But these problems are dwarfed by a deep contradiction that lies at the heart of the entire book. Zimblatt makes clear that the threat to democracy lies on the right. But who are these "right" that he speaks of? Sometimes the threat appears to come from the pre-democratic ruling elite, fearful of giving up its privileges.
But other times, the threat seems to come from somewhere else -- from the right-wing grassroots, from interest groups and activists on the right, while Zimblatt sees the role of the pre-democratic ruling elite as reigning them in. So who are these right-wing grassroots, these interest groups and activists? Zimblatt never exactly says.
Some of what he means can be inferred from his two examples -- Britain and Germany. Although Zimblatt never says it in so many words, the British crisis that followed the defeat of the Conservatives in 1906 was actually two crises. One was a crisis of the old landed aristocracy seeing its class privileges threatened by redistributionist taxation and the beginnings of the welfare state. The other was a crisis regarding Irish home rule. Irish Catholics demanded home rule for the entire island, while Irish Protestants in the North feared for their future in a Catholic Ireland and opposed the project. One one side of the political divide was the Conservative Party -- the party of the landed aristocracy and the social conservatives it was able to attract -- and the Irish Unionist Party,* which consisted of Irish Protestants opposed to home rule. On the other side were the Liberals and nascent Labour Party creating the beginnings of the welfare state, and Irish Party -- a party of Irish Catholics seeking home rule.
The crisis over a landed elite fearing loss of its prerogatives came first, over the years 1906 through 1911. It was characterized by clear violations of established norms, but not by extra-legal much less illegal actions. Established custom at the time allowed the House of Lords some obstructive or delaying role, but ultimately did not allow it to block legislation passed by the House of Commons, especially spending bills, which threatened the House of Commons' power of the purse strings, a power going back to the Middle Ages. But the House of Lords blocked or significantly changed many (though by no means all) of the proposed legislation and vetoed a spending bill that would have established a welfare state supported by progressive taxation -- the first such veto in two centuries. The Liberals responded in 1911 by passing the Parliament Act which ended the House of Lord's authority to veto legislation (although it retained authority to delay). The House of Lords submitted only when the House of Commons persuaded the King to threaten to create enough new Lords to pack the House.
At this point the crisis escalated, but the issue changed from economic and budgetary issues to Irish home rule. Zimblatt suggests this may have been because the Conservatives were able to poll their voters and determine that blocking the Liberals' economic agenda was not a winning issue, but that home rule for Ireland was. And certainly from then on, Ireland became the issue. This was at least in part because the Liberals lost their majority in Parliament. In order to hold onto power, they had to form a coalition with the Irish Party and offer home rule to all of Ireland -- a thing unacceptable to the Protestants in the North, or the public opinion in general.** Opposition moved from mere norm violation to the extra-legal, as Conservative leadership began to use the language of violence and revolt, and Irish Protestants began forming their own radical wing, complete with private militias. Crisis was precipitated when 57 out of 70 mid-level officers in North Ireland resigned rather than implement the Liberal government's decision, an attempt by the military to pressure the civilian government on policy and clear threat to civilian control of the military. This shock, along with the brewing crisis in Europe that became WWI, persuaded all parties to reach a compromise, and the crisis passed.
So, in this case it would appear that the right wing grassroots consisted of militant Irish Protestants fearing for their fate in Catholic Ireland. That the main issue shifted from economic issues to Ireland showed on the one hand, that the old landed aristocracy was willing to concede some of its privileges under democracy, and that the Conservative Party had developed a strong enough party and electoral elite to see electoral success as more important than upholding aristocratic privileges and thus be willing to yield on the former issue in favor of one with more public support. On the other hand, it showed that the Conservative Party had dangerously radical elements in the form of militant Irish Protestants. Though Zimblatt calls these the right wing grassroots, in the sense of not being part of the elite, they were a small portion of the total population, exercising influence all out of proportion to their numbers.
Zimblatt goes on to discuss the Conservative Party during the interwar period, and how British democracy remained solid even as democracies fell across Europe. Conservatives encouraged the Labour Party, feared by many as dangerous radicals, to participate in the political process, both hoping to split the left and fearing that Labour would otherwise be radicalized. In this, they were opposed by two right-wing media moguls, Lord Beaverbrook and Viscount Rothermere (consider them the Rupert Murdochs of their day), but the strong party apparatus was able to contain both. The author also suggests that fascism did not arise in Britain because a strong, cohesive conservative party left no space for the far right.
And then, of course, there is Germany. Zimblatt describes not only the weakness of Germany's Conservative Party in the 19th Century, but also ill-fated search for allies, which left it unable to contain activists and interest groups. These took two main forms -- the Agrarian League, and anti-Semites.
The Agrarian League might seem like a promising opportunity for the landed aristocracy to broaden its appeal. The landed aristocracy, after all, was an agricultural interest. While there are obvious differing interests between great aristocrats and small holders, they have common interests as well, such as keeping land taxes low, pursuing a pro-agriculture trade policy, and protection from the various risks that plague agriculture. The Agrarian League was both territorially diffuse and hierarchically centralized. In other words it provided the broad base and strong organization that the Conservatives were so sorely lacking. Why couldn't the Conservatives remake themselves as a farmer's party? The problem was that the Agrarian League was not a political party, but an interest group. It had no interest in running as a party, but only in providing support to parties that favored its program. Better organized than the Conservative Party, the Agrarian League could regularly bend elected officials to its will. It also had unpleasant anti-Semitic, anti-urban and militaristic undertones. Zimblatt describes this as capture of a party by an interest group, pushing it to the right of the monarchy and the old pre-democratic order.
The Conservative Party also tried outreach to urban lower middle class groups of conservative outlook. These tended to be demagogic and anti-Semitic in ways that the leadership found distasteful but was unable to stop. Zimblatt comments that party activists, whether of the left or right, are more ideologically extreme than election-minded party leaders. This would imply that activists are also more extreme than the general public, even as they (often) regard themselves as the true voice of the people. Hence his emphasis on the need for a strong, electorally-minded party leadership to reign in the activists.
Fast forward to Weimar. As discussed before, Zimblatt sees the true downhill turn for the Weimar Republic, not as the Great Depression, but as the 1928 election in which the DNVP (the successor to the German Conservative Party) lost and seemed to hopelessly fragment. Always skeptical of the Republic, the DNVP responded to its defeat by radicalizing, by seeking more to enforce ideological purity than to start winning elections again. The process ultimately led to Germany's conservative parties complete self-destruction and the rise of the Nazis to take their place.
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| Alfred Hugenberg |
Zimblatt contrasts the DNVP as a weak party with the Social Democrats as a strong party. The Social Democrats were funded mostly by membership dues and had their own party newspaper. The DNVP lacked either its own base of funding or its own newspaper. Hugenberg supplied both. He used his wealth to finance the party and to decide where to channel funds. (Zimblatt estimates he may have provided 30% or more of the DNVP's funds). He used his newspapers to shape public opinion, particularly against moderation in the party. He planted his own supporters as local party chairmen to direct local party organizations and used his wealth to decide what candidates to finance. Following the 1928 defeat, Hugenberg was able to appointed DNVP chairman and used his position to purge the party moderates. And just as the pre-war German Conservatives ended up to the right even of the Kaiser, Hugenberg's DNVP ended up to the right of Hindenburg.
The result was a disaster for the DNVP -- its share of the vote fell from 14% to 7% in the next election -- but a success for the radical right outside the DNVP. Zimblatt sees the inability of Germany's leading conservative party to compete as a major factor in the neutering of parliament and the switch to Hindenburg's narrow presidential government. German conservatives were unwilling to compete in parliamentary government, knowing that there was no way to make a coalition that would exclude the Social Democrats. (The need on the German right to exclude Social Democrats from any governing coalition is not explored; Zimblatt simply takes it as a given).
As the DNVP shrank, the Nazi Party filled the void on the right that it had left. Given that Hugenberg was purging the moderates and pushing the party in an ever more radical direction, this is a surprising development. Zimblatt explains it by saying that Hugenberg made right-wing radicalism respectable and, particularly, by allying himself with the Nazis, he made the Nazis respectable.
Yet this is a strangely unsatisfying account. I am quite willing to concede to Zimblatt that the Nazis came to power because Germany had no strong democratic conservative party to block their way. But he never addresses the obvious question. Who were the Nazis? Where did they come from? It makes sense to say that the Nazis arose because the DNVP was too weak to stop them, and that Hugenberg's attempt to purge the party led to mass defections to the Nazis. But why, if Hugenberg was purging the moderates, did they go over to the Nazis instead of a more moderate alternative?
And so we see the basic flaw of Zimblatt's theory. He may well be right that ruling elites will only allow a democratic transition if they have a strong party capable of competing in democratic elections. He may be right that in the absence of a strong, competitive party, pre-democratic elites will abort the process. (He is probably right in calling Egypt a recent example).
But at some point the threat ceases to be from pre-democratic elites and becomes a threat from right-wing activists at the party grass roots. The role of a strong democratic conservative party stops being to allow the old ruling classes to protect their interest, and becomes to reign in the grassroots activists and channel dissent through democratic channels. But, once again, that can only raise the question of who these right-wing grassroots activists are. Where do they come from?*** How numerous are they compared to the general population? And if the electorally-inclined party leadership is really closer to the general public, how do these activists get enough of a following to be dangerous. And why is this so strongly a right-wing phenomenon?
Zimblatt conflates two separate and distinct threats to democracy. Both threats are on the right, and the remedy for both is a strong, well-disciplined conservative party. But their origins and the nature of the threat posed are different. And Zimblatt leaves a major hole in his theory by not addressing the distinction.
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*Mild expression of frustration at the author using "Conservative" and "Unionist" more or less interchangeably without explanation.
**And, interestingly enough, this issue remains critical to this day and is the chief obstacle to any proposal for the Brexit.
***He gives a reasonably satisfactory answer in Britain -- they were Irish Protestants legitimately fearful of their fate in a Catholic Ireland. But we are left without a clue in Germany, where such "activists" were vastly more numerous and powerful.
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