So, Do I Wish Now Trump Had Won?

 

So, do I wish Trump had won now?  I don’t know yet, it will depend how things shake out.

Because I am inclined to believe that if Trump had won, Putin would not have invaded Ukraine.  After all, he would have a friend in the White House.  Why take actions that could jeopardize their friendship?  Trump was busy undermining NATO and quite probably intended to withdraw in his second term.  With NATO self-destructing, why take actions that might bring it together? 

And, to be clear, if there had been an ordinary Republican in the White House, I do not doubt that Putin would have proceeded the same as he is proceeding now.  Maybe the generic Republican would have initiated sanctions faster than Biden has, maybe not.  But I would not expect it to make any difference.  I would not expect a generic Republican to coordinate an international response as well as Biden has, but given just how destructive these sanctions can be, I am not convinced that would be altogether bad.

And certainly if Putin had nonetheless invaded with Trump in the White House, I would not expect Trump to have organized such an effective international response as Biden has done.  I would expect Trump to respond by locking himself in the bathroom and banging out petulant tweets about how none of this was his fault.  The result – Ukraine would have been overrun much faster.  (Its persistence has been largely the result of NATO assistance with both weapons and intelligence).  And given the horrors we see unfolding today, maybe that would be more merciful.  Would Putin then go on to invade other countries as well?  Possibly central Asian countries that were part of the old Soviet Union, but I doubt he would take on any NATO powers.  And I certainly would not expect Trump to have the diplomatic skill to organize the sort of sanctions that Biden has done, or to be willing the accept the associated hardships.  But, again, the question has to be just how bad those hardships turn out to be, less for the US than for poorer countries cut off from Russia and Ukrainian grain.

I also believe that if Trump had won, he would have spent his second term finding ways to persecute his opponents, make the US government the instrument of his power, and ultimately destroy US democracy.  So, do I think the destruction of US democracy would be an acceptable price to pay to avoid the know horrors we are seeing unfold in Ukraine and the unknown horrors we will see unfold from the sanctions?  I don’t know yet.  That will depend on how things shake out.

There are very few things I would consider the destruction of US democracy and the breakup of the Western alliance as an acceptable price to pay.  Avoiding global thermonuclear war is one.  Avoiding WWIII, even if it doesn’t turn thermonuclear is another.  What about avoiding an economic WWIII with worldwide famine and upheaval?  Maybe.  I don’t know yet.  It will depend how things shake out.  On the other hand, paying lower prices at the pump is not something I am prepared to sacrifice US democracy and the Western alliance for.  (Certain Republicans I know disagree).  Nor is avoiding Cold War II.  We have been headed for Cold War II for quite some time.  A Trump presidency would merely have delayed, not prevented, Cold War II, and it would have brought us into the new Cold War in a much weaker position.

And finally, I will take any President – Biden, Trump or anyone else you can name -- who is old enough to remember the Cold War the old cardinal rule of Cold War days – nuclear powers must never go to war directly against other nuclear powers.  We need to start giving the younger generation a crash course on just the terror that was routine during the Cold War.  The Cold War generation will die off and sooner or later a post-Cold War President will be elected.  We need him/her to understand just what is at stake.

About Those Ukrrainian Neo-Nazis

 

Vladimir Putin keeps saying that he is going to war to free Ukraine from neo-Nazis.  The accusation is absurd, of course.  Neo-Nazis exist the world over, of course, so it is probably asking too much to expect Ukraine to be an exception.  Still far-right influence in Ukraine has been much less than in most ex-Communist countries.  Ukraine is best characterized as a flawed democracy, making the transition from authoritarianism but have trouble rooting out corruption and other bad habits.  President Volodymyr Zelenzky is Jewish.  The far right Svoboda (freedom) coalition saw its influence peak in 2012 with 10.45% of the vote and 37 out of 450 seats in parliament. In the most recent election (2019), Svoboda won 2.5% of the vote and a single seat.  It has consistently polled between one and two percent in presidential elections.

In short, neo-Nazis are completely marginalized from any sort of power in Ukraine.  But, as is so often the case with propaganda, there has to be just a large enough grain of truth to be plausible to Russian audiences.

There really was widespread Ukrainian collaboration with the Nazis during WWII.  This is somewhat understandable, given the way Stalin had treated Ukraine.  But it is also true that Ukraine had a longstanding history of antisemitism dating back at least to the 17th Century.

None of that should mean that Ukraine is permanently tainted and, as discussed above, in the leadup to the invasion the far right in Ukraine was completely marginalized and unimportant.  Except that, as in so many countries, the far right is vastly over-represented in paramilitary.organizations. These organizations offered valuable resistance to Russia when it invaded Donbas.  They recaptured Mariupol from Russian forces in 2014.  And given the shattered condition of the Ukrainian military in 2014, there was little choice but to absorb such organizations and make use of them.

But make no mistake, such groups are increasing their power as arms proliferate throughout Ukraine.  In case of an insurgency, they would play a disproportionate role. Insurgencies destroy the institutions of society.  They bring about whole generations who know nothing but war. And they empower the most extreme elements.  This is one reason to be altogether pleased about conventional forces preventing the Russians from occupying most of Ukraine.  And it is a reason to fear even a low-level war and insurgency in Russian-occupied territories.  

And it is also why in the end, the Ukrainians will have to be the ones who decide when to end the war, no matter how rash their decision may seem to us.  I want to see the war end quickly, both as a general humanitarian matter, and to avoid the risk of escalating into WWIII.  But countries being attacked do not tend to think in humanitarian terms.  Bombing of civilians and other harm from the war tend (to a point) to strengthen, rather than weaken, resolve.  Only the long, weary grind ultimately undermines resolve.  (This applies to Russia, to their losses and to the sanctions as well).  Whatever the terms of this war's end, they will have to be something that Putin can spin as a win.  Such are the unfortunate facts of life in dealing with a deranged man with nuclear weapons.  

Whatever the terms of the end of the war, President Zelensky will also no doubt try to spin it as a win, and with some plausibility.  But invariably there will be second guessing.  Zelensky is refusing to make territorial concessions because Ukrainian public opinion is dead set against such concessions.  But in the end, Russia will, no doubt, gain some territory, and certainly Ukraine will not retake Crimea and Donbas.  (And it would have to deal with its own insurrection in that case).  There will be second guessing, ultra-nationalists denouncing any terms as a sell-out and insisting they could have done better.  Recriminations of this kind are inevitable when a country loses a war.  Remember, both Putin and Hitler arose out of their country's defeat and humiliation. Zelensky is the hero of the hour now, but when the war ends, the rally-round-the-chief effect will also end. Zelensky will doubtless emerge angry and embittered at NATO for not saving his country.  Many countrymen will no doubt be more so.

My guess is that a prolonged insurrection would have been the ruin of Ukrainian society for a generation to come and more.  Ending the war less than favorable terms will weaken liberal democracy and strengthen far right nationalist elements.  That does not mean all is lost.  Liberal democracy has taken blows, lost wars, an recovered.  The best we can do is twofold.  First, let the Ukrainians decide when to end the war.  And second, do all we can to help the country rebuild.  Prosperity will make defeat seem not so bad.

The Outlines of the End are Starting to Emerge

 

I think we are starting to see the outlines of how the Russia-Ukraine war will end.  Dmitry Alperovitch is reaching the same conclusion I did and that many observers are reaching as well.  If the possible endings are (1) long term occupancy and insurgency, (2) Russia declares victory and pulls out, (3) Zelensky agrees to Putin's terms, and (4) Putin overthrown, the outcome is shaping up to be 1.5 -- Russian declares victory and digs in.

It is by now obvious to all that Russia will not conquer and annex all of Ukraine.  And it does not seem unduly optimistic to say that it seems most unlikely that the Russian forces will topple the Ukrainian government and install a puppet regime.  Nor does it seem likely that the Ukrainian forces will drive the Russians out altogether, especially given that, faced with such a possibility, Putin would probably resort to chemical or biological weapons or even tactical nuclear weapons.

It therefore seems most likely that the Russians will dig into whatever territory they can hold and call it a victory.  And it will be a victory in the sense that Russia will doubtless end up holding more territory than it did at the time it invaded,  just not in the sense of meeting Putin's maximal war aims.

Where exactly the lines will be will be determined in the next few weeks of fighting.  Ukraine is launching counter offensives in the north and the west (i.e., the Black Sea coast west of the Crimea), while Russian forces are advancing in the south (the Black Sea coast east of Crimea, especially Mariupol) and east.  Eventually they will reach a stalemate with neither side having and really hope to advance.  The real question is, what happens then.

A true peace treaty seems out of the question.  President Zelensky has ruled out any sort of territorial concessions.  So what does that leave.  In order of desirablility, not of probability (I have no idea of the probabilities here), I would say the possible outcomes are as follows:

Best case scenario:  No peace treaty, but a permanent cease-fire and armistice on the Korean model. The two sides stop shooting and fortify their border, but neither acknowledges the permanency or legality of the arrangement.  Obviously this is not ideal.  It leaves a raw wound between the countries, and a raw wound to Vladimir Putin's ego.  It leaves the door open for a new war a few years down the line. How long?  Well, the first Chechen War ended in a Russian defeat in 1996.  Putin resumed the war a mere three years later in 1999.  I think this war had made it clear to Putin that Ukraine is a lot larger than Chechnya and will be harder to conquer.  Russia more-or-less won in Chechnya in 2000.  Its invasion of Georgia took place eight years later, in 2008.  Russia's earlier invasion of Ukraine, to seize Crimea and Donetsk, took place in six years later in 2014.  The full scale invasion took place eight years later in 2022.  Russian will certainly emerge weakened from this war and need some time to recover before it is ready to start any more wars.  So, given Putin's overall history, maybe six to eight years. But not necessarily.  A lot can happen in that time.  And, after all, sooner or later Vladimir Putin will have to die.  He is currently 69 years old, which admittedly is not all that old these days, but there have been speculations about his health.  This latest war was clearly Putin's war.  Maybe if he dies within the next eight years it will make a difference.  And an armistice, after all, can be stable.  Just look at Korea.

Bad but tolerable:  A long-term, low grade war, similar to what was ongoing from 2014 to 2022, border clashes alternating with ceasefires, at a level not too draining on the participants.  This is what Alperovitch thinks is most likely.  It has the same drawbacks as an armistice, except with greater potential to explode down the line.  But a least in the short term, this looks sustainable.

Really bad, but unlikely:  Long-term, high grade war around relatively static lines.  In other words, WWI all over again.  But this seems unlikely, since both sides are looking exhausted and depleted and I don't think either has the resources to sustain a high-level war for long.

What I fear will be the outcome:  My great fear is that the fighting reaches a stable stopping place on the ground, but that Putin continues his bombardment purely out of spite, and as a warning to others who might defy him.  So far as I can tell, there is really nothing to stop him, short of running low on ammunition. And how long will that take.  Weeks?  Months?  Years?  I have no idea.  But it costs Russia little and does horrible things to Ukraine (or any other target).  

Worst case scenario:  And even that is based on the optimistic but not crazy assumption that Putin will limit spite bombardments to conventional firepower and not resort to chemical biological or nuclear, and that any military assistance from China will come in more slowly that the Russians can fire it off.  Again, I think these are reasonable assumptions, but with Putin you never know.  In the end, the only think stopping Putin from dumping his entire tactical nuclear arsenal on Ukraine may be the knowledge that Ukraine is right next door to and upwind of Russia and not wanting to deal with the literal fallout.

So How Does the War End?

Dmitri Alperovich lays out what he thinks are the four possible outcomes of the war in Ukraine, in order of likelihood:

1. Long term occupation and insurgency with destruction of Ukrainian cities
2. Putin declares victory and pulls out
3.   Zelensky compromises on NATO and Crimea and Donetsk
4. Putin overthrown

He adds that these outcomes are not mutually exclusive.  My own guess is that it ends somewhere between 1 and 2, call it 1.5, Putin declares victory and digs in.

I don’t see the Russians conquering all of Ukraine over even large portions of it.  Their advances are largely stalled out.  Yes, granted, three weeks is a very short war, and eventually the mud will dry out so they can move.  So maybe I am being optimistic here, but it seems unlikely that they will capture much more territory.  And even if they did, I have heard the estimate that it will take 500,000 troops or more to occupy all of Ukraine.  That is more than enough to tie down the Russian forces and keep the Russian Army from doing anything else.  At some point even Putin has to recognize that the costs of “winning” such a war exceed the costs of – well, not winning.

Furthermore, the war appears to be headed toward stalemate, with Russian troops unable to advance and Ukrainians unable to remove them. And it seems unlikely that the Russians will give up territory they have seized.  The logic of the situation seems to suggest, dig in.  

Yet so long as the Russians have rockets, they can keep destroying much of the country.  There is my real confusion.  In destroying much of Ukraine, is Putin acting out of pure spite, or is he trying to force the Ukrainians to accept his terms?  And if the senseless bombardment of civilian targets is being done out of pure spite, how much ammunition do the Russians have?  How long can it be sustained? 

So it seems to me that the only way for the war to end is for the Russians to stop trying to take any more territory, start focusing on consolidating what they have, and then “graciously” declare a unilateral cease-fire after having achieved their objectives.  Ukrainians will decide the costs of renewing the war exceed the benefits and start fortifying their borders.  Both countries dissolve into anger and recriminations over the outcome.  But at this point any end to the war seems better than none.

Some Very Self-Centered Thoughts on the Ukrainian War

 

So, my vow to write about nothing but Ukraine until we see how it shakes out has been a mixed bag.  On the one hand, I haven't written about anything else.  On the other hand, the terror and horror have been so great that I just couldn't face it.

The horror -- bombing of civilian targets, maternity hospitals, children taking refuge, old age homes, everything.  Promising to open humanitarian corridors for people to escape and then firing on the people fleeing. Forcible relocation of refugees to Russia.  Kidnapping of officials. Endless, wanton, senseless death and destruction.

And the terror -- how much worse can it get?  Will Putin use nuclear weapons?  And even if he doesn't, the list of horrible that he could do is both long and appalling.

And at least as bad, what should we dread the most?  Should be dread Russian victories, meaning that the bad guys are winning?  Or should be dread Ukrainian victories, because Putin might do who-knows-what in response?

There is no doubt to my mind what the best possible outcome could be.  The best outcome is a negotiated end to the war that both sides can spin as a win.  But somehow that doesn't seem likely.  The Russians insist on annexation of Ukrainian territory and the Ukrainians absolutely refuse.  Both see this as non-negotiable.

So the next best outcome, I guess, is any negotiated settlement whatever.  And it is undoubtedly true that often in order for belligerents to reach a negotiated settlement of a war, they have to escalate first to strengthen their position.  Which wouldn't seem so bad if escalation simply meant escalating an offensive on the ground against enemy soldiers.  But in Putin's case, it means more relentless bombing of innocent civilians, and quite possibly worse yet.

And yet people somehow manage to carry on with their lives.