NOTE: I have edited an earlier version for clarity.
Roger Stone's indictment is somewhat exculpatory to the Trump campaign in that it seems to indicate the campaign had no direct contacts with Wikileaks, but only hung on Roger Stone's every word as to what to expect.
The Paul Manafort allegations of breach of his plea agreement is a different matter. It may be the smoking gun that shows collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russians, although Trump himself is not directly implicated.
It began with an error in redaction by Manafort's lawyers. Although their Response to the attempt to find he had breached the agreement was redacted, it turned out that the underlying text came through when the document was copied and pasted.
Manafort met with Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian political consultant and former employee of the Russian Military Intelligence (the service that hacked and released the Democrat's e-mails). They discussed a "Ukrainian peace plan," generally understood to mean some sort of recognition of Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine and lifting of sanctions on Russia. The Response also reveals that Manafort shared "polling data . . . related to the 2016 presidential campaign" with Kilimnik. Also discussed but less relevant to the Russia investigation were some sort of financial chicanery, some other investigation in Virginia, and allegations that Manafort kept the Trump administration in the loop as to what the prosecutor was doing.
Unclear is whether Trump knew of the data transfer, where the data went, and what it consisted of. That last is important because it could make the entire exchange (relatively) innocent. If the data was public, the Russians could have obtained it elsewhere. If the data was secret, then Manafort was giving away information that the Russians might use to target voters and sway the election. The New York Times ran a story saying that Manafort asked Kilimnik to pass the information on to two Ukrainian oligarchs who owed Manafort money, and who Manafort was attempting to collect from to pay off the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. The Times further states that the meeting took place in the spring of 2016 and that the polling data was mostly public but included some private campaign information. The story also makes clear that it is unknown why Manafort gave Kilimnik the information. Was he knowingly giving information to allow the Russians to target voters, giving what he was asked for without knowing the reason, or merely trying to prove that it was even possible for Trump to win?
The judge then held a hearing to decide whether Manafort breached the plea agreement. The transcript is 142 pages long, frequently redacted, addressed to multiple topics, and often confusing. The part about Manafort's meeting with Kilimnik would be incomprehensible without the earlier failed redactions. There are some references to Ukraine, particularly an election there, but no unredacted mentions of the Ukrainian peace plan. Furthermore, all direct references to polling data on the Trump campaign are redacted. The only mentions of polling data that are left in refer to polling in 2017 in Ukraine related to an upcoming election in 2018.
Nonetheless, despite all that is hidden, what is seen cannot be unseen and it is possible using the hints from Manafort's lawyers' pleading to piece together a general gist of what is being discussed.
There were multiple discussions of the (redacted) Ukrainian "peace plan" (transcript page 63). The first was August 2, 2016, while Manafort was Trump's campaign manager. This would seem to indicate that the New York Times story is wrong about Manafort handing over polling data in the spring of 2016. We get all sorts of juicy details about this meeting. It was set at a time when Manafort was busy as campaign chair and unlikely to have time to going off and meeting foreign political consultants in person (p. 68). It took place in the Grand Havana Room, a private cigar room, and was attended only by Kilimnik, Manafort, and Manafort's campaign deputy, Rick Gates. The parties limited their e-mails to scheduling the time and place of the meeting and said nothing about what was to be discussed. Manafort and Gates took care to leave through separate doors from Kilimnik.
The next such discussion was in December, 2016 after the election. Manafort and Kilimnik discussed the "peace plan" in person in January 2017 while Kilimnik was in Washington, D.C. for the inauguration (implying that the December discussion was not in person) and discussed it an indeterminate number of times in February, 2017, one of them in person. They even continued such discussions through the winter of 2018. Although the place where the in-person meeting in February, 2017 took place is redacted, the cat is out of the bag. The meeting took place in Madrid.
There is also considerable discussion of Manafort's polling work in Ukraine. Kilimnik apparently gave Manafort guidance on how to word this poll (p. 69). Presumably Manafort was working for a pro-Russian candidate in Ukraine and the poll was designed to test how acceptable the "peace plan" would be. Manafort's lawyers defended the poll as testing whether the candidate was viable so that Manafort could decide whether to work for the candidate (pp. 77-78). The prosecutor appeared to believe that Manafort had more substantial contacts with the candidate than he was acknowledging (page 80). There also appears to be an effort to conceal someone's involvement in the poll (name redacted of course), which the prosecutor sees as sinister (p. 81).
As for polling data on the campaign, discussions are so redacted that nothing can be said with confidence, but the earlier slip-up allows for some educated guesses. The handoff is strongly implied to have taken place at the August 2, 2016 meeting. The reason for delivering the data is apparently unclear, except that Manfort saw no "downside" to it, which implies he saw it as advantageous regardless of how the election turned out. Manafort told the grand jury he was giving Kilimnik only public information (p. 82). Manafort definitely sent Gates and e-mail that says "print this," but does say to take it to the meeting (p. 87). Presumably one can see from the e-mail attachment what was to be printed (presumably polling data). However, the unredacted record does not say so directly.
Manafort's lawyers are at some pains to point out that the redacted subject they are discussing (i.e., the polling data) was so detailed as to be largely incomprehensible (pp. 89-90). They also argued that Gates never actually said the polling data was turned over at the August 2, 2016 meeting (p. 91). The prosecutor responds that Kilimnik would understand the confusing material because he worked with Manafort many years. The prosecutor also arguesd that Gates said Manafort led Kilmnik through the confusing stuff at the August 2 meeting (p. 97). My guess is that the point is is that Manafort and Kilmnik had worked with complex polling data on other occasions, including the upcoming Ukrainian election, and that Manafort "walked him through" any confusing parts.
Since the only witnesses were Manafort, Kilimnik and Gates, and since all parties took care not to discuss such a sensitive topic by e-mail or text, the prosecution's case rests heavily on Gates' testimony. Much of the discussion consists of Manfort's lawyers seeking to discredit Gates, who was not present.
So, beneath all the layers of redaction, this looks like the actual smoking gun indicating collusion by a high-ranking member of the campaign. Oh, yes, and the prosecutor said he believed Manfort was holding back on this subject to "augment his chances for a pardon." (Page 84).
Still, there is nothing that expressly ties this to Trump and at least some reason to believe it may have been a rogue operation.
Next: What Did the President Know and When Did He Know It?
No comments:
Post a Comment