 |
| But her e-mails! |
So, granting that it is now beyond dispute that Trump is/was a threat to democracy, how much does that threat resemble actual fascism? Also, I went through this in 2016, so how do I perceive Trump today as compared to then?
 |
| This American Carnage Ends Now |
A psychology of lizard brain machismo. Well, duh!
An ideology of palingenetic populist hypernationalism. Palingenetic means a rebirth. In other words, palingenetic hypernationalism is the belief that one's nation has fallen from its former glory and must be reborn. As captured in slogans such as Make America Great Again. The basic view that America is seen as weak and a world-wide laughingstock and must be restored is central to Trump's world view.
A paramilitary party that has taken over the state (or aspires to take over the state) and claims (or aspires to claim) an effective monopoly of political activity. It has been obvious since 1992 or so that the Republican Party sees itself as entitled to political power, though not to political activity. In other words, what the Republican Party appears to aspire to is not a de jure one party state like a Communist or fascist country, but a de facto one party state, like Mexico in the heyday of the PRI. Other parties were legal, but the system was rigged to ensure they could never win. Trump certainly never made any attempt to suppress other political parties, but he went farther than anyone had before in rigging the system, i.e., by routinely ignoring the Hatch Act and using the federal government as an instrument of his political power.
Back in 2016, I saw no paramilitary aspects at all. And even today the Republican Party, Trump or no Trump, is a far from a paramilitary party. But not as far as it was in 2016, or even 2019. The Capitol Hill insurrection, which was mostly an unorganized mob, but did include organized paramilitaries is only the most recent example. Trump's exhortation to the Proud Boys, "Stand back and stand by" is another such example. Republican glorification of vigilantes like Kyle Rittenhouse is another such example. And there were the alarming forces in unmarked uniforms that Trump sent to break up riots in Portland. On the other hand, so far none of these groups have been breaking up Democratic meetings or intimidating voters or otherwise acting like the true paramilitary arm of a political party. So, no, not a paramilitary party, but taking steps in that direction.
And now the old standbys.
The fascist negations:
Anti-radical: I generally said no in 2016. Today the answer has to be yes. Central to Trump's appeal was denouncing Democrats as dangerous radicals on the verge of creating a Communist tyranny. And Republicans in general and Trump in particular took the very dangerous step of losing the distinction between the center-left and the hard left.
Anti-liberal: Very much so.
Anti-conservative: Again, fulmination against Republican elites and the desire to burn it all down are anti-conservative..
Ideology and goals:
Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state based not merely on traditional principles or models. No, so far as I can tell. Trump did not really seek to extend the power of the state, except over immigrants and protesters. In his last year of power, he was much more geared to opposing expansion of the state's power to fight the pandemic.
A paramilitary party that has taken over the state (or aspires to take over the state) and claims (or aspires to claim) an effective monopoly of political activity. It has been obvious since 1992 or so that the Republican Party sees itself as entitled to political power, though not to political activity. In other words, what the Republican Party appears to aspire to is not a de jure one party state like a Communist or fascist country, but a de facto one party state, like Mexico in the heyday of the PRI. Other parties were legal, but the system was rigged to ensure they could never win. Trump certainly never made any attempt to suppress other political parties, but he went farther than anyone had before in rigging the system, i.e., by routinely ignoring the Hatch Act and using the federal government as an instrument of his political power.
 |
| I alone can fix it |
And now the old standbys.
From Stanley Payne, in Fascism: Comparison and Definition (1980):
The fascist negations:
Anti-radical: I generally said no in 2016. Today the answer has to be yes. Central to Trump's appeal was denouncing Democrats as dangerous radicals on the verge of creating a Communist tyranny. And Republicans in general and Trump in particular took the very dangerous step of losing the distinction between the center-left and the hard left.
Anti-liberal: Very much so.
Anti-conservative: Again, fulmination against Republican elites and the desire to burn it all down are anti-conservative..
Ideology and goals:
Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state based not merely on traditional principles or models. No, so far as I can tell. Trump did not really seek to extend the power of the state, except over immigrants and protesters. In his last year of power, he was much more geared to opposing expansion of the state's power to fight the pandemic.
Organization of some new kind of regulated, multiclass, integrated national economic structure, whether called national corporatist, national socialist, or national syndicalist. Not a trace of it.
The goal of empire or a radical change in the nation’s relationship with other powers. No to empire; yes to a radical change in relationship to other powers. In Trump's case, mostly destroying alliances, or turning allies into tribute-paying vassals. I don't know whether Payne would consider this to be semi-fascist.
Specific espousal of an idealist, voluntarist creed, normally involving the attempt to realize a new form of modern, self-determined, secular culture. I have no idea what this means, nor do I see any real sign of it.
Style and Organization:
Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political choreography, stressing romantic and mystical aspects. All of this is to some degree normal in a competitive democracy. Candidates have their slogans, bumper stickers, T-shirts, logos, etc. I would say Trump took if further than most with MAGA hats, Trump flags, dancing to YMCA (I don't get that one) and so forth. But not as far as true fascists, or as the Tea Party, for that matter, with their 18th century costumes.
Attempted mass mobilization with militarization of political relationships and style and with the goal of a mass party militia. See discussion of a paramilitary party above.
Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use, violence. Back in 2016 I found Trump's fondness for violence disturbing, but mostly defensive. Given his behavior in 2020, to say nothing of inciting an insurrection, this one is now a yes.
Extreme stress on the masculine principle and male dominance, while espousing the organic view of society. Well, duh.
Exaltation of youth above other phases of life, emphasizing the conflict of generations, at least in effecting the initial political transformation. No in 2016. No today, although the Proud Boys and other paramilitary trends show that Trumpism has its youth movement.
Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political choreography, stressing romantic and mystical aspects. All of this is to some degree normal in a competitive democracy. Candidates have their slogans, bumper stickers, T-shirts, logos, etc. I would say Trump took if further than most with MAGA hats, Trump flags, dancing to YMCA (I don't get that one) and so forth. But not as far as true fascists, or as the Tea Party, for that matter, with their 18th century costumes.
Attempted mass mobilization with militarization of political relationships and style and with the goal of a mass party militia. See discussion of a paramilitary party above.
Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use, violence. Back in 2016 I found Trump's fondness for violence disturbing, but mostly defensive. Given his behavior in 2020, to say nothing of inciting an insurrection, this one is now a yes.
Extreme stress on the masculine principle and male dominance, while espousing the organic view of society. Well, duh.
Exaltation of youth above other phases of life, emphasizing the conflict of generations, at least in effecting the initial political transformation. No in 2016. No today, although the Proud Boys and other paramilitary trends show that Trumpism has its youth movement.
Specific tendency toward an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command, whether or not the command is to some degree initially elective. Duh!
So, I would say three out of three for fascist negations, maybe one half out of four for ideology and goals. For style and organization, I would say yes for three out of six and maybe about half for three out of six. Not good!
Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, and the "nine mobilizing passions":
-- a sense of overwhelming crisis beyond the reach of any traditional solutions: In 2016 I was skeptical, seeing Trumpism as driven more by anger than by fear. This time round I would say yes. The degree of fear over COVID restrictions, over Black Lives Matter and over the believe that the Democrats are wild-eyed radicals is really alarming. And it goes to prove that fear really is more dangerous than anger.
-- the primacy of the group, toward which one has duties superior to every right, whether universal or individual, and the subordination of the individual to it: No. The reaction to COVID shows the exact opposite, a radical individualism.
-- the belief that one's group is a victim, a sentiment which justifies any action, without legal or moral limits, against the group's enemies, both internal and external: As in 2016, the sense of victimization yes. And a willingness to go farther than Trumpsters went in 2016. But still probably not this far.
-- dread of the group's decline under the corrosive effect of individualistic liberalism, class conflict, and alien influences: Yes.
So, I would say three out of three for fascist negations, maybe one half out of four for ideology and goals. For style and organization, I would say yes for three out of six and maybe about half for three out of six. Not good!
Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism, and the "nine mobilizing passions":
-- a sense of overwhelming crisis beyond the reach of any traditional solutions: In 2016 I was skeptical, seeing Trumpism as driven more by anger than by fear. This time round I would say yes. The degree of fear over COVID restrictions, over Black Lives Matter and over the believe that the Democrats are wild-eyed radicals is really alarming. And it goes to prove that fear really is more dangerous than anger.
-- the primacy of the group, toward which one has duties superior to every right, whether universal or individual, and the subordination of the individual to it: No. The reaction to COVID shows the exact opposite, a radical individualism.
-- the belief that one's group is a victim, a sentiment which justifies any action, without legal or moral limits, against the group's enemies, both internal and external: As in 2016, the sense of victimization yes. And a willingness to go farther than Trumpsters went in 2016. But still probably not this far.
-- dread of the group's decline under the corrosive effect of individualistic liberalism, class conflict, and alien influences: Yes.
-- the need for closer integration of a purer community, by consent if possible, or by exclusionary violence if necessary: I would say yes.
-- the need for authority by natural leaders (always male), culminating in a national chief who alone is capable of incarnating the group's destiny: Well, duh!
-- the superiority of the leader's instincts over abstract and universal reason: Again, duh!
-- the beauty of violence and the efficacy of will, when they are devoted to the group's success: To judge from the Capitol Hill insurrection, yes.
-- the right of the chosen people to dominate others without restraint from any kind of human or divine law, right being decided by the sole criterion of the group's prowess in a Darwinian struggle: In 2016 and today, I would say, the belief in their right to dominate, yes, but probably not going that far.
So out of the nine mobilizing passions, I would say six are yes and two are at least partly yes. So I would say Trump showed some fascistic traits, especially when facing defeat. But none of the true totalitarianism of the fascist ideology and goals. He is simply too lazy, to unimaginative, and too incompetent ever to make a real fascist.
No comments:
Post a Comment