Liberalism and Illiberalism

 

Of course, that comment does an injustice to conservatism which, at its best can advocate for an even-handed application of the law.  It is better taken as the definition of authoritarianism.  And, again, the above proposition is actually four propositions:

1. The law protects our in-group
2. The law does not bind our in-group
3. The law binds out-groups
4. The law does not protect outgroups

There is nothing illiberal or authoritarian about 1 and 3, which are completely compatible with even-handed justice.  The problem is with propositions 2 and 4.  And, as I  noted before, proposition 2, the law is not binding on us often gets the most attention.  

This would suggest that an offensive sense of entitlement is a hint of authoritarianism -- laws are for other people. I would also add that an offensive sense of entitlement, a conviction that the rules only apply to someone else, represents authoritarianism in its milder forms.  Who hasn't at least sometimes believed that the rules should bend to accommodate our particular circumstances?  Actual hostile and punitive behavior toward outsiders is the more dangerous manifestation of authoritarianism.  

The alternative is liberalism, which Wilhoit defines in its broadest sense:

A noble sentiment, but then again, let us not forget that liberalism is hard.  It isn't easy to apply the rules even handedly to the people we love and the people we hate.

All of which, of course, leads to the subject of the latest protests on campus.  I recommend this article for a thoughtful, well-balanced description of what is going on with the Columbia protests.  The overall tone of the article is that the protests on Columbia are peaceful.  The protesters are camped out on the lawn and not engaged in violence.  They are at pains to argue they are not anti-Jewish, only anti-Zionist.  They have encouraged Jews to join the protests, have held a Shabbat dinner and are planning a Passover Seder.  

But they reject the existence of Israel as illegitimate and refuse to allow any differing views.  If anyone who disagrees approaches the encampment, the protesters link arm and bar the intruder as a threat to "privacy."  Violence on campus is rare, but the social pressure to conform and not to voice opposing views is intense.  Members of the press are directed to a few official spokespeople.  Other members of the encampment refust to speak to outsiders.  

Outside the campus, things are a lot uglier as protesters, probably Arab, harass Jews and call for the destruction of Israel.  The students on campus disclaim such things, but do not put much energy into denouncing them.  And, above all, the general consensus, even among people who disagree with the protests, is one of opposition to any attempt to forcibly shut down the protests.

So maybe a good place to start is the work more at publicizing the concept of time, place, and manner restrictions on speech.  What this means, in simples terms is that government * may not limit the content of what is said, but it may place restriction on the time, place, and manner of the speech.  A state university,* for instance, could not ban pro-Palestinian, or pro-Hamas rallies while allowing pro-Israel rallies, or vice versa.  But it can limit speech to rallies in the quad that end at a certain hour and ban camping on the lawn.  

And any state can absolutely ban protestors from blocking highways.  That particular technique was pioneered by Black Lives Matter and there were cries of outrage on our side when some states outlawed the technique.  The cries out outrage went the other way when anti-vax truckers in Canada protested vaccine mandates by blocking major trade routes and the Canadian government shut them down (without resorting to violence, it should be noted).  Well, now it is pro-Hamas protestors blocking traffic in multiple locations.

So, let's all take a deep breath and agree that yes, bans on blocking traffic fit well within constitutional "time, place and manner" restrictions, as do bans on camping on the lawn.  And yes, I realize that protestors will say that their cause is more important that such restrictions.  In fact, pro-Hamas protestors are claiming a general exemption from being bound by any rules on the grounds that such rules are less important than "genocide" in Gaza.  To which two responses are obvious.  One is that there is no reason whatever to believe that blocking the Golden Gate Bridge will do anything whatever to end the war in Gaza. 

The other is to point out that this is no different than, say, right-wing parents who disrupted school board meetings and threatened, stalked and harassed school board members. Their response to any sort of law enforcement action was to say that they were being persecuted just for being concerned parents, and that their children's safety was more important that time, place and manner restrictions.  Both groups are claiming that their cause is so important that the rules should not apply to them.

It is also not so different from Bill Barr saying that he considers Trump the lesser evil compared to Biden, even though Trump tried to overturn an election and wanted to execute people who caused him trouble because Biden will impose energy efficiency regulations on appliances.  Or Jonah Goldberg's Liberal Fascism, which argued that GW Bush's claims of uncheck powers of indefinite detention, "enhanced interrogation," and warrantless surveillance were really less dangerous to liberty than public smoking bans.**  The point in such cases is clear enough.  Unlimited executive power (in the hands of a Republican, of course) is not really bad because it only affects other people.

Regulations affect me.

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*A private university is not government, but we can ignore that for now.
**To Goldberg's credit, he has been signing a different tune since Donald Trump came to power.