So it is time to circle back, once again to Lawfare's seven theories of Trump/Russia, from least to most sinister.
Theory 1: Coincidence: This theory postulates that no element of the Trump-Russia mess is connected with any other. This seemed implausible from the start. Lawfare has since ruled it out in light of all the contacts that were later proven.
Theory 2: Trump attracted Russophiles: This can be difficult to distinguish from Theory 1. It says that Trump's pro-Russia pronouncement led to two things. First, to Russia attempting to rig the election in his favor, and second to a lot of campaign staff with sleazy Russian ties. At last notice (August 2, 2018), Lawfare could not positively rule this one out, but was finding it increasingly unlikely. At the very least, Trump and Russia appeared to have reached out to each other, although there was no evidence they had actually struck a deal. Well, in Paul Manafort we now have a deal struck, although it remains unclear whether Manafort was acting on behalf of the campaign or gone rogue.
Theory 3: The Russian actions were anti-Clinton rather than pro-Trump: Ruled out by subsequent information.
In short, the three least sinister theories have to be taken off the table. What does that leave.
Theory 4: Russia infiltrated the campaign, but Trump didn't know about it: Well, with the Manafort-Kilimnik, we definitely have proof of infiltration now, and at a very high level. We don't have proof that Trump knew.
Theory 5: There was Russian infiltration and Trump knew or should have known: The should have known by now goes without saying. Proof that he actually knew remains missing. But just how far can willful blindness go before it starts to be treated as constructive knowledge?
Theory 6: Kompromot: Trump is unwillingly working for the Russians because they have a hold on him. Not proven, but seems increasingly likely. There is a lot of talk about a peepee tape, but it seems most unlikely that a peepee tape alone would be enough to compel this degree of submission. Another possibility often mentioned is financial -- Trump has been laundering money for the Russians and they could expose his criminal activities. This has the disadvantage from the Russian perspective, that if they expose Trump, they expose themselves. Less dangerous for the Russians is simply the possibility that Trump as borrowed so much money from them that if they ever call in loans they could crush his empire like an empty eggshell. It would mean giving up an important source of money laundering, though. Sexual kompromot has the advantage from the Russian perspective of carrying no risk at all for Russia. Furthermore, any kompromot involving Trump's business dealings might be unearthed by Congressional investigators. Sex tapes will be a whole lot harder to find. But it would have to be something a whole lot more serious than just a peepee party.
Theory 7: Trump is a Russian Agent: Lawfare dismissed this a crazy talk, even though it is consistent with all known facts. And now we know that the FBI has taken this possibility seriously.
Monday, February 25, 2019
What Did the President Know and When Did He Know It?
So, we now know that Paul Manafort, while acting as chairman of Trump's campaign, secretly met with Konstantin Kilimnik, an old associate in the lobbying business who was also an ex-employee of Russian Military Intelligence, which was then attempting to rig the election in Trump's favor. We know that at that meeting Manafort gave Kilimnik detailed polling data (possibly 75 pages of it). We know that Manafort and Kilimnik were old pros at polling and later worked together to prepare polls for a Ukrainian election. And we know that Manafort walked Kilimnik through the more obscure parts. They also discussed a pro-Russian "peace plan" for its ongoing conflict with Ukraine.
There is a lot we don't know. We don't know on the Russian side who Kilimnik was working for. Was he working for old contacts with Russian Military Intelligence or for pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs who were business associates of Manafort and owed him money? Nor do we know what the Russians did with the polling data once they got it. I have no idea whether we can examine Russian micro-targeting to see whether it appears to have been influenced by the polling data provided. If so, that is highly significant. If not, then I think we will have to write off the entire Russian side of the story as an unknowable mystery.
What we can hope to know (and what the Mueller investigation is presumably seeking to find out) is what Manafort's motives were and whether Trump was aware of his actions.
I see three possibilities.
Possibility 1: Manafort was acting on Trump's direct orders. If true, that is our smoking gun. That is collision. The Trump campaign give 75 pages of polling data to the Russians to coordinate their messaging in exchange for a promise to lift sanctions and give a favorable peace in Ukraine.
Possibility 2: Manafort was a rogue actor. This one cannot be ruled out. Manafort had major debts to Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and was attempting to collect from Ukrainian oligarchs who owed money to him. The New York Times appears to indicate that Manafort asked Kilimnik to pass the information on to two Ukrainian oligarchs in a presumed attempt to collect a debt. Manafort and Kilimnik were long-term associates in sleazy lobbying on behalf of Ukraine's pro-Russian party. Manafort was certainly unethical enough to do such a thing. In that case, his secrecy may have been intended to conceal the meeting, not just from the US intelligence committee, but also from the Trump campaign. The prosecutor made comments about this being "win-win" and "no downside" for Manafort, suggesting that he expected to benefit whether Trump won or lost.
If this is so, the degree of disloyalty is mind-boggling. To wrap one's head around just how disloyal he was, try to draw and analogy to any normal campaign. Suppose some normal campaign hired a campaign manager who had a lavish lifestyle, was up to his neck in debt, and desperately trying to collect from various people who owed him just to keep his head above water. That alone would show poor judgment. If such a man were to offer his services for free, he might as well come out and say, "I have a corrupt motive here." To hire him would be sheer madness. But suppose he then went rogue and stole campaign polling data to sell to a data broker that sells such information to marketing agencies to allow them to narrowcast their advertising. Or even suppose he did not get paid directly, but asked the data broker to turn it over to people owing the campaign manager money in order to get them to pay.
Quite simply, data theft is theft. Not only could the campaign manager go to jail for his actions, but the candidate would be well-nigh apoplectic with rage over such an unthinkable act of disloyalty and the first to demand a maximum sentence. If the candidate had such an itchy twitter finger as Trump, one can imagine some, well, colorful comments. The absence of such outrage would seem mighty suspicious. And if, in fact, the candidate did not make any expression of outrage, and if the stolen data seemed to turn up in various pro-candidate political action committees and other independent organizations, that would set off major alarm bells. (Campaign laws do not allow candidates to coordinate directly with pro-candidate PAC's and other organizations). It would raise suspicion that there was some complicity there. And if such complicity were proven -- well, I don't know if it would be impeachable, but it would be very, very serious.
Now just throw in a hostile foreign power. And a President who values personal loyalty above all else. And yet the silence is deafening. If would defer to this article:
So what was Trump signalling to his campaign? Well, he consistently denied that Russia was responsible for the hacks, in the face of all evidence to the contrary. He regularly quoted Russia Today and Sputnik as sources of information. He hired sleazy characters with sinister Russian ties, like Paul Manafort, Carter Page and Michael Flynn. He deflected all questions about his ethics with references to Hilary's e-mails. He openly called on Russia to release his opponent's e-mails. In short, he was signaling loud and clear, presumably surrounded by people who knew how to pick up on those signals.
Any my guess is that this third possibility is the most likely.
There is a lot we don't know. We don't know on the Russian side who Kilimnik was working for. Was he working for old contacts with Russian Military Intelligence or for pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs who were business associates of Manafort and owed him money? Nor do we know what the Russians did with the polling data once they got it. I have no idea whether we can examine Russian micro-targeting to see whether it appears to have been influenced by the polling data provided. If so, that is highly significant. If not, then I think we will have to write off the entire Russian side of the story as an unknowable mystery.
What we can hope to know (and what the Mueller investigation is presumably seeking to find out) is what Manafort's motives were and whether Trump was aware of his actions.
I see three possibilities.
Possibility 1: Manafort was acting on Trump's direct orders. If true, that is our smoking gun. That is collision. The Trump campaign give 75 pages of polling data to the Russians to coordinate their messaging in exchange for a promise to lift sanctions and give a favorable peace in Ukraine.
Possibility 2: Manafort was a rogue actor. This one cannot be ruled out. Manafort had major debts to Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and was attempting to collect from Ukrainian oligarchs who owed money to him. The New York Times appears to indicate that Manafort asked Kilimnik to pass the information on to two Ukrainian oligarchs in a presumed attempt to collect a debt. Manafort and Kilimnik were long-term associates in sleazy lobbying on behalf of Ukraine's pro-Russian party. Manafort was certainly unethical enough to do such a thing. In that case, his secrecy may have been intended to conceal the meeting, not just from the US intelligence committee, but also from the Trump campaign. The prosecutor made comments about this being "win-win" and "no downside" for Manafort, suggesting that he expected to benefit whether Trump won or lost.
If this is so, the degree of disloyalty is mind-boggling. To wrap one's head around just how disloyal he was, try to draw and analogy to any normal campaign. Suppose some normal campaign hired a campaign manager who had a lavish lifestyle, was up to his neck in debt, and desperately trying to collect from various people who owed him just to keep his head above water. That alone would show poor judgment. If such a man were to offer his services for free, he might as well come out and say, "I have a corrupt motive here." To hire him would be sheer madness. But suppose he then went rogue and stole campaign polling data to sell to a data broker that sells such information to marketing agencies to allow them to narrowcast their advertising. Or even suppose he did not get paid directly, but asked the data broker to turn it over to people owing the campaign manager money in order to get them to pay.
Quite simply, data theft is theft. Not only could the campaign manager go to jail for his actions, but the candidate would be well-nigh apoplectic with rage over such an unthinkable act of disloyalty and the first to demand a maximum sentence. If the candidate had such an itchy twitter finger as Trump, one can imagine some, well, colorful comments. The absence of such outrage would seem mighty suspicious. And if, in fact, the candidate did not make any expression of outrage, and if the stolen data seemed to turn up in various pro-candidate political action committees and other independent organizations, that would set off major alarm bells. (Campaign laws do not allow candidates to coordinate directly with pro-candidate PAC's and other organizations). It would raise suspicion that there was some complicity there. And if such complicity were proven -- well, I don't know if it would be impeachable, but it would be very, very serious.
Now just throw in a hostile foreign power. And a President who values personal loyalty above all else. And yet the silence is deafening. If would defer to this article:
It seems there’s a conspiracy there one way another. Either Manafort effectively stole Trump’s campaign data and traded it to foreigners for monetary gain. And/or Manafort handed over that data expecting that the campaign would get a thing of value from the foreigners he was sharing it with. . . . [G]iven the public facts in this case, Republicans should be outraged that Trump’s campaign manager was so disloyal he shared highly sensitive data with potentially malign actors. Republicans should be outraged that Trump’s campaign manager was putting his own financial imperatives ahead of sound campaign practice.
But they’re not. For some reason, Republicans are not squawking about the explanation for this data hand-off that would suggest the campaign didn’t expect to benefit.Possibility 3: Nudge, nudge, wink wink. Plenty of people have said that it is inconceivable that Paul Manafort, Roger Stone and others would not have discussed their sinister activities with Trump. I disagree. It is entirely possible that he ran his operation on a need-to-know basis. His subordinates may have understood that if illegal activities were called for, the boss wanted to be left out of the loop on the operational details so as to preserve plausible deniability. The boss may very well have known how to signal what he wanted while taking care not to say anything indictable. He had practice with that sort of thing.
So what was Trump signalling to his campaign? Well, he consistently denied that Russia was responsible for the hacks, in the face of all evidence to the contrary. He regularly quoted Russia Today and Sputnik as sources of information. He hired sleazy characters with sinister Russian ties, like Paul Manafort, Carter Page and Michael Flynn. He deflected all questions about his ethics with references to Hilary's e-mails. He openly called on Russia to release his opponent's e-mails. In short, he was signaling loud and clear, presumably surrounded by people who knew how to pick up on those signals.
Any my guess is that this third possibility is the most likely.
A Quick Note
A quick note to anyone reading over the conspiring between Manafort and Kilimnik to promote a Ukrainian "peace plan" and saying that the whole scandal is a "criminalization of policy differences."
Nonsense. It is not a crime to favor a pro-Russian settlement of the war or a lifting of the sanctions. The crime is in secret Russian assistance in doing so. This simple table should make the distinction clear:
That is all.
Nonsense. It is not a crime to favor a pro-Russian settlement of the war or a lifting of the sanctions. The crime is in secret Russian assistance in doing so. This simple table should make the distinction clear:
|
|
For a US government employee,
elected official, or candidate
|
For a private citizen
|
|
Legal
|
To advocate for a pro-Russian peace plan in Ukraine and lifting of
sanctions. (Or any other foreign
policy, however ill-advised)
|
To advocate for a pro-Russian peace plan in Ukraine and lifting of
sanctions. (Or any other foreign
policy, however ill-advised)
|
|
Illegal
|
To do so in exchange for a personal or electoral benefit from a
foreign power
|
To do so in exchange for a personal benefit from a foreign power
without registering as an agent of that power and making a full disclosure of
all payments and lobbying activities
|
That is all.
Sunday, February 24, 2019
Attempting to Decode the Manafort Hearing (Edited)
NOTE: I have edited an earlier version for clarity.
Roger Stone's indictment is somewhat exculpatory to the Trump campaign in that it seems to indicate the campaign had no direct contacts with Wikileaks, but only hung on Roger Stone's every word as to what to expect.
The Paul Manafort allegations of breach of his plea agreement is a different matter. It may be the smoking gun that shows collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russians, although Trump himself is not directly implicated.
It began with an error in redaction by Manafort's lawyers. Although their Response to the attempt to find he had breached the agreement was redacted, it turned out that the underlying text came through when the document was copied and pasted.
Manafort met with Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian political consultant and former employee of the Russian Military Intelligence (the service that hacked and released the Democrat's e-mails). They discussed a "Ukrainian peace plan," generally understood to mean some sort of recognition of Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine and lifting of sanctions on Russia. The Response also reveals that Manafort shared "polling data . . . related to the 2016 presidential campaign" with Kilimnik. Also discussed but less relevant to the Russia investigation were some sort of financial chicanery, some other investigation in Virginia, and allegations that Manafort kept the Trump administration in the loop as to what the prosecutor was doing.
Unclear is whether Trump knew of the data transfer, where the data went, and what it consisted of. That last is important because it could make the entire exchange (relatively) innocent. If the data was public, the Russians could have obtained it elsewhere. If the data was secret, then Manafort was giving away information that the Russians might use to target voters and sway the election. The New York Times ran a story saying that Manafort asked Kilimnik to pass the information on to two Ukrainian oligarchs who owed Manafort money, and who Manafort was attempting to collect from to pay off the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. The Times further states that the meeting took place in the spring of 2016 and that the polling data was mostly public but included some private campaign information. The story also makes clear that it is unknown why Manafort gave Kilimnik the information. Was he knowingly giving information to allow the Russians to target voters, giving what he was asked for without knowing the reason, or merely trying to prove that it was even possible for Trump to win?
The judge then held a hearing to decide whether Manafort breached the plea agreement. The transcript is 142 pages long, frequently redacted, addressed to multiple topics, and often confusing. The part about Manafort's meeting with Kilimnik would be incomprehensible without the earlier failed redactions. There are some references to Ukraine, particularly an election there, but no unredacted mentions of the Ukrainian peace plan. Furthermore, all direct references to polling data on the Trump campaign are redacted. The only mentions of polling data that are left in refer to polling in 2017 in Ukraine related to an upcoming election in 2018.
Nonetheless, despite all that is hidden, what is seen cannot be unseen and it is possible using the hints from Manafort's lawyers' pleading to piece together a general gist of what is being discussed.
There were multiple discussions of the (redacted) Ukrainian "peace plan" (transcript page 63). The first was August 2, 2016, while Manafort was Trump's campaign manager. This would seem to indicate that the New York Times story is wrong about Manafort handing over polling data in the spring of 2016. We get all sorts of juicy details about this meeting. It was set at a time when Manafort was busy as campaign chair and unlikely to have time to going off and meeting foreign political consultants in person (p. 68). It took place in the Grand Havana Room, a private cigar room, and was attended only by Kilimnik, Manafort, and Manafort's campaign deputy, Rick Gates. The parties limited their e-mails to scheduling the time and place of the meeting and said nothing about what was to be discussed. Manafort and Gates took care to leave through separate doors from Kilimnik.
The next such discussion was in December, 2016 after the election. Manafort and Kilimnik discussed the "peace plan" in person in January 2017 while Kilimnik was in Washington, D.C. for the inauguration (implying that the December discussion was not in person) and discussed it an indeterminate number of times in February, 2017, one of them in person. They even continued such discussions through the winter of 2018. Although the place where the in-person meeting in February, 2017 took place is redacted, the cat is out of the bag. The meeting took place in Madrid.
There is also considerable discussion of Manafort's polling work in Ukraine. Kilimnik apparently gave Manafort guidance on how to word this poll (p. 69). Presumably Manafort was working for a pro-Russian candidate in Ukraine and the poll was designed to test how acceptable the "peace plan" would be. Manafort's lawyers defended the poll as testing whether the candidate was viable so that Manafort could decide whether to work for the candidate (pp. 77-78). The prosecutor appeared to believe that Manafort had more substantial contacts with the candidate than he was acknowledging (page 80). There also appears to be an effort to conceal someone's involvement in the poll (name redacted of course), which the prosecutor sees as sinister (p. 81).
As for polling data on the campaign, discussions are so redacted that nothing can be said with confidence, but the earlier slip-up allows for some educated guesses. The handoff is strongly implied to have taken place at the August 2, 2016 meeting. The reason for delivering the data is apparently unclear, except that Manfort saw no "downside" to it, which implies he saw it as advantageous regardless of how the election turned out. Manafort told the grand jury he was giving Kilimnik only public information (p. 82). Manafort definitely sent Gates and e-mail that says "print this," but does say to take it to the meeting (p. 87). Presumably one can see from the e-mail attachment what was to be printed (presumably polling data). However, the unredacted record does not say so directly.
Manafort's lawyers are at some pains to point out that the redacted subject they are discussing (i.e., the polling data) was so detailed as to be largely incomprehensible (pp. 89-90). They also argued that Gates never actually said the polling data was turned over at the August 2, 2016 meeting (p. 91). The prosecutor responds that Kilimnik would understand the confusing material because he worked with Manafort many years. The prosecutor also arguesd that Gates said Manafort led Kilmnik through the confusing stuff at the August 2 meeting (p. 97). My guess is that the point is is that Manafort and Kilmnik had worked with complex polling data on other occasions, including the upcoming Ukrainian election, and that Manafort "walked him through" any confusing parts.
Since the only witnesses were Manafort, Kilimnik and Gates, and since all parties took care not to discuss such a sensitive topic by e-mail or text, the prosecution's case rests heavily on Gates' testimony. Much of the discussion consists of Manfort's lawyers seeking to discredit Gates, who was not present.
So, beneath all the layers of redaction, this looks like the actual smoking gun indicating collusion by a high-ranking member of the campaign. Oh, yes, and the prosecutor said he believed Manfort was holding back on this subject to "augment his chances for a pardon." (Page 84).
Still, there is nothing that expressly ties this to Trump and at least some reason to believe it may have been a rogue operation.
Next: What Did the President Know and When Did He Know It?
Roger Stone's indictment is somewhat exculpatory to the Trump campaign in that it seems to indicate the campaign had no direct contacts with Wikileaks, but only hung on Roger Stone's every word as to what to expect.
The Paul Manafort allegations of breach of his plea agreement is a different matter. It may be the smoking gun that shows collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russians, although Trump himself is not directly implicated.
It began with an error in redaction by Manafort's lawyers. Although their Response to the attempt to find he had breached the agreement was redacted, it turned out that the underlying text came through when the document was copied and pasted.
Manafort met with Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian political consultant and former employee of the Russian Military Intelligence (the service that hacked and released the Democrat's e-mails). They discussed a "Ukrainian peace plan," generally understood to mean some sort of recognition of Russian annexation of parts of Ukraine and lifting of sanctions on Russia. The Response also reveals that Manafort shared "polling data . . . related to the 2016 presidential campaign" with Kilimnik. Also discussed but less relevant to the Russia investigation were some sort of financial chicanery, some other investigation in Virginia, and allegations that Manafort kept the Trump administration in the loop as to what the prosecutor was doing.
Unclear is whether Trump knew of the data transfer, where the data went, and what it consisted of. That last is important because it could make the entire exchange (relatively) innocent. If the data was public, the Russians could have obtained it elsewhere. If the data was secret, then Manafort was giving away information that the Russians might use to target voters and sway the election. The New York Times ran a story saying that Manafort asked Kilimnik to pass the information on to two Ukrainian oligarchs who owed Manafort money, and who Manafort was attempting to collect from to pay off the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska. The Times further states that the meeting took place in the spring of 2016 and that the polling data was mostly public but included some private campaign information. The story also makes clear that it is unknown why Manafort gave Kilimnik the information. Was he knowingly giving information to allow the Russians to target voters, giving what he was asked for without knowing the reason, or merely trying to prove that it was even possible for Trump to win?
The judge then held a hearing to decide whether Manafort breached the plea agreement. The transcript is 142 pages long, frequently redacted, addressed to multiple topics, and often confusing. The part about Manafort's meeting with Kilimnik would be incomprehensible without the earlier failed redactions. There are some references to Ukraine, particularly an election there, but no unredacted mentions of the Ukrainian peace plan. Furthermore, all direct references to polling data on the Trump campaign are redacted. The only mentions of polling data that are left in refer to polling in 2017 in Ukraine related to an upcoming election in 2018.
Nonetheless, despite all that is hidden, what is seen cannot be unseen and it is possible using the hints from Manafort's lawyers' pleading to piece together a general gist of what is being discussed.
There were multiple discussions of the (redacted) Ukrainian "peace plan" (transcript page 63). The first was August 2, 2016, while Manafort was Trump's campaign manager. This would seem to indicate that the New York Times story is wrong about Manafort handing over polling data in the spring of 2016. We get all sorts of juicy details about this meeting. It was set at a time when Manafort was busy as campaign chair and unlikely to have time to going off and meeting foreign political consultants in person (p. 68). It took place in the Grand Havana Room, a private cigar room, and was attended only by Kilimnik, Manafort, and Manafort's campaign deputy, Rick Gates. The parties limited their e-mails to scheduling the time and place of the meeting and said nothing about what was to be discussed. Manafort and Gates took care to leave through separate doors from Kilimnik.
The next such discussion was in December, 2016 after the election. Manafort and Kilimnik discussed the "peace plan" in person in January 2017 while Kilimnik was in Washington, D.C. for the inauguration (implying that the December discussion was not in person) and discussed it an indeterminate number of times in February, 2017, one of them in person. They even continued such discussions through the winter of 2018. Although the place where the in-person meeting in February, 2017 took place is redacted, the cat is out of the bag. The meeting took place in Madrid.
There is also considerable discussion of Manafort's polling work in Ukraine. Kilimnik apparently gave Manafort guidance on how to word this poll (p. 69). Presumably Manafort was working for a pro-Russian candidate in Ukraine and the poll was designed to test how acceptable the "peace plan" would be. Manafort's lawyers defended the poll as testing whether the candidate was viable so that Manafort could decide whether to work for the candidate (pp. 77-78). The prosecutor appeared to believe that Manafort had more substantial contacts with the candidate than he was acknowledging (page 80). There also appears to be an effort to conceal someone's involvement in the poll (name redacted of course), which the prosecutor sees as sinister (p. 81).
As for polling data on the campaign, discussions are so redacted that nothing can be said with confidence, but the earlier slip-up allows for some educated guesses. The handoff is strongly implied to have taken place at the August 2, 2016 meeting. The reason for delivering the data is apparently unclear, except that Manfort saw no "downside" to it, which implies he saw it as advantageous regardless of how the election turned out. Manafort told the grand jury he was giving Kilimnik only public information (p. 82). Manafort definitely sent Gates and e-mail that says "print this," but does say to take it to the meeting (p. 87). Presumably one can see from the e-mail attachment what was to be printed (presumably polling data). However, the unredacted record does not say so directly.
Manafort's lawyers are at some pains to point out that the redacted subject they are discussing (i.e., the polling data) was so detailed as to be largely incomprehensible (pp. 89-90). They also argued that Gates never actually said the polling data was turned over at the August 2, 2016 meeting (p. 91). The prosecutor responds that Kilimnik would understand the confusing material because he worked with Manafort many years. The prosecutor also arguesd that Gates said Manafort led Kilmnik through the confusing stuff at the August 2 meeting (p. 97). My guess is that the point is is that Manafort and Kilmnik had worked with complex polling data on other occasions, including the upcoming Ukrainian election, and that Manafort "walked him through" any confusing parts.
Since the only witnesses were Manafort, Kilimnik and Gates, and since all parties took care not to discuss such a sensitive topic by e-mail or text, the prosecution's case rests heavily on Gates' testimony. Much of the discussion consists of Manfort's lawyers seeking to discredit Gates, who was not present.
So, beneath all the layers of redaction, this looks like the actual smoking gun indicating collusion by a high-ranking member of the campaign. Oh, yes, and the prosecutor said he believed Manfort was holding back on this subject to "augment his chances for a pardon." (Page 84).
Still, there is nothing that expressly ties this to Trump and at least some reason to believe it may have been a rogue operation.
Next: What Did the President Know and When Did He Know It?
Meanwhile, on the Russia Front
Wow! In the time I stopped posting a lot has happened with Trump and Russia.
We have learned that Donald Trump was planning to build a Trump Tower in Moscow and possibly bribe Vladimir Putin with a penthouse to make it go through. We have learned that plans were cancelled only when the news came out that the Russians had hacked the Democratic National Committee (DNC).
We have learned that the FBI opened a counter-intelligence investigation into Trump after he invited the Russians into the Oval Office, told them he fired James Comey as FBI Director to stop the Russia investigation, and revealed super-top-classified information to them.
Rudy Giuliani, as Trump's lawyer, first said that negotiations on the Trump Tower in Moscow might have continued as late as the 2016 election and then walked it back. He also said that when he denied any Moscow contact during the election, he only meant the top four or five people in the campaign, not minor functionaries like the campaign manager.*
And then there were the Roger Stone and Paul Manafort revelations.
I will save Manafort for later.
As for Roger Stone, there were no big surprises, since his friend Jerome Corsi had already leaked his plea agreement. Stone was indicted for that old standby, perjury, which is what prosecutors use when more serious offenses are too hard to prove. All perjury is technically a crime, but whether it is actually prosecuted usually depends on the seriousness of the underlying conduct that the defendant lied about.
In Roger Stone's case, it is not clear that there was any underlying crime at all. It is clear from the indictment that Stone was regularly in contact with Wikileaks and getting advance scoops (not all of them accurate) on what was about to be dropped. But talking to Wikileaks is not a crime. Possibly it might be for actual members of the campaign -- it might constitute accepting foreign campaign contributions or illegal coordination with an independent entity or some technical violation of campaign law. But to judge from the indictment, the campaign took care not to have any direct contacts with Wikileaks, and instead hung on Roger Stone's word as to what was going on.
Roger Stone was not a member of the campaign, although he was in contact with many members. So far as I know, it is not a crime for a private citizen not affiliated with a campaign to be in contact with Wikileaks. Certainly Roger Stone did not think it was a crime, because he ran around very publicly boasting about his inside line with Wikileaks and advance knowledge of what was about to drop.
But communications with Wikileaks, although not a crime, are apparently not all that easy to do. At least, Stone's communications appear not to have been with Julian Assange of Wikileaks directly, but rather Stone contacted a friend in the US who contacted a friend in London who communicated with Assange. There is some uncertainty as to who the London contact was, but Stone's American go-betweens were Randy Credico, a left-wing radio personality who supported Bernie Sanders, and Jerome Corsi, a right-wing writer and conspiracy theorist.
Stone's earlier contacts with Wikileaks were with Corsi (referred to in the indictment as "Person 1" because he was the earlier contact). The indictment mentions three e-mails between Stone and Corsi about contacting Wikileaks, from July 25, 2016 to August 2, 2016. Corsi informed Stone that Wikileaks was going to expose Hilary Clinton as "in bed w enemy" and reveal evidence that she had had a stroke or was otherwise in failing health. Stone must have passed this on because over the next few days rumors of Hilary's failing health ran rampant in the right wing media. In fact, Hilary really did have pneumonia and collapsed at a 9-11 memorial, so Wikileaks may have been on to something. But she had not had a stroke, and Wikileaks never did release what Corsi promised.
Perhaps disappointed in the failure, or perhaps inspired because Credico actually had Assange on his radio show, Stone switched his intermediary to Credico. The indictment identifies four texts from Credico to Stone on the subject and multiple e-mails and texts in September and October between Stone and Credico. These included Stone's request for Hilary's State Department e-mails for August, 2011 (something never produced that Wikileaks almost certainly did not have) and talk of an October surprise that would sink the Clinton campaign. When the dump was delayed, Credico attributed the delay to pressure from the Clinton campaign. The release ultimately turned out to be Clinton campaign chair John Podesta's e-mails, released October 7, 2016. Although Corsi was earlier, Credico really does appear to have been the more important go-between.
When Credico did testify, Stone called him a "rat," a "stoolie," told him "Prepare to die," and threatened his dog. Stone's defense has been that this was mere bluster not meant to be taken as a serious threat of homicide, but any time you threaten someone's little dog too, it tends to be taken seriously.
So Stone has been charged with one count of obstruction, one count of witness tampering, and five counts of perjury. The serious question has to be why. If there was no underlying crime, why engage in perjury and witness tampering to cover it up. And even granting that some of the written communications, especially the specific requests for obviously stolen information, were embarrassing, why was Stone willing to give up Credico, but not Corsi?
________________________________________
*Giuliani's behavior has been bizarre, but Kevin Drum, who usually dismisses the idea of Nth dimensional chess, has what I believe is the correct explanation:
We have learned that Donald Trump was planning to build a Trump Tower in Moscow and possibly bribe Vladimir Putin with a penthouse to make it go through. We have learned that plans were cancelled only when the news came out that the Russians had hacked the Democratic National Committee (DNC).
We have learned that the FBI opened a counter-intelligence investigation into Trump after he invited the Russians into the Oval Office, told them he fired James Comey as FBI Director to stop the Russia investigation, and revealed super-top-classified information to them.
Rudy Giuliani, as Trump's lawyer, first said that negotiations on the Trump Tower in Moscow might have continued as late as the 2016 election and then walked it back. He also said that when he denied any Moscow contact during the election, he only meant the top four or five people in the campaign, not minor functionaries like the campaign manager.*
And then there were the Roger Stone and Paul Manafort revelations.
I will save Manafort for later.
As for Roger Stone, there were no big surprises, since his friend Jerome Corsi had already leaked his plea agreement. Stone was indicted for that old standby, perjury, which is what prosecutors use when more serious offenses are too hard to prove. All perjury is technically a crime, but whether it is actually prosecuted usually depends on the seriousness of the underlying conduct that the defendant lied about.
In Roger Stone's case, it is not clear that there was any underlying crime at all. It is clear from the indictment that Stone was regularly in contact with Wikileaks and getting advance scoops (not all of them accurate) on what was about to be dropped. But talking to Wikileaks is not a crime. Possibly it might be for actual members of the campaign -- it might constitute accepting foreign campaign contributions or illegal coordination with an independent entity or some technical violation of campaign law. But to judge from the indictment, the campaign took care not to have any direct contacts with Wikileaks, and instead hung on Roger Stone's word as to what was going on.
Roger Stone was not a member of the campaign, although he was in contact with many members. So far as I know, it is not a crime for a private citizen not affiliated with a campaign to be in contact with Wikileaks. Certainly Roger Stone did not think it was a crime, because he ran around very publicly boasting about his inside line with Wikileaks and advance knowledge of what was about to drop.
But communications with Wikileaks, although not a crime, are apparently not all that easy to do. At least, Stone's communications appear not to have been with Julian Assange of Wikileaks directly, but rather Stone contacted a friend in the US who contacted a friend in London who communicated with Assange. There is some uncertainty as to who the London contact was, but Stone's American go-betweens were Randy Credico, a left-wing radio personality who supported Bernie Sanders, and Jerome Corsi, a right-wing writer and conspiracy theorist.
Stone's earlier contacts with Wikileaks were with Corsi (referred to in the indictment as "Person 1" because he was the earlier contact). The indictment mentions three e-mails between Stone and Corsi about contacting Wikileaks, from July 25, 2016 to August 2, 2016. Corsi informed Stone that Wikileaks was going to expose Hilary Clinton as "in bed w enemy" and reveal evidence that she had had a stroke or was otherwise in failing health. Stone must have passed this on because over the next few days rumors of Hilary's failing health ran rampant in the right wing media. In fact, Hilary really did have pneumonia and collapsed at a 9-11 memorial, so Wikileaks may have been on to something. But she had not had a stroke, and Wikileaks never did release what Corsi promised.
During Congressional investigations, Stone identified Credico as his go-between, but denied having any others and denied any written communications. OK, so that is an absolute, open-and-shut case of perjury, since the Mueller investigation has those written communications, with both Corsi and Credico. Stone also denied asking for specific documents, when Mueller had e-mails doing just that. He also falsely denied passing information on to the Trump campaign. Finally, and far more seriously than mere perjury, Stone pressured Credico to go along with his story. He urged Credico to imitate "Frank Pentangeli," a character in Godfather II who lied to a Senate investigating committee and thereby spared his godfather a charge of (you guessed it) perjury. He also ended up being ordered to commit suicide for going in front of the committee at all, a thought that Credico presumably did not find encouraging.
When Credico did testify, Stone called him a "rat," a "stoolie," told him "Prepare to die," and threatened his dog. Stone's defense has been that this was mere bluster not meant to be taken as a serious threat of homicide, but any time you threaten someone's little dog too, it tends to be taken seriously.
So Stone has been charged with one count of obstruction, one count of witness tampering, and five counts of perjury. The serious question has to be why. If there was no underlying crime, why engage in perjury and witness tampering to cover it up. And even granting that some of the written communications, especially the specific requests for obviously stolen information, were embarrassing, why was Stone willing to give up Credico, but not Corsi?
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*Giuliani's behavior has been bizarre, but Kevin Drum, who usually dismisses the idea of Nth dimensional chess, has what I believe is the correct explanation:
[I]t’s obvious what Giuliani has been doing ever since he started representing Trump last year: tossing out chaff so vigorously that nobody can tell from day to day what the current story is supposed to be. The point of this—and this is the important part—is not just to confuse everyone. It’s to make Giuliani the bearer of bad news so that eventually, when Trump is forced to admit something damaging, it’s “old news” that he’s been “saying all along.” The complete explanation for Giuliani looks something like this:
Giuliani is chosen as Trump’s “lawyer” because TV networks love him and will always give him airtime.
In times of crisis, Giuliani starts tossing out story after story, creating confusion and making Giuliani, not Trump, the center of attention.
All of these stories are deniable by the White House since they come from someone whose actual position is kind of vague. Eventually, though, one of them sticks.
Later—which could be days or weeks depending on how long Trump lies low—Trump publicly acknowledges the final story and says it’s already been litigated to death and is old news.
By then, (a) everyone really is confused, (b) they don’t remember all the details from a few weeks ago, and (c) there’s some new scandal that’s seized everyone’s attention. So Trump’s confession slides under the radar.
This isn’t a foolproof hack of the media, but it’s pretty good.
Another Disturbing Trend
I favor violating the rights of right-wingers, as a general principle.
I favor violating the rights of right-winger because nothing else will make right wingers sit up and pay attention to the danger of the government's daddy functions. And when right wingers become concerned about government in its daddy functions, they manage to get things done.
When Bill Clinton was President, Timothy McVeigh blew up the Oklahoma City Federal Building killing 168 people. His actions drew attention to the militia or Patriot movement -- private armies stockpiling arsenals and training in the woods to offer armed resistance to the federal government. The argument had been going around for some time that the Second Amendment allows any law-abiding citizen who feels wronged by government to offer armed resistance, and some people were taking that right seriously. One killed 168 people. Clinton asked Congress for an expansion in his powers to deal with armed militias.
This led to a great cry of alarm among conservatives that honest citizens might be persecuted just for training private armies to engage in violent revolution when a Democrat was in the White House. They resisted the proposal. The ACLU and other left-wing civil libertarians also came out against the proposals, not because they supported the right of armed resistance to a Democratic President, but because they believed that people who did so still deserved to have their civil rights respected. The alliance was powerful and the measures were defeated.
Under the Bush II Presidency, Mideastern terrorists flew planes into the World Trade Center. Bush asked Congress for increased powers to spy on Muslims. There was some resistance from the ACLU and company, but the right wing all lined up behind Bush and impugned the patriotism of anyone who questioned his actions. The measure passed.
Under the Obama Presidency, even the suggestion that there might be right-wing terrorists led to a great outcry and any further action ended before it started.
I am not a big fan of anti-government militias or right-wing terrorists, but I do believe that their civil rights should be respected. And when conservatives rushed to champion militias and white supremacists, they were at least defending the civil rights of regular guys on the street.
This time is different, though. It doesn't surprise me that with Donald Trump as President the NRA no longer I thinks that armed resistance to the federal government is patriotic and scarcely even seems sure that criticism is allowed anymore.
No, what I find disturbing is the reaction to finding out that members of the Trump campaign (or administration) were targets of investigation for ties to Russia. Revelations that Carter Page was wiretapped, or that Trump was investigated as counter-intelligence threat, or that Paul Manafort had his bail revoked for witness tampering, or that lower level officials are "flipping" on higher level ones.
This has led to an outcry, a denunciation of these violations of Team Trump's rights. But not to any sort of general civil libertarian uproar, any overall cry that could protect the rights of regular guys on the street. No, it has been a fairly open pronouncement that running for President, let along being elected, exempts the candidate, or the office-holder and anyone he chooses to protect from any sort of legal scrutiny, no matter what he does.
So long, of course, as the candidate in question is a Republican.
I favor violating the rights of right-winger because nothing else will make right wingers sit up and pay attention to the danger of the government's daddy functions. And when right wingers become concerned about government in its daddy functions, they manage to get things done.
When Bill Clinton was President, Timothy McVeigh blew up the Oklahoma City Federal Building killing 168 people. His actions drew attention to the militia or Patriot movement -- private armies stockpiling arsenals and training in the woods to offer armed resistance to the federal government. The argument had been going around for some time that the Second Amendment allows any law-abiding citizen who feels wronged by government to offer armed resistance, and some people were taking that right seriously. One killed 168 people. Clinton asked Congress for an expansion in his powers to deal with armed militias.
This led to a great cry of alarm among conservatives that honest citizens might be persecuted just for training private armies to engage in violent revolution when a Democrat was in the White House. They resisted the proposal. The ACLU and other left-wing civil libertarians also came out against the proposals, not because they supported the right of armed resistance to a Democratic President, but because they believed that people who did so still deserved to have their civil rights respected. The alliance was powerful and the measures were defeated.
Under the Bush II Presidency, Mideastern terrorists flew planes into the World Trade Center. Bush asked Congress for increased powers to spy on Muslims. There was some resistance from the ACLU and company, but the right wing all lined up behind Bush and impugned the patriotism of anyone who questioned his actions. The measure passed.
Under the Obama Presidency, even the suggestion that there might be right-wing terrorists led to a great outcry and any further action ended before it started.
I am not a big fan of anti-government militias or right-wing terrorists, but I do believe that their civil rights should be respected. And when conservatives rushed to champion militias and white supremacists, they were at least defending the civil rights of regular guys on the street.
This time is different, though. It doesn't surprise me that with Donald Trump as President the NRA no longer I thinks that armed resistance to the federal government is patriotic and scarcely even seems sure that criticism is allowed anymore.
No, what I find disturbing is the reaction to finding out that members of the Trump campaign (or administration) were targets of investigation for ties to Russia. Revelations that Carter Page was wiretapped, or that Trump was investigated as counter-intelligence threat, or that Paul Manafort had his bail revoked for witness tampering, or that lower level officials are "flipping" on higher level ones.
This has led to an outcry, a denunciation of these violations of Team Trump's rights. But not to any sort of general civil libertarian uproar, any overall cry that could protect the rights of regular guys on the street. No, it has been a fairly open pronouncement that running for President, let along being elected, exempts the candidate, or the office-holder and anyone he chooses to protect from any sort of legal scrutiny, no matter what he does.
So long, of course, as the candidate in question is a Republican.
Wednesday, February 20, 2019
How to Make Parties Police Their Own
Related to the issue of how to deal with politicians with an unsavory episode in their past is how to deal with politicians with unsavory behavior in their present. Here, theoretically, the answer is simpler. There should be an investigation. The investigation should not become a kangaroo court. It should seriously look into the facts and allow the politician to opportunity to defend himself. But if the misconduct is serious enough, then the politician should resign.
Everyone, I think, would agree with this in theory. But it becomes very hard to live up to these standards when that means handing the office over to a member of the opposing party. The uproar in Virginia is an obvious example. Democrats were quick to call for Northam's resignation, so long as they thought he had an excellent successor in Lt. Governor Justin Fairfax. But when Fairfax was charged with rape and the Democratic Attorney General also turned out to have worn blackface, suddenly everything changed.
Likewise, Democrats called for Senator Al Franken of Minnesota to step down for accusations of pinching women's bottoms, but found it in their hearts to forgive Senator Bob Melendrez of New Jersey for accusations of bribery. They made various excuses, but we all knew the real reason. Franken's replacement would be appointed by a Democratic governor; Melendrez' replacement would be appointed by Republican Chris Christie.
As for Republicans, let us be real. Donald Trump could shoot someone in the middle of Fifth Avenue and Mike Pence could supply the gun and hide it afterward and help Trump clean the blood off his clothes, and Republicans would refuse to impeach because Nancy Pelosi would be next in line.
The answer is obvious. We should ensure that a politician who prematurely departs office will have to be replaced by a member of the same party. Many states have laws that if a US Senate seat falls vacant the governor must appoint a member of the same party as the former Senator. I favor such laws and would add that, as moral matter admittedly not enforceable, the Governor should appoint someone as similar as possible to the departing Senator, minus whatever infirmity caused the seat to be vacant. (It used to be customary to appoint the widows of Senators who died in office).
And I would favor taking the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Temp of the Senate out of the line of succession for Presidency and go straight to the Cabinet instead. If Donald Trump shot someone in the middle of Fifth Avenue and Mike Pence was his accomplice, I am sure Republicans could live with a President Mike Pompeo.
Everyone, I think, would agree with this in theory. But it becomes very hard to live up to these standards when that means handing the office over to a member of the opposing party. The uproar in Virginia is an obvious example. Democrats were quick to call for Northam's resignation, so long as they thought he had an excellent successor in Lt. Governor Justin Fairfax. But when Fairfax was charged with rape and the Democratic Attorney General also turned out to have worn blackface, suddenly everything changed.
Likewise, Democrats called for Senator Al Franken of Minnesota to step down for accusations of pinching women's bottoms, but found it in their hearts to forgive Senator Bob Melendrez of New Jersey for accusations of bribery. They made various excuses, but we all knew the real reason. Franken's replacement would be appointed by a Democratic governor; Melendrez' replacement would be appointed by Republican Chris Christie.
As for Republicans, let us be real. Donald Trump could shoot someone in the middle of Fifth Avenue and Mike Pence could supply the gun and hide it afterward and help Trump clean the blood off his clothes, and Republicans would refuse to impeach because Nancy Pelosi would be next in line.
The answer is obvious. We should ensure that a politician who prematurely departs office will have to be replaced by a member of the same party. Many states have laws that if a US Senate seat falls vacant the governor must appoint a member of the same party as the former Senator. I favor such laws and would add that, as moral matter admittedly not enforceable, the Governor should appoint someone as similar as possible to the departing Senator, minus whatever infirmity caused the seat to be vacant. (It used to be customary to appoint the widows of Senators who died in office).
And I would favor taking the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Temp of the Senate out of the line of succession for Presidency and go straight to the Cabinet instead. If Donald Trump shot someone in the middle of Fifth Avenue and Mike Pence was his accomplice, I am sure Republicans could live with a President Mike Pompeo.
Reflections on the "20-20 Rule"
The blackface uproar in Virginia may have died down, but who can doubt there are plenty more scandals where that came from. Let's face it. There is none righteous that sinneth not. Every candidate will always turn out to have some sort of discreditable episode. If being perfect one's entire life is made a requirement for office, then no one will qualify.* That's why I think we should consider Kevin Drum's 20-20 rule. Actions taken more than 20 years ago or before the age of 20 should be forgiven on three conditions:
Finally, I would add that even quite a severe offense might be forgivable, but it will require a much greater display of contrition than a minor offense. In 1963, George Wallace, governor of Alabama, employed a Klansman as his speech writer and personally stood in the schoolhouse doorway to keep black students out. In 1982, he was elected to a fourth term on the strength of black voters. This was very serious bad conduct, and anyone can suspect his contrition was more political opportunism than sincere. But nonetheless, black voters forgave him. While I would hate to offer George Wallace as a positive role model for anything, still, politicians might consider his example in the virtues of owning up to past vices.
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*Spare me any jokes about maybe this being a good thing.
- The offense must not be too serious.
- The candidate must have cleaned up his act and stopped offending since.
- The candidate must honestly own up to whatever it was.
That third condition is usually where candidates trip up. Consider two recent examples.
Brett Kavanaugh was clearly a drunken, obnoxious frat boy during his high school and college years. Two women made credible but uncorroborated accusations of sexually misconduct that could plausibly been seen by a drunken frat boy as a harmless prank and by the woman involved as a serious rape attempt. No one disputed that during his legal and judicial career, his behavior toward women was exemplary. So, I would say that Kavanaugh met the first two conditions. But he utterly failed on the third one by denying the obvious -- that he had been drunk and obnoxious at the time and pretending to be a near-saint. So we were treated to the repugnant spectacle of Senators going through Kavanaugh's high school year book, looking for (and finding) evidence of any failing, no matter how minor. An honest acknowledgement and apology cave have spared us the ghastly business.
So, too, with Ralph Northam. Once year books become fair game, who knows what they will turn up. In Northam's case, it was a photograph of him and another student posing, one in blackface, and one in Klan robes. It was in terrible taste, but not any sort of crime. And the caption was innocuous. ("There are more old drunks than old doctors in this world, so I think I'll have another beer." So why not just show a barroom scene?). So it meets the first condition. Northam has had a perfectly good record on race since, while Virginia Republicans are increasingly going neo-Confederate. So the second condition is also met. But Northam, too, is completely failing on the third condition, making comments so incoherent and ill-thought-out that it would be a favor to handcuff him, stuff something in his mouth, and lock him in the closet till this blows over.
And with the Democratic primaries for governor heating up, there will be plenty more examples. Elizabeth Warren is an obvious case. She claims to have some Cherokee ancestry and listed her ethnic group as "American Indian" in a few cases where it has been advantageous for her to do so. Although there is no direct evidence that she ever received affirmative action benefits for her heritage, no doubt there was some social cachet in it. So I would give her a pass on her first condition -- the offense was not too serious. Furthermore, Warren has not made her claim to Cherokee ancestry a defining quality in her political career, focusing mostly on race-neutral issues such as bank regulation. So she meets the second condition as well. But she has proven a similar disaster on the third condition -- not honestly facing up to why she made such claims and what the advantage might be.
All of which raises a few other points. First of all, if the offense in question is extremely common, we are going to have to give more of a pass on it than if it is not. This is not the same as saying that it was perfectly acceptable in those days, or that people didn't know better back them. But if an offense is so common that making it disqualifying would seriously shrink the pool of candidates, we really should take off severity points (while still requiring the candidate to mend his or her ways, and to honestly own up to it). Drunken frat boy behavior was rampant among elite colleges and students when Kavanaugh was in school, and making it disqualifying would seriously reduce the available pool of federal judges. While one would expect anyone in the 1980's to know that black face and Klan robes are not funny, judging from the number of revelations coming out, blackface appears to have been extremely common at Virginia Military Institute (VMI, Virginia's most elite college). Making it disqualifying would (apparently) strip Virginia of much of its leadership. And every white person in Oklahoma claims a Cherokee princess somewhere in their family tree. Forcing candidates in Oklahoma to forego this confection would turn the state over to carpetbaggers.
And that raises another point as well. As the office becomes higher, the applicant pool becomes wider, and perhaps what is pardonable in a lower office becomes more serious in a higher office. Federal judge-ships may have an inordinate number of graduates from elite schools with a frat boy culture; Virginia politics may have an inordinate number of VMI graduates who wore blackface; and Oklahoma residents, politician or not, may see a Cherokee princess ancestor as part of the Oklahoma identity. But Presidential elections can be more particular. (Although it does seem a bit unfair to exclude Virginia or Oklahoma politicians from running for President). A fine example here is Joe Biden. Biden was forced to withdraw from the 1988 presidential primary when he was found to have plagiarized speeches. Plagiarizing speeches was apparently seen as disqualifying from being President. But it did not prevent him from serving another 20 years as a Senator from Delaware, or for eventually becoming Vice President. It is unlikely to be an issue if Biden chooses to run this time because the scandal came out a long time ago and is seen as old news.
Finally, I would add that even quite a severe offense might be forgivable, but it will require a much greater display of contrition than a minor offense. In 1963, George Wallace, governor of Alabama, employed a Klansman as his speech writer and personally stood in the schoolhouse doorway to keep black students out. In 1982, he was elected to a fourth term on the strength of black voters. This was very serious bad conduct, and anyone can suspect his contrition was more political opportunism than sincere. But nonetheless, black voters forgave him. While I would hate to offer George Wallace as a positive role model for anything, still, politicians might consider his example in the virtues of owning up to past vices.
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*Spare me any jokes about maybe this being a good thing.
Republicans and Executive Power
I have a hard time taking Republican claims that conservatives have always feared an overreaching executive seriously. It requires airbrushing out about 40 years of our quite recent history, from 1968 to 2008.
This is not to deny that Republicans feared executive overreach during the Roosevelt era, which one can extend from 1933 all the way up to the mid '60's. Democrats controlled the presidency most of the time from 1933 to 1968, except for eight years of the liberal Republican Eisenhower. This was the era of the imperial presidency when the power of the executive branch expanded to an extraordinary degree but the restraints and safeguards did not. There were serious abuses of power, generally escalating.* But the apogee of the imperial presidency was in the Republican, Richard Nixon. It was under Nixon that the full scope of abuses came out, and a Democratic Congress began taking measure to reign in the abuses of the executive branch, over the resistance of Nixon and his Republican successors. Granted, there was a measure of hypocrisy there. The complaint that Democrats in Congress ignored the abuses until a Republican started committing them has some validity. Nonetheless, the abuses were real and needed reigning in.
Furthermore, Nixon began an era of Republican dominance of the presidency, even as Democrats continued to control Congress. From 1968 to 1992, Republicans held the presidency all but four year. Furthermore, they won all all their elections by landslides, with the sole exception of 1968. And the 1968 election was complicated by a third party candidacy of George Wallace. Counting each vote for Wallace as a vote for Nixon, 1968 was a Republican landslide as well. The Democrats' only victory during this time was by Jimmy Carter, in the wake of Watergate, against the only person ever to serve as both President and Vice President without being elected to either office. It could be dismissed as an anomaly. And Republicans during this time became increasingly champions of executive power. It was during this time that the theory of the unitary executive began to become popular. Antonin Scalia was a great champion of executive power. William Barr, Donald Trump's new Attorney General, served as Attorney General under Bush I and was a strong champion of executive power. Attempts to reign in the President were denounced on the right as the work of an "imperial Congress."
The Clinton Presidency was a major shock to Republicans, who had assumed that there would never be a Democratic President again. They managed to dismiss him as an illegitimate anomaly, the freak result of a third party candidate in Ross Perot. And, as such, Republicans continued to be champions of presidential power, especially the power to cut spending. There was much talk, for instance of allowing the President a line item veto or other ways of reducing spending beyond what Congress authorized.
And this is to say nothing of the Bush II presidency, in which the theory of the "unitary executive" was effectively taken to mean that the President could do anything, including things expressly banned by Congress such as indefinite detention, warrantless surveillance, and torture, so long as he said "national security" first. David Addington and John Yoo became notorious for their championship of such ideas.
Then, on January 20, 2009, the day Obama was inaugurated, Republicans suddenly became greatly alarmed about an overreaching executive. Even then, they could dismiss his election as an anomaly, the result of a deeply unpopular war and the worst economic crisis since 1929. But with his reelection in 2012, it became clear that Democratic Presidents would happen quite regularly and the Republican freakout became epic. People who applauded indefinite detention, warrantless surveillance, and torture as executive prerogative even when forbidden by law started to see tweaking of regulations as monstrous acts of tyranny and refraining from deporting people illegally brought to the US as children as the end of America.
Yeah, I know, the mommy party and the daddy party. Bush was claiming unlimited ability to exercise daddy powers, which are all find and good, while Obama was committing the monstrous tyranny of using mommy powers. But honestly, the sight of Republicans going from championing unlimited executive power to suddenly proclaiming their fear of an out-of-control executive happened so suddenly it could almost give you whiplash. And the sight of Republican proclaiming that they have "always" feared an out-of-control executive so soon after championing just that is positively disgusting.
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*It is not clear to me that Truman was worse than Roosevelt in that regard, or Eisenhower worse than Truman, but certainly Kennedy was worse than Eisenhower, Johnson worse than Kennedy, and Nixon worst of all.
This is not to deny that Republicans feared executive overreach during the Roosevelt era, which one can extend from 1933 all the way up to the mid '60's. Democrats controlled the presidency most of the time from 1933 to 1968, except for eight years of the liberal Republican Eisenhower. This was the era of the imperial presidency when the power of the executive branch expanded to an extraordinary degree but the restraints and safeguards did not. There were serious abuses of power, generally escalating.* But the apogee of the imperial presidency was in the Republican, Richard Nixon. It was under Nixon that the full scope of abuses came out, and a Democratic Congress began taking measure to reign in the abuses of the executive branch, over the resistance of Nixon and his Republican successors. Granted, there was a measure of hypocrisy there. The complaint that Democrats in Congress ignored the abuses until a Republican started committing them has some validity. Nonetheless, the abuses were real and needed reigning in.
Furthermore, Nixon began an era of Republican dominance of the presidency, even as Democrats continued to control Congress. From 1968 to 1992, Republicans held the presidency all but four year. Furthermore, they won all all their elections by landslides, with the sole exception of 1968. And the 1968 election was complicated by a third party candidacy of George Wallace. Counting each vote for Wallace as a vote for Nixon, 1968 was a Republican landslide as well. The Democrats' only victory during this time was by Jimmy Carter, in the wake of Watergate, against the only person ever to serve as both President and Vice President without being elected to either office. It could be dismissed as an anomaly. And Republicans during this time became increasingly champions of executive power. It was during this time that the theory of the unitary executive began to become popular. Antonin Scalia was a great champion of executive power. William Barr, Donald Trump's new Attorney General, served as Attorney General under Bush I and was a strong champion of executive power. Attempts to reign in the President were denounced on the right as the work of an "imperial Congress."
The Clinton Presidency was a major shock to Republicans, who had assumed that there would never be a Democratic President again. They managed to dismiss him as an illegitimate anomaly, the freak result of a third party candidate in Ross Perot. And, as such, Republicans continued to be champions of presidential power, especially the power to cut spending. There was much talk, for instance of allowing the President a line item veto or other ways of reducing spending beyond what Congress authorized.
And this is to say nothing of the Bush II presidency, in which the theory of the "unitary executive" was effectively taken to mean that the President could do anything, including things expressly banned by Congress such as indefinite detention, warrantless surveillance, and torture, so long as he said "national security" first. David Addington and John Yoo became notorious for their championship of such ideas.
Then, on January 20, 2009, the day Obama was inaugurated, Republicans suddenly became greatly alarmed about an overreaching executive. Even then, they could dismiss his election as an anomaly, the result of a deeply unpopular war and the worst economic crisis since 1929. But with his reelection in 2012, it became clear that Democratic Presidents would happen quite regularly and the Republican freakout became epic. People who applauded indefinite detention, warrantless surveillance, and torture as executive prerogative even when forbidden by law started to see tweaking of regulations as monstrous acts of tyranny and refraining from deporting people illegally brought to the US as children as the end of America.
Yeah, I know, the mommy party and the daddy party. Bush was claiming unlimited ability to exercise daddy powers, which are all find and good, while Obama was committing the monstrous tyranny of using mommy powers. But honestly, the sight of Republicans going from championing unlimited executive power to suddenly proclaiming their fear of an out-of-control executive happened so suddenly it could almost give you whiplash. And the sight of Republican proclaiming that they have "always" feared an out-of-control executive so soon after championing just that is positively disgusting.
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*It is not clear to me that Truman was worse than Roosevelt in that regard, or Eisenhower worse than Truman, but certainly Kennedy was worse than Eisenhower, Johnson worse than Kennedy, and Nixon worst of all.
Tuesday, February 19, 2019
A Brief Note on the Trump Tax Bill
So, tax refunds are coming in and a lot of people are finding that under the new tax law their refunds have shrunk. How many people? And how do they compare to ones who have seen their refunds grow? I have not seen any statistics on that so far, only anecdotes.
Any major reform will have losers as well as winners. Such was the case with Obamacare, and it is the case with the Republican tax bill. And invariably you will hear a lot more from losers than winners. The number of losers under Obamacare was not great compared to the total population, but they made their anger known. Republicans were quick to trumpet the loses under Obamacare to condemn the whole bill. Now Republicans are getting a taste of their own medicine.
Forgive me for finding it a gratifying sight.
One More Comment on Howard Schultz
Look, I know it's terribly unoriginal to comment that Howard Schultz sort of libertarianism lite is the general ideology of our ruling class, or that the reason it never catches on is that no one else shares it.
But I do think it should be added that our ruling class holds this ideology out of a sincere and honest conviction that it is what is best for the country and keeps trying to sell libertarianism lite in the belief it is really what is needed.
I don't think our ruling class are hardcore economic royalists, but they are lite economic royalists. They accept the legitimacy of Social Security and Medicare, but believe that major cuts are necessary to preserve these programs. They accept the income tax and at least some economic regulation, but generally believe that minimal constraints on profit-making are what best benefits the economy. And they see social conservatism as simple bigotry.
Ruling classes everywhere have a remarkable skill for confusing their power and privilege for the common good. When industrial capitalism rules, the ruling class convinces itself that whatever raises profits highest is in the common good. Rising tide lifts all boats and so forth. In a democracy, this requires going one step further and believing that the people must be with you because how could they be so benighted as to disagree. (This is common to partisans all across the spectrum).
What gets comparatively little attention, because our ruling class regards it as outside all reasonable bounds, is the opposite ideology -- economically liberal but socially conservative. A sizable share of our population fits into this category, but our ruling elite considers it to be completely out of bounds. A significant part of Donald Trump's appeal was that he spoke to this ideology, although once in power he quickly turned out to be just another economic royalist. (To point out that Trump is no true social conservative is like pointing out that his skin and hair are fake -- obvious to all but the most truly indoctrinated).
The best description I have heard of this excluded combination is Christian Democrat. Christian Democracy is a positive expression of the economic liberal/social conservative combination that respects democratic institutions and norms and the rule of law. It may resist immigration as a threat to social cohesion without demonizing immigrants. Confronted with a flood of refugees, Christian Democracy might reject as a false dichotomy the choice between indiscriminate admission and leaving them to their fate, seeking instead for creative third options.
One might even speculate that it was the lack of any political space for the Christian Democratic outlook in the U.S. that drove potential adherents to demagogues like Trump. Although it is also true that the Christian Democrats are in decline all across Europe, with devastating effects on freedom and democracy.
Third parties in the United States are hopeless causes doomed to failure as such, but often useful in pushing the main parties in their direction. Certainly there are those who speculate that Howard Schultz' proposed run is mostly an attempt to pressure Democrats in an economically conservative direction. And what of a Christian Democratic third party? Unlike a libertarian-lite third party, an economically liberal/socially conservative candidate would have real appeal to a significant portion of the population. Might such a candidate push the Republicans away from their economic royalism and find humanitarian alternatives to the current deadlock on immigration? Obviously such a candidate would not appeal to people who want to celebrate hatred as "authenticity." But the authoritarians will always be with us. We can only hope to keep them in check.
But I do think it should be added that our ruling class holds this ideology out of a sincere and honest conviction that it is what is best for the country and keeps trying to sell libertarianism lite in the belief it is really what is needed.
I don't think our ruling class are hardcore economic royalists, but they are lite economic royalists. They accept the legitimacy of Social Security and Medicare, but believe that major cuts are necessary to preserve these programs. They accept the income tax and at least some economic regulation, but generally believe that minimal constraints on profit-making are what best benefits the economy. And they see social conservatism as simple bigotry.
Ruling classes everywhere have a remarkable skill for confusing their power and privilege for the common good. When industrial capitalism rules, the ruling class convinces itself that whatever raises profits highest is in the common good. Rising tide lifts all boats and so forth. In a democracy, this requires going one step further and believing that the people must be with you because how could they be so benighted as to disagree. (This is common to partisans all across the spectrum).
What gets comparatively little attention, because our ruling class regards it as outside all reasonable bounds, is the opposite ideology -- economically liberal but socially conservative. A sizable share of our population fits into this category, but our ruling elite considers it to be completely out of bounds. A significant part of Donald Trump's appeal was that he spoke to this ideology, although once in power he quickly turned out to be just another economic royalist. (To point out that Trump is no true social conservative is like pointing out that his skin and hair are fake -- obvious to all but the most truly indoctrinated).
The best description I have heard of this excluded combination is Christian Democrat. Christian Democracy is a positive expression of the economic liberal/social conservative combination that respects democratic institutions and norms and the rule of law. It may resist immigration as a threat to social cohesion without demonizing immigrants. Confronted with a flood of refugees, Christian Democracy might reject as a false dichotomy the choice between indiscriminate admission and leaving them to their fate, seeking instead for creative third options.
One might even speculate that it was the lack of any political space for the Christian Democratic outlook in the U.S. that drove potential adherents to demagogues like Trump. Although it is also true that the Christian Democrats are in decline all across Europe, with devastating effects on freedom and democracy.
Third parties in the United States are hopeless causes doomed to failure as such, but often useful in pushing the main parties in their direction. Certainly there are those who speculate that Howard Schultz' proposed run is mostly an attempt to pressure Democrats in an economically conservative direction. And what of a Christian Democratic third party? Unlike a libertarian-lite third party, an economically liberal/socially conservative candidate would have real appeal to a significant portion of the population. Might such a candidate push the Republicans away from their economic royalism and find humanitarian alternatives to the current deadlock on immigration? Obviously such a candidate would not appeal to people who want to celebrate hatred as "authenticity." But the authoritarians will always be with us. We can only hope to keep them in check.
Sunday, February 3, 2019
On Howard Schultz
Nothing very original here, but since Howard Schultz, CEO of Starbucks thinks that his fortune qualifies him to be President, I might as well compare him to other business execs in the who have shared that belief.
Most obviously, Donald Trump. Let there be no doubt, if the election were somehow to come down to a choice between Trump and Schultz, the choice would be a total no-brainer. Schultz is incomparably better than Trump in a whole lot of ways:
Most obviously, Donald Trump. Let there be no doubt, if the election were somehow to come down to a choice between Trump and Schultz, the choice would be a total no-brainer. Schultz is incomparably better than Trump in a whole lot of ways:
- Schultz is an actual, legitimate, competent, successful, self-made businessman, while Trump's business career has been fraudulent at best and outright gangsterism at worst.*
- Schultz has, so far as we can tell, a normal ability and willingness to learn.
- Schultz has, so far as we can tell, normal impulse control, a normal attention span, a concept of objective reality, etc.
- Schultz is, to all appearances, motivated by a sincere concern for the public good.
- Schultz does not scapegoat immigrants or celebrate hate as "authenticity."
- I am not worried about Schultz running the country for the benefit of Starbucks Coffee. I don't even see how such a thing would be possible.**
- He might very well be willing to sell his interest in Starbucks and put his assets in blind trust.
- Schultz shows no signs of vindictiveness or a belief that the federal government should be a tool for punishing enemies.
- Schultz does not appear to think that the federal government would be his private property if he wins, or that he would be an elective dictator.
- I am not worried about Schultz creating a crisis out of personal pique.
- Schultz has no sinister ties with a foreign country.
So all of this is clear advantage to Schultz over Trump. But Schultz shares a major shortcoming with Trump. He knows nothing at all about how government, politics, and policy work. And he sees this ignorance, not as a shortcoming to be overcome, but as a virtue to be touted. In this he is, like so many billionaires running for president, a classic politiphobe.
[Politiphobes] see the contentious give-and-take of politics as unnecessary and distasteful. Specifically, they believe that obvious, commonsense solutions to the country’s problems are out there for the plucking. The reason these obvious solutions are not enacted is that politicians are corrupt, or self-interested, or addicted to unnecessary partisan feuding. . . . [T]hey do not acknowledge that meaningful policy disagreement even exists. From that premise, they conclude that all the arguing and partisanship and horse-trading that go on in American politics are entirely unnecessary. Politicians could easily solve all our problems if they would only set aside their craven personal agendas.
And, given that real, deep-seated policy differences do exist, and that policy making is a complex set of tradeoffs, politiphobes tend to respond to discovering what policy and politics are really like by either becoming increasingly authoritarian or shutting down altogether.
Comparing Schultz to other CEO candidates, I would prefer him to Ross Perot in that he shows none of Perot's authoritarianism or paranoia. But I would rank him well behind Mitt Romney or any other businessman with actual experience in government. Schultz might more accurately be compared to Herman Caine -- a legitimate and competent businessman, but utterly clueless about how government and policy making actually work.
And finally, Schultz has one obvious disadvantage compared to Trump, Perot or Caine (though perhaps not Romney). Whatever else one may think of Trump, Perot, or Caine, they were at least colorful and charismatic, able to inspire followers. Schultz is about as colorful and charismatic as a mashed potato sandwich.***
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*I realize that plenty of people either think gourmet coffee is a scam or else take gourmet coffee seriously but think Starbucks is merely overpriced imitation gourmet coffee. But that is mere puffery and in no way comparable to routinely stiffing subcontractors, banks, immigrant laborers, and anyone else who does business with you, let alone laundering money for the Russian Mob.
**Starbucks, overpriced though it may be, is still a retailer and, as such, operates on a low-price-high-volume model. Anyone wanting to engage in corrupt dealings would have to buy a helluva lot of Starbucks coffee to have any real impact. A President Schultz might set policy with an unusual consciousness of the needs of the retail industry or the food service industry, but that is not corrupt in the same way as running the country for the good of one particular company.
***Nothing against mashed potatoes, you understand. I love potatoes in all forms. I don't think I have ever met a potato I didn't like. But neither have I ever met a potato I would vote for as President.
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