All sense of fairness, perspective, and patriotism combined to require me to wait for a decent interval after the airstrike killing General Suleimani before analyzing it from the perspective of domestic US politics.
And by a decent interval, of course, I mean one day.
So here goes.
My opinion in international terms remains the same. It was a brilliant tactical strike showing the extraordinary skill of our military and intelligence services. Whether it was an appropriate response to head off an imminent terrorist attack, and what the medium- to long-term ramifications are are unknown and unknowable at present. They will be revealed over time.
I must say, though, that I don't agree with people saying this was a rash and impulsive response to the attack on our embassy. An attack of this kind has to be planned out well in advance. My guess is that the drone strikes and the airstrike were part of a pre-conceived plan. That the attack on the embassy occurred during the interval was not part of our plan, but may have stiffened our resolve.
In terms of domestic policy.
First of all, coming in the middle of impeachment proceedings, this necessarily raises Wag the Dog questions. Is Trump escalating against Iran as a matter of national interest, or to distract from his domestic political problems. I have no idea.
On the other hand, the opposite question arises. Has Trump's particularly deranged tweeting recently been a clever attempt to distract people from an ongoing military operation? That would require more foresight and self control that he has generally shown, but you never know.
Second, I continue to believe that Trump knows nothing about policy and does not care to learn, refuses to pay attention to his security briefing, and has the emotional maturity and impulse control of a small child. This nonetheless has not prevented the military and the intelligence services from doing highly competent work.
Third, the very night the strike occurred I saw an article, on of many, speculating that Trump has dementia. This one went further than most, specifically predicting that by next year he will increasingly lose balance and become "uncommunicative." (Not clear what that means). By 2021 he will need a cane and become increasingly wheelchair bound. By 2022 he was start having problems with aspiration (choking). By 2023 he will be bedridden and need 24-7 care. Clearly by that time even Trump's most devoted followers will have to admit he is unfit to govern and the 25th Amendment will come into play. But in the meantime we might be faced with the prospect of a war, or at least a highly delicate international situation that could lead in unpredictable directions, under the leadership of a President whose cognitive abilities are degenerating fast. Not an encouraging prospect!
Finally, I have definite advice to all Democrats on what to say. Praise the tactical brilliance of the strike and then add that no one can know the long-range outcome and we must all hope and pray for the best while preparing for the worst. That is a nice vague statement that can't get you in trouble no matter what happens.
Finally, on a personal level, as the saying goes, two things can be true. (1) I am beside myself with anxiety, wonder what will be next and hating the absolute uncertainty of it, and (2) the countless commentators (expert and pundit alike) speculating on what comes next are driving me nuts!
Friday, January 3, 2020
Thursday, January 2, 2020
!!!
And, now an event powerful enough to drive impeachment into the background.
US forces bombed an Iranian convoy in Iraq, killing Iranian General Qassim Suleimani, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Quds, the intelligence service that runs the Iranian secret police and terrorist proxies throughout the world) and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, leader of Qataib Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian militia that attacked the US embassy in Iraq, together with a spokesman for the militia and two others.
According to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Suleimani's forces were planning additional attacks on US troops and diplomats throughout Iraq. If so, Suleimani was extraordinarily rash and arrogant in his actions and certain to overreach sooner or later. (Sooner, it turned out).
So what to make of this? I don't have the slightest idea. Still, a few uninformed comments.
First, clearly this was a brilliant tactical operation, supported by some extraordinary intelligence, so congratulations to our forces for a job well done.
Second, although Suleimani has headed Quds for some 20 years, it seems unlikely that this will be a decapitation strike that brings down the whole organization. Quds, by all accounts, is an entrenched bureaucracy that will be able to replace its leader.
Third, Suleimani's replacement may very well be just as bad, if not worse, but it seems unlikely that he will be as competent. By all accounts, Suleimani was extremely competent. Quds will not collapse or moderate, but it may be thrown into temporary confusion and permanently weakened.
Fourth, I have no idea whether Qataib Hezbollah will survive.
And finally, I do not know enough to even speculate on the long-term ramifications. I have heard everything from this is the beginning of the end of all Iranian influence throughout the region to this will engulf the Middle East in a massive war. (All from experts, by the way). So I will refrain from predictions and watch events unfold.
One inexpert comment, though. In general, optimism is not a good bet in the Mideast.
US forces bombed an Iranian convoy in Iraq, killing Iranian General Qassim Suleimani, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Quds, the intelligence service that runs the Iranian secret police and terrorist proxies throughout the world) and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, leader of Qataib Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian militia that attacked the US embassy in Iraq, together with a spokesman for the militia and two others.
According to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, Suleimani's forces were planning additional attacks on US troops and diplomats throughout Iraq. If so, Suleimani was extraordinarily rash and arrogant in his actions and certain to overreach sooner or later. (Sooner, it turned out).
So what to make of this? I don't have the slightest idea. Still, a few uninformed comments.
First, clearly this was a brilliant tactical operation, supported by some extraordinary intelligence, so congratulations to our forces for a job well done.
Second, although Suleimani has headed Quds for some 20 years, it seems unlikely that this will be a decapitation strike that brings down the whole organization. Quds, by all accounts, is an entrenched bureaucracy that will be able to replace its leader.
Third, Suleimani's replacement may very well be just as bad, if not worse, but it seems unlikely that he will be as competent. By all accounts, Suleimani was extremely competent. Quds will not collapse or moderate, but it may be thrown into temporary confusion and permanently weakened.
Fourth, I have no idea whether Qataib Hezbollah will survive.
And finally, I do not know enough to even speculate on the long-term ramifications. I have heard everything from this is the beginning of the end of all Iranian influence throughout the region to this will engulf the Middle East in a massive war. (All from experts, by the way). So I will refrain from predictions and watch events unfold.
One inexpert comment, though. In general, optimism is not a good bet in the Mideast.
Wednesday, January 1, 2020
Impeachment Hearings, Continued
Also Day Three: Alexander Vindman and Jennifer Williams
This was a somewhat unusual pairing in that both parties brought the perspective of Washington; neither was stationed in Ukraine. Also somewhat unusual: I don't really understand the point of Williams' testimony. Vindman is a career military man who was serving on National Security Council (NSC) at all relevant times. Williams is a career diplomat worked for the Office of the Vice President at all relevant times. Both were present during the fatal phone call of July 25.
Vindman also attended the inauguration of President Zelensky. (He played no role in deciding who was to attend). He was also present when Ukrainian National Security Adviser Oleksandr Daniluk visited Washington and met with US national security officials and Gordon Sondland. It was during this meeting that Sondland insisted in investigations of the 2016 election, Burisma, and the Bidens. This led National Security Adviser John Bolton to cut the meeting short. Vindman told Sondland directly that such a demand was improper and reported it to the NSC lawyer. He also was present during the July 25 phone call and reported it to the NSC lawyer. He also testified (and Williams agreed) that a reference in the July 25 transcript to "the company" actually said "Burisma," and that it was most unusual that a US President, asking a foreign government to root out corruption, would mention a specific company. Vindman did not directly address security assistance.
Williams' testimony was mostly supplemental. She was also present on the phone call and thought it unusual to bring up specific individuals or companies. (She agreed that Burisma was specifically named). She attempted to schedule the Vice President's attendance at President Zelensky's inauguration, but had a very narrow window to schedule and was ultimately ordered from above, for unknown reasons, that he would not be attending. She was also present at a meeting in Warsaw between President Zelensky and Vice President Pence in which Zelensky asked about the hold on security assistance and Pence assured Zelensky of US support.
In his cross examination of the witnesses, Devin Nunes raised some questions about Ukraine that seemed quite alarming, if true. The fact that no other Republicans raised the issue led me to suspect that the allegations were false. (More on that later). He also pressed on identifying the whistle blower, until Chairman Schiff cut him off.
Day Four Gordon Sondland
Gordon Sondland testified alone, and properly so, I would say. Sondland was the only witness before the committee who had significant knowledge of events in both Washington and Ukraine. I did not find his testimony to be either as damning as Democrats believed, or as exculpatory as Republicans claimed. Furthermore, Sondland, like Volker, was far enough implicated in the whole scheme to have strong reasons to be self-serving.
Sondland began by acknowledging that he is not a note-taker and was not given access to official documents, so his memory was imperfect. He would also defer to career diplomats who were note takers. Like Volker, Sondland denied being part of any irregular back channel, and he kept all officials back in Washington apprised of what was going on. This was his primary emphasis throught his opening statement and, like Volker, it seems likely his emphasis was self-serving. Like Volker, he also denied knowing that investigating Burisma was code for investigating the Bidens, although he considered it clear in hindsight. Unlike Volker, he did understand "talk to Rudy" as a directive to talk to Rudy. Although he was never told why security aid was suspended, he did come to understand it was conditional on investigating Burisma and 2016. Sondland thus redoubled his efforts to get the Ukrainians to do those investigations, but did not press them to investigate the Bidens.
Sondland was present during the meeting between Ukrainian National Security Adviser Oleksandr Daniluk and members of the US National Security Council. He acknowledged pressing Daniluk on the need for investigations at that meeting, but denied that the demand led to any conflict. He was not present on the July 25 call and did not learn that anything improper happened until the transcript was made public. But he did prep Zelensky to discuss investigations before the call, and worked with him on preparing an announcement after the call. At the multilateral Warsaw conference, he pulled aside Zelensky's adviser Andrei Yermak to tell him that security aid depended on investigations. And at some point he proposed that the prosecutor general announce the investigation, only to be told that it had to be Pesident Zelensky. Probably also significant and consistent with the testimony of every other witness -- no one Sondland talked to favored withholding the military aid.
Sondland's supposedly most damning testimony was:
This was a somewhat unusual pairing in that both parties brought the perspective of Washington; neither was stationed in Ukraine. Also somewhat unusual: I don't really understand the point of Williams' testimony. Vindman is a career military man who was serving on National Security Council (NSC) at all relevant times. Williams is a career diplomat worked for the Office of the Vice President at all relevant times. Both were present during the fatal phone call of July 25.
Vindman also attended the inauguration of President Zelensky. (He played no role in deciding who was to attend). He was also present when Ukrainian National Security Adviser Oleksandr Daniluk visited Washington and met with US national security officials and Gordon Sondland. It was during this meeting that Sondland insisted in investigations of the 2016 election, Burisma, and the Bidens. This led National Security Adviser John Bolton to cut the meeting short. Vindman told Sondland directly that such a demand was improper and reported it to the NSC lawyer. He also was present during the July 25 phone call and reported it to the NSC lawyer. He also testified (and Williams agreed) that a reference in the July 25 transcript to "the company" actually said "Burisma," and that it was most unusual that a US President, asking a foreign government to root out corruption, would mention a specific company. Vindman did not directly address security assistance.
Williams' testimony was mostly supplemental. She was also present on the phone call and thought it unusual to bring up specific individuals or companies. (She agreed that Burisma was specifically named). She attempted to schedule the Vice President's attendance at President Zelensky's inauguration, but had a very narrow window to schedule and was ultimately ordered from above, for unknown reasons, that he would not be attending. She was also present at a meeting in Warsaw between President Zelensky and Vice President Pence in which Zelensky asked about the hold on security assistance and Pence assured Zelensky of US support.
In his cross examination of the witnesses, Devin Nunes raised some questions about Ukraine that seemed quite alarming, if true. The fact that no other Republicans raised the issue led me to suspect that the allegations were false. (More on that later). He also pressed on identifying the whistle blower, until Chairman Schiff cut him off.
Day Four Gordon Sondland
Gordon Sondland testified alone, and properly so, I would say. Sondland was the only witness before the committee who had significant knowledge of events in both Washington and Ukraine. I did not find his testimony to be either as damning as Democrats believed, or as exculpatory as Republicans claimed. Furthermore, Sondland, like Volker, was far enough implicated in the whole scheme to have strong reasons to be self-serving.
Sondland began by acknowledging that he is not a note-taker and was not given access to official documents, so his memory was imperfect. He would also defer to career diplomats who were note takers. Like Volker, Sondland denied being part of any irregular back channel, and he kept all officials back in Washington apprised of what was going on. This was his primary emphasis throught his opening statement and, like Volker, it seems likely his emphasis was self-serving. Like Volker, he also denied knowing that investigating Burisma was code for investigating the Bidens, although he considered it clear in hindsight. Unlike Volker, he did understand "talk to Rudy" as a directive to talk to Rudy. Although he was never told why security aid was suspended, he did come to understand it was conditional on investigating Burisma and 2016. Sondland thus redoubled his efforts to get the Ukrainians to do those investigations, but did not press them to investigate the Bidens.
Sondland was present during the meeting between Ukrainian National Security Adviser Oleksandr Daniluk and members of the US National Security Council. He acknowledged pressing Daniluk on the need for investigations at that meeting, but denied that the demand led to any conflict. He was not present on the July 25 call and did not learn that anything improper happened until the transcript was made public. But he did prep Zelensky to discuss investigations before the call, and worked with him on preparing an announcement after the call. At the multilateral Warsaw conference, he pulled aside Zelensky's adviser Andrei Yermak to tell him that security aid depended on investigations. And at some point he proposed that the prosecutor general announce the investigation, only to be told that it had to be Pesident Zelensky. Probably also significant and consistent with the testimony of every other witness -- no one Sondland talked to favored withholding the military aid.
Sondland's supposedly most damning testimony was:
I know that members of this committee frequently frame these complicated issues in the form of a simple question. Was there a quid pro quo?
As I testified previously, with regard to the requested White House call and the White House meeting, the answer is yes.
Mr. Giuliani conveyed to Secretary Perry, Ambassador Volker, and others that President Trump wanted a public statement from President Zelensky committing to investigations of Burisma and the 2016 election. Mr. Giuliani expressed those requests directly to the Ukrainians and Mr. Giuliani also expressed those requests directly to us. We all understood that these prerequisites for the White House call and the right -- White House meeting reflected President Trump's desires and requirements.
But an opponent of impeachment might respond, so what. Quid pro quo simply means an exchange of value, which is the lifeblood of diplomacy, just as it is the lifeblood of business or politics. The real questions is not whether there was a quid pro quo, but whether there was a corrupt quid pro quo, and this statement leaves room for doubt. Sondland speaks of exchanging a White House visit for investigation of Burisma and the 2016 election, not of exchanging military aid for investigation of the Bidens. And, after all, a president has absolute discretion to decide what foreign leaders he wants to invite to the White House, while the military aid was appropriated by Congress and was mandatory. and Burisma, at least, might be seen as investigating domestic corruption, rather than intervening in US politics. Even the 2016 election cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that Alexandra Chalupa might have improperly cooperated with the Ukrainian embassy. But he also made clear that Trump never expressly told him that aid was tied to investigations.*
The supposedly exculpatory statement occurred on September 9 when Sondland asked Trump what he wanted in order to release military aid and Trump said, "I want nothing. I want no quid pro quo. Tell Zelensky to do the right thing." This is entirely unconvincing for two reasons. First, it was spoken after the scandal had become public, so anything Trump might say (even in private) was obviously self-serving. Second, saying you are making no demands, followed by a demand is obviously self-refuting.
The fourth day was a long day, with Gordon Sondland followed by testimony from Laura Cooper and David Hale (no opening statement). Both are career employees, Cooper the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia and Hale the Undersecretary of State for Political affairs. Both witnesses brought the perspective of Washington, not Ukraine.
Anything else they had to say was overshadowed by a bombshell dropped by Laura Cooper. Up until then, Trump's defenders might argue that he could not have used military aid to pressure the Ukrainians because they were not aware of the hold until it appeared in Politico. Cooper revealed that her staff had searched their e-mails and discovered two from the Ukrainian embassy complaining about a hold on security assistance on July 25, the day of the infamous phone call. She did not know how the Ukrainians learned of the hold. Any concerns about the had had been certified by the Pentagon in May. Every agency except the OMB favored release of the aid.
Hale was a witness requested by Republicans. He testified that military aid has been withheld from other countries too, such as Pakistan, Lebanon, and countries in Central America.
This testimony took place at night after Sondland's testimony and, it seems safe to assume, the committee members were tired. Schiff decided to forego his usual 45 minute question and answer sessions the two party leaders on the committee and their lawyers and go directly to 5-minute question sessions. On the whole it was one of the more forgettable sessions, other than Laura Cooper's bombshell.
The fourth day was a long day, with Gordon Sondland followed by testimony from Laura Cooper and David Hale (no opening statement). Both are career employees, Cooper the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia and Hale the Undersecretary of State for Political affairs. Both witnesses brought the perspective of Washington, not Ukraine.
Anything else they had to say was overshadowed by a bombshell dropped by Laura Cooper. Up until then, Trump's defenders might argue that he could not have used military aid to pressure the Ukrainians because they were not aware of the hold until it appeared in Politico. Cooper revealed that her staff had searched their e-mails and discovered two from the Ukrainian embassy complaining about a hold on security assistance on July 25, the day of the infamous phone call. She did not know how the Ukrainians learned of the hold. Any concerns about the had had been certified by the Pentagon in May. Every agency except the OMB favored release of the aid.
Hale was a witness requested by Republicans. He testified that military aid has been withheld from other countries too, such as Pakistan, Lebanon, and countries in Central America.
This testimony took place at night after Sondland's testimony and, it seems safe to assume, the committee members were tired. Schiff decided to forego his usual 45 minute question and answer sessions the two party leaders on the committee and their lawyers and go directly to 5-minute question sessions. On the whole it was one of the more forgettable sessions, other than Laura Cooper's bombshell.
______________________________________
*Sondland appears to be the only witness to talk to President Trump directly.
Monday, December 30, 2019
Comments on the Impeachment Witnesses, Days 1-3
I don't intend to discuss the impeachment hearings in detail, just to give my brief impressions of the witnesses and their testimony.
Day One: William Taylor and George Kent.
These were the first witnesses. A lawyer's usual strategy is to end with the strongest witness, start with the second-strongest, and put weaker witnesses in the middle. Taylor was the acting ambassador to Ukraine at the time of the relevant events; George Kent is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. In other words, Taylor had the Ukrainian perspective and Kent the Washington perspective.
Taylor was a strong witness. He gave a detailed chronological account of events, date by date, based on contemporaneous notes that he took. He reported that when serving as acting ambassador, he began to notice that there was a second, irregular channel of communications, consisting of the Three Amigos -- Gordon Sondland, Kurt Volker and Rick Perry. At first the irregular channel seemed to share his goal -- to arrange a meeting between President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky.
But by mid-July, it was apparent to Taylor that the meeting was conditioned on investigation of Burisma, and alleged Ukrainian interference and the 2016 U.S. elections. Taylor also realized about the same time that security assistance was on hold, but did not immediately connect the two. That left Taylor in an awkward position. Ukrainians very appreciative of US security assistance and Taylor aware that assistance had been withheld and not authorized to disclose this fact and not knowing why. Taylor first learned of the link on September 1 when he received a readout of a call between Zelensky and Vice President Pence that quoted Sondland linking military aid to "investigations." He promptly texted Sondland -- to create a paper trail, many of us suspect. Sondland promptly answered, "Call me," -- to avoid a paper trail, many suspect. Sondland confirmed in the call that security aid as well as the White House meeting depended on a public commitment to "investigations."
All these discussions of "investigations" invariably just mentioned Burisma and the 2016 election but Taylor figured out along the way that "investigations" implied the Bidens. (No specific date of revelation; the only thing not dated). Sondland quoted Trump as denying a "quid pro quo," but saying that without investigations things were at a "stalemate" and that when a businessman is about to sign a check to someone who owes him something, the businessman asks that person to pay up before signing the check. (Not made clear: What the Ukrainians "owed" Trump). The release was made September 11, and Taylor followed up by urging the Ukrainians not to announce "investigations." Indeed, no investigations were announced.
Kent gave decidedly less information in his opening statement and answered many fewer questions. He did, however, make the point that if the genuine concern was corruption, there were official channels to follow, that Vice President Joe Biden did have a potential conflict of interest pressing Ukraine on corruption while his son was serving on the Burisma board of directors, but that there was never any attempt by the US government (Obama Administration) to shield Burisma and many calls to resume investigation.
Day Two, Marie Yovanovich.
Marie Yovanovich was the Ambassador to Ukraine before William Taylor. She was removed as a result of smears, largely orchestrated by Rudy Giuliani. I did not find her testimony very useful, to be honest. She was recalled before the relevant events and therefore did not witness any of them. Her opening statement focused mostly on refuting various smears, and the questions asked by the committee were painfully focused on her feelings (perhaps because she is a woman).
Day Three, Kurt Volker and Tim Morrison.
Volker and Morrison are considered defense (i.e., Republican) witnesses. Once again, Volker was the witness to events in Ukraine and Morrison the witness to events in Washington.
Volker is a retired career diplomat, brought back into service to serve as one of the Three Amigos. His testimony seemed more focused on defending his own conduct than in defending Trump. Volker emphasized his highly reputable background, his role and an official, not irregular, channel, and his hawkishness toward Russia. Yet his advocacy of Ukraine was being undermined by the old Prosecutor General and by Rudy Giuliani. Volker maintained that Giuliani was acting as a private citizen and had no role in setting policy, and that he believed both Trump and Giuliani were acting out of a good-faith concern about corruption. Although Giuliani did specifically mention the Bidens, Volker assured him there was nothing to the allegation. While Volker hoped that a generic commitment to fighting "corruption" would be sufficient, Giuliani insisted that the Ukrainians mention "Burisma" and "2016." He also denied being aware of the July 25 phone call until it was made public (undoubtedly true), knowing that security assistance as well as a White House visit was tied to "investigations," (possible) or knowing that "Burisma" was code for Biden (extraordinarily naive, if true).
Volker's opening statement makes clear that Rudy Giuliani was making demands about what sort of announcement was needed before President Trump would give the Ukrainians a White House meeting, and also that he was negotiating with the Ukrainians to give the sort of statement Giuliani wanted. He seems strangely unaware that that effectively meant that a private citizen -- and Donald Trump's personal lawyer at that -- was dictating Ukraine policy. Indeed, Giuliani was clearly Trump's main source of information on Ukraine. When the Three Amigos' account did not agree with Giuliani's, Trump would say, "Talk to Rudy." Volker insisted, under questioning, that he had no idea that that was a directive to talk to Rudy.
In short, Volker made a terrible defense witness. He made no attempt whatever to defend Trump's conduct on the July 25 call, only to dissociate himself from it.
Morrison was the senior policy director for Europe on the National Security Council. He testified that he saw nothing illegal on the July 25 call and only notified the NSC lawyer because it was politically embarrassing, and denied having any role in subjecting the call to an inordinately high security rating. He did also emphasize his commitment to Ukraine's defense and his disappointment in the July 25 call. He also referred to Sondland and Giuliani as a "parallel process." Unlike Volker, Morrison said he was aware that investigating Burisma meant investigating the Bidens, and that Trump was withholding military aid to coerce the investigation. Like Volker, Morrison made no attempt to defend the policy on the merits. His defense was that it was merely a bad policy and not actually illegal.
To date, no witness has defendant Trump's actions as appropriate.
Day One: William Taylor and George Kent.
These were the first witnesses. A lawyer's usual strategy is to end with the strongest witness, start with the second-strongest, and put weaker witnesses in the middle. Taylor was the acting ambassador to Ukraine at the time of the relevant events; George Kent is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. In other words, Taylor had the Ukrainian perspective and Kent the Washington perspective.
Taylor was a strong witness. He gave a detailed chronological account of events, date by date, based on contemporaneous notes that he took. He reported that when serving as acting ambassador, he began to notice that there was a second, irregular channel of communications, consisting of the Three Amigos -- Gordon Sondland, Kurt Volker and Rick Perry. At first the irregular channel seemed to share his goal -- to arrange a meeting between President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky.
But by mid-July, it was apparent to Taylor that the meeting was conditioned on investigation of Burisma, and alleged Ukrainian interference and the 2016 U.S. elections. Taylor also realized about the same time that security assistance was on hold, but did not immediately connect the two. That left Taylor in an awkward position. Ukrainians very appreciative of US security assistance and Taylor aware that assistance had been withheld and not authorized to disclose this fact and not knowing why. Taylor first learned of the link on September 1 when he received a readout of a call between Zelensky and Vice President Pence that quoted Sondland linking military aid to "investigations." He promptly texted Sondland -- to create a paper trail, many of us suspect. Sondland promptly answered, "Call me," -- to avoid a paper trail, many suspect. Sondland confirmed in the call that security aid as well as the White House meeting depended on a public commitment to "investigations."
All these discussions of "investigations" invariably just mentioned Burisma and the 2016 election but Taylor figured out along the way that "investigations" implied the Bidens. (No specific date of revelation; the only thing not dated). Sondland quoted Trump as denying a "quid pro quo," but saying that without investigations things were at a "stalemate" and that when a businessman is about to sign a check to someone who owes him something, the businessman asks that person to pay up before signing the check. (Not made clear: What the Ukrainians "owed" Trump). The release was made September 11, and Taylor followed up by urging the Ukrainians not to announce "investigations." Indeed, no investigations were announced.
Kent gave decidedly less information in his opening statement and answered many fewer questions. He did, however, make the point that if the genuine concern was corruption, there were official channels to follow, that Vice President Joe Biden did have a potential conflict of interest pressing Ukraine on corruption while his son was serving on the Burisma board of directors, but that there was never any attempt by the US government (Obama Administration) to shield Burisma and many calls to resume investigation.
Day Two, Marie Yovanovich.
Marie Yovanovich was the Ambassador to Ukraine before William Taylor. She was removed as a result of smears, largely orchestrated by Rudy Giuliani. I did not find her testimony very useful, to be honest. She was recalled before the relevant events and therefore did not witness any of them. Her opening statement focused mostly on refuting various smears, and the questions asked by the committee were painfully focused on her feelings (perhaps because she is a woman).
Day Three, Kurt Volker and Tim Morrison.
Volker and Morrison are considered defense (i.e., Republican) witnesses. Once again, Volker was the witness to events in Ukraine and Morrison the witness to events in Washington.
Volker is a retired career diplomat, brought back into service to serve as one of the Three Amigos. His testimony seemed more focused on defending his own conduct than in defending Trump. Volker emphasized his highly reputable background, his role and an official, not irregular, channel, and his hawkishness toward Russia. Yet his advocacy of Ukraine was being undermined by the old Prosecutor General and by Rudy Giuliani. Volker maintained that Giuliani was acting as a private citizen and had no role in setting policy, and that he believed both Trump and Giuliani were acting out of a good-faith concern about corruption. Although Giuliani did specifically mention the Bidens, Volker assured him there was nothing to the allegation. While Volker hoped that a generic commitment to fighting "corruption" would be sufficient, Giuliani insisted that the Ukrainians mention "Burisma" and "2016." He also denied being aware of the July 25 phone call until it was made public (undoubtedly true), knowing that security assistance as well as a White House visit was tied to "investigations," (possible) or knowing that "Burisma" was code for Biden (extraordinarily naive, if true).
Volker's opening statement makes clear that Rudy Giuliani was making demands about what sort of announcement was needed before President Trump would give the Ukrainians a White House meeting, and also that he was negotiating with the Ukrainians to give the sort of statement Giuliani wanted. He seems strangely unaware that that effectively meant that a private citizen -- and Donald Trump's personal lawyer at that -- was dictating Ukraine policy. Indeed, Giuliani was clearly Trump's main source of information on Ukraine. When the Three Amigos' account did not agree with Giuliani's, Trump would say, "Talk to Rudy." Volker insisted, under questioning, that he had no idea that that was a directive to talk to Rudy.
In short, Volker made a terrible defense witness. He made no attempt whatever to defend Trump's conduct on the July 25 call, only to dissociate himself from it.
Morrison was the senior policy director for Europe on the National Security Council. He testified that he saw nothing illegal on the July 25 call and only notified the NSC lawyer because it was politically embarrassing, and denied having any role in subjecting the call to an inordinately high security rating. He did also emphasize his commitment to Ukraine's defense and his disappointment in the July 25 call. He also referred to Sondland and Giuliani as a "parallel process." Unlike Volker, Morrison said he was aware that investigating Burisma meant investigating the Bidens, and that Trump was withholding military aid to coerce the investigation. Like Volker, Morrison made no attempt to defend the policy on the merits. His defense was that it was merely a bad policy and not actually illegal.
To date, no witness has defendant Trump's actions as appropriate.
Sunday, December 29, 2019
Impeachment Hearings: Some Preliminary Comments
All right, on to the impeachment hearings, knowing it is rather late. To be clear, I did not watch the hearings on TV (some of us have day jobs), but I did read the opening statements of all witnesses and listen to Lawfare Podcast recordings of their testimony, edited to ensure "no member-infighting, no speechifying, and no unnecessary fluff."
I will begin with a few comments as a lawyer.
Comment number 1: The hearings did not follow the rules of evidence as to what would be admissible at trial. Normally witnesses (with the exception of experts) are limited to what they could perceive with their five senses -- what did they see, hear, touch, smell and taste. What witnesses heard other people say is hearsay and is not admissible, subject to numerous exceptions. Witnesses are also not allowed to testify to what thought or concluded, or what was obvious but never expressly said or seen. Committee witnesses testified to hearsay, opinions and general impressions all the time.
This is not necessarily wrong. An impeachment is not the same as a trial (criminal or civil). Impeachment has been likened to an indictment and the actual "trial" taking place in the Senate. The rules of what is admissible in an indictment are much broader than what is admissible at trial.
There are other differences as well. In a trial, any juror who knows the defendant, much less has a working relationship, is automatically disqualified. A President necessarily has a working relationship with members of Congress. That is an essential part of the job. President Trump has also been attempting to influence Republicans in Congress (mostly the Senate) in ways that would land him in jail in an ordinary trial. So maybe it is appropriate to offset these advantages to the defendant with broader rules of admissibility.
Comment number 2: Witness testimony took a different form than it does in a trial. In a trial, the lawyers begin with opening statements explaining what they are going to present. Witnesses then come and testify exclusively in a Q&A format. Witnesses are not allowed to make speeches. The lawyer introducing a witness must establish the witness's account through the Q&A format and is not allowed to ask leading questions. The opposing party attempts to undermine the witness's testimony is is allowed (though not required) to ask leading questions.*
In the impeachment hearings, the witnesses began with an opening statement. The committee members and committee lawyers then asked questions (open and leading) based on the witness's opening statements, but often bringing up additional information not mentioned in opening. (All members knew what to expect, since they had previously interviewed the witnesses in closed hearings). Committee members also took some of their time to make speeches, which is never allowed in a trial. And, as mentioned above, the witnesses testified to a good deal more than would have been allowed at trial, but also took care to mention that it was not for them to decide whether President Trump's conduct was legal or illegal, impeachable or not impeachable.
Another difference (obviously) is that at trial only one witness testified at a time. In the impeachment hearing, there were usually two witnesses called at once -- most typically one to testify about events in Ukraine and one to testify to events in Washington.
Comment number 3: Despite these differences, the overall approach was what a lawyer would expect. Democrats attempted to build a case; Republicans attempted to knock it down. In particular, Democrats had witnesses present an account; Republicans tried to punch holes in the account. They got admissions, for instance, that the witnesses in Washington did not know in detail what was going on in Ukraine, and that the witnesses in Ukraine did not know what was going on in Washington and never heard the relevant telephone conversation. They got the admission that military aid to Ukraine was eventually released even though no investigation was ever announced. Republicans exposed various other gaps in the witnesses' knowledge and probed for bias. They did not make any serious attempt at a counter-case. And this is fine. It leaves non-lawyers unimpressed, but it is absolutely standard practice for defense lawyers. Defense lawyers are only required to knock down the case against their clients; they are not required to build a case of their own.
Comment number 4: There was one major outlier, and it was not Jim Jordan. Many people commented on Jim Jordan appearing in his shirt sleeves (it's his schtick, deal with it), or yelling and ranting, but the substance of what he said was no different from the other Republicans -- an attempt to poke holes in the witnesses' testimony.
The real outlier was Devin Nunes, who said some very strange things. A typical trial begins with an opening statement in which the party seeking to prove its case explaining what its case is and what evidence it intends to present. That is what Adam Schiff did. The opposing party then points out defects in the case being made and (usually) presents it own theory of what happened. Devin Nunes instead engaged in a political and conspiratorial rant, convincing only to the party faithful. His questions to witnesses raised signs of conspiracy between Burisma and the Bidens that would be genuinely alarming if true. But that fact that no one else addressed these allegations was a strong hint that there was nothing there. I will get to this in a later post.
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*And although every academic work explaining questioning to lawyers warns them to ask only leading questions on cross examination, I have never yet seen a lawyer who actually did that. I have also found the ban on asking one's own witness leading questions is not as rigid in practice as it may be in theory.
I will begin with a few comments as a lawyer.
Comment number 1: The hearings did not follow the rules of evidence as to what would be admissible at trial. Normally witnesses (with the exception of experts) are limited to what they could perceive with their five senses -- what did they see, hear, touch, smell and taste. What witnesses heard other people say is hearsay and is not admissible, subject to numerous exceptions. Witnesses are also not allowed to testify to what thought or concluded, or what was obvious but never expressly said or seen. Committee witnesses testified to hearsay, opinions and general impressions all the time.
This is not necessarily wrong. An impeachment is not the same as a trial (criminal or civil). Impeachment has been likened to an indictment and the actual "trial" taking place in the Senate. The rules of what is admissible in an indictment are much broader than what is admissible at trial.
There are other differences as well. In a trial, any juror who knows the defendant, much less has a working relationship, is automatically disqualified. A President necessarily has a working relationship with members of Congress. That is an essential part of the job. President Trump has also been attempting to influence Republicans in Congress (mostly the Senate) in ways that would land him in jail in an ordinary trial. So maybe it is appropriate to offset these advantages to the defendant with broader rules of admissibility.
Comment number 2: Witness testimony took a different form than it does in a trial. In a trial, the lawyers begin with opening statements explaining what they are going to present. Witnesses then come and testify exclusively in a Q&A format. Witnesses are not allowed to make speeches. The lawyer introducing a witness must establish the witness's account through the Q&A format and is not allowed to ask leading questions. The opposing party attempts to undermine the witness's testimony is is allowed (though not required) to ask leading questions.*
In the impeachment hearings, the witnesses began with an opening statement. The committee members and committee lawyers then asked questions (open and leading) based on the witness's opening statements, but often bringing up additional information not mentioned in opening. (All members knew what to expect, since they had previously interviewed the witnesses in closed hearings). Committee members also took some of their time to make speeches, which is never allowed in a trial. And, as mentioned above, the witnesses testified to a good deal more than would have been allowed at trial, but also took care to mention that it was not for them to decide whether President Trump's conduct was legal or illegal, impeachable or not impeachable.
Another difference (obviously) is that at trial only one witness testified at a time. In the impeachment hearing, there were usually two witnesses called at once -- most typically one to testify about events in Ukraine and one to testify to events in Washington.
Comment number 3: Despite these differences, the overall approach was what a lawyer would expect. Democrats attempted to build a case; Republicans attempted to knock it down. In particular, Democrats had witnesses present an account; Republicans tried to punch holes in the account. They got admissions, for instance, that the witnesses in Washington did not know in detail what was going on in Ukraine, and that the witnesses in Ukraine did not know what was going on in Washington and never heard the relevant telephone conversation. They got the admission that military aid to Ukraine was eventually released even though no investigation was ever announced. Republicans exposed various other gaps in the witnesses' knowledge and probed for bias. They did not make any serious attempt at a counter-case. And this is fine. It leaves non-lawyers unimpressed, but it is absolutely standard practice for defense lawyers. Defense lawyers are only required to knock down the case against their clients; they are not required to build a case of their own.
Comment number 4: There was one major outlier, and it was not Jim Jordan. Many people commented on Jim Jordan appearing in his shirt sleeves (it's his schtick, deal with it), or yelling and ranting, but the substance of what he said was no different from the other Republicans -- an attempt to poke holes in the witnesses' testimony.
The real outlier was Devin Nunes, who said some very strange things. A typical trial begins with an opening statement in which the party seeking to prove its case explaining what its case is and what evidence it intends to present. That is what Adam Schiff did. The opposing party then points out defects in the case being made and (usually) presents it own theory of what happened. Devin Nunes instead engaged in a political and conspiratorial rant, convincing only to the party faithful. His questions to witnesses raised signs of conspiracy between Burisma and the Bidens that would be genuinely alarming if true. But that fact that no one else addressed these allegations was a strong hint that there was nothing there. I will get to this in a later post.
_________________________________________
*And although every academic work explaining questioning to lawyers warns them to ask only leading questions on cross examination, I have never yet seen a lawyer who actually did that. I have also found the ban on asking one's own witness leading questions is not as rigid in practice as it may be in theory.
Wednesday, December 25, 2019
Mainstream Stories About Ukrainian "Interference"
All of that puts mainstream Republicans in an awkward position. On the one hand, they don't want to be caught quoting ridiculous conspiracy theories and make fools of themselves. On the other hand, if Donald Trump says there was Ukrainian interference in the election, then that is the party line and they must not dissent from it. So the response of mainstream Republicans has been to take the position that:
One: The current Ukrainian interior minister and a former prime minister said nasty things about candidate Trump on Facebook (in Ukranian). The author acknowledges that the Ukrainians' hostility toward Trump was somewhat understandable, given that they were being invaded by Russia and that Trump was running on a pro-Russian platform, even to the extent of allowing Russia to annex Ukrainian territory. In any event, it is not illegal foreign government officials to say mean things about US candidates on Facebook. It is illegal to hack servers and distribute private, hacked e-mails.
Two: The Ukrainian ambassador to the US published an editorial in The Hill strongly critical of Trump's pro-Russian stance. That is not illegal either.
The Facebook posts and the editorial are examples of white propaganda, i.e., material intended to persuade, with an acknowledged author. White propaganda is usually considered the least dangerous kind because the author is known, can be exposed as biased, and can be held accountable. The reason political ads identify who is paying for them is because of campaign finance laws requiring our political advertising to stay in the realm of white propaganda. And in any event, neither editorials nor Facebook posts are covered by campaign finance laws.
Three: Ukrainian journalist and member of parliament Serhei Leshchenko published a "black ledger" of payoffs by Ukraine's former pro-Russian government to various persons, including Trump's then-campaign chairman, Paul Manafort. Apparently Republicans recognize that it is going a bit far to ask Ukrainians to refrain from publishing a list of payoffs in their own domestic newspapers, lest it affect the US election. The main argument, therefore, is that the black ledger may not be genuine. The main evidence that it is not genuine is that the Mueller investigation did not charge Manafort for the payoffs listed in the ledger.
In any event, if this account of Leshchenko's publications are accurate, that, too, fits in the category of white propaganda. Leschchenko, it should be noted, disputes this account. According to Leshchenko, he received and published 22 pages of the black ledger (out of 400 to 800 total), none of which mentioned Manafort. He first learned that Manafort was named in the black ledger from an August 15, 2016 article in the New York Times. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) confirmed the story a few days later, and it is fairly clear from the article that NABU was the source. So, a Ukrainian government bureau leaked information to the New York Times about payoffs to Manafort. This fits in the category of "gray propaganda," i.e., material intended to persuade, from an unknown author. That is somewhat more troubling than white propaganda. But the use of anonymous leakers is routine in journalism and there are no laws against publishing material from foreign leakers.
The Russian troll farm, by contrast, was black propaganda, i.e., material that actively conceals its source.
Four: Leshchenko was reported a source for Fusion GPS doing opposition research on Trump and family's foreign business dealings. More accurately, Nellie Ohr (wife of senior Justice Department official Bruce Ohr) mentioned that her bosses at Fusion GPS mentioned Leshchenko as a source. Leshchenko has denied any contact with anyone from Fusion GPS and speculates they may have been referring to his public speeches or interviews. Nellie Ohr also stated that her research was based on open sources, and that there was abundant work by Leshchenko available from open sources. In short, Leshchenko's work was probably a source for opposition research and might have been incorporated into gray propaganda if Fusion GPS's work ever became public, which it did not.
Five: Alexandra Chalupa. This is based mostly on a story in Politico that Alexandra Chalupa, a Ukrainian-American Democratic consultant, researched Paul Manafort and had extensive sources, some in Ukraine. In the process, she may have coordinated with both the DNC and the Ukrainian embassy in violation of laws against foreign interference in elections. So at last we have something that might constitute illegal foreign meddling, although we still know very little about it, and it was certainly nothing so direct as the e-mail Donald Trump, Jr. received telling him that the Russian government was going to share damaging information on Hillary Clinton as "part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump." Chalupa, for what it is worth, has declared herself eager to testify and clear her name.
So, mean Facebook posts, a hostile editorial, release of documents damaging to Paul Manafort, and possible assistance in researching Manafort. Not only is this rather weak tea, it raises an obvious question. If this is election "interference," just how common is it. Is Ukraine truly the only government ever to criticize a US candidate for president, or to release possibly damaging information?
And the answer, or course, is that Ukraine's actions are by no means unique. The most obvious example Binyamin Netanyahu, Prime Minster of Israel who made not secret in 2012 that he wanted Obama to lose. Netanyahu denounced Obama's Iran policy on Sunday talk shows, warmly welcomed Mitt Romney to Israel, and even ran an ad saying, "The world needs American strength, not apologies." This looked very much like "interference" in the US election -- albeit legal and limited to white propaganda. And in fairness to Netanyahu, the US had often returned the favor.
Election "interference" of this kind is perfectly legal and requires no investigation. It is generally considered ill-advised, for two reasons. One reason is that most people resent foreign meddling in their elections and too close an association with a foreign leader is more likely to harm than help a candidate. The other reason is that if a country's favored candidate loses, it puts the country on a bad footing with the winner.
But personal hostility is not usually enough to overcome national interest. Obama's personal relationship with Netanyahu was frosty after the 2012 election. Obama continued to pursue a more conciliatory policy toward Iran than Netanyahu cared for, and he continued to pressure Israel on West Bank settlements. But the basic strategic partnership between the US and Israel remained, and certainly Obama never withheld funding from Israel's Iron Dome defense to protect it from Hamas rockets.**
And plenty of other governments made hostile comments about candidate Trump in 2016, but without the same sort of retaliation. Fiona Hill's testimony in that regard is revealing:
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*Or, perhaps, that there was no hack, but that Seth Rich stole the e-mails and then Ukraine framed Russia for a non-existent hack.
**That is actually not a bad analogy. If Obama had withheld funding from Israel's Iron Dome in an effort to pressure a new Israeli government to "investigate" Netanyahu's actions in the 2012 election, that would have been a scandal of the highest order.
[T]hat opinion is based on the premise that either Russia or Ukraine interfered. It could not have been both. And the critics . . . appeared to suggest that Republicans, echoing the Kremlin, are somehow denying the fact of Russian interference. . . . In reality, what Republicans were saying is that it appears that both Russia and Ukraine interfered, although not on the same scale.The problem here is that, whatever Congressional Republicans may have been saying, Donald Trump has definitely been saying that it was Ukraine, not Russia, that was behind the DNC hack.* In an effort to stay on the right side of both Trump and reality, Republicans cite five instances of alleged Ukrainian "interference."
One: The current Ukrainian interior minister and a former prime minister said nasty things about candidate Trump on Facebook (in Ukranian). The author acknowledges that the Ukrainians' hostility toward Trump was somewhat understandable, given that they were being invaded by Russia and that Trump was running on a pro-Russian platform, even to the extent of allowing Russia to annex Ukrainian territory. In any event, it is not illegal foreign government officials to say mean things about US candidates on Facebook. It is illegal to hack servers and distribute private, hacked e-mails.
Two: The Ukrainian ambassador to the US published an editorial in The Hill strongly critical of Trump's pro-Russian stance. That is not illegal either.
The Facebook posts and the editorial are examples of white propaganda, i.e., material intended to persuade, with an acknowledged author. White propaganda is usually considered the least dangerous kind because the author is known, can be exposed as biased, and can be held accountable. The reason political ads identify who is paying for them is because of campaign finance laws requiring our political advertising to stay in the realm of white propaganda. And in any event, neither editorials nor Facebook posts are covered by campaign finance laws.
Three: Ukrainian journalist and member of parliament Serhei Leshchenko published a "black ledger" of payoffs by Ukraine's former pro-Russian government to various persons, including Trump's then-campaign chairman, Paul Manafort. Apparently Republicans recognize that it is going a bit far to ask Ukrainians to refrain from publishing a list of payoffs in their own domestic newspapers, lest it affect the US election. The main argument, therefore, is that the black ledger may not be genuine. The main evidence that it is not genuine is that the Mueller investigation did not charge Manafort for the payoffs listed in the ledger.
In any event, if this account of Leshchenko's publications are accurate, that, too, fits in the category of white propaganda. Leschchenko, it should be noted, disputes this account. According to Leshchenko, he received and published 22 pages of the black ledger (out of 400 to 800 total), none of which mentioned Manafort. He first learned that Manafort was named in the black ledger from an August 15, 2016 article in the New York Times. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) confirmed the story a few days later, and it is fairly clear from the article that NABU was the source. So, a Ukrainian government bureau leaked information to the New York Times about payoffs to Manafort. This fits in the category of "gray propaganda," i.e., material intended to persuade, from an unknown author. That is somewhat more troubling than white propaganda. But the use of anonymous leakers is routine in journalism and there are no laws against publishing material from foreign leakers.
The Russian troll farm, by contrast, was black propaganda, i.e., material that actively conceals its source.
Four: Leshchenko was reported a source for Fusion GPS doing opposition research on Trump and family's foreign business dealings. More accurately, Nellie Ohr (wife of senior Justice Department official Bruce Ohr) mentioned that her bosses at Fusion GPS mentioned Leshchenko as a source. Leshchenko has denied any contact with anyone from Fusion GPS and speculates they may have been referring to his public speeches or interviews. Nellie Ohr also stated that her research was based on open sources, and that there was abundant work by Leshchenko available from open sources. In short, Leshchenko's work was probably a source for opposition research and might have been incorporated into gray propaganda if Fusion GPS's work ever became public, which it did not.
Five: Alexandra Chalupa. This is based mostly on a story in Politico that Alexandra Chalupa, a Ukrainian-American Democratic consultant, researched Paul Manafort and had extensive sources, some in Ukraine. In the process, she may have coordinated with both the DNC and the Ukrainian embassy in violation of laws against foreign interference in elections. So at last we have something that might constitute illegal foreign meddling, although we still know very little about it, and it was certainly nothing so direct as the e-mail Donald Trump, Jr. received telling him that the Russian government was going to share damaging information on Hillary Clinton as "part of Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump." Chalupa, for what it is worth, has declared herself eager to testify and clear her name.
So, mean Facebook posts, a hostile editorial, release of documents damaging to Paul Manafort, and possible assistance in researching Manafort. Not only is this rather weak tea, it raises an obvious question. If this is election "interference," just how common is it. Is Ukraine truly the only government ever to criticize a US candidate for president, or to release possibly damaging information?
And the answer, or course, is that Ukraine's actions are by no means unique. The most obvious example Binyamin Netanyahu, Prime Minster of Israel who made not secret in 2012 that he wanted Obama to lose. Netanyahu denounced Obama's Iran policy on Sunday talk shows, warmly welcomed Mitt Romney to Israel, and even ran an ad saying, "The world needs American strength, not apologies." This looked very much like "interference" in the US election -- albeit legal and limited to white propaganda. And in fairness to Netanyahu, the US had often returned the favor.
Election "interference" of this kind is perfectly legal and requires no investigation. It is generally considered ill-advised, for two reasons. One reason is that most people resent foreign meddling in their elections and too close an association with a foreign leader is more likely to harm than help a candidate. The other reason is that if a country's favored candidate loses, it puts the country on a bad footing with the winner.
But personal hostility is not usually enough to overcome national interest. Obama's personal relationship with Netanyahu was frosty after the 2012 election. Obama continued to pursue a more conciliatory policy toward Iran than Netanyahu cared for, and he continued to pressure Israel on West Bank settlements. But the basic strategic partnership between the US and Israel remained, and certainly Obama never withheld funding from Israel's Iron Dome defense to protect it from Hamas rockets.**
And plenty of other governments made hostile comments about candidate Trump in 2016, but without the same sort of retaliation. Fiona Hill's testimony in that regard is revealing:
I also mentioned in my deposition of October 14th that in fact many officials from many countries including Ukraine bet on the wrong horse. They believe that Secretary Clinton, former Senator Clinton, former First Lady Clinton was going to win. And many said some pretty disparaging and hurtful thing about President Trump. But I can't blame him for feeling aggrieved about them. And when we were setting up Head of State visits, remember I have a portfolio of 50 plus countries plus NATO and the European Union, we thought it prudent to collect as much as possible about comments that people might have said about the President during the campaign when he was either one of the candidates to be the nominee for the Republican party or when he was actually the candidate running against Hillary Clinton. And I'm sorry to say that awful lot and perhaps I shouldn't name them here because it will have conscience an awful lot of Senior Officials in many Goverance (ph) including our Allied Governments said some pretty hurtful things about The President.
And I would also personally take offense at some the things that were said if I were The President. Now the difference here however is that that hasn't had any major impact on his feelings towards those countries. Not that I have seen. But I've heard The President say, and he said it in public so I'm not revealing any kind of executive privilege here that Ukraine tried to take me down. What (ph) I have seen is this ill advised Ukrainian Officials, Ambassador Charlie been removed as being the Ambassador from here. Made some pretty unpleasant statements and above all some ill advised opeds. But I could list a whole host of Ambassadors from allied countries who tweeted out, who had public comments about The President as well. And it did not affect security assistance having meetings with them. If it would there been a lot of people he wouldn't have met with.That is an important point that no one else at the hearings seems to have made, and one that Republicans should answer if they are going to claim Ukrainian "interference."
__________________________________________
*Or, perhaps, that there was no hack, but that Seth Rich stole the e-mails and then Ukraine framed Russia for a non-existent hack.
**That is actually not a bad analogy. If Obama had withheld funding from Israel's Iron Dome in an effort to pressure a new Israeli government to "investigate" Netanyahu's actions in the 2012 election, that would have been a scandal of the highest order.
Nutty Stories About Ukrainian Interference
Wow! It's been a long time since I last posted! OK, on to the impeachment.
I must say that one thing that surprised me during this impeachment saga is talk about Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election. I knew that Donald Trump and some conspiracy-minded right wingers denied that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. I had just never heard Ukraine mentioned in that regard.
Let's start with the most basic fact that no one disputes because it took place so publicly as to be undeniable. Wikileaks published e-mails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Hillary Clinton's campaign manager, John Podesta. That is beyond dispute. Also not seriously disputed is that goal of this was to hurt Hillary's campaign. So, how did Wikileaks get the e-mails?
I was well acquainted with stories (many of the originating with Julian Assange, head of Wikileaks), that the e-mails were provided by Seth Rich, a murdered DNC staffer. Such claims invariably hint, without quite saying, that Hillary then had Rich killed to silence him.* Realizing that their e-mails had been stolen, and guessing they would be revealed, the DNC then hired Crowdstrike (a cyber security firm) to fake evidence pinning the theft on a Russian hack. Central to this claim was that the Democrats did not turn over their server to the FBI.** In fact, there were some 140 DNC servers, and turning them over to the FBI would mean suspending operations. Making an electronic image of the hard drives is actually superior to taking them into evidence, because the contents of the hard drives are constantly changing. This is long-standing and accepted practice.***
So I was familiar with all this well before Trump's phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky came out. But I had never heard so much as a hint of Ukrainian involvement. Where did that come in. Apparently there is belief that the servers were taken to Ukraine. The only evidence for such a belief appears to be that the founder of Crowdstrike has a Slavic name that might sound Ukrainian. (Actually, it is Russian and he is a naturalized citizen).
I have seen many articles since the phone call came out debunking the theory. The articles generally begin with the bizarre belief that Ukraine hid the server, explaining where the story might come from, and why it was not true. All agree that the purpose of the theory was to clear Russia of hacking the DNC and claim that Ukraine framed Russia. None of them address how, under this theory, Wikileaks came into possession of the DNC e-mails. Given that Wikileaks deployed the e-mails so as to do maximum damage to the Clinton campaign, it seems reasonable to assume that someone stole the DNC e-mails and turned them over to Wikileaks.****
I could see two alternative theories here. One is that there was no hack. Seth Rich stole the e-mails and turned them over to Wikileaks. The DNC, learning of the theft and fearing the stolen e-mails would come out, hired Crowdstrike to fake a hack. And Ukraine somehow ended up with the server. The alternate theory that I see suggested more than stated, is that Ukraine conducted the hack and then forged evidence blaming it on Russia. But that makes no sense at all. Since everyone agrees that the Ukrainians wanted Hillary Clinton to win, why would they turn over the e-mails to Wikileaks to deploy against her?
___________________________________________
*I used to think that was for fear that claiming Hillary had Seth Rich murdered was so over-the-top that proponents of the theories refrained from saying so for fear of looking ridiculous. Now I am starting to suspect another motive. US libel law makes it very difficult for a public figure (which Hillary obviously is) to sue. But falsely accusing her of murdering a DNC staffer just might be enough.
**I was once so naive as to think that, while any evidence the FBI turned up could be dismissed as a "deep state" plot, the involvement of a private company would strengthen the DNC argument, but that ignores how the conspiracist mindset works. If a private company found evidence of Russian hacking, the private company must be part of the conspiracy.
***This source is an article dated July 17, 2018 addressing the issue of the "missing" server. The article makes no mention of Ukraine -- or Seth Rich, for that matter.
****I would take "handed over" to include handed over through an intermediary. I suppose one could argue that someone stole the e-mails from the original e-mail thief and handed them over to Wikileaks, or that Wikileaks used the e-mails in a manner the thief did not intend. But it seems most implausible.
I must say that one thing that surprised me during this impeachment saga is talk about Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election. I knew that Donald Trump and some conspiracy-minded right wingers denied that Russia interfered in the 2016 election. I had just never heard Ukraine mentioned in that regard.
Let's start with the most basic fact that no one disputes because it took place so publicly as to be undeniable. Wikileaks published e-mails from the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Hillary Clinton's campaign manager, John Podesta. That is beyond dispute. Also not seriously disputed is that goal of this was to hurt Hillary's campaign. So, how did Wikileaks get the e-mails?
I was well acquainted with stories (many of the originating with Julian Assange, head of Wikileaks), that the e-mails were provided by Seth Rich, a murdered DNC staffer. Such claims invariably hint, without quite saying, that Hillary then had Rich killed to silence him.* Realizing that their e-mails had been stolen, and guessing they would be revealed, the DNC then hired Crowdstrike (a cyber security firm) to fake evidence pinning the theft on a Russian hack. Central to this claim was that the Democrats did not turn over their server to the FBI.** In fact, there were some 140 DNC servers, and turning them over to the FBI would mean suspending operations. Making an electronic image of the hard drives is actually superior to taking them into evidence, because the contents of the hard drives are constantly changing. This is long-standing and accepted practice.***
So I was familiar with all this well before Trump's phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky came out. But I had never heard so much as a hint of Ukrainian involvement. Where did that come in. Apparently there is belief that the servers were taken to Ukraine. The only evidence for such a belief appears to be that the founder of Crowdstrike has a Slavic name that might sound Ukrainian. (Actually, it is Russian and he is a naturalized citizen).
I have seen many articles since the phone call came out debunking the theory. The articles generally begin with the bizarre belief that Ukraine hid the server, explaining where the story might come from, and why it was not true. All agree that the purpose of the theory was to clear Russia of hacking the DNC and claim that Ukraine framed Russia. None of them address how, under this theory, Wikileaks came into possession of the DNC e-mails. Given that Wikileaks deployed the e-mails so as to do maximum damage to the Clinton campaign, it seems reasonable to assume that someone stole the DNC e-mails and turned them over to Wikileaks.****
I could see two alternative theories here. One is that there was no hack. Seth Rich stole the e-mails and turned them over to Wikileaks. The DNC, learning of the theft and fearing the stolen e-mails would come out, hired Crowdstrike to fake a hack. And Ukraine somehow ended up with the server. The alternate theory that I see suggested more than stated, is that Ukraine conducted the hack and then forged evidence blaming it on Russia. But that makes no sense at all. Since everyone agrees that the Ukrainians wanted Hillary Clinton to win, why would they turn over the e-mails to Wikileaks to deploy against her?
___________________________________________
*I used to think that was for fear that claiming Hillary had Seth Rich murdered was so over-the-top that proponents of the theories refrained from saying so for fear of looking ridiculous. Now I am starting to suspect another motive. US libel law makes it very difficult for a public figure (which Hillary obviously is) to sue. But falsely accusing her of murdering a DNC staffer just might be enough.
**I was once so naive as to think that, while any evidence the FBI turned up could be dismissed as a "deep state" plot, the involvement of a private company would strengthen the DNC argument, but that ignores how the conspiracist mindset works. If a private company found evidence of Russian hacking, the private company must be part of the conspiracy.
***This source is an article dated July 17, 2018 addressing the issue of the "missing" server. The article makes no mention of Ukraine -- or Seth Rich, for that matter.
****I would take "handed over" to include handed over through an intermediary. I suppose one could argue that someone stole the e-mails from the original e-mail thief and handed them over to Wikileaks, or that Wikileaks used the e-mails in a manner the thief did not intend. But it seems most implausible.
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