump ends up looking weak and the Republican power structure (including his own Justice Department) abandons him.  He limps out to the end of his term a lame duck, his power gone.  In this the authors are influenced by the work of Timur Kuran.  Kuran looks at the French, Russian and Iranian revolutions -- all largely the work of street protests and mobs.  In all cases, the regime in power seemed solid and entrenched -- and then it wasn't.  He suggests that there may be secret, latent resentment of the status quo that goes unexpressed because no one sees anyone else opposing the regime and therefore no one dares to act.  But even a very small indication that the regime is not invulnerable may set off chain reaction.  Except that this appears to apply to a certain kind of regime -- one that is repressive enough to let popular opposition simmer a long time before it breaks into revolt, but not repressive enough to crush the revolt.  It is far from clear whether the US under Trump meets with that description.

Look, I really would prefer to see the Trump regime weakened enough stop being a threat and lose in the normal course of electoral politics than an all-out confrontation over whether elections are still binding.  But I am not hopeful it will turn out that way.  The closest we have come to this sort of scenario has been ICE surges and popular resistance -- most dramatically in Minneapolis, but in Los Angeles and Chicago as well.  In Los Angeles there were actual riots and Trump mobilized the National Guard.  Mercifully, both sides quietly backed away.  In Chicago, he was on the verge of calling up the National Guard but was blocked by the courts.  In Minneapolis, Trump was seriously considering sending in the army, but ultimately backed down in the face of public outrage.  All of this shows that Trump is far from complete consolidation of power.  And it has persuaded him to stop doing ICE blitzes, which is all to the good.  But it has not made him a lame duck.  The latest candidate for turning Trump into a lame duck is his failed war in Iran.  Losing a war has been the downfall of many a dictator.  But, again, it has not happened thus far.

The strike committee and the 22nd Amendment

It seems more likely -- very likely -- that the showdown will be over Trump trying to defy the Constitution and seek a third term.  Protests erupt across the country, Republican governors send in the National Guard, and Texas and Florida even attempt to cancel the election. The authors have the strike committee resist by calling a general strike.  And I will admit, a general strike seems like an appropriate response to so extreme and action, so maybe it does make sense to have the strike committee take the lead here, rather than in the electric vehicle scenario.  The strike committee is joined by fund raisers for non-profits, which makes sense because, again, strikers will need financial support to remain on strike.  Also joining are people providing cultural grounding for the movement.  The authors see them as important for getting disparate groups to work together.  The underground railroad also joins.  Why the underground railroad?  The authors suggest, to smuggle in whistle blowers.  But whistle blowers have their place in all these showdowns.  I am inclined to think that this is like the tax resistance -- they had to fit in somewhere and this was an open slot.  

I do sort of like the detail that non-resistance members were aware of the one-minute strikes but never took part, even though the effort would be minimal.  It drives home the point that you don't have to do everything -- at least until the final showdown.  I suggested that the constitutional convention differs from the other groups in that everyone else can take three days out to attend.  But it is even easier to stop work for one minute, yet not everyone does.

The authors offer many scenarios, all involving strikes, economic upheaval, and violence, but all ending with the same outcome.  Trump loses the election, incumbents are swept from office in record numbers, and the proposed constitutional reforms are enacted.  The authors end in a triumphant note:

Your movement didn’t just win elections — they’ve won pledges to abide by the outcomes of the deep democracy-modeled Constitutional Convention. Its sensible recommendations come from now over 2,000 cities. The federal reforms happen first. New laws affirm that money is not speech and put an end to gerrymandering. The bill for term limits for all federal leaders barely passes — only passing with a controversial exemption for current senators and house members. There is an end to right-to-work legislation and support for card check neutrality. The changes take place, buoyed by a movement that keeps up regular protests and occasional strikes. You continue your work, aware of much more to do. And you feel proud of your role in all of it.

This appears to be the authors' favorite scenario.  It is achieved by strikes, with much economic upheaval and hardship, and with violence from rightwing militias.  But it is rewarded with a sweeping win and implementation of the measures the authors favor.  

They seem less happy about the third scenario.

The Paperclip Movement and President Eric Trump

This version actually focuses less on seeking a third term than on running Eric (Don Junior having all to obviously flamed out) and trying to rig the election.  Since the Paperclip Movement is apparently an organization of civil servants pledged to refuse illegal orders, it makes sense they would lead the opposition to an attempt to rig the election.  The organization of election workers is an obvious ally.  After all, the Paperclip movement is just asking local officials to join in their pledge to refuse illegal orders.  The authors have also foreshadowed that the Paperclip Movement will ally with the constitutional convention.  “You know those government workers wearing paperclips? That movement is already using our language and guidance for their Constitutional Oath.”  So, unsurprisingly, the Paperclip Movement seeks alliance with the constitutional convention as well.  They say they want "all of your participants — city workers, police, and others" to take a pledge not to obey illegal orders on the election.  I am not quite sure I understand that.  I know that election workers are public employees, usually at the county level.  Is the constitutional convention also supposed to consist of municipal employees?  Nothing else in the book suggests that.

The authors have another problem as well.  They set out four categories of activists -- protecting individuals, defending institutions, envisioning what comes after Trump, and resistance.  Three out of those four categories have three sub-categories.  But envisioning what comes after has only two.  Otherwise each resistance group could form an alliance with one member of each other category, for four in each scenario.  But instead there are only 11 groups instead of twelve, so someone has to get the short end of the stick.  It turns out to be the Paperclip Movement.  So, Trump pushes voting restrictions (true) and sends the National Guard to polling places (plausible).  Election workers slow-walk the new restrictions.  Foreign observers observe.  The broader public protects.  Or else the governors of Texas and Florida attempt to cancel the election.  Election workers hold the election anyhow, and governors eventually back down.  (That one is more of a stretch).  Either way the election is much like 2020.  It comes down to a few swing states that are close.  Trump tries to stop counting while his son is still ahead.  It takes a few weeks, but Trump narrowly loses and, once again, attempts to overturn the result.  If the public remains passive, the army ends up letting Trump stay rather than stage a coup against him.  But if large crowds turn out to "help Trump pack his bags," it is still a very close call, but Trump ends up leaving.  The new President takes over a "battered, bruised" nation.  The coup has been averted "but just by the skin of its teeth."  

In short, Trump does not go quietly as he does in the electric vehicle scenario.  There is none of the triumphalism of the strike committee scenario.  US democracy narrowly prevails, but remains precarious.  So, why do the authors show so much less enthusiasm for this scenario than the alternative?  Obviously, I don't know.  But my guess is that this approach relies too much on government insiders (Paperclip Movement civil servants, election officials, and apparently a variety of municipal officials) for the authors' comfort.  Maybe they just like a more "outsider" approach.

I will wrap this series up with a few final thoughts.

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*Not quite.  The cultural grounding group is somewhat different. 
**That seemed far-fetched to me.  It still seems like a stretch in light of Trump's ultimate alliance with Elon Musk.  But apparently he has done a good, though more subtle, job of undermining the electric vehicle industry and has an outright vendetta with wind power, so maybe.

What if Trump Wins: Envision What Happens After Trump

 

Category	Activity
Protect people being targeted	Mutual aid society Fundraising for nonprofits Underground railroad
Defend existing institutions	Outreach to veterans/families/military Citizen scientist to assist EPA Find grants to strengthen elections
Envision what comes after Trump	Cultural/psychological grounding Constitutional convention
Resistance	Paperclip movement among civil servants Strikes Tax resistance

The next useful option suggested by What if Trump Wins is to envision what comes after Trump.  After all, the authors point out, simply reacting to what Trump does gives him the entire initiative and lets him set the agenda, which creates an obvious advantage for him.  Trump won because people were not happy with the way things were going.  To defeat him, we have to offer a positive agenda.

Actually, I am not entirely convinced.  Trump won because people were upset about inflation and chaos at the border.  If he continues to break Rule Number One of Smart Authoritarians (only take unpopular actions if they advance your power), we may be able to defeat him simply by promising "change."  Nonetheless, we do need a positive agenda for what comes after Trump if we want to avoid breaking into hopeless factional fighting and if we want to prevent a future Trump from threatening democracy.

In every other category, the authors offer three options.  Here they offer only two -- offer cultural grounding to the movement or hold a constitutional convention to propose amendments.  This means there are only eleven categories instead of twelve and causes some unevenness when the groups team up at the end, but let that go.

Provide cultural grounding for the movement.

I found it interesting that the authors saw this as useful, given that they generally warn against limiting yourself to self-expression, such as posting on social media and marching in the streets. At the same time, there is no doubt that a movement of this type needs cultural grounding in the form of songs, art, symbol, and the like.  It is also true that if activists do not practice self-care, they will burn out and end up achieving nothing.  The authors envision "cultural grounding" as including healing circles for mutual aid societies supporting immigrants under attack, and psychological support for whistle blowers being protected by the underground railroad, as well as music, body work, poems, and healing practices.  As this account may suggest, it also means being in contact with many different groups opposing Trump who may not be aware of each other.  And it may mean bringing them together and coordinating them.  This makes support work very important indeed!

This category also differs from the others in that the authors do not offer the alternatives of scaling up or not.  Instead, the strike committee invites you to a meeting in which they plan a large-scale strike to protest Trump's plans to stay in office past his second term.  You, the culture worker, do not really have a role in planning the strike, just keeping everyone grounded and keeping them from rushing into action unthinkingly.  Your actions in grounding and working together may save the strike committee from splitting into factions all going off in different directions and unable to achieve anything.  Important, indeed!  And I assume that in real life there are people doing something very much like this.  

Constitutional Convention:

Just to be clear, our Constitution's provision on amendments says:

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress. . .

In other words, amendment by constitutional convention requires request by two-thirds of the states and ratification by three-fourths of the states.  Which is to say, the "convention" will simply be offering suggestions that are in no way legally binding.  But they can create serious political pressure -- really the only use of such pressure the book offers. 

The convention starts in Philadelphia (site of the original Constitutional Convention), in which people express their commitment to the Constitution and offer changes to protect against future Trumps -- most particularly, amendments to make clear that corporations are not people and money is not speech.  Other reforms are discussed (it does not say which ones) and the organizers propose tens of thousands of conventions to be held across the country.  Civil servants from the Paperclip Movement pledge to support them.

So, once again, you are offered the alternatives of running a local convention or setting up conventions across the country.  As with (most of) the other alternatives, going national is essential to be truly effective, but a national network is made up of local chapters, so those are important too.  The authors show a distinct ideological agenda here, with all of the conventions following the same format (presumably learned at the pre-convention) and coming up with similar measures, probably pushed by the convention sponsors.  Under the general format, the convention will last three days.  The first day will be dedicated to learning about the Constitutions, the second day to making proposals, and the third day to voting on them.  The last day is like a science fair, with people walking around and hearing debates about various proposals. Some people attend online.  On a large electronic board, people see results coming in from other towns.  

The authors anticipate that there will be wide agreement on eliminating money from politics, setting term limits for senators and judges, ending secret holds and the filibuster, "breaking apart" the two-party system (how?) and creating a pathway to citizenship.  Other proposals such as dealing with crime, guns, and future immigration, are more controversial and are saved for later conventions (or, perhaps, for the usual political process).  The authors envision your local convention having turnout comparable to "some elections."  They also envision national leaders traveling across the country setting up numerous conventions.  (You set up 43).

I have some questions here.  I previously questioned whether people would actually care about the abstract, procedural issues raised here, as opposed to something with more immediate impact on their lives.  But I suppose after spending a day learning what is in the constitution and why it focuses on procedural issues, people may start thinking in different terms.  I am also going to suspect a certain amount of manipulation by the organizers to get the results they want.   I am also curious about the three days.  Are they set over a three-day weekend (Labor Day, maybe), or three successive Saturdays?  Either way, that would seem to exclude service workers who regularly work on Saturdays and holidays.  But let that go.  

I am also interested in whether all these conventions are taking place at the same time.  The part about simultaneous conventions and electronic boards following what is happening in other cities certainly seems to suggest that.  The organizer going from one city to another setting up conventions seems to suggest they happen on different dates.  Several alternatives present themselves.  Maybe the traveling organizer is pre-planning conventions all set to take place on the same day.  Or maybe holding tens of thousands of simultaneous conventions in a country with a population of over 300 million is not feasible and there are multiple coordinated conventions at different times.  The authors are not clear, perhaps intentionally.

Well, to state the obvious, that had not happened.  There have been coordinated marches and protests, but nothing like these coordinated conventions.

Also, I find it interesting that the authors assume these conventions can operate in the open and not be harassed by either the government or rightwing militias.  That seems accurate, based on the protest marches that have taken place without incident.  Even in the most brutal phase of the crackdown in Minneapolis, crackdown coexisted with large-scale protests that were not disrupted.  The authors are assuming tens of thousands of towns, and turnout comparable to some elections (it does not say which ones!).  Like large-scale protests, that is just more people that government can hope to arrest, although it might target the organizers.  That mostly has not happened so far, except where ICE is concerned, but recently there have been alarming developments.

Finally, I started to say that one of these things is not like the others.  Running a local convention takes only three days; the other activities the authors suggest are ongoing.  But that is not actually true.  Presumably setting up a local convention is enough to keep you busy.  You would have to rent a venue, buy refreshments, advertise, set up a social media account and possibly a website, circulate your plans, perhaps design and print brochures, etc. etc.  Still, it does seem reasonable to assume that other people opposing Trump could take three days out from their work to attend.

And when the convention is over, the planners will find their work done and perhaps join some other group.  Yes, granted, they will be tired at the end and want to take a well-deserved break.  But Trump will still be in power and still wreaking havoc, so after the local convention planners have had time to recover, maybe they will want to join one of the other groups.

Trump or Vance? Pick Your Poison

 

I know some people think there is something in the Epstein files that will end Trump's Presidency.  

Color me skeptical.  If inciting an insurrection that put Congress's lives in danger wasn't enough to persuade Republicans to impeach and convict, it is hard to imagine anything that could.

Still, I will concede that the chances of Trump being impeached and convicted have gone from impossible to highly implausible, so I suppose you never know.*  And besides, Trump appears to be losing his mind, so there is always the possibility of him being sidelined for incapacity.  So it is time to give some serious thought to a JD Vance Presidency.

So, what do I make of JD Vance?  In picking a Vice President, Trump had a strong incentive to pick the worst possible candidate to make himself impeachment proof (and even 25h Amendment-proof).  I go back and forth between whether Vance is an opportunist with no principles, or a dogmatic ideologue.  Everyone I have asked says opportunist.  I can only hope so, because at least an opportunist can change his mind when it is to his advantage.  But at the same time, these two things may not be as different as they seem.  Someone who is dogmatically rigid about one principle -- in Vance's case, xenophobia -- can be extremely unprincipled and opportunistic about everything else so long as they serve the one goal.  So Vance may actually combine the worst of both traits.  He seems just as authoritarian as Trump, but a whole lot smarter and more disciplined.

Nonetheless, I want to compare the two men point by point.

Personality.  No matter how slimy Vance is, he simply is not pathological in the same way Trump is.  Vance is immoral rather than amoral.  While Trump has the ethical standards of a tapeworm -- not only none, but self-evidently absurd to even ask -- Vance at least knows what ethical standards are.  Likewise, while I do not trust Vance to respect the rule of law, I expect him at least to understand the concept.  Vance may have a grossly warped sense of the national interest, at least he knows how to distinguish the national interest from his personal interest.  And I don't expect Vance to be as personally vindictive as Trump.  Advantage: Vance.

Cult following.  Vance does not have Trump's charisma.  No one trusts him.  He simply is not going to attract the sort of cult following that Trump does.  There is a high probability that the MAGA movement will split under him.  Advantage: Vance.

The Epstein files.  Vance did not rise to national prominence until after Epstein's fall, so he cannot possibly be in the Epstein files.  He will no doubt be happy to release the files, seeing every powerful figure of either party ruined as a result as a rival eliminated.  Advantage: Vance.  I think.

Corruption.  Trump is running his entire administration as a giant bribe-fest.  I don't expect Vance to operate in those terms.  I expect Vance to operate according to principles -- specifically, principled xenophobia.  Again, I think this is advantage Vance, but I wouldn't swear to it.

Weaponization of government.  Trump's attempts to prosecute his political opponents have been notable failures.  His attempts to coerce by withholding federal funds are moderately successful.  Federal courts have frequently ruled against him, but the Administration has resisted and the Supreme Court has generally backed them up.  The results of Trump's attempts to use the IRS, RICO, surveillance, or terrorism law to target his opponents remain inconclusive.  I think that Trump's effectiveness has been somewhat stymied by his tendency to think solely in terms of personal friends and foes, rather than in terms of the Republican Party.  I expect Vance to be a lot smarter at this -- to seek to establish a Republican one-party state and target opponents more with administrative and financial penalties that outright criminal investigation.  Advantage: Trump, who is more malevolent, but too petty to really pull it off.

Corrupt pardons.  I expect both men to order subordinates to commit crimes and then pardon them.  I don't expect Vance to take outright bribes to give pardons.  So advantage Vance.

Respect for election outcomes.  Tough to tell.  Trump has made himself clear.  He considers any election that he loses to be fraudulent by definition.  He is dropping very broad hints that he will treat the midterms as fraudulent of the Democrats win.  He attempted to use force in the form of an angry mob last time and I fully expect him to be ready to resort to the Deep State this time.  Vance duly said that he did not consider the 2020 election to be fair, and that Congress and the Vice President could overturn the results.  He has remained non-committal about future elections.  While he will no doubt do all he can to rig future elections, I think he will consider staging an outright coup to be to unsubtle, although I could be wrong.  Advantage: Vance, who might accept defeat over Trump, who definitely won't.

Immigration.  If Vance is not a dogmatic ideologue on this one, he is giving a good imitation of one.  Trump occasionally wavers when he fears that his crackdown will cause economic damage.  Vance shows no such hesitations and seems determined to proceed with the program of ethnic cleansing regardless of the costs.  Thus do we see the advantage of an opportunist over an ideologue.  Advantage: Trump.

Foreign policy.  Trump's foreign policy is all about him.  He wants a Nobel Peace Prize. He favors anyone who bribes or flatters him.  This is easier for an authoritarian to do than a democratic leader, so the effect is one of favoring authoritarians, but more by accident than by design.  Vance, by contrast, has a clear ideological goal -- the destruction of liberal democracy in favor of blood and soil nationalism.  Thus Trump favors Russia over Ukraine partly because Putin is better at flattering him and has more resources to bribe him, partly because he wants the Nobel Peace Prize for ending the war and thinks the easiest way to achieve it is by coercing the weaker party into submission, and partly because he instinctively sides with strength.  Vance, by contrast, favors Russia because he wants Putin to win and impose his vision on as much of Europe as possible.  He also wants to coerce Europe into putting the most rightwing leaders into power as possible, who can be trusted to halt all immigration and undertake something like our regime of mass deportations.  Advantage: Trump.  I prefer the unprincipled opportunist over the dogmatic ideologue.

Economic policy.  Honestly, I want this to be as bad as possible, on the theory that economic hardship is the best way to undermine Trump/Vance and we can survive economic hardship, since we have many times before.  Trump's policy seems to be one of protectionism with the goals of (1) restoring a manufacturing economy, (2) circumventing Congress's power of the purse and having his own personal slush fund, and (3) extorting as many bribes as possible.  A fourth goal is probably to be able to announce all sorts of trade deals, whether they materialize or not.  The result is a flighty policy that ruins small business with uncertainty, but can be very advantageous for big business, since they can buy any favors they want.  Vance is most likely to focus on goal (1), building a manufacturing economy.  This is unlikely to succeed and will doubtless cause great hardship along the way, though it will be less corrupt than Trump's approach and also cause less uncertainty.  Advantage: Vance, I think, but I could easily be wrong.

Healthcare.  I would expect Vance to keep RFK, Jr. on, but reign him in.  By all means, feel free to talk a MAHA game, but don't interfere with actual vaccines or other useful health developments.  I would also expect Vance to understand much better than Trump when his policies were stripping people of their health insurance and to avoid such actions.  Here, Vance is the less doctrinaire of the two.  Damaging our healthcare system and stripping people of their insurance does nothing to promote his Fortress American plan and violates Rule Number One of Smart Authoritarians (don't do unpopular things unless they promote your power).  So advantage Vance if you care about people's healthcare and Trump if you want things to get as bad as possible.

Energy policy.  I expect Vance to be more rational here than Trump.  Sure, he will no doubt denounce renewables as "woke," tout fossil fuels as manly, remove environmental regulations restricting fossil fuels, and boast about our oil and gas boom.  But actually suppressing renewables will raise people's electric bills, so I expect him to drop Trump's vendetta against renewables and quietly allow them to grow.  Yes, rising energy prices will hurt the incumbent party, but given that the survival of the Earth is at stake here, I would say advantage Vance.

Succession.  Trump will undoubtedly seek to circumvent the 22nd Amendment and be President for life. On the other hand, he is 79 years old and getting less coherent all the time, so "life" will probably not be all that long.  Vance is easily young enough to be in power for 30 years if he could get away with it, but I don't think he can.  My guess is that instead he will attempt something like Mexico under the PRI -- a one-party state, with each Republican President serving two four-year terms and then stepping down for a chosen successor.  Doubtless Vance will want to manipulate things from behind the scenes, but more likely he will fail and just establish a de facto one-party system that will become increasingly corrupt and sclerotic.  This one is tough. Trump's dictatorship will inherently be shorter than Vance's one-party system, but also more arbitrary and lawless.  And thoroughly undermining the rule of law in his own lifetime is apt to cause damage that will continue long after he is gone.  So advantage Vance here, probably, but maybe not.

But there is one advantage inherent to impeachment, which some people offered as a reason to impeach GW Bush even if it meant getting Cheney as President.  It smacks down the executive and establishes legislative supremacy.  It gives JD Vance a warning that he, too, can be impeached if he steps too far out of line.  And for that reason, I suppose, advantage impeachment regardless.

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*I will also give a word of advice to any Democrats who want to impeach Trump and are looking for something that might persuade Republicans.  Go with the Qatari jet, or maybe Trump's dealings with the Saudis.  The reason is obvious.  First, these reek of a bribe, and bribery is expressly stated by the Constitution to be grounds for impeachment.  Furthermore, bribery is paired with treason, implying (though not expressly stating) that this refers in particular to foreign bribery.  Of course, Trump's foreign policy in general looks like a bribery game.  But impeachment is most likely to succeed if it caters to MAGA prejudice by focusing on bribery by a Muslim nation.  Even MAGA diehards like Laura Loomer are outraged by that.

Despair is Dangerous. So is Complacency

 

Something feels different.  It feels as if Donald Trump's attempt to undermine US democracy are failing and his presidency is on the downslope.  People who were deeply pessimistic before are looking up.

Of course, throughout August, September, and October, it felt as if we were reaching an irreversible tipping point toward dictatorship and nothing could stop it.  

All of which just goes to show that feelings are not facts.  When things look bad, it is good to remember that hope is no guarantee of success, but despair means giving up and guarantees defeat.  But when things start to look up, it is a mistake to declare mission accomplished too early because that, too, means giving up the fight and letting Team Trump make a comeback.

Signs Trump's power is waning

Certainly there are signs that Trump's power may be waning.

Most obviously, the November elections went poorly for Republicans, and Trump has accepted the outcome as valid.

Donald Trump and Russ Vought encouraged the government shutdown, intending a power grab.  They were not notably successful at it, and took a significant political blow that maybe, just maybe, may discourage them from seeking any future government shutdowns.

Congressional Republicans openly revolted over the Epstein files.  

Trump has proposed a healthcare plan that would replace subsidies to buy insurance with direct payments.  Maybe Republicans will all line up behind it when he cracks the whip, but somehow it seems unlikely.

Senate Republicans are refusing to end the filibuster or blue slips (allowing Senators a de facto veto on judicial appointments in their own states).

Indiana Republicans are refusing to redistrict.

Trump is starting to withdraw some tariffs to lower prices.

Elite universities are rejecting his favored funding-for-control proposals.

His proposed 50-year mortgage went over like a lead balloon.

He appears to be quietly backing away from plans to deploy the National Guard in Portland and Chicago.

Greg Bovino and his Border Patrol thugs, after vowing to stay in Chicago till their mass deportations were complete, are moving on, mission not accomplished.

The politically motivated prosecution of James Comey is facing dismissal by the judge and possible disciplinary sanctions.

And the Adam Schiff investigation is facing an actual DOJ investigation!

All of which clearly shows that (1) Trump has not consolidated complete power yet and (2) he has experienced a setback in the attempt.  But let there be no mistake.  His attempt is far from over, and he will be back.

But he has plenty of cards left

There is plenty of room for foot-dragging or selective release on the Epstein files, as well as the prospect of the whole thing becoming an all-out moral panic.  And if documents addressing Trump ever do come, the whole thing will probably be anticlimactic.  (See Russiagate).

His popularity will no doubt improve now that the shutdown is over.  Withdrawing the tariffs may boost the economy and further improve his standing.

The Supreme Court may grant him unbridled discretion in deploying the National Guard.

ICE is receiving a massive increase in personnel, budget, surveillance capability, and thuggishness.

Federal money remains a powerful tool of coercion.

Trump allies are buying up ever-growing shares of media.

RICO and tax investigations of opposing organizations are just beginning.

But scariest of all is the upcoming midterm election.  Attempts are already well underway to rig the midterms through gerrymanders, control of media companies, and various voter suppression laws.  A large enough landslide can overcome these obstacles, but that leaves scarier options -- ICE raids on Democratic gatherings, or on voting places, pressure on Republican election officials to change results, seizing ballot boxes to "recount" and look for "fraud," and who knows what else.  

How to know if we have won

So, what would I take as more than just a setback, but an actual sign that Trump has lost and democracy has won?

I list the following in roughly escalating order of significance.

If media outlets bought by Trump allies remain critical of him.

If Republicans in Congress splinter and Trump cannot bring them into line.

If attempts to target opposing organizations through taxes or RICO are thrown out, or never materialize.

If universities, high power law firms, and other institutions targeted by Trump start consistently defying him.

If the Supreme Court makes a meaningful attempt to reign Trump in.

If Democrats win control of the House and Trump cannot stop them.

If Democrats win control of the Senate and Trump cannot stop them.

If growing numbers of state and local jurisdictions reject cooperation with ICE, putting more strain on the organization.

If ICE starts losing personnel faster than it can recruit them and begins shrinking.

It Trump supporters stop making death threats and harassment against people who he criticizes.

And finally, we will know Trump has truly and decisively failed if big money interests start standing up to him.

Why I am (Mostly) OK with Democrats Caving on the Shutdown

 

One provision in the continuing resolution is completely unacceptable -- a provision allowing Senators to sue the government if their phone records were subpoenaed during the January 6 investigation.  This is part of the ongoing effort to ensure that Republican office holders are above the law -- unless the run afoul of Trump, of course.

As for the rest of the bill, I know it is an unpopular view on my side, but I really don't think it is so bad.  I do understand the argument that you should never reward a hostage taker or you will just encourage them.  At the same time, I also at least partly agree with JV Last that the Democrats are really better off losing this fight than winning it.

Last goes further than I am willing to go.  He says that the real issue at stake is not policy but power -- specifically, Trump's outrageous authoritarian power grabs.  I agree.  But I don't think the American people broadly understand that.  Trump's power grabs are just too remote and abstract for the average low information voter to get too excited about.  What does excite a low information voter is skyrocketing insurance premiums.  

Last proposes that Democrats refuse to open the government unless Congress admits Washington DC as a state.  Needless to say, that is not going to happen.  It will just make Democrats look like outrageous extortionists and sway public opinion heavily in favor of Republicans.  If DC statehood is too extreme, Last suggests some sort of measure to reign in ICE.  While I am all in favor of that, I still don't think it would command the sort of public approval that would translate into support for a government shutdown.  Alternately, he suggests releasing the Epstein files.  That just might sway some voters, Trump supporters included, but still probably not enough to make them support the Democrats in the shutdown.  But saving voters from skyrocketing insurance premiums -- now that is the sort of thing that

 lines up public opinion behind the Democrats.  And it did.  The only problem is that Democrats can only win politically by losing.  In other words, if Republicans had actually agreed to extend the subsidies, the result would have been that people's insurance premiums would not go up and no one would see what the big deal was about.  Voters will never give you credit for averting a disaster if things basically stay unchanged.

So Democrats lost substantively, which means that they won politically.  And we should not underestimate what they gained in the exchange.

The government is only open until January 30.  That means that if the Democrats really want to, they can do a shutdown all over again.

There are exceptions for the Departments of Defense, Veteran's Affairs, and Agriculture which are funded for the fiscal year.  That means if the Democrats do decide to do another government shutdown, Trump will be deprived of some of his most valuable hostages.  The country will not face the prospect of the troops going unpaid, veterans being denied benefits, or people losing their food stamps.  These were all factors in the Democrats' decision to back down.  They will not be issues in January.  Furthermore, the holidays will be over in January, so air traffic snarls will not be as bad.

Furloughed employees will receive back pay and fired employees will be reinstated.  This is highly significant because the whole reason for the shutdown was, quite simply, that Donald Trump and OMB Director Russ Vought wanted the shutdown as cover for a major power grab.  Vought made clear that he intended to use the shutdown to cancel widespread programs, most of them benefitting Democrats, and to engage in widespread firings of federal employees.  Actual number fired: 4,000.  The fact that they are being reinstated and that Trump is signing off on it effectively means that the power grab failed.  Senate Democrats, by shouting and waving their arms about healthcare subsidies and keeping quiet about the power grab gave Trump space to very quietly back down on it.  Of course, this victory will only be successful if people refrain from talking about it!

This just might sour Trump on government shutdowns.  After initially welcoming the shutdown, Trump has become increasingly eager to end it, once it became clear that it was hurting him, and Republicans in general.  Again, this shutdown appears to have been largely orchestrated by Russ Vought, who has been described as a competent version of Elon Musk.  I am not sure he is quite as competent as advertised.  Vought's 4000 firings included 1000 CDC employees monitoring infectious disease, from measles to Ebola.  Once word got out, federal officials assured employees that this had been an error and the firings would be reversed.  That sounds just like Musk.  In any event, Vought's power play appears to have backfired on Trump.  While it is no doubt asking too much to hope that Vought is going anywhere very soon, we can at least hope that Trump will be slower to take his advice in the future.

Trump has clearly violated Rule No. One of Smart Authoritarians, which is to save the unpopular stuff until you have consolidated complete power.  Trump has been doing so many unpopular things lately that I was beginning to be concerned that might be a sign he was confident that he had fully consolidated power.  I think recent events are clear evidence that he is not there yet.

The filibuster survived.  I know there are people on our side like JV Last and Matthew Yglesias favor ending the filibuster.  I agree on the sole issue of continuing resolutions.  It should not require the President, the House of Representatives and a super majority in the Senate to keep the government open.  The last thing we need in our government is the opportunity for the minority party in the Senate to make government shutdowns a routine way of doing business.  Last and Yglesias favor allowing the Senate to pass legislation by a simple majority so that if the dominant party wants to pass something unpopular it will have to live with the results.  Under normal circumstances, I would agree.  Passing legislation by a simple majority of the Senate should not be a radical, extraordinary, shocking measure.  Under normal circumstances, it should be routine.  

But circumstances are not normal.  We have a dangerous authoritarian in the White House and spinelessly compliant party in control of both houses of Congress.  If they want to pass unpopular measures and face a public backlash, I am fine with that.  What I am afraid of is procedurally authoritarian measures that are too abstract and obscure to attract public outcry, but pose a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law.  This threat is not hypothetical.  The One Bonkers Barbaric Bonanza originally contained provisions that would have prevented courts from enjoining government actions that was fortunately rejected by the Senate Parliamentarian as subject to filibuster.  Ted Cruz has proposed a bill that would add "riot" to the list of offenses that could result in RICO prosecutions.  The implications are truly alarming.  For instance, the October "No Kings" protests were almost entirely peaceful -- almost.  In Los Angeles after the bulk of the marchers had gone home, small crowds caused disturbances.  Under Ted Cruz's law, that alone might open every group involved in the "No Kings" protests to prosecution as a criminal enterprise.  The only Republicans I trust to vote against such legislation are Thomas Massie and Rand Paul.  We need to keep the filibuster alive to block such things.

Winning the shutdown give Republicans a Huge Political Headache.  Simply put, Republicans know that soaring insurance premiums will be wildly unpopular and have no idea what to do about it.  The vote is set for December.  That will give plenty of time for the public to see its premiums go up an pressure to build.  And if the vote to extend subsidies fails, Democrats have made completely clear who is to blame.  

Viewing Democratic tactics, a cynic might wonder whether the party, which failed to make the enhanced Obamacare credits permanent during the Biden administration, laid a trap for Republicans on an issue their rivals always failed to solve, especially under Trump.

To which I can only say, "Ya think?" 

PS:  In further good news House Republicans are just as outraged over Senators' giveaways to themselves as anyone else.  Though not prepared to continue the shutdown over this particular provision, they plan to move to strike it in separate legislation.  At last, a measure that will command overwhelming bipartisan support!

ICE Compared to DOGE: How Does it End?

 

It didn't take me too long to recognize that Elon Musk's rampage through the federal government was not sustainable and had to come to an end, albeit with great damage.  The same applied to the worst of Trump's tariff's -- the markets cracked the whip, and he retreated to tariffs that were merely damaging, rather than ruinous.*

I would like to think that the same rule applies to mass deportations, that deporting so much of our labor force will become so ruinous that it just has to stop.  But at the same time, Team Trump has invested so many resources in mass deportation, and Republicans are so committed to it that it seems hard to imagine them pulling back.

The case for pessimism

The One Botched, Bungled Boondoggle increases the budget for border enforcement from $34 billion to $168 billion -- nearly a five-fold increase.  This is approximately the combined total of all local police budgets in the US.  It also seeks to hire another 10,000 ICE agents, up from the current 20,000 and as much as a 13-fold increase in the detention and surveillance budget.  Many of these facilities are already built, so there will not be much delay.  And detention and surveillance will be a strong interest group fighting any cuts.  Firing tens of thousands of unionized federal employees is not politically feasible (although DOGE has set an interesting precedent here).  ICE has tasted blood and will be extremely difficult to reign in.  And this seems to be broadly desired by Republicans across the board, being offered as a spoonful of sugar to sweeten the bitter medicine if Medicaid cuts.  The only Republican to have questioned the expansion is Rand Paul, whose only objection appears to be a desire for greater accountability for the expense.  And when Trump briefly relented for farms and hotels he quickly reversed, apparently in response to Republican outcry.

Opinion polls are also revealing.  It appears that Americans believe that ICE has gone too far by 54% to 44%. But 80% of Republicans approve, with 31% even saying that ICE has not gone far enough.  So long as 80% of Republicans support ICE brutality, it will be very hard for Republicans to go against it.

In short, Republicans in general and Trump in particular have made mass deportations their signature policy, created a huge bloc of interests in mass deportations, have a rabid base, and will have great difficulty backing down.

The case or optimism

At the same time, sooner or later the economic consequences of deportations on such a scale will make themselves known.  At the same time, immigrants make up about 19% of the US labor force.  Yes, granted, many of them have legal status, but neither ICE nor hardcore Republicans seem to care.  Including undocumented only, Republicans are proposing to deport nearly a third of the workforce in construction, nearly half our workforce in agriculture, nearly a third of home health workers, and perhaps one out of four or five residential care workers.  Deporting so much of our workforce is going to be seriously disruptive and lead to growing pushback.  Donald Trump is showing signs of wavering, proposing exemptions for workers in agriculture and hospitality, though so far not following through.  Immigrant-heavy industries are beginning to experience labor shortages, especially in agriculture.

And now we are getting reports that even ICE is getting tired of this.  At least some ICE officers disapprove of their agency's lawlessness, although I think it is obvious that others love it.  But it does seem plausible that even agents who like the work are getting tired of starting at 4:00 a.m. and working weekends.  And even pushing so hard, ICE is still falling well short of Stephen Miller's goal of 3,000 arrests a day -- an average of 1,200 per day and only two days with 2,000.  The latest budget seeks to expand ICE's workforce by half -- from 20,000 to 30,000.  It seeks to more than double detainee capacity -- from 41,000 to 100,000.  Even with such an expansion, Miller's quota seems like a stretch. At the same time, this has not (thus far) led to widespread resignations or internal protests, and in the absence of such a response, discontent is not much use.  But it does suggests that the ICE rank and file might be more open to being reigned in than one might expect -- so long as the pressure from above relents.

What to Expect

Well, Elon Musk got kicked out when the rest of Trump's cabinet revolted.  All of them, no matter how rightwing, had actual work to get done and were tired of the disruptions.  Is there a chance of that happening here?  Other departments are being asked to divert more and more resources to deportations.  Some of them must be tired of being diverted from their normal missions.  A lot of employers, many of the Republicans, are getting frustrated with labor shortage.  And even Homeland Security is offering a sweetener to its threats -- the opportunity for anyone who self-deports to apply for readmission.  Tr

Sooner or later -- my guess is about 3-4 months, but that is purely a guess -- labor shortages will get so bad that the Team Trump will see no choice but to relent, at least in agriculture.  And if Trump relents in agriculture, how long can it be before other industries want in as well?  He has already proposed an exception for hospitality.  Construction and healthcare will also want in.  And no doubt others.  Trump has proposed to allow employers to "vouch" for their workforce to protect them from deportation.**  A few points are in order here.  

One is that this sounds terribly exploitive.  It makes it essentially impossible for a laborer to change jobs without a sponsor's agreement, and it allows employers to hold the threat of deportation over anyone they consider out of line.

At the same time, not all employers are purely exploitive.  Many will no doubt be willing to vouch for an employee purely as a protective matter.  In fact, I would expect that even if right wingers can eventually be brought around to such a system, they will be absolutely paranoid about fake certifications.

And finally, this will require at least some relenting in ICE's reign of terror.  An end to workplace raids at farms, obviously.  But ending workplace raids will be of limited value of employees can be arrested any time going to and from work, buying groceries, picking up children from school, attending church, etc.  Granted, ICE can continue random sweeps of these place.  But it will at least have to give people the opportunity to present proof of protection by an employer, and will have to respect such a certification.  That might even mean ending outrageous quotas in favor of a more targeted system.  And that, in turn, might require getting rid of Stephen Miller.

Hey, I can dream.

___________________________________________

*And now he is once again threatening ruinous -- starting August 1.  We will see how long that lasts.

**He raised the issue in agriculture only, but one can easily imagine a similar system in other industries.

The First 100 Days by Choose Democracy

 

And then there are the speculations on the Trump Presidency from What if Trump Wins, a choose your own adventure from Choose Democracy.  Naturally, as a choose your own adventure, there were alternate scenarios of what Trump might do, and alternate responses.  Their basic advice on resistance is about the same, regardless of what Trump does.  Democracy fails if you don't resist, or resist the wrong way.  But it offers at least two ways that popular resistance might bring down the regime, if Trump tries to cancel the 2028 election or tries to shut down an electric vehicle plant.*

But that it getting a little ahead of ourselves.  It offered six alternate scenarios of the first 100 days.

Certain communalities present themselves in these alternate scenarios.  In nearly all, Trump:

• Pardons himself and the other January 6 defendants (true)
• Either closes the border (true) or reallocates funds to build the border wall (false, he seems to have lost interest in this), which is challenged in court but not halted (false)
• Withdraws from the Paris Climate Accords, halts all government research on climate, and/or deletes it from government websites (true)
• Appoints loyalists to key positions (true), possibly bypassing the Senate (false)
• Classifies 50,000 to 100,000 federal workers as Schedule F so he can replace them, temporarily blocked by courts (not quite but happened, but really!)

Clearly, these were the things the authors were most confident Trump would do and, for the most part, they were correct.  They did underestimate Trump's effectiveness in closing the border and failed to foresee DOGE, but no one foresaw DOGE.  

There were also differences.

Scenario 1: Trump installs loyalists  and opens IRS investigations into protest groups

This one is only presented if there are widespread protests against Trump that degenerate into violence.  It has Trump institute a 16-week abortion ban and has the IRS freeze the assets of the groups that organized the protests.  The IRS freezes assets of organizations involved in protests, opens investigations of Planned Parenthood, MoveOn, and a dozen others.  

Certainly this was something I was very much afraid of.  But in fact widespread pre-inauguration protests and violence did not materialize, and neither did IRS attacks on organizations opposed to Trump -- at least not yet.  One reason may be that there are currently institutional safeguards that make such a thing extremely difficult.  The bad news is that Trump's "big beautiful bill" contains a provision that would largely eliminate those barriers.  Stay tuned.

Scenario 2, Trump issues 150 radical executive orders

Aside from the usual measures (see above), Trump issues a "Back the Blue" order giving legal protection to police and encourages them to join forces with ICE.  He orders ICE to prepare for mass deportations, which ICE begins, joined by right wing militias.  Trump also orders the investigation of Liz Cheney, the rest of the January 6 Select Committee, and 27 others involved in the 2020 election.  

The mass deportation part is true, clearly, although it took longer than this scenario supposed, presumably as a result of the logistical difficulty in ramping up deportations so quickly.  Neither local police nor rightwing militias appear to have joined the effort.  And there have been no investigations of Liz Cheney and the rest.  So basically thus far the Trump Administration has been focusing on deporting immigrants -- including ones with a plausible claim to legal status -- but not on his political opponents. 

Scenario 3: Trump talks big, but his chaotic office only completes 10 major executive orders:

The executive orders are basically the ones outlined above.  Further actions are stymied by infighting within the Administration.  Unable to gain traction on real-world actions, Trump turns to online incitement.  In this scenario, the Georgia case against him for election subversion continues and the Proud Boys firebomb Fani Willis's house and shoot at her father.  

The authors did not anticipate that Fani Willis would be disqualified for having an affair with the special prosecutor she hired.  What would have happened if the parties had curbed their impulses is anyone's guess.

Scenario 4: Trump invokes the Insurrection Act and orders the military into major Democratic cities

In this scenario, besides the usual actions above, Trump pledges to end the "lawlessness of major Democratic cities," invokes the Insurrection Act, and sends in the National Guard.  Military leaders are alarmed and take this to military courts, which limit the activity.  National Guard limits itself to walking around, but everyone is on edge, fearing a violent explosion.  

Well, first of all, the authors get this wrong. Trump would have said, "lawlessness of major Democrat cities," a small difference, but one with big resonance.  Obviously, this hasn't happened.  Trump has focused on deportations instead.  And I must say that I, at least, was not all that worried about this one.  I was prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that his threat to invoke the Insurrection Act and send in the National Guard were limited to violent riots.  And, in fact, it was proposed as an alternative mostly (not exclusively) if there were widespread protests that broke out into violence.

Scenario 5: Trump talks big but governs like a normal President

This one is very similar to Scenario 3, above, including the hypothetical firebombing and shooting at Fani Willis's house.  The main difference is that the governors of Texas and Arizona send the National Guard to the border, backed by rightwing militias.  

This one did not happen, either.  Trump has proved much more aggressive and successful on the border than anyone anticipated.

Scenario 6: Trump invokes the Insurrection Act and orders the military to the US Mexico border

This is probably the closest to what actually happened.  Trump issues the usual orders, invokes the Insurrection Act, sends the military to the border, and proclaims "the largest domestic deportation operation in American history."  For the first 100 days, the National Guard limits itself to patrolling the border and does not engage in military operations.  Border crossings are reduced.  The authors do not say anything about domestic deportations.

After the first 100 days, before the midterms

Regardless of what Trump does, the basic options on how to respond are about the same.  I will address that later.  Also notable are that the options on how to respond all assume certain things are happening above and beyond what is proposed in the six scenarios.  Maybe the authors think of these as things that happen after the first 100 days, or maybe they expect these things to happen within the first 100 days but saw them as background noise.  Most of these presumed events assume that the midterm elections have not yet happened, although the midterms play a fairly minimal role in the book. 

Obviously awe are just a little out of the first 100 days and well short of the midterms.  A lot can happen in the next year and a half.  Still, it is worth considering what the authors expect to happen over the first year or so of the Trump term and what has happened so far:

• Large scale immigration raids and mass deportations, with little or no process
• Loss of funding for health departments
• Increase is hate crime or workplace violence, which the FBI declines to investigate
• Somewhat vague conflict with the military, which slow-walks some of Trump's orders
• Department of Education takes funding from public schools and sends it to private schools
• Trump appoints young, rightwing judges who gerrymander districts to ensure Republicans will win
• Large scale firing of executive branch officials, to the point of making most regulation impossible
• Right wing violence against protesters
• Calls for political arrests

At this early stage, much of this has come about, but not all.  Obviously, the mass deportations, loss of funding, and widespread firing of executive branch officials have come about.  The cancellation of funding and firings have been much worse than anyone could have foreseen, and are being at least somewhat reversed.  Trump will undoubtedly appoint rightwing judges, many of whom do not have the same devotion to the rule of law as his first-term appointees, but that will take time.  Calls to prosecute opponents have happened but so far it has mostly been empty talk, with the notable exception of public officials who stand in the way of the Administration's worst deportation policies.

What the authors most seem to overestimate is the power of rightwing militias and terrorists.**  I do not mean to deny the existence of such things.  There is some evidences, for instance, that some Senate votes to confirm have been the result of threats of physical violence and not merely threats of a primary challenge.  And there have been vague but alarming threats against federal judges.  But judges continue ruling against the Trump Administration, and plenty of Republicans in Congress, like Thomas Massie and Rand Paul, freely speak out against Trump's economic policies.  And there has been no widespread outbreak of rightwing violence.

I was afraid of this sort of thing, too.  Looking back on it, that may have been a misunderstanding of how these things work. In general, rightwing militias tend to tick upward when a Democrat is in the White House because they feel threatened and downward under a Republican because they consider mission accomplished.  The upsurge in 2020 was a exception, largely in response to COVID lockdowns and riots, that militia members saw as threatening.

I assured many friends ahead of the election that while I greatly feared Trump winning, I did not think he was Hitler -- more like Orban.  One challenged me.  Did I mean that Trump was not as evil as Hitler, or not as competent.  I thought it over and and said that the US was not facing the sort of social breakdown that Germany was.

While I stand by this opinion, there is more to add to it.  When Hitler was named Chancellor, he had a private army of 2 million Brown Shirts out of a population of about 66 million.  Do the math.  That means about one in 33 Germans was a Brown Shirt, or about 3% of the population.  Rounding the US population today to 330 million, that would be equivalent to about 10 million Proud Boys.  (Or 10 million combined Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters).  If Donald Trump had a private army of that size, the calculus of power would undoubtedly be very different from what it is today.  

Maybe the Three Percenters are onto something.

NEXT UP:  What Choose Democracy recommends we do.

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*I personally considered the former much more likely than that latter, but that is just applying Rule Number One of Smart Authoritarians.  It should be obvious by now that Trump is not very smart.

**Also significant -- the authors do not say anything about economic damage from tariffs or budget-busting tax cuts, even though these were major campaign promises that Trump made.  Presumably the authors deemphasize these issue because they do not see them as serious threats to democracy.  But Trump's incredibly arbitrary tariff policies are a vivid illustration of the danger of Congress ceding the power of the purse strings.  And economic issues of this kind are what is most likely to sink the Trump Administration.