And I will now add to what I have said before, that for democracy to be functional, each side has to show some respect for the architecture created by its predecessors. What do I mean by that? Well, to take an extreme hypothetical, if one party wants to nationalize industry and the other does not, it would be disastrous for to nationalize and denationalize industry every time power changed hands. Or if one side wants to keep Social Security in its present from and one wants to turn it into a 401-k, switching between one and the other with every change of party would be worse than either alternative.
Many people, myself among them, think our system is failing in large part because it has so many veto points ad to lead to complete paralysis. But some veto points are needed, and some difficulty in making major policy changes, in order to avoid ruinous swings in policy with every election. Norman Ornstein has suggested the following options to a loyal opposition faced with legislation it dislikes:
When a law is enacted, representatives who opposed it have some choices (which are not mutually exclusive). They can try to repeal it, which is perfectly acceptable -- unless it becomes an effort at grandstanding so overdone that it detracts from other basic responsibilities of governing. They can try to amend it to make it work better -- not just perfectly acceptable but desirable, if the goal is to improve a cumbersome law to work better for the betterment of the society and its people. They can strive to make sure that the law does the most for Americans it is intended to serve, including their own constituents, while doing the least damage to the society and the economy. Or they can step aside and leave the burden of implementation to those who supported the law and got it enacted in the first place.
His comment referred to Obamacare, and his point was that actively sabotaging a law and trying to keep people from benefitting from it was not reasonable or acceptable. But I am prepared to go a step further and say that once a law becomes embedded to a degree and shapes people's behaviors and expectations, outright repeal becomes an extreme step that should be undertaken only in the most extreme circumstances. On the whole, modifying is the better course.
Let us take some concrete examples. When Ronald Reagan became president, the top marginal tax rate was 70%. His great, dramatic tax cuts lowered that rate -- to 50%. The tax reform in his second term greatly simplified that tax code, removed many deductions, and lowered the top marginal rate to 28%. Since then, many complications and deductions have found their way back in and, perhaps not coincidentally, the top marginal rate has crept back up. But it has never reach 50% again, let alone 70%.
This is an example of a policy change that hat been tweaked, modified, and perhaps even undermined, but not repealed.* Other policy architecture deserves similar respect. Obamacare is an obvious example. Certainly, there is plenty of room to criticize Obamacare, and doubtless there are changes that Republicans could make to make it more to their liking. But by the time Republicans were in an actual position to repeal, 10 million people were getting health insurance through the Medicaid expansion and another 10 million were buying insurance on the exchanges. Simply to have repealed the whole system would have meant stripping 20 million people of their health insurance. Republicans learned the hard way that doing so is a surefire electoral loser.
Republicans did generally respect the architecture of Obama's financial regulations. Now housing prices are once again soaring to insane levels, and whether that produces a new financial crisis will depend on how good the financial regulations are.
The other main piece of architecture that Obama left was the Iranian nuclear deal -- the JCPOA. Republicans denounced the agreement as a disaster, but recall that it:
- Reduced Iran's level of enrichment from 20% to 3.67% fissile material
- Reduced Iran's number of centrifuges for enriching uranium from over 19,000 to 6,104
- Reduced advanced centrifuges from over 1,000 to none
- Closed the enrichment facility most likely to be used to make nuclear weapons
- Reduced Iran's stockpile of low enriched uranium from over 10,000 kg to 300 kg
- Eliminated Iran's stockpile of medium enriched uranium altogether
- Gave access to nuclear inspectors to ensure that these terms were kept
Conservative had two main criticisms (1) the terms were in effect for only ten years, and (2) other issues, such as Iran's support for armed proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah were not addressed. A more sensible approach would have been to seek to modify, rather than destroy the framework. If conservatives' main objection was to the limited duration of the agreement, they could seek to extend it. If their main objection was Iran's continued support for proxies, they could have been more confrontational. Of course, there would be tradeoffs. If one's goal is to extend the nuclear restraints beyond ten years, it might call for a conciliatory approach that might condone Iran's support for armed proxies so long as they did not become too aggressive. Alternately a more confrontational approach over armed proxies might undermine and weaken the proxies and give hope for their eventual destruction, but it might make Iran less interested in renewing the nuclear agreement. But life is full of tradeoffs and you don't always get what you want.
And to be clear, this rule should apply to our side as well. The Trump Administration has achievements and made changes to the international architecture that the Biden Administration should respect. To some degree it has. The Trump Administration brokered recognition of Israel by several Arab countries; the Biden Administration has respected these agreements and sought to expand on them.
By contrast, the Biden Administration made a serious misstep when it sought to end the Trump Administrations remain in Mexico approach to asylum seekers. It has since attempted to backtrack by using the COVID emergency as an excuse to keep asylum seekers in Mexico, except for minors. None of this makes much sense. It is driven by domestic politics -- the Democratic base outraged by remain in Mexico and wants it to end, but letting in an unrestrained flood of asylum seekers would be electoral suicide. A better approach would have been to make the remain in Mexico policy more humane -- speed up the asylum process and give assistance to people waiting. I plan to discuss this more in a future post.
But in nearly all cases, modifying, rather than reversing, one's predecessor's architecture is the better approach. I plan to discuss this, and the real but manageable policy differences it can leave in place, in future posts on what a sensible center right -- and a sensible center left -- would look like.
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*And even if the top marginal rate does make it all the way back to 70%, it will certainly be a gradual process with room for opposition all along the way.
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