Saturday, January 5, 2019

The Steele Dossier Revisited: Why it May Matter

All of which is a sort of a lead-up to the real issue -- evidence that Michael Cohen really did visit Prague in August or September of 2016.

To recap:  We don't know what evidence the intelligence community has obtained through wiretaps, friendly intelligence services and the like about Trump and Russia.  The most damaging information against the Trump campaign that has gone public is the notorious Steele Dossier, which alleges extensive coordination between the Trump campaign and the Russian intelligence hacking the Democrats and releasing their information through Wikileaks.  The Steele Dossier is the product of milking the rumor mill in Russia.  The rumor mill produces material of mixed reliability, possibly including some deliberate deceptions.  It should therefore not be believed without further verification. No open source, whether Steele, his employers, the Clinton campaign, or the news media have been able to verify the contents.  What the intelligence community may have verified is unlikely to see the light of day for fear of giving away vital sources and methods.

Of the many allegations in the Steele Dossier, three stand out as most sensational.
  1. That when Trump was in Moscow for the 2013 Miss Universe competition, he was filmed hiring Russian prostitutes to urinate on the Obamas' bed, and that the tape was used to blackmail him.  
  2. That when Carter Page traveled to Moscow in early July, 2016 to deliver an address to the Higher Economic School in Moscow he secretly met with two Russian officials.  Igor Sechin, chairman of Rosneft, a Russian oil company, offered the Trump gang "the brokerage of up to a 19 percent (privatised) stake in Rosneft" in exchange for relief on sanctions.  Page expressed an interest but did not commit.  Page also met with Igor Divekin, a Kremlin official of some sort, and mentioned that the Kremlin had damaging information on Hillary Clinton and discussed the possibility of sharing this information, while also broadly hinting that the Kremlin had damaging information on Trump if he did not cooperate.  
  3. That Michael Cohen met with Russian officials in late August or early September, 2016 in Prague and arranged for the Trump organization to help pay and conceal the hackers that Russia had employed.
Of these three allegations, the first is the most publicized, but the least significant.  If Trump did, in fact, hire Russian prostitutes to pee on the Obamas' bed, that would be embarrassing but, at worst, a petty misdemeanor, and well outside of US jurisdiction.  It seems unlikely that mere fear of embarrassment could induce the sort of compliance that Trump seems to be showing.  It is, however, widely believed in intelligence circles that there may be some kind of sex tape used for blackmail, and perhaps more than one, and possibly showing something a good deal worse.

The second allegation is both the only one to appear in the press before the existence of the dossier was revealed by Mother Jones on October 31, 2016 and the basis of the FISA warrant on Carter Page.  The sequence of events here is interesting.  Page's trip to Russia is undisputed. 

On July 7-8, 2016 he appeared in Moscow and gave a public speech to the Higher Economic School in which he said that the US should mind its own business and not meddle in Russia's internal affairs. 

On July 19, 2016, Report 94 said that Page had met with Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft to discuss lifting sanctions and "possible future bilateral energy cooperation."  Page reacted positively but made no promises.  It also alleges that Page met with Kremlin official Igor Divyekin, who told Page that the Kremlin had compromising material on Hillary Clinton and discussed possibly releasing it to the Trump campaign.  Divyekin also hinted that the Kremlin might also have damaging materials on Trump and that he should keep that in mind.  No mention is made of the possible Rosneft bribe, merely "bilateral energy cooperation."

On September 23, 2016, national security reporter Michael Isikoff ran an article in Yahoo News.  Much of the article dealt with public information, such as Page's background, his (somewhat nebulous) rule in the Trump campaign, and his July visit to Moscow.  However, the article also alleges that Page met with Sechin, an individual under sanctions, to discuss possible lifting of sanctions, and with Divyekin.  No mention is made of Divyekin either offering damaging information on Hillary or threatening Trump with release of other damaging material.  Isikoff's primary source for his article was, in fact, Michael Steele and the material he had gathered to date.  He takes care to disguise his sources, making the article sound as though it originated with members of the Congressional intelligence committee.  He does drop a few hints here and there, saying that "a well-placed Western intelligence source" says that Congress has been briefed on Page's meeting with Sechin, and that "U.S. intelligence agencies have also received reports" of the meeting with Divyekin. The disguise was apparently good enough to fool the FBI, which stated in its FISA application that, despite startling similarities, it did not believe that Steele was the source of Isikoff's information. 

On October 18, 2016, Report 134 gave further details about the meeting.  It confirmed that the date was July 7 or 8, during Page's trip to Moscow to address the Higher Economic School (no surprise there).  This memo also says that Sechin promised "the brokerage of up to a 19 percent (privatised) stake in Rosneft" in return for sanctions relief, that Page promised sanctions relief, and that Page did not expressly say that he had Trump's authority to promise, but he implied it.  The memo goes on to say that Sechin no longer believed Trump could be elected and that Michael Cohen was playing an important role in communications with the Kremlin, further details blacked out.

Some time in October, 2016 (the date is blacked out), the FBI applied for a FISA warrant on Page, using Steele's report as its primary source.  We do not know whether the application was made before or after Steele's second report on the meeting, or how long it took from the time Steele prepared the report until the FBI received it.  However, the second report does not appear to have influenced the application.  The report makes no mention of the Rosneft deal, but only of "future bilateral energy cooperation" and lifting sanctions.  It also mentions Divyekin and his proposal to give the Trump campaign damaging information on Hillary Clinton.  (Pages 15-18).  Significant portions of the footnotes confirming Steele as reliable are blacked out.  This information is followed by two pages that are blacked out and my contain corroboration. 

The FBI reviewed the application in January, 2017; April, 2017; and June, 2017.  (FISA warrants automatically expire after 90 days unless renewed).  These new applications contain further information, much of it blacked out.  None mentions anything about bribery with Rosneft stock.  All mention that after James Comey announced that the FBI was re-opening its investigation of the Clinton e-mails and her political fortunes tanked, Steele expressed frustration and made an unauthorized leak of his materials, and that the FBI severed relations as a result.  All continue to say they do not believe Steele was the source of the Yahoo article, long after it should have been apparent that he was.

Oh, yes and a 19% share of Rosneft really was privatized (though not sold to Trump and associates).  And Sechin's chief of staff (a possible source) really did turn up dead under mysterious circumstances.

So what are we to make of all this?  First of all, the Steele Dossier is not despite the impression sometimes given, the origin of the government's investigation of Trump's Russia ties, nor is it the central hub of their investigation.  Certainly Steele was not the source of information on the Russian hacks of the Democrats.  Nor was the the first or only source of information about Trump's ties to Russia.  Apparently the investigation began when Trump adviser George Papadopoulos made some drunken and offhand comments to the Australian ambassador about getting information from Russia.  People in the know also say that there was plenty of signals intelligence from allies indicating suspicious contacts between Trump and the Russians.  One claims that the investigation began when a Baltic intelligence service overheard a conversation about money going from the Kremlin to the Trump campaign.  Certainly Mueller's indictments make clear that we know a great deal about Russia's activities on behalf of the Trump campaign that have nothing to do with the Steele Dossier.

But there is evidence that the Steele Dossier was important as well.  It was important enough to be the primary source of information for a warrant to wiretap Page.  Based on the foregoing, I would guess that the intelligence community had enough information to know that Page really did meet with Sechin and Divyekin during his visit to Moscow and was lying when he denied it.  It may have known that Page and Sechin discussed lifting sanctions, or that may simply have been an educated guess given the context.  But it did not know the details of the conversation, including the Rosneft bribe and Divyekin's discussion of compromising materials.  Presumably Sechin and Divyekin know enough to be careful what they say over any sort of electronic communications because someone might be listening in.  Thus Steele's milking of the rumor mill may have been the best source available for what happened in those meetings.

But this is the mere speculation of an Enlightened Layperson.  In my next post I intend to discuss the Steele Dossier and Michael Cohen.  Spoiler alert:  My conclusions with Cohen are similar to the ones about Page.

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