Tuesday, November 24, 2015
A Bit of Insane Optimism
Any chance that the alarm surrounding Turkey shooting down a Russian plane might make our leaders think twice about a no-fly zone? That raises our chances of shooting down a Russian plane? No? Well, I can always dream.
Monday, November 23, 2015
Hitler and Guns
All right, I may be a little late to the game commenting on Ben Carson's notorious remarks that Hitler came to power because Germans lacked the guns to stop them, or that the Holocaust succeeded because the Nazis took away the Jews' guns. The action usually cited was a 1938 law requiring guns to be registered. It is alleged that the Nazis, having a list of who owned guns, then confiscated them and proceeds to subjugate the now-helpless population and exterminate the now-helpless Jews. Many refutations have rained in, but a lot of them miss important underlying assumptions and simply reinforce the gun culture's conviction that firearms are necessary to resist tyranny. Others comments, however, are significant, as are some that the refuters have missed altogether.
In particular, it is not useful to point out that strict gun control began under Weimar, with a ban on all private guns in 1919 as part of the disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles, or that firearms registration began under Weimar in 1928 when the complete ban on guns was relaxed.* Gun advocates would simply see this as supporting their point. They see a democratically elected government as simply the Nazis waiting to happen. Many incorporate this into their narrative. The innocent and well-meaning Weimar government registered all firearms. Then the Nazis were elected and confiscated the guns, as a prelude to imposing a total dictatorship. We must therefore keep guns legal and free from registration, because you never know when the Nazis might be elected here, seize them, and institute dictatorship, if no genocide.
Gun advocates may also point out, with some justification, that Weimar's anti-gun laws were not very effective. The Weimar ban on guns did not prevent Freikorps (private paramilitaries) from flourishing, or Freikorps from doing battle with Communist revolutionaries, attempting a coup, or from terrorizing their opponents in Bavaria. Clearly there is some truth to statement that when guns are outlawed, only outlaws carry guns.
But there are other ways in which events in Germany clearly go against the NRA's preferred narrative. These should be stressed. First of all, the alleged confiscation of guns did not happen -- except for Jews. The 1938 statute relaxed firearms restrictions for others, but barred Jews from owning guns. This is significant, but I will get to it later.
In the NRA outlook, it is assumed not only that democratically elective government is simply tyranny waiting to happen (Hitler came to power by election!), but that private paramilitaries outside the control of government are the natural defenders of liberty. The whole history of Weimar calls this assumption into doubt. Because if there was one problem the Weimar Republic did not have, it was a shortage of private paramilitaries. There were paramilitaries everywhere, the Freikorps, the Communists, and other extremists. But they were not champions of liberty against an oppressive government. They were the threats to liberty, terrorizing and killing whoever opposed them. I suppose today's militia types might acknowledge that not all private paramilitaries are necessarily good guys but that simply shows that good guys need guns so they can defend themselves against the bad guys.
That runs into a definite problem. The good guys in Weimar did, in fact, form their own paramilitary in an attempt to counter the bad guys. The "Weimar coalition" of parties that supported the Republic formed the Reichsbanner following the Beer Hall Putsch in an attempt to counter the paramilitaries that were attacking the Republic. Its initial years were ones of relative quiet, but with the onset of the Great Depression and the growing power of the Nazis, its role in fighting their violence and intimidation grew. More hard line members broke off and formed the Iron Front to fight the Nazis. But these groups ultimately did not prove and effective counter-force, and when the Nazis came to power, the "good guy" paramilitaries were easily suppressed.
And no, this is not because Weimar gun control measures disarmed the good guy militias while leaving the bad guys untouched. It was for two main reasons, both rather embarrassing to hardcore Second Amendment fans.
First off, people who genuinely respect democratic norms and the rights of others don't want to contest power through paramilitaries. They want to contest power through the orderly democratic process. Militias shooting it out on the streets are an immistakable rejection of the democratic process. (And it is a sad commentary on the state of our political discourse that anyone even needs to point out this obvious fact). Well, so what, NRA types may say. When the bad guys have guns and start shooting, do good guys want to be helpless before them? Bad guy paramilitaries can't be wished away, after all; they must be confronted by force. But this misses the point. When the state of a country's politics reach the point of good guy paramilitaries and bad guy paramilitaries shooting it out in the streets, liberty is already lost. What is left is not liberty at all, but the law of the jungle, which is freedom only for people at the top of the food chain.
And second in a direct confrontation between paramilitary and regular military, the paramilitary doesn't have a chance. Because this didn't just apply to "good guy" paramilitaries. It applied to bad guy paramilitaries as well. Most famously, consider the Beer Hall Putsch. Hitler's paramilitary marched. The army fired. The paramilitary scattered, and the revolt was over. A crackdown ensued. It persuaded Hitler not to attempt violent revolution again, but to seek power through the electoral process. And, as with the Ku Klux Klan, the only successful paramilitary revolt in our own history, the point is not moral, but tactical. Our own militia movement need not have anything morally in common with the Nazis to learn some tactical lessons from them. Or consider Hitler's Stormtroopers or SA. They were his paramilitary that terrorized opponents. They numbered three million, versus the small 100,000 man army. They were armed. Many were WWI veterans. Yet when Hitler allowed the army to crack down on the SA, they went down without a fight. Others have commented that many people in occupied countries did offer armed resistance, to little avail. As for Jews, they made up about 1% of the German population. Armed resistance would certainly have been easily defeated. The much-admired Warsaw Ghetto Uprising did not even slow down the Holocaust.
And all of this raises yet a third point. The Jews were so few as to make armed resistance hopeless. Some people move this question to the German people in general and say that the German people were not able to resist the Nazis because they were disarmed. But the real reason the Nazis did not meet with resistance was that they were generally popular. Insurrectionist types tend to assume that their fantasied armed rebellion will the by The People (good guys) against The Government (bad guys), and that the people will all agree when the time for revolution is ripe and be able to act with unity. But the simple fact is that no domestic government can endure without the support of at least a significant minority of the population. The glorious uprising will invariably take the form, not of the People against the Government, but of the people against each other.
And this means some uncomfortable things. Given that (1) paramilitaries are no match for regular militaries and (2) a significant sub-section of the population will support the government, this means that armed rebellion by a private paramilitary will have to start out hitting soft targets, i.e. terrorizing government supporters. That is precisely what Hitler's paramilitary did, and quite successfully. It was only when they took on the armed forces directly (and prematurely) that they were crushed. This is the pattern any revolt by irregular forces will have to take. It ain't pretty.
Note that I qualify this statement by saying that it refers to domestic governments. A foreign occupation is a different matter.** A foreign occupation may very well rest on brute force alone and not have the support of even a significant minority of the population. But even the worst occupation will have collaborators, and an irregular resistance will have to start out by targeting them. Furthermore, there is the tendency of revolutions to devour their children. People who fully agree in hating the government in power my bitterly disagree on what is to replace it. And once people get in the habit of resolving disputes by violence, it can be hard to break. The same applies even to resistance movements fighting a foreign occupier. Certainly in WWII, resistance movements were severely divided between pro- and anti-Communist forces. In Yugoslavia and Greece, where resistance forces managed an effective guerrilla warfare, the forces of the resistance fought each other as much as they fought the Germans, and civil war co-existed with resistance. The opposite side won in these respective countries, but neither were nice guys or champions of liberty.
All of which is a way of saying that the theory that private paramilitaries are the natural champions of justice and the final defense against oppressive government falls apart as soon as one learns anything about actual, real-world paramilitaries. So it often is when beautiful theories are brought face-to-face with ugly facts.
_____________________________________
*The 1938 registration law actually relaxed firearms restrictions for non-Jews even further.
**A government of collaborators installed and supported by an occupying force is an intermediate category.
In particular, it is not useful to point out that strict gun control began under Weimar, with a ban on all private guns in 1919 as part of the disarmament under the Treaty of Versailles, or that firearms registration began under Weimar in 1928 when the complete ban on guns was relaxed.* Gun advocates would simply see this as supporting their point. They see a democratically elected government as simply the Nazis waiting to happen. Many incorporate this into their narrative. The innocent and well-meaning Weimar government registered all firearms. Then the Nazis were elected and confiscated the guns, as a prelude to imposing a total dictatorship. We must therefore keep guns legal and free from registration, because you never know when the Nazis might be elected here, seize them, and institute dictatorship, if no genocide.
Gun advocates may also point out, with some justification, that Weimar's anti-gun laws were not very effective. The Weimar ban on guns did not prevent Freikorps (private paramilitaries) from flourishing, or Freikorps from doing battle with Communist revolutionaries, attempting a coup, or from terrorizing their opponents in Bavaria. Clearly there is some truth to statement that when guns are outlawed, only outlaws carry guns.
But there are other ways in which events in Germany clearly go against the NRA's preferred narrative. These should be stressed. First of all, the alleged confiscation of guns did not happen -- except for Jews. The 1938 statute relaxed firearms restrictions for others, but barred Jews from owning guns. This is significant, but I will get to it later.
In the NRA outlook, it is assumed not only that democratically elective government is simply tyranny waiting to happen (Hitler came to power by election!), but that private paramilitaries outside the control of government are the natural defenders of liberty. The whole history of Weimar calls this assumption into doubt. Because if there was one problem the Weimar Republic did not have, it was a shortage of private paramilitaries. There were paramilitaries everywhere, the Freikorps, the Communists, and other extremists. But they were not champions of liberty against an oppressive government. They were the threats to liberty, terrorizing and killing whoever opposed them. I suppose today's militia types might acknowledge that not all private paramilitaries are necessarily good guys but that simply shows that good guys need guns so they can defend themselves against the bad guys.
That runs into a definite problem. The good guys in Weimar did, in fact, form their own paramilitary in an attempt to counter the bad guys. The "Weimar coalition" of parties that supported the Republic formed the Reichsbanner following the Beer Hall Putsch in an attempt to counter the paramilitaries that were attacking the Republic. Its initial years were ones of relative quiet, but with the onset of the Great Depression and the growing power of the Nazis, its role in fighting their violence and intimidation grew. More hard line members broke off and formed the Iron Front to fight the Nazis. But these groups ultimately did not prove and effective counter-force, and when the Nazis came to power, the "good guy" paramilitaries were easily suppressed.
And no, this is not because Weimar gun control measures disarmed the good guy militias while leaving the bad guys untouched. It was for two main reasons, both rather embarrassing to hardcore Second Amendment fans.
First off, people who genuinely respect democratic norms and the rights of others don't want to contest power through paramilitaries. They want to contest power through the orderly democratic process. Militias shooting it out on the streets are an immistakable rejection of the democratic process. (And it is a sad commentary on the state of our political discourse that anyone even needs to point out this obvious fact). Well, so what, NRA types may say. When the bad guys have guns and start shooting, do good guys want to be helpless before them? Bad guy paramilitaries can't be wished away, after all; they must be confronted by force. But this misses the point. When the state of a country's politics reach the point of good guy paramilitaries and bad guy paramilitaries shooting it out in the streets, liberty is already lost. What is left is not liberty at all, but the law of the jungle, which is freedom only for people at the top of the food chain.
And second in a direct confrontation between paramilitary and regular military, the paramilitary doesn't have a chance. Because this didn't just apply to "good guy" paramilitaries. It applied to bad guy paramilitaries as well. Most famously, consider the Beer Hall Putsch. Hitler's paramilitary marched. The army fired. The paramilitary scattered, and the revolt was over. A crackdown ensued. It persuaded Hitler not to attempt violent revolution again, but to seek power through the electoral process. And, as with the Ku Klux Klan, the only successful paramilitary revolt in our own history, the point is not moral, but tactical. Our own militia movement need not have anything morally in common with the Nazis to learn some tactical lessons from them. Or consider Hitler's Stormtroopers or SA. They were his paramilitary that terrorized opponents. They numbered three million, versus the small 100,000 man army. They were armed. Many were WWI veterans. Yet when Hitler allowed the army to crack down on the SA, they went down without a fight. Others have commented that many people in occupied countries did offer armed resistance, to little avail. As for Jews, they made up about 1% of the German population. Armed resistance would certainly have been easily defeated. The much-admired Warsaw Ghetto Uprising did not even slow down the Holocaust.
And all of this raises yet a third point. The Jews were so few as to make armed resistance hopeless. Some people move this question to the German people in general and say that the German people were not able to resist the Nazis because they were disarmed. But the real reason the Nazis did not meet with resistance was that they were generally popular. Insurrectionist types tend to assume that their fantasied armed rebellion will the by The People (good guys) against The Government (bad guys), and that the people will all agree when the time for revolution is ripe and be able to act with unity. But the simple fact is that no domestic government can endure without the support of at least a significant minority of the population. The glorious uprising will invariably take the form, not of the People against the Government, but of the people against each other.
And this means some uncomfortable things. Given that (1) paramilitaries are no match for regular militaries and (2) a significant sub-section of the population will support the government, this means that armed rebellion by a private paramilitary will have to start out hitting soft targets, i.e. terrorizing government supporters. That is precisely what Hitler's paramilitary did, and quite successfully. It was only when they took on the armed forces directly (and prematurely) that they were crushed. This is the pattern any revolt by irregular forces will have to take. It ain't pretty.
Note that I qualify this statement by saying that it refers to domestic governments. A foreign occupation is a different matter.** A foreign occupation may very well rest on brute force alone and not have the support of even a significant minority of the population. But even the worst occupation will have collaborators, and an irregular resistance will have to start out by targeting them. Furthermore, there is the tendency of revolutions to devour their children. People who fully agree in hating the government in power my bitterly disagree on what is to replace it. And once people get in the habit of resolving disputes by violence, it can be hard to break. The same applies even to resistance movements fighting a foreign occupier. Certainly in WWII, resistance movements were severely divided between pro- and anti-Communist forces. In Yugoslavia and Greece, where resistance forces managed an effective guerrilla warfare, the forces of the resistance fought each other as much as they fought the Germans, and civil war co-existed with resistance. The opposite side won in these respective countries, but neither were nice guys or champions of liberty.
All of which is a way of saying that the theory that private paramilitaries are the natural champions of justice and the final defense against oppressive government falls apart as soon as one learns anything about actual, real-world paramilitaries. So it often is when beautiful theories are brought face-to-face with ugly facts.
_____________________________________
*The 1938 registration law actually relaxed firearms restrictions for non-Jews even further.
**A government of collaborators installed and supported by an occupying force is an intermediate category.
Friday, November 20, 2015
Another Comment on Health Insurance
Besides the dropout of an important insurer, one huge complaint about Obamacare is that the policies it offers are not very good. The deductibles are so high that they offer nothing for ordinary healthcare but only serious illness. Certainly that has been my experience with my own policy. Although somewhat overlooked, this has been a common complaint about health insurance policies even before Obamacare, but the general trend does seem to be toward higher deductibles.
Nonetheless, even with the deductibles I think insurance policies have advantages for the simple reason that it is expensive to be uninsured. Insurance companies are able to use their monopsony power to get providers to accept lower payments from them than they do from the uninsured. Even if your insurance does not cover a service, people who have it benefit from the lower reduction offered insurance companies. Sometimes the amounts are quite large. The other reason being uninsured is expensive is that many providers require the uninsured to pay the full price up front before seeing them. If you have insurance, they require only a copay up front. Granted, if the service later turns out to be within the deductible, you get billed for it later on. But, besides the reduced price providers offer to insurance companies, you have at least the option of paying in installments instead of all at once.
Of course, all this will probably be less than the premium price. Indeed, insurance companies make their money by collecting more in premiums than they pay out to claimants. Specifically, health insurers make more by collecting more premiums from the well than they pay out on behalf of the sick. And that basic model will apply, Obamacare or no Obamacare.
Nonetheless, even with the deductibles I think insurance policies have advantages for the simple reason that it is expensive to be uninsured. Insurance companies are able to use their monopsony power to get providers to accept lower payments from them than they do from the uninsured. Even if your insurance does not cover a service, people who have it benefit from the lower reduction offered insurance companies. Sometimes the amounts are quite large. The other reason being uninsured is expensive is that many providers require the uninsured to pay the full price up front before seeing them. If you have insurance, they require only a copay up front. Granted, if the service later turns out to be within the deductible, you get billed for it later on. But, besides the reduced price providers offer to insurance companies, you have at least the option of paying in installments instead of all at once.
Of course, all this will probably be less than the premium price. Indeed, insurance companies make their money by collecting more in premiums than they pay out to claimants. Specifically, health insurers make more by collecting more premiums from the well than they pay out on behalf of the sick. And that basic model will apply, Obamacare or no Obamacare.
Thursday, November 19, 2015
Bad News for Obamacare
Uh-oh. This latest is not from Republicans eager to see Obamacare fail, but from Sarah Kliff, a serious healthcare wonk who wants to see it succeed. Apparently UnitedHealth may withdraw from the exchanges next year, saying they are not profitable. In most states, it is not that big a deal, but in New York and Nevada, UnitedHealth is a major player and its withdrawal would be disastrous.
But the issue is bigger than UnitedHealth. The question is whether it is simply the first of many to withdraw from the exchanges. Certainly I know that in my own state of New Mexico, Blue Cross Blue Shield is withdrawing from the exchanges when the regulators would not allow it to make the large rate increases it wanted. This is not a good sign. It may herald the "death spiral" that Democrats fear and Republicans eagerly hope for.
Of course, if the exchanges do start to fail, that will pose a problem for Republicans as well. If the exchanges begin to seriously malfunction, the pressure will be on to do something about them. Responding to serious problems on the exchanges where many people buy their health insurance by shutting them down altogether and replacing them with nothing will not be a popular action.
The rubber may hit the road for repeal and replace.
But the issue is bigger than UnitedHealth. The question is whether it is simply the first of many to withdraw from the exchanges. Certainly I know that in my own state of New Mexico, Blue Cross Blue Shield is withdrawing from the exchanges when the regulators would not allow it to make the large rate increases it wanted. This is not a good sign. It may herald the "death spiral" that Democrats fear and Republicans eagerly hope for.
Of course, if the exchanges do start to fail, that will pose a problem for Republicans as well. If the exchanges begin to seriously malfunction, the pressure will be on to do something about them. Responding to serious problems on the exchanges where many people buy their health insurance by shutting them down altogether and replacing them with nothing will not be a popular action.
The rubber may hit the road for repeal and replace.
Some Hills are Not Worth Dying On
So, it would appear that Republicans have found a new issue to threaten a government shutdown -- Syria refugees. Not cutting them off altogether, not even changing the substance of the vetting process, just making it slower and more cumbersome.
This shows something significant, I think. It shows that really the issue triggering the government shutdown is secondary. What the Republicans really want is to have such a showdown, and to win it.
And on this one they probably will. The author of the article stresses that Republicans could win this one because this time Republicans are united Democrats are not, but ignores the underlying reason why that is so. The reason that in other shutdowns Democrats stayed united and Republicans split was that the issue leading to the shutdown was unpopular on the substance. Shutting down the government to voucherize Medicare or cut Social Security or shut down Obamacare after people use it to get health insurance is going to be unpopular. The public sides with the President and blames Congress for the showdown/shutdown not just because these things are structured in the President's favor, but because they agree with him on the underlying issue. On other issues, Obama could say, "The Republicans are shutting down the government because they want to cut Social Security/take away people's health insurance." The Republicans had a hard time blaming Obama because most people did not support what they wanted to achieve.
This time, Republicans can say, "Obama is shutting down the government to force us to take in a bunch of Arab refugees without properly vetting them." Obama will have a hard time blaming the Republicans because most people will not agree with him on this.
Furthermore, Obama will do his brand serious harm if he goes to the mats on this. The author of the article says that Democrats voting against this bill risk being labeled as "soft on terror" in the next election. But if there is one thing the Obama Administration has proved, it is that how a Democrat votes does not matter. If the President proposed something unpopular (nationally or locally) and a member of his party votes against, they will not get any credit for that vote. As members of the President's party they will be tarred with whatever the President favors.
In the meantime, the Republican demands are fairly modest. They will clog the admission process but not stop it. The harm to refugee admissions is not that great. The harm to the Democratic brand is immense. My advice to Obama is to cave and agree to sign the bill.
Of course, once Obama agrees to something, it automatically becomes poison to Republicans. What they want is not any particular concession. They want to win a loud public showdown and make clear to the base that the concessions were forced over on Obama against his maximal resistance. Concede on this and they will simply ask for more. My answer to that is fine, let them. Keep conceding and conceding and conceding until the Republicans are forced to make unpopular demands. Then hold the line and force the showdown. Why, if you are lucky, you may force the Republicans to overreach all the way into conceding on the refugees as well.
This shows something significant, I think. It shows that really the issue triggering the government shutdown is secondary. What the Republicans really want is to have such a showdown, and to win it.
And on this one they probably will. The author of the article stresses that Republicans could win this one because this time Republicans are united Democrats are not, but ignores the underlying reason why that is so. The reason that in other shutdowns Democrats stayed united and Republicans split was that the issue leading to the shutdown was unpopular on the substance. Shutting down the government to voucherize Medicare or cut Social Security or shut down Obamacare after people use it to get health insurance is going to be unpopular. The public sides with the President and blames Congress for the showdown/shutdown not just because these things are structured in the President's favor, but because they agree with him on the underlying issue. On other issues, Obama could say, "The Republicans are shutting down the government because they want to cut Social Security/take away people's health insurance." The Republicans had a hard time blaming Obama because most people did not support what they wanted to achieve.
This time, Republicans can say, "Obama is shutting down the government to force us to take in a bunch of Arab refugees without properly vetting them." Obama will have a hard time blaming the Republicans because most people will not agree with him on this.
Furthermore, Obama will do his brand serious harm if he goes to the mats on this. The author of the article says that Democrats voting against this bill risk being labeled as "soft on terror" in the next election. But if there is one thing the Obama Administration has proved, it is that how a Democrat votes does not matter. If the President proposed something unpopular (nationally or locally) and a member of his party votes against, they will not get any credit for that vote. As members of the President's party they will be tarred with whatever the President favors.
In the meantime, the Republican demands are fairly modest. They will clog the admission process but not stop it. The harm to refugee admissions is not that great. The harm to the Democratic brand is immense. My advice to Obama is to cave and agree to sign the bill.
Of course, once Obama agrees to something, it automatically becomes poison to Republicans. What they want is not any particular concession. They want to win a loud public showdown and make clear to the base that the concessions were forced over on Obama against his maximal resistance. Concede on this and they will simply ask for more. My answer to that is fine, let them. Keep conceding and conceding and conceding until the Republicans are forced to make unpopular demands. Then hold the line and force the showdown. Why, if you are lucky, you may force the Republicans to overreach all the way into conceding on the refugees as well.
Tuesday, November 17, 2015
Distinguishing Between Positive Economics and Normative Economics
Okay, I am late to this one, but I have been wanting for some time to comment on this column and this follow up (via Paul Krugman) on why politicians don't follow economists' suggestions. The author says that their decisions are often political rather than economic, and that it is perfectly legitimate to make policy on a political basis:
Economists tend to assume that there is a single right answer (even if they disagree bitterly among each other about what the right answer is). They explore what is “correct” from a theoretical point of view and are puzzled when their “correct” ideas are not followed. Political scientists don’t usually start from the basis that there is a single correct way to do things. Instead, they assume that there is more than one interpretation of what is correct, and try to come up with theories about which “correct” answer is chosen. There is no correct answer when there are competing rival views that are not easily testable in a complex world where one cannot readily carry out controlled experiments with obvious real world interpretations.
. . . . . .
Instead of relying on expertise, we should figure out what people actually want from policy (and map the forces that block or channel their efforts to express and act on their desires).And in the later column:
More broadly, and more contentiously, one might push back at the notion that all that matters therefore is an analysis of the facts and the correct theory. That certainly matters, but we live in a world of fundamental uncertainty. Thus, there are many judgment calls, where the facts are ambiguous or unhelpful.
. . . . . . . .
Values – and not just smarts and theory — help shape how you come down on uncertainty.This struck a chord with me for two reasons. It is about the difference between positive economics and normative economics -- the economics of description and the economics of prescription. When I took freshman economics in college, at a time when inflation and nominal interest rates were unusually high (yes, I date myself), the difference was explained that positive economics says, "As long as X continues, interest rates will remain high." Normative economics says, "We've got to get interest rates down."
We had a book on normative economics, applying economic analysis to public policy decisions. However, it tended to blur the distinction between positive and normative economics. Policy decisions are typically made for political rather than economic reasons and yield an outcome different from the one that the free market would have made on its own. But this is, properly speaking, mere description rather than prescription, a positive observation and nothing more. The authors tended to treat such policy decisions and outcomes as inherently illegitimate without seriously justifying that underlying assumption.
The author here makes the opposite error. He takes for granted the legitimacy of making decisions on a political basis. But he seems strangely indifferent to the economic results of such decisions.
Or, put differently, macroeconomists generally agree that when the economy hits the zero lower bound (i.e., when the economy remains below capacity even when the central bank cuts short-term interest rates to zero), austerity causes the economy to get worse, and that a shrinking economy raises the debt burden relative to GDP. They also generally agree that raising interest rates under such circumstances worsens the recession. These opinions are in the realm of positive, not normative, economics.
It is possible to believe that deficits are so evil, or tight money so virtuous, that we should pursue fiscal and monetary tightening in a recession, regardless of the harm to the economy. That would be an instance of normative economics -- as is the assumption that we should always fight recessions rather than let them play themselves out. A good discussion of normative economics should be grounded in a solid background of positive economics. A proper debate on deficit reduction at the zero lower bound would take into account the general macro consensus that the economy would be hurt as a result and consider whether the value of deficit cutting outweighs the harm it will cause. Conflicting values and interests would play out, but with their eyes open to the probable outcomes of their actions.
The error of the author is to ignore what economists are saying about probable outcomes and treat values and interests as the only important thing.
Monday, November 16, 2015
Anti-State versus Anti-Other
Republicans are doing what they so often do -- denouncing intrusive Big Government while calling for bigger and more intrusive government to crack down on immigrants, beating the drums of war, and calling for everyone to rally around the police and exempt them from any criticism. Is this hypocritical? I would say it is less hypocrisy than an error in terminology. Or as this wise observer put it, it is the difference between being anti-state and "anti-other." And here is the thing -- anti-other can easily masquerade as anti-state. Ron Paul and his followers are classic examples.
I got a useful insight from Jonathan Haidt's discussion of the moral foundations -- particularly the foundation of in-group loyalty. If maximizing your in-group's autonomy and sovereignty are important goals, it went a long way toward explaining to me why right-wingers are so strongly opposed to international cooperation, from the United Nations to trade agreements. They are threats to national autonomy and sovereignty. And it explained why conservatives are strong advocates of states' rights -- the importance of local autonomy and sovereignty. And, incidentally, I am more sympathetic to that viewpoint than I have been in the past. It is clear that on the matter of the euro the ignorant masses were right and purportedly enlightened elites were wrong. Introducing a trans-national currency really was a dangerous infringement on national sovereignty that undermined countries' ability to manage their own economies and left them at the mercy of their creditors.* In the Iraq war, the very worst insurgents were the international jihadis with no local ties and therefore no stake in the country's long-term survival. So such concerns are legitimate, and confronted with them I (we) should give the matter greater thought before rejecting them as simple bigotry.
But too strong a focus on preserving one's in-group autonomy and sovereignty and protecting it from outside contamination can lead in a very ugly direction. It is an obvious case of us-and-them thinking. And it sees the state's proper role as throwing a protective circle around Us to shield Us from Them. Superficially, this sort of outlook can seem anti-state because we don't want the state meddling in matters between Us, since the state is never truly one of Us. Thus preserving the autonomy and sovereignty of one's in-group means minimizing the power of the state over it. Thus the anti-other outlook can seem extremely libertarian and anti-state to the extent that it wants to deny or at least minimize state authority in dealings among Us. But if the role of the state is to draw a protective shield between Us and Them, then there no need for any limits on its power in dealing with Them.
Note, too, that although fine distinctions among Them** are unimportant and parsing them is simply proof that the speaker is not one of Us, there are degrees of other-ness. Us-and-Them is best seen, not as a sharp dichotomy, but as a series of concentric circles. The outermost circle are hostile foreign powers and anyone who resembles them. For instance, in the wake of the 9-11 attacks, a whole lot of people were unconcerned with the fine distinction between Afghanistan and Iraq, or between Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, and the Taliban. They were all Muslim, Mideastern, and enemies, so why bother distinguishing between them. Likewise, I assume that when Mike Huckabeee responds to the ISIS attack in Paris by calling on us to scrap our nuclear deal with Iran, it is because neither he nor his supporters are interested in such fine details as that the Iranian government is fighting ISIS! Yet at the same time, when North Korea began ramping up its nuclear program around the time we prepared for war with Iraq, there was no appetite for war with North Korea -- partly, no doubt, because such a war promised to be bloody, but also because it was obvious to even the more pig-headed that North Korea had nothing to do with 9-11 and was therefore not an obvious target for revenge.
Foreign countries in general occupy the next circle. Here there is a tendency to see foreign countries in two categories, friend and foe. With a foe (including countries like North Korea that we are not actually at war with, but are clearly hostile), the only options are war and complete disengagement. Friendly countries are the enemy of an enemy. We expect them to support us in all our wars and will, in turn, support them in all their wars. Failure to support a friendly country in its wars (either by that country or by us) is counted as a betrayal. But the anti-other outlook distrusts any sort of international cooperation (except for fighting the same enemies) as a threat to national sovereignty. Thus they distrust not only diplomacy, but even lower level engagement, such as trade. Here clearly the anti-state viewpoint (free trade! No protectionism!) comes into conflict with the anti-other outlook (protect Us from Them). That is why Ron Paul's opposition to NAFTA, or the Republican rank-and-file opposition to the Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement are so important. They are signs that a purported anti-state outlook is really anti-other.
Next come foreign nationals trying to enter the US. And here all pretext of being anti-state vanishes. Militarization of the border, immigration raids, maximally intrusive surveillance of anyone entering on a legal visa, any number of annoying business regulations and red tape to prevent hiring anyone without a Green Card -- all these are clearly state action in its most intrusive and coercive. They are also clear examples of what happens when the state tries to fight the will of the free market, in this case, in labor. A true anti-state libertarian would emphasize this point. An anti-other viewpoint may regret the regulatory burden on businessmen (many of whom are Us), but simply does not see state coercion against Them as an issue. Likewise, we can imagine that in the war on terror, an anti-other would oppose any state dragnet over domestic telephone and e-mail record on the grounds that the state should keep its hands off me, but might have no objection to extremely intrusive surveillance over international communications on the grounds that anyone communicating with a foreign country is probably up to no good.
States' rights libertarians also look very much more anti-other than anti-state. The underlying assumption in states' rights libertarianism is that only the federal government can oppress and that the actions of states, even if they are identical to federal actions, are inherently less oppressive. But, although an assumption that the states can do no wrong is clearly contradicted by empirical evidence and contrary to libertarian opposition to all government, but it does fit well with the value maximizing in-group autonomy and sovereignty. It should not be surprising that Ron Paul and a lot of neo-Confederate psuedo-libertarians belong to this tendency.
Finally, although not so Them as foreigners, fellow citizens are not necessarily Us. I was particularly struck by this with a poster to Rod Dreher (which he wrote a separate column about, but which I am not going to go to the trouble of finding) in response to white support for black protests against the police. The post made quite clear that the author saw the role of big city police as protecting the SWPL (pronounced swipple. Look it up) from the ravening black hoards and that the only authentic way any white person can respond to a police shooting of a black person is to line up behind the cops as one's own. Questions of investigating individual crimes, making arrests, and justice to individuals did not seem to register in his view. He did not seem to regard crimes by one black person against another as any concern of the authorities. Indeed, it is far from clear that he even thought the urban police should investigate a crime by one white person against another. Also unaddressed -- growing rates of interracial marriage and whether a white person may "authentically" care about a black spouse or their multi-racial children.
In short, the basic view of less government for Us and more for Them is not really incoherent if looked at from the right angle. But from any angle, it is still ugly.
__________________________________________
*Although, just for the record, the gold standard has exactly the same failing, and it seems strange to see Ron Paul sorts of libertarians, so prescient on the euro, fail to see the similarity to gold.
**Such as the difference between Communist, socialist and fascist; between Muslim and atheist; between Sunni and Shiite; and between any factions and distinctions of people who look vaguely Mideastern.
I got a useful insight from Jonathan Haidt's discussion of the moral foundations -- particularly the foundation of in-group loyalty. If maximizing your in-group's autonomy and sovereignty are important goals, it went a long way toward explaining to me why right-wingers are so strongly opposed to international cooperation, from the United Nations to trade agreements. They are threats to national autonomy and sovereignty. And it explained why conservatives are strong advocates of states' rights -- the importance of local autonomy and sovereignty. And, incidentally, I am more sympathetic to that viewpoint than I have been in the past. It is clear that on the matter of the euro the ignorant masses were right and purportedly enlightened elites were wrong. Introducing a trans-national currency really was a dangerous infringement on national sovereignty that undermined countries' ability to manage their own economies and left them at the mercy of their creditors.* In the Iraq war, the very worst insurgents were the international jihadis with no local ties and therefore no stake in the country's long-term survival. So such concerns are legitimate, and confronted with them I (we) should give the matter greater thought before rejecting them as simple bigotry.
But too strong a focus on preserving one's in-group autonomy and sovereignty and protecting it from outside contamination can lead in a very ugly direction. It is an obvious case of us-and-them thinking. And it sees the state's proper role as throwing a protective circle around Us to shield Us from Them. Superficially, this sort of outlook can seem anti-state because we don't want the state meddling in matters between Us, since the state is never truly one of Us. Thus preserving the autonomy and sovereignty of one's in-group means minimizing the power of the state over it. Thus the anti-other outlook can seem extremely libertarian and anti-state to the extent that it wants to deny or at least minimize state authority in dealings among Us. But if the role of the state is to draw a protective shield between Us and Them, then there no need for any limits on its power in dealing with Them.
Note, too, that although fine distinctions among Them** are unimportant and parsing them is simply proof that the speaker is not one of Us, there are degrees of other-ness. Us-and-Them is best seen, not as a sharp dichotomy, but as a series of concentric circles. The outermost circle are hostile foreign powers and anyone who resembles them. For instance, in the wake of the 9-11 attacks, a whole lot of people were unconcerned with the fine distinction between Afghanistan and Iraq, or between Saddam Hussein, Osama Bin Laden, and the Taliban. They were all Muslim, Mideastern, and enemies, so why bother distinguishing between them. Likewise, I assume that when Mike Huckabeee responds to the ISIS attack in Paris by calling on us to scrap our nuclear deal with Iran, it is because neither he nor his supporters are interested in such fine details as that the Iranian government is fighting ISIS! Yet at the same time, when North Korea began ramping up its nuclear program around the time we prepared for war with Iraq, there was no appetite for war with North Korea -- partly, no doubt, because such a war promised to be bloody, but also because it was obvious to even the more pig-headed that North Korea had nothing to do with 9-11 and was therefore not an obvious target for revenge.
Foreign countries in general occupy the next circle. Here there is a tendency to see foreign countries in two categories, friend and foe. With a foe (including countries like North Korea that we are not actually at war with, but are clearly hostile), the only options are war and complete disengagement. Friendly countries are the enemy of an enemy. We expect them to support us in all our wars and will, in turn, support them in all their wars. Failure to support a friendly country in its wars (either by that country or by us) is counted as a betrayal. But the anti-other outlook distrusts any sort of international cooperation (except for fighting the same enemies) as a threat to national sovereignty. Thus they distrust not only diplomacy, but even lower level engagement, such as trade. Here clearly the anti-state viewpoint (free trade! No protectionism!) comes into conflict with the anti-other outlook (protect Us from Them). That is why Ron Paul's opposition to NAFTA, or the Republican rank-and-file opposition to the Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement are so important. They are signs that a purported anti-state outlook is really anti-other.
Next come foreign nationals trying to enter the US. And here all pretext of being anti-state vanishes. Militarization of the border, immigration raids, maximally intrusive surveillance of anyone entering on a legal visa, any number of annoying business regulations and red tape to prevent hiring anyone without a Green Card -- all these are clearly state action in its most intrusive and coercive. They are also clear examples of what happens when the state tries to fight the will of the free market, in this case, in labor. A true anti-state libertarian would emphasize this point. An anti-other viewpoint may regret the regulatory burden on businessmen (many of whom are Us), but simply does not see state coercion against Them as an issue. Likewise, we can imagine that in the war on terror, an anti-other would oppose any state dragnet over domestic telephone and e-mail record on the grounds that the state should keep its hands off me, but might have no objection to extremely intrusive surveillance over international communications on the grounds that anyone communicating with a foreign country is probably up to no good.
States' rights libertarians also look very much more anti-other than anti-state. The underlying assumption in states' rights libertarianism is that only the federal government can oppress and that the actions of states, even if they are identical to federal actions, are inherently less oppressive. But, although an assumption that the states can do no wrong is clearly contradicted by empirical evidence and contrary to libertarian opposition to all government, but it does fit well with the value maximizing in-group autonomy and sovereignty. It should not be surprising that Ron Paul and a lot of neo-Confederate psuedo-libertarians belong to this tendency.
Finally, although not so Them as foreigners, fellow citizens are not necessarily Us. I was particularly struck by this with a poster to Rod Dreher (which he wrote a separate column about, but which I am not going to go to the trouble of finding) in response to white support for black protests against the police. The post made quite clear that the author saw the role of big city police as protecting the SWPL (pronounced swipple. Look it up) from the ravening black hoards and that the only authentic way any white person can respond to a police shooting of a black person is to line up behind the cops as one's own. Questions of investigating individual crimes, making arrests, and justice to individuals did not seem to register in his view. He did not seem to regard crimes by one black person against another as any concern of the authorities. Indeed, it is far from clear that he even thought the urban police should investigate a crime by one white person against another. Also unaddressed -- growing rates of interracial marriage and whether a white person may "authentically" care about a black spouse or their multi-racial children.
In short, the basic view of less government for Us and more for Them is not really incoherent if looked at from the right angle. But from any angle, it is still ugly.
__________________________________________
*Although, just for the record, the gold standard has exactly the same failing, and it seems strange to see Ron Paul sorts of libertarians, so prescient on the euro, fail to see the similarity to gold.
**Such as the difference between Communist, socialist and fascist; between Muslim and atheist; between Sunni and Shiite; and between any factions and distinctions of people who look vaguely Mideastern.
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