The Outlines of the End are Starting to Emerge

 

I think we are starting to see the outlines of how the Russia-Ukraine war will end.  Dmitry Alperovitch is reaching the same conclusion I did and that many observers are reaching as well.  If the possible endings are (1) long term occupancy and insurgency, (2) Russia declares victory and pulls out, (3) Zelensky agrees to Putin's terms, and (4) Putin overthrown, the outcome is shaping up to be 1.5 -- Russian declares victory and digs in.

It is by now obvious to all that Russia will not conquer and annex all of Ukraine.  And it does not seem unduly optimistic to say that it seems most unlikely that the Russian forces will topple the Ukrainian government and install a puppet regime.  Nor does it seem likely that the Ukrainian forces will drive the Russians out altogether, especially given that, faced with such a possibility, Putin would probably resort to chemical or biological weapons or even tactical nuclear weapons.

It therefore seems most likely that the Russians will dig into whatever territory they can hold and call it a victory.  And it will be a victory in the sense that Russia will doubtless end up holding more territory than it did at the time it invaded,  just not in the sense of meeting Putin's maximal war aims.

Where exactly the lines will be will be determined in the next few weeks of fighting.  Ukraine is launching counter offensives in the north and the west (i.e., the Black Sea coast west of the Crimea), while Russian forces are advancing in the south (the Black Sea coast east of Crimea, especially Mariupol) and east.  Eventually they will reach a stalemate with neither side having and really hope to advance.  The real question is, what happens then.

A true peace treaty seems out of the question.  President Zelensky has ruled out any sort of territorial concessions.  So what does that leave.  In order of desirablility, not of probability (I have no idea of the probabilities here), I would say the possible outcomes are as follows:

Best case scenario:  No peace treaty, but a permanent cease-fire and armistice on the Korean model. The two sides stop shooting and fortify their border, but neither acknowledges the permanency or legality of the arrangement.  Obviously this is not ideal.  It leaves a raw wound between the countries, and a raw wound to Vladimir Putin's ego.  It leaves the door open for a new war a few years down the line. How long?  Well, the first Chechen War ended in a Russian defeat in 1996.  Putin resumed the war a mere three years later in 1999.  I think this war had made it clear to Putin that Ukraine is a lot larger than Chechnya and will be harder to conquer.  Russia more-or-less won in Chechnya in 2000.  Its invasion of Georgia took place eight years later, in 2008.  Russia's earlier invasion of Ukraine, to seize Crimea and Donetsk, took place in six years later in 2014.  The full scale invasion took place eight years later in 2022.  Russian will certainly emerge weakened from this war and need some time to recover before it is ready to start any more wars.  So, given Putin's overall history, maybe six to eight years. But not necessarily.  A lot can happen in that time.  And, after all, sooner or later Vladimir Putin will have to die.  He is currently 69 years old, which admittedly is not all that old these days, but there have been speculations about his health.  This latest war was clearly Putin's war.  Maybe if he dies within the next eight years it will make a difference.  And an armistice, after all, can be stable.  Just look at Korea.

Bad but tolerable:  A long-term, low grade war, similar to what was ongoing from 2014 to 2022, border clashes alternating with ceasefires, at a level not too draining on the participants.  This is what Alperovitch thinks is most likely.  It has the same drawbacks as an armistice, except with greater potential to explode down the line.  But a least in the short term, this looks sustainable.

Really bad, but unlikely:  Long-term, high grade war around relatively static lines.  In other words, WWI all over again.  But this seems unlikely, since both sides are looking exhausted and depleted and I don't think either has the resources to sustain a high-level war for long.

What I fear will be the outcome:  My great fear is that the fighting reaches a stable stopping place on the ground, but that Putin continues his bombardment purely out of spite, and as a warning to others who might defy him.  So far as I can tell, there is really nothing to stop him, short of running low on ammunition. And how long will that take.  Weeks?  Months?  Years?  I have no idea.  But it costs Russia little and does horrible things to Ukraine (or any other target).  

Worst case scenario:  And even that is based on the optimistic but not crazy assumption that Putin will limit spite bombardments to conventional firepower and not resort to chemical biological or nuclear, and that any military assistance from China will come in more slowly that the Russians can fire it off.  Again, I think these are reasonable assumptions, but with Putin you never know.  In the end, the only think stopping Putin from dumping his entire tactical nuclear arsenal on Ukraine may be the knowledge that Ukraine is right next door to and upwind of Russia and not wanting to deal with the literal fallout.