Monday, October 22, 2012

Romney-Ryan on Foreign Policy

I have not watched any of the presidential debates -- too stressful.  I did watch the vice presidential debate and followed general comments on the presidential ones.  And the general consensus seems to be that Romney and Ryan that they won't do anything different from Obama.  They will just beat their chests harder and give more belligerent speeches, and this will make them much more effective.  Their reasons for assuring people they won't do anything different is obvious.  The American people are war-weary and have no desire for any more wars.  Actual belligerence is unpopular.  But Romney-Ryan argue that talking belligerent will make the same policies much more effective.  Why the emphasis on talk at the expense of action.  I can think of four (probably interrelated) theories:

They Really Believe It.

It may be that Romney and Ryan believe that words carry immense, almost magical power.  Let us not forget, after all, that many right wingers believe that Ronald Reagan toppled Communism just by saying, "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall."

And, to be quite fair, a number of Republican Presidents have used the well-executed bluff effectively.  Dwight David Eisenhower ended the war in Korea, refrained from starting one in Vietnam, and held the first Cold War summit with the Soviets.  But he also had an attack dog in the form of is Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.  Unlike today's Republicans, Eisenhower and Dulles were genuine fiscal conservatives who wanted balanced budgets and considered military spending to be "spending."  So Dulles uses loud bluster and threats of nuclear war in lieu of an actual military buildup.  Sometimes it worked; sometimes it didn't.  Richard Nixon pursued detente with the Soviets, but also encouraged the belief during crises that he was a "madman" who might actually be crazy enough to use nuclear weapons.  Ronald Reagan at least sometimes copied Dulles and Nixon and apparently had the Soviets believing he was a crazed warmonger long after it became apparent to even his harshest domestic critics that he was nothing of the kind.

So belligerent talk can sometimes be effective as a bluff.  It has its disadvantages, though.  For one thing, it rattles allies as well as enemies.  But I suspect that will not bother conservatives.  Most right wingers do not want allies -- only obedient vassals or enemies.*  To actually have to take an ally's interests into account is seen as a threat to our sovereignty.  Bluffs can also have tragic consequences when friends act in reliance on them.  Dulles' promises to liberate Eastern Europe may have encouraged the heroic but doomed Hungarian Revolution that was bloodily crushed.  Less famously, Nixon and Kissenger encouraged Kurdish revolts in Iraq and then did nothing when they were crushed.  Finally, while bluffs might intimidate, say, the government of Iran, we are currently up against a highly fragmented enemy in the form of Islamic terrorists.  No amount of belligerent talk is going to intimidate every individual terrorist or small group of terrorist in the whole world.

It is Purely for Domestic Consumption.

Chest beating and big talk may not move actual events with foreign powers, but they sell well with domestic audiences.  Let's face it.  Most Americans don't especially care about foreign policy.  But they like Presidents who stand tall and talk tough.  So long as they don't start any prolonged wars, who cares whether such talk is effective.  And if anything bad does happen, you are less likely to get blamed for it if you at least sound tough.

Once again, this is not altogether new.  Many people suspect that Dulles' loud talk was aimed largely at a domestic audience.  Truman had been relentlessly hounded for being soft on Communism.  Eisenhower's policies were objectively no more aggressive than Truman's (less, if you consider that Truman fought a major war and Eisenhower didn't).  But so long as Dulles sounded off, he protected his right flank from the McCarthy wing of the party.

It is an Awkward Political Compromise.

This is closely related, of course, but not quite the same.  I did read an interesting suggestion on the subject -- that it is simply an attempt to sound tougher (as a sop to the base) without actually doing anything that might start a war (to please the broader public).  Or, as the author puts it, "Rhetorical argument signals differences with Obama without publicly committing to to any particular one."

It's a Christian Thing.

I owe this one to Fred Clark, the Slacktivist.  Clark argues that to a certain strain of Evangelical Christians, what is in the heart is most important, while actions are secondary, and consequences almost irrelevant.**  Thus good intentions and virtuous attitudes are what is really important.  Actions are far less important than the intent behind them.  If their intent is right, good consequences will necessarily follow.

And come to think of it, just as my second and third possibilities have a great deal in common, so do the first and the last.

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*Except for Israel.  Israel is not our vassal; we are Israel's vassal.
**The same attitude applies to programs for the poor.  The important thing is to ensure that people donate freely, with a charitable heart.  Whether the poor are adequately provided for is a matter of no importance.

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