Instead, the FBI opted to have confidential informants talk to the targets to see what they could learn. These conversations were recorded. Clearly this is a more intrusive technique that an open source search or seeking information from other government agencies, but it does not require a warrant or even approval of higher-ups, even in sensitive political matters. Rather, it is treated as a judgment call by the investigation (pp. 307, 355-356).
What is considered sensitive and does require extensive authorization and supervision, is infiltrating a confidential source into a political organization (p. 316, 403). In other words, having a confidential informant inside the Trump campaign reporting on its activities. To do so would require (1) approval of the Special Agent in Charge, notice to the Sensitive Operations Review Committee, and departmental approval to record any conversations (p. 403). The members of the investigation were well aware of these restrictions and did not attempt to place any informants inside the campaign (pp. 311). The FBI has a number of pre-existing informants in the Trump campaign but did not seek to activate any of them, (pp. 336-340, with heavy redactions). The Inspector General also found no evidence that the FBI send any informants to the Trump campaign prior to opening the investigation (pp. 312-313).
The first outreach to an informant took place on August 11. The plan was to talk about Russian interference in the election and possibly mention Papadopoulos (p. 314). Much the the FBI agent's surprise, the informant had been offered a job in the Trump campaign, by Carter Page, no less and also mentioned Manafort and Flynn as people to watch (p. 315). But the job offer raised problems, since the job offer with the Trump campaign raised all the restrictions and oversight needed to place an informant in a political operation (p. 316). The source met with Carter Page on August 20, purportedly to discuss possible employment in the Trump campaign. Page said that he had never met Manafort and that Manafort never responded to his e-mails. (Keep in mind that this was nearly a month before the investigation received Christopher Steele's report that Page was Manafort's liaison with the Russians). Page also complained about unfavorable press coverage (this was nearly a month after the Yahoo article accusing him of meeting with sanctioned Russians during his visit). Page also hinted at an October Surprise but was evasive and seemed open to making use of Russian information if done very discreetly (pp 317-318).
On September 1, 2016, the same source met, wearing a wire, with an unnamed high level campaign official who was not a target of the investigation, in hopes of learning more about Page and Papdopoulos. The conversation yielded little to nothing of any significance. The report expressed concern about the lack of safeguards to protect any sensitive information that might have been revealed (pp. 326-329).
The same source also met with George Papadopoulos on September 15. In an attempt to recreate the conditions that led to Papadopoulos' indiscrete comments to the ambassador, the FBI arranged to have the meeting take place out of the country (at FBI expense), over drinks, for the nominal purpose of discussing business dealings (pp. 329-330). Papadopoulos denied any coordination with either the Russians or Wikileaks and said that such things would be illegal (pp. 331-332). The source and the FBI were suspicious of these responses, which seemed rehearsed (p. 332). Without reading or hearing these statements, it is hard to tell whether they were correct, or if motivated reasoning and confirmation bias were taking over.
The FBI also took advantage of its August 31, 2016 briefing of the Trump campaign to talk to Michael Flynn and get a sense of him (pp. 340-344).
All these conversations, it must be noted, took place before Crossfire Hurricane received the Steele Dossier on September 19. Prior to receiving the report, the investigation had consisted of doing an open source search, seeking information from other government agencies, and having several taped conversations. As the report comments, this had yielded some suspicious background on several campaign members, but nothing truly incuplatory (p. 101). Presumably the investigators were starting to get frustrated and uncertain how to proceed when this apparent gold mine came along. Also predisposing the FBI to believe the Steele report was that it confirmed what they had already learned in their investigation of the hacks -- that Russian intelligence was responsible for the DNC hacks, that the Russian government was supporting the Trump campaign, and that the Russian government was seeking to sow division in the United States and the trans-Atlantic alliance (p. 101).
The FBI then began investigating the materials in the dossier. They developed diagrams, charts, timelines and spreadsheets of the events identified, seeking sources and what could be verified (pp. 101-102).
Agents for Crossfire Hurricane inquired about Steele to his handler and received an endorsement that rather exaggerated his importance and reliability (p. 102). By the time the FBI met with Steele in October, he had already discussed his findings with other government officials (Bruce Ohr of the Justice Department) and discussed the matter with the press. All outlets except Yahoo News had deemed the matter too unverified to publish, but well before the meeting Yahoo News had run a story alleging that Carter Page met with a sanctioned individual in Russia (pp. 104-105). While the FBI was uncertain whether Steele was directly responsible for the Yahoo story, it had little doubt that his research was the ultimate source (pp. 106-107). At their October meeting, the FBI agreed to employ Steele to search for additional intelligence on named individuals, physical evidence of collaboration, and information on his sub-sources (pp. 109-110). Steele was disappointed at this request, wanting to focus on Trump, but he did identify some of his sources. He also declined to identify who he was working for (pp. 110-111). There was also evidence from the start that his information might not be reliable. The Russian who Steele identified as Page's possible handler was one that Page had given the CIA information about (p. 111).
The FBI also told Steele to report to the FBI only (p. 112). Steele, needless to say, did not comply. The FBI fired him as a source after he leaked the investigation to Mother Jones on October 31, 2016 (pp. 172-175). Most of the FBI's investigation into either Steele's reliability and his reporting took place after he was fired, and even after the election. Further investigation into Steele revealed him not to be as reliable or as important as he had claimed (pp. 182-186). It was not until early 2017 that the FBI was able to talk to Steele's primary sub-source (p. 186). The sub-source's comments decidedly tended to weaken and undermine the dossier. For instance, the sub-source could not the urinating on the bed incident at the Ritz Carlton in 2013 and denied any knowledge of Carter Page being offered a bribe when he visited Russia in July, 2016 (p.. 187). The sub-source also made clear that the information being passed on consisted of rumors by people who did not have first-hand information, and that Steele's reports made it all sound more definite that it really was (p. 188) and that much of what was reported as fact was actually analysis or supposition (p. 190).
he Inspector General found that the use of informants met with existing FBI policy, which made the matter purely discretionary, so long as the FBI did not place informants within the campaign itself. The report found (appropriately, I think) that there needed to be more controls over the use of informants, and that the matter should not be left solely to the discretion of the investigating officer. In particular, the report recommended policies to protect against the incidental collection of politically sensitive information, and for assessments to determine whether the potential impact on constitutionally protected activity outweighs the potential investigative benefit (p. 400). (Someone within the Trump campaign appears to have approached the FBI and provided them with information, and that the Inspector General has concerns about that. However, the section is so heavily redacted that it is not possible to tell what happened, p. 402). As stated before, the report did not find the use of any informants inside the Trump campaign. Presumably this means that the strict rules in such cases were effective (pp. 403-404). The report also expressed misgivings about using briefing to gain information on Michael Flynn, mostly on the grounds that it could undermine the trust necessary in such briefings, (pp. 407-409). While not prepared to call for an absolute ban, the report recommended requiring the approval of senior leaders (p. 409).
With respect to Steele, the Inspector General found that the FBI was not required to ignore his work simply because it was opposition research , but was required to critically examine the information taking that into account (p. 383). Initially the FBI was unable to verify Steele's information, and after talking to his sub-source, found it to be questionable (pp. 383-384). The report goes on to say that these problems should have been included in the FISA application (pp. 384-385).
Next up: The FISA warrant.
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