What We Should Fear: Competitive Authoritarianism

 

The other risk Trump poses besides patrimonialism is competitive authoritarianism.  In other words, something that is no longer democratic, but not fully a dictatorship:

What lies ahead is not fascist or single-party dictatorship but competitive authoritarianism—a system in which parties compete in elections but the incumbent’s abuse of power tilts the playing field against the opposition. . . . Under competitive authoritarianism, the formal architecture of democracy, including multiparty elections, remains intact. Opposition forces are legal and aboveground, and they contest seriously for power. Elections are often fiercely contested battles in which incumbents have to sweat it out. And once in a while, incumbents lose . . . But the system is not democratic, because incumbents rig the game by deploying the machinery of government to attack opponents and co-opt critics. Competition is real but unfair.

One obvious tool for rigging the system is the use of selective prosecution:

The most visible means of weaponizing the state is through targeted prosecution. Virtually all elected autocratic governments deploy justice ministries, public prosecutors’ offices, and tax and intelligence agencies to investigate and prosecute rival politicians, media companies, editors, journalists, business leaders, universities, and other critics. In traditional dictatorships, critics are often charged with crimes such as sedition, treason, or plotting insurrection, but contemporary autocrats tend to prosecute critics for more mundane offenses, such as corruption, tax evasion, defamation, and even minor violations of arcane rules. If investigators look hard enough, they can usually find petty infractions such as unreported income on tax returns or noncompliance with rarely enforced regulations.

While the independent judiciary will probably protect Trump's opponents from imprisonment, the time and expense of defending against completely meritless prosecutions can be ruinous.  And regulatory actions are more easily politicized.  The author offers as an obvious example IRS audits and withdrawal of non-profit status for unfriendly organizations.  I was very much afraid of that myself ahead of the election.  At least for now, DOGE seems more interested in crippling the IRS than weaponizing it.  The author also warns (correctly) about attempts to coerce higher education with the threat of withholding funds and frivolous libel suits.  One thing neither he nor I anticipated -- denying security clearance and access to government buildings to law firms that oppose the Administration or its supporters.  That is proving to be extremely dangerous.

And other forms of abuse are easily deployed:

A weaponized state is not merely a tool to punish opponents. It can also be used to build support. Governments in competitive authoritarian regimes routinely use economic policy and regulatory decisions to reward politically friendly individuals, firms, and organizations. Business leaders, media companies, universities, and other organizations have as much to gain as they have to lose from government antitrust decisions, the issuing of permits and licenses, the awarding of government contracts and concessions, the waiving of regulations or tariffs, and the conferral of tax-exempt status. If they believe that these decisions are made on political rather than technical grounds, they have a strong incentive to align themselves with incumbents.

This is already well underway.

None of this would be entirely new for the United States. Presidents have weaponized government agencies before. The FBI director J. Edgar Hoover deployed the agency as a political weapon for the six presidents he served. The Nixon administration wielded the Justice Department and other agencies against perceived enemies. But the contemporary period differs in important ways. For one, global democratic standards have risen considerably. By any contemporary measure, the United States was considerably less democratic in the 1950s than it is today. A return to mid-twentieth-century practices would, by itself, constitute significant democratic backsliding.

More important, the coming weaponization of government will likely go well beyond mid-twentieth-century practices. Fifty years ago, both major U.S. parties were internally heterogeneous, relatively moderate, and broadly committed to democratic rules of the game. Today, these parties are far more polarized, and a radicalized Republican Party has abandoned its long-standing commitment to basic democratic rules, including accepting electoral defeat and unambiguously rejecting violence.

Moreover, much of the Republican Party now embraces the idea that America’s institutions—from the federal bureaucracy and public schools to the media and private universities—have been corrupted by left-wing ideologies. Authoritarian movements commonly embrace the notion that their country’s institutions have been subverted by enemies. . . 

 The author then goes on to offer at least some grounds for hope.  The United States has more independent institutions -- governmental and private -- than many other democracies that were subverted.  And Trump is less popular than most successful authoritarian leaders consolidating power.  Although, I will add, an authoritarian is most dangerous at the outset when he is most popular.  That popularity can offer cover for subverting democracy.  Once the subversion is complete and the leader has established a dictatorship, the danger is greatest when the leader becomes unpopular -- it is at that point that the leader throws off the democratic mask and becomes openly dictatorial.  (See Russia, Venezuela, Turkey, with Hungary trending that way fast).  Hence rule number on of smart authoritarians -- save the unpopular stuff until after you consolidate power.  Trump, needless to say, is blatantly violating this rule.

But none of that is a guarantee that he will be stopped.  Most people, after all, are easily intimidated.  Even modestly raising the costs of opposition may be enough to allow consolidation of power.

 Although I will throw in this article -- by two Hungarians -- to argue the advantages the US has over Hungary in opposing a dictator:

Unlike the two main parties in the United States, Fidesz holds no primaries, and it has been systematically deprived of internal diversity because all of its senior ranks are subservient to Orban. As party leader, the Hungarian prime minister has the right to handpick all parliamentary and local (mayoral) candidates; he decides on the parliamentary group leader; and he can freely replace members of his administration who have no independent, let alone opposing, agenda or ambition. There is no loyalty to Fidesz as an organization—only to Orban.

. . . .

Trump’s rampage through the federal bureaucracy and efforts to begin purges of civil servants, along with his flurry of executive orders that demonstratively challenge constitutional limitations on executive power, may seem shocking to U.S. democratic norms. But none of these plans have been put before Congress, and many of them will face legal and legislative roadblocks before they can be fully implemented. By contrast, Orban has been able to use his disciplined supermajority in parliament to formally change Hungary’s legal foundations: tax laws, reforms, and even electoral amendments are regularly passed within days. Even the new constitution of Hungary has been amended 14 times by Fidesz without public debate—something impossible in the United States, where constitutional amendments have been comparatively rare, requiring not only broad congressional approval but a laborious process of state ratification.

The federal foundations of American democracy also give U.S. states considerable leeway to set their own policies, including in education and environmental standards. They can also use their own legal authority to challenge federal laws and the behavior of the federal government, as groups of states have already done in response to some of Trump’s executive orders. Hungary offers no such federal balance. Instead, Orban has centralized power by stripping municipalities of most of their competences and revenues.

Finally, the diversity of U.S. news organizations makes it much more difficult for Trump to wield decisive influence over the media. In Hungary, the Orban regime controls media revenues, and independent news media account for just 21 percent of the market by income. It’s important to note, as well, that the culture of debate is very different in the United States, even in a media and social media environment in which Trump has gained considerable influence, than it is in Hungary. Fox News, which is often considered a Trump mouthpiece and has close ties to many officials in the Trump administration, nevertheless also features Democrats in its programs and has organized debates between the two parties’ candidates. By contrast, in Hungary’s 2022 parliamentary election, Hungarian public television, which has long served as a platform for government propaganda, provided the joint opposition candidate a total of five minutes of airtime during the entire campaign.

The authors also mention a danger that is both more and less serious than in Hungary -- Elon Musk.  In Hungary, wealth is dependent on political connections.  Hungary's richest man became so solely because of his ties to Viktor Orban.  Musk's came by his wealth independently of any political ties, but is using it to attempt to buy up the government:

Whereas Trump, following Orban, seeks to weaken the institutions of public deliberation, Musk is undermining the principle of elected government by appropriating for himself powers that are reserved for the state. This is not a case of regulated privatization or transparent outsourcing but of big oligarchy. By using his immense economic power to integrate himself into politics, Musk is effectively buying statelike powers and threatening the foundations of liberal democracy. . . . U.S. democracy is unlikely to be replaced by a full-fledged Hungarian-style autocracy any time soon, though it may face another challenge: the rise of an oligarch, a high-tech loose cannon, whom neither the president nor the state can entirely control.

I will finally add that Trump has one clear disadvantage compared to leaders such as Hugo Chavez, Vladimir Putin, Recep Erdogan, and Viktor Orban.  He is much older than any of these leaders (all came to power in their 40's) and therefore does not have as much time to consolidate his power.

I plan to write more later on about further implications of patrimonialism and competitive authoritarianism. 

What We Should Fear: Patrimonialism

 

I am not afraid that Trump will be Hitler -- either in the sense of gas chambers or of men in trench coats sitting in the hallway keeping track of visitors.  

But I am very much afraid that he is a mortal danger to democracy.  What do I fear?

Alas, I don't have anything very original to say.  In fact, I can't really think of anything to add to these three articles, so I will let them speak for me.

The first one makes the same point that I have made in the past.  Trump is a patrimonialist.  The author distinguishes patrimonialism from "classic authoritarianism," or from autocracy, oligarchy, or monarchy.  

Patrimonialism is less a form of government than a style of governing. It is not defined by institutions or rules; rather, it can infect all forms of government by replacing impersonal, formal lines of authority with personalized, informal ones. Based on individual loyalty and connections, and on rewarding friends and punishing enemies (real or perceived), it can be found not just in states but also among tribes, street gangs, and criminal organizations.  In its governmental guise, patrimonialism is distinguished by running the state as if it were the leader’s personal property or family business.

Historically, most governments have been patrimonial, so in very real sense patrimonialism is classical authoritarianism.  Latter-day forms of authoritarianism are the ones that are not "classical."  Russia under Putin, Hungary under Orban, Turkey under Erdogan, India under Narendra Modi, and Poland under the Law and Justice Party are all examples.

The opposite is "bureaucratic proceduralism."  Bureaucratic proceduralism means government by a bureaucracy following formal rules.  Bureaucratic proceduralism can be democratic or dictatorial.  Communist governments were notorious for their bureaucratic proceduralism.  So, too, patrimonialism is not immediately opposed to democracy.  In fact, elected patrimonialists are noted for their populist rhetoric, setting themselves up as champions of the people against unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats.  But treating government instead as the leader's personal fiefdom -- even an elected leader with a popular mandate -- is ultimately corrosive of both government competence and the rule of law.

The author suggests that patrimonial governments will inevitably lose popular support due to their corruption and incompetence.  I am not sure I share his confidence.  The US in unique in its deep-seated hostility to all government.  I have little doubt that Trump and company can use the government incompetence they create to their advantage to turn at least the party faithful ever more against government altogether.  As for corruption, the author ruefully admits:

[B]ecause he [Trump] seems so unfiltered, he benefits from a perception that he is authentic in a way that other politicians are not, and because he infuriates elites, he enjoys a reputation for being on the side of the common person. Breaking those perceptions can determine whether his approval rating is above 50 percent or below 40 percent, and politically speaking, that is all the difference in the world.

The question, of course, is how.  Thus far Trump appeals to people who are utterly cynical about the system.  He has mastered a sort of political jiujitsu that allows him to turn all attacks against the attacker.  He has convinced his supporters that the worse his character is, the better, because he will deploy all those worst traits on their behalf.  If he is corrupt, he is no worse than anyone else, and besides, it shows he has mastered the system and knows how to use it for his supporters.  

Scandals will matter with Trump supporters only when they are convinced that he has hurt them in some more tangible way.  Remember:

When a president is popular, nothing sticks and nothing matters. When a president is unpopular, every stupid, random thing is a catastrophe they have to answer for.

Back to Ukraine

 

So what are Trump's true motives when it comes to Ukraine.  I have heard a number of suggestions.

Trump wants Russia to win.  Simple enough.  He favors dictatorship over democracy and is switching sides in the conflict.

Trump favors a policy of spheres of influence.  He believes Russia should dominate Europe, China should dominate Asia, and the US should dominate the Western Hemisphere.  Hence he is giving Putin Europe as his plaything.

Trump is trying to win Russia away from its alliance with China.  By siding with Russia, he seeks to engineer a split and ally with Russia against China.

Trump is a Russian agent.  He is deliberately trying to weaken US power to benefit his paymasters in the Kremlin.

I suppose we can't rule out any of the above.  Certainly I think some of these viewpoints exist among Trump's advisors.  In particular, the tech bro crowd, including JD Vance, do seem to unambiguously favor Russia over Ukraine and want to see Russia win.

But after watching Trump's crazy flip-flops, I am beginning to think we should consider that his motives are considerably less strategic, shorter-sighted, and more self-centered.

Look at the record.  First, Trump said he saw no reason to support Ukraine at all and called Zelensky a dictator.  Lindsey Graham approached Trump and suggested that we would benefit from alliance with Ukraine because of its rare earth minerals.  Trump then demanded a highly one-sided agreement offering nothing in return, while the Ukrainians offered a largely meaningless deal.  As Zelensky headed to the White House to sign the deal, Trump denied having called him a dictator.  My thought at the time -- he's lying, obviously, but if pretending to believe his lie is the price of his support for Ukraine, so be it.

Then came the blow-up on national television, and Republicans all lined up to applaud Trump for standing up to a foreign leader.  My thought at the time -- this was staged for a domestic audience, to tell Republicans that the new party line is to drop support for Ukraine and they had better get in line.  And so it seemed as Trump cut off weapons and intelligence sharing.

Then Russia subjected Ukraine to its worst one-day bombardment yet and Trump called for "sanctions,"  an empty threat since we have essentially no trade left with Russia.  The only sanction that can matter is aid to Ukraine.  My thought at the time -- if there is anyone left who is sane and has Trump's ear (Lindsey Graham, maybe?) maybe they can suggest resuming at least defensive intelligence sharing.  And, indeed, the Trump Administration appears to have recognized that depriving Ukraine of its ability to protect itself from bombardment is not a good look and hastened to give assurances that it had halted only offensive and not defensive intelligence sharing.  Was that true?  Who knows.  My thought at the time -- if Trump could reverse under public pressure on tariffs, spending cuts, and federal layoffs, might he susceptible to pressure on this, too?

And then Trump resumed assistance to Ukraine after it agreed to support a 30-day truce.  My thought -- how for how long?

So what are Trump's motives?  None of the above really make much sense.  So let me offer another possibility.  I think Trump wants to be the hero of the day by ending the war, get a big, showy peace signing ceremony, and maybe even win the Nobel Peace Prize.  In all fairness to Trump, many other Presidents have had similar motives in the past.  The difference, which John Bolton has pointed out (alas, can't find link!) is that Trump sees foreign policy solely in terms of personal relationships.  He assumed that the easiest way to a peace agreement was to ask his friend Pooty what he wanted and put pressure on those nasty Ukrainians to agree to it.  The problem -- Pooty doesn't want peace just to do his friend Donny a favor.  He wants to win. 

How Trump will handle that is anybody's guess.

The Meaning of Hitler

 

Someone on Facebook put up a post with a typical concentration camp scene and the caption "It didn't begin with gas chambers there either."

This isn't helpful.  Why not?

Well, obviously it is true that no dictatorship ever began with gas chambers.  But here is the thing.  The vast majority of dictatorships don't end with gas chambers either.

When people compare Trump to Hitler, the problem is that in our culture Hitler has two meanings.  One is the archetype of how democracies can fail.  The other is as the archetype of all evil.  This runs the risk of conflating these two things, but they are not the same.  Many democracies have failed.  Only one such failure has ended up with gas chambers.  

We desperately need another way to talk about democracy failing, another point of comparison.  Talk Orban, Erdogan, Putin, Hugo Chavez -- anyone but Hitler.  Granted, all these analogies have their own problems.  None of them are as well known as Hitler, for one.  Furthermore, many of Trump's supporters would cheerfully embrace comparisons to Orban, or even Putin.  And Putin comparisons seem more than a little hyperbolic -- not as bad as Hitler comparisons, but no one really expects a rash of Trump's opponents falling out of windows any time soon.  

Let me put it plainly.  I see the risk of the US becoming a "mild," Orban-style dictatorship as quite high, somewhere in the range of 30-70%.  I see the risk of a harsher, Putin style dictatorship as lower, but still real, maybe 5-20%.  And I see the risk of this ending in gas chambers as zero, none, zip, nil, nada.

It also brings to mind Naomi Wolf's End of America, which, among other things, describes what everyday life was like in Nazi Germany for an ordinary, non-political German:

You never knew who it might be when the doorbell rang. [W]e children were not allowed to touch the curtains . . . There was always somebody with a leather trench coat standing there in the hallway. And, especially when there were two or three people at our place, there would be several people standing outside in front of our house.

She also estimates that in Nazi Germany fully 36% of the population was briefly arrested for questioning.  

It seems unlikely that we will have men in trench coats standing in hallways, or 36% of the population arrested for questioning, just as we are far from having Proud Boys harassing and breaking up anti-Trump rallies.  Elon Musk's search engine trawling social media and unleashing the troll army is a different matter.

I also recommend the movie Swing Kids.  Yes, I know, the movie is fiction, but it gives some idea what everyday life looked like to an ordinary, non-political German citizen.  The movie led to a revival in interest in swing in the US because it was, in so many ways, a typical teen angst movie that American teens could relate to -- aside from being set in Nazi Germany!  Swing music was seen as suspect both in the US and Germany, both because of its sensuality and its association with Black culture.  The difference was that in the US, teens who followed swing music came into conflict with their parents.  In Nazi Germany, the consequences were rather more dire.  Hitler Youth beat up swing kids.  (They also beat up Jews, not that most swing kids cared).  The police were known to raid clubs were swing music was suspected, and the bands and dancers learned to change their style very quickly.

Darker things are afoot as well.  The primary character is Peter.  Peter's father was once a college professor who quit to protest the firings of Jewish colleagues.  One night the Gestapo showed up and took him away.  He returned, broken and cringing from torture and died soon after as a result of the abuse.  Peter is understandably intimidated as a result.  Peter's mother is particularly afraid of having her son mixed up with swing kids because of this experience.  Peter steals a radio (ransacked from a Jewish home) and is arrested.  To avoid further trouble with the law, he and his best friend are compelled to join the Hitler Youth and spy on suspected enemies of the regime, including family and friends.  They begin joining ironically, but Peter sees his friend gradually subverted into an actual Nazi.  Peter is eventually arrested when his former friend joins the Hitler Youth in breaking up his swing club and goes away defiant, "I don't mean a thing if it ain't got that swing!"

Roger Ebert criticized the movie as downplaying the horrors of the Nazis, but I can't say I agree.  Even in Nazi Germany, life goes on.  This is what everyday life looked like for an ordinary German.

Again, I am really not afraid of that.  I don't expect things to get that bad, anymore than they have gotten that bad in Orban's Hungary, Erdogan's Turkey, or Putin's Russia -- at least until the Ukraine war.

I plan to post soon on what I think we should fear.

We Have Passed the Nazi Mark. Where do Things Stand Now?

 

Well, we have now passed the first 50 days of the Trump Presidency, so we are more than halfway to the 100 day mark.  Of course, that mark is more symbolic than substantive, but assuming that all administrations loose steam over time, there it is.  

We are also passed the 53 day mark that it took Hitler to end the Weimar Republic. How do we stack up?

I would say right now we have a dictatorship of money, tech, and computer access.  Hitler at this point had a dictatorship of police, prisons, and thugs.  Am I worried that we might end up there?  I absolutely am.  But we aren't there yet.

When I say that Trump is violating Rule # 1 of smart authoritarians -- save the unpopular stuff till after you have consolidated complete power -- some people say that these unpopular actions suggest that Trump has consolidated complete power.  Nonsense!  Things are absolutely scary, but Trump is far, far from consolidating absolute power.  

Do I worry that the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers and Three Percenters will become Trump's own brownshirts?  I absolutely do, but it will take time for their numbers to build.  Do I worry that Trump will undercut press freedom?  Again, yes, but thus far our outlets -- including despised legacy outlets -- have been quite free in exposing what is going on.  

Other alarming events are underway.  Trump is attacking judicial review of his actions not (so far) by openly defying court rulings, but by denying security clearance and government access to firms opposing him.  He is moving against immigrants -- even green card holders -- in an alarming fashion.  He is using threats to withhold funding in an attempt to coerce policy at universities.  And, perhaps scariest of all, the FBI is seeking to freeze funds and pursue possible criminal fraud charges against any non-profit that accepted Biden-era funds related to climate change.  So, yes, things are scary.

At the same time, I am seeing protests all across the country.  I am not seeing Proud Boys breaking them up.  I am seeing our press continue to expose what is going on.  I am seeing judges rule against the Trump administration time and time again.  I belong to Indivisibles and watch it operating openly, posting pictures to social media.  I am seeing ever growing meetings in local restaurants, whose owners are happy for the business.  I am seeing cars honking their approval when we hold a protest.  I don't think I would see these things at this stage of the game in Nazi Germany.  

Obviously the game is young yet.  A lot can happen over the next four years.  Still, I read over the article on how Hitler ended democracy in just 53 days.  Short version -- the Reichstag fire made a huge difference.  We haven't had a Reichstag fire.  (Some acts of vandalism at Tesla dealerships just aren't comparable).  

I prepared a table and, lest anyone say it shows some alarming parallels, my answer can only be yes, I was deliberately seeking to draw them.  Trump has some advantages over Hitler, most notably, the ability to choose his own cabinet.  But he also has some signal disadvantages.  The biggest one -- nothing even close the Hitler's Brown Shirt army.  At least not yet.  And, once again, his ability to recruit Brown Shirts is going to track with his popularity.

Hitler	Trump
Successfully paralyzed government until it admitted him as chancellor	Successfully paralyzed the Republican Party until it nominated him and did his bidding
Held 37% of seats in the Reichstag as part of a coalition that held 51% of total seats.  Leftwing coalition of Social Democrats and Communists held 38%, Catholic parties held the remainder.	Held a 220-215 majority in the House and 53-47 majority in the Senate.  Democrats or independents caucusing with Democrats held the remainder.
All but two cabinet posts given to coalition partner to reign Hitler in.  One was minister of the interior, in charge of police, federalism, and elections	Full authority to choose cabinet, subject to Senate confirmation.  Senate intimidated into confirming at least three dubious picks.
Goering moved in on Prussian head of police, took over police, authorized them to shoot on sight as real or alleged Communists.  Political opponents arrested.	Elon Musk’s DOGE moved in on many agencies, locked out senior civil servants, shut off funds at will, fired probationary employees.
Goering deputized Prussian Brownshirts with police powers.  Number: About 2 million nationwide, many not in Prussia.	US Marshals deputized Musk’s bodyguard with police powers.  Number: Unknown, but obviously much less.
Courts order release of political opponents.	Courts order release of funds, reinstatement of employees.
Called new elections, hoping to expand his position in the Reichstag.	Appointed three Republicans in the House to executive positions necessitating special elections.  Two Democrats in the House died necessitating more special elections.
Reichstag building burned down, apparently by a lone crazed Communist, emergency decree suspending civil liberties.	Acts of vandalism against Tesla dealerships; AG vows to prosecute them as domestic terrorism.
Communist Party banned, leaders of Communist Party and Social Democratic Party arrested, opposition newspapers shut down.	Spurious defamation suits against various outlets, Associated Press barred from press conferences.  Firing everyone involved in prosecuting Trump, thus-far empty threats of prosecution against a few Democratic leaders.  Private law firms representing opponents denied security clearance and access to government buildings.
Elections 5 days after Reichstag fire, turnout increased by 2 million, most of those votes go to Nazis.  Nazis win 44% of vote, Communists banned, Social Democrats lose only one seat, right wing parties gain a 2/3 majority.	Special elections for Congress not held yet; since all vacant seats are safe seats, unlikely to change composition.  Some swing toward Democrats in state and local special elections.
March 6, Nazis seize state government buildings across the country, tens of thousands of opposition leaders arrested, others flee for their lives.	Freeze all climate-related grants under the Biden Administration and prosecute non-profits receiving grants for fraud.
March 21, all Nazis convicted of crimes advancing Hitler’s fortunes amnestied.  Tens of thousands of arrested political opponents imprisoned in makeshift facilities that become concentration camps.	All January 6 defendants, including violent ones, pardoned on day 1.  (Some have since been rearrested for state crimes or killed by local police).
Jew barred from government employments and professions, attempts to deport all Jewish immigrants stall for now.	All mention of achievements by minorities removed from government websites.  Alarming to strip permanent legal residents of status and deport them, for very minor crimes or expressing pro-Palestinian views.
March 23, Reichstag meets to vote on law giving Hitler dictatorial powers for the next four years.  Communist deputies arrested to prevent them from voting.  Social Democratic leader returns from exile to speak out against the bill, another Social Democrat released from arrest to allow him to vote.  Some other parties express doubts and reservations; all but Social Democrats vote in favor.	Trump pressures all but on House Republican to approve a budget that continues prior funding with minimal reductions but allows Trump/Musk to withhold funds at will.  On March 14, all but one Republicans Senators and 10 Democratic Senators vote to approve the budget.

I Wish We Had a Parliamentary System

While I firmly believe that the best way to save our democracy from Donald Trump is to make in maximally unpopular before he consolidates power, there is simply no denying that this method would be a whole lot more effective if we had a parliamentary system.

This particularly came to my mind after James Carville predicted the administration would suffer a "massive collapse" within 30 days.  The first and most obvious question to ask is what does that mean?  Does it mean that he will not be able to get Congress to pass a budget?  That Trump's popularity will collapse?  Or that his government will become dysfunctional to the point of being completely non-functional?  Any of those things seems reasonably plausible, and all of them at once are not altogether implausible. 

But the next and also obvious question is, then what?  

In a parliamentary system the answer would be simple.  The cabinet could toss Trump out and choose a new Prime Minister.  And a new one if that one failed.  And, ultimately, if worst came to worst and it could not form a stable government, it could call new elections.

But a presidential system does not have that option.  No matter how ineffectual or unpopular the President, there is no way to hold a new election until the fixed date.  If worst absolutely comes to worst, the Cabinet can invoke the 25th Amendment and declare the President unable to serve.  Or the House can impeach and the Senate remove.  Neither option has ever been used in our history.  And either way, JD Vance would become the new President.  Our system leaves no other option.

How bad would it have to be?  And then what?

Parliamentary system

In a parliamentary system, as I understand it, a serious collapse in popularity and pushing for measures opposed by most of the cabinet would be sufficient.  For instance, if Trump's tariffs sufficiently damage the economy and Elon Musk seriously impairs government function and if this were to hurt Trump's popularity even among the MAGA faithful, he could be replaced.  Presumably the foreign minister would be next in line, i.e Marco Rubio.  We can imagine that Rubio would kick Musk to the curb, both because of Musk's unpopularity and because he would be a clear threat to Rubio's own power, and tell the Cabinet to salvage as much of their department functions as they could.  I would expect Prime Minister Rubio's main other change to be in foreign policy.  I would expect him to work at unwinding the trade war to boost the economy, drop Trump's senseless belligerence toward Canada, Greenland, and Panama (no real support for that), quietly resume aid to Ukraine, and work on mending relations with Europe.  I think that Rubio's hawkish instincts have not really left him, just been suppressed.  

I would expect Prime Minister Rubio to continue Trump's general anti-immigration policy, which seems broadly popular, perhaps (canny Floridian that he is) making an exception for Cubans and Venezuelans in denying Temporary Protected Status.  I would also expect him to continue Trump's anti-DEI and anti-trans policies, both generally popular, though in a less heavy-handed manner.  I would expect him to fire RFK, Jr. as Secretary of Health and Human Services and replace him, perhaps, with Bill Cassidy (in a parliamentary system, cabinet ministers are also members of the legislature).  

He might even fire Pete Hegseth as unqualified and of dubious loyalty and replace him with, say, Joni Ernst.  And maybe even Kash Patel and Dan Bongino from the FBI, replacing them with law enforcement professionals from outside the agency with impeccable credentials, solid conservative backgrounds, and no political involvement.  He would direct them to regain respect for the agency by focusing on border issues like drugs and human trafficking and avoiding controversial matters.  He would direct them  not to prosecute any Republican office holder or candidate, or right wing donor or influencer unless the very online right was prepared to condone the action.  (Think Dennis Hastert). Prosecution of Democratic office holders or candidates or left wing donors or influencers was to be done only if there was a very strong case and all rules about sensitive matters were strictly followed.  In other words, I would expect a Prime Minister Rubio to weaponize government to protect friends but not to punish foes.

Finally, I would expect Prime Minister Rubio to be a captive of Republican dogma, which says that taxes can never be increased (except for import taxes, now) and to find it just about impossible to pass a budget.  And inability to pass a budget just might lead to a new round of elections with Democrats winning.

Twenty-Fifth Amendment if Trump is truly incapacitated

The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides that if a President is unable to discharge his duties, the Vice President and a majority of his Cabinet can remove him and place the Vice President in charge until the disability ends.  If the President says that he is able to resume his duties, he may resume unless two-thirds of both houses of Congress vote to remove him.  In other words, it is not intended as a mechanism for deposing a President against his will except in the most extreme circumstances.  This was seriously considered after Trump tried to overturn the 2020 election.  Some people believe it should have been invoked in light of Biden's cognitive decline.

Certainly if Trump were to have a truly incapacitating stroke, invoking the 25th Amendment should not pose any problem.  JD Vance would take over -- just as authoritarian as Trump, but a lot smarter and better disciplined.  If such a thing were to happen, I would expect Vance to move away from some of Trump's more bizarre foreign policy behavior.  Presumably he would drop talk of annexing Canada or Greenland, things there is no appetite for in this country, and to cut some sort of favorable deal with Panama on the canal.  But I would not expect him to change Trump's pro-Russia, anti-Europe, anti-Ukraine policy.

I would expect Vance to wind down the tariffs and step up bird flu vaccines in the general belief that he has a better understanding than Trump of Rule # 1 of Smart Authoritarians -- save the unpopular stuff until after you have consolidated complete power -- and also because he has a better understanding than Trump of what is unpopular.  I would also expect him to put pressure on Musk to declare mission accomplished, partly for the same reason, partly because he would fear Musk's power as a threat to his own, but mostly because Musk smashing the government would interfere with his plans to weaponize it.  And, naturally, I would expect Vance to continue Trump's anti-immigration, and DEI, and anti-trans policies in all their glory.  And to have the chronic Republican problem -- taxes can never be cut, but the level of spending Republicans want can never be done without breaking Rule #1 of Smart Authoritarians.

Twenty-Fifth Amendment to force Trump out

The 2th Amendment is really not intended to depose a President against his will, but it is (theoretically) not impossible.  That thought has occurred to me for some time.  What if Trump wigs out so badly that it is clear to everyone around him that he should not be trusted with power, but he is still well enough to assert himself as capable of governing?  Could the 25th Amendment come into play?

My thought on that is that is possible, but (1) Trump would have to become extremely unpopular first, and (2) the flip-out would have to be so public that even supporters would have to admit that Trump had passed his sell-by date.   

Of course, it is highly plausible that if Trump wigs out that badly, it would be preceded by behavior so erratic and damaging as to make him highly unpopular.  Given the intensity of his supporters, that would have to be very unpopular indeed.  At the time Nixon resigned, his approval rating had fallen to 24%.  But 24% of the US population is still a lot of people.  New reporters of the time had no difficulty making safaris into Nixon country and talking to supporters.  Many Republicans who contributed to forcing Nixon out did so at the cost of their future careers.  Nixon never inspired the same sort of fanatical devotion as Trump, who keeps Republicans in Congress in line with the threat of actual physical violence by deranged supporters.  That being the case, I think his approval would have to fall well below 24% before he could be forced out by the 25th Amendment.

I will also add that, although theoretically under the 25th Amendment, any Cabinet majority is sufficient, as a practical matter it would have to include the head of all the "power ministries" -- Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security -- to ensure that if Trump refused to go the "deep state" could be counted on to remove him by force.  All these leaders are staunch Trumpists.  That would mean he would have to be very unpopular and very erratic indeed.

Still, between the time Trump named his eight potential candidates for Vice President and when he chose Vance, I had fantasies on this score.  Those fantasies involved him picking Doug Burgum, who seemed like a decent enough guy who was just telling politically expedient lies. I imagined Trump going all-in with tariffs and budget-busting tax cuts.  The tariffs would be an adverse supply shock that produced stagflation -- rising prices combined with falling growth.  The gaping deficits would send interest rates up, with a predictable squeeze on the economy.  Trump would pressure the Fed to lower interest rates to let the economy grow.  Chairman Jerome Powell would refuse, learning the lessons of the '70's -- that lowering interest rates to meet an adverse supply shock can set off an inflationary spiral.  Trump would grumble but bide his time.  Powell's term would expire in May, 2026.  Trump would wait and then appoint a partisan hack who would lower interest rates, setting off an inflationary spiral.  

Still the November elections would be only six months later, before the inflationary spiral would make itself fully felt. Still, the tariffs would be painful enough for Democrats to win both house.  After the midterms, inflation would keep growing and Trump would respond by doing what many people, including supporters, rightly condemned when Kamala Harris proposed it -- impose price control.  The effect would be predictable -- empty shelves, long lines, and rationing.  Rather than admit he had made a mistake, Trump would double down, abandoning attempts at weaponizing the DOJ and regulatory agencies against opponents and instead going after businesses for alleged price gouging.  This, in turn, would lead many to challenge the Administration's actions as unconstitutional and the Supreme Court, whole-hearted economic royalists that they were, agreeing.  It would also lead to serious cracks within the Administration as many people saw such actions as going against their economic royalist principles.

My fantasy culminated in Trump wigging out so badly that his Cabinet saw no choice but to toss him aside.  I imagined Burgum, who seemed like a basically honorable guy, taking over.  In power, he would stop the investigations for price gouging, work to wind down the tariffs, and even encourage the Fed to tighten to break the inflationary spiral.  But he would still be captive of Republican dogma which forbids any tax increase and thus be unable to close the deficits that were driving much of the problem.  Democrats would win in 2028, bit the bullet, and raise taxes.  It would be unpopular enough to cost them the midterms, but ultimately right the economy and lead them to victory in 2032.

Could it happen?  Maybe.  Trump has shown some flexibility in willingness to reverse himself when his actions prove unpopular and so far has rejected the sort of doubling-down in my imaginary scenario. But already he is talking about price gouging for eggs.  And, of  course, he has sought to protect himself from ouster by picking JD Vance as his Vice President.

Impeachment

Three words on impeachment.  Ain't gonna happen.  Successful impeachment would require two-thirds of the Senate to conclude that Trump had not just passed his sell-by date, but had engaged in serious misconduct.  I will happily concede that he has probably committed a whole stack of impeachable offenses by now, but you know that no Senate Republican is willing to say so.  And, again, it would require enough splits within the Administration that we could be confident that if Trump refuses to leave the Deep State will put him out.  And besides, he has Vance to make him impeachment-proof.

I suppose maybe if Starlink severed its Ukrainian connections and Russians overran the entire country and threatened to invade Poland and Romania and Trump said fine, AND Russian malware infected our systems and there were multiple cyber attacks and Trump still refused to do anything AND tariffs tanked the economy AND there were massive cuts to Medicaid and rural hospitals all over the country failed as a result AND the immigration crackdown finally started in earnest and farm communities all over the country saw their main business shut down with predictable and effects on food prices and Texas learned why deporting half the construction force is not a good idea AND measles broke out all over the country and even polio made a comeback while Trump vowed to defund every school with a vaccine mandate AND putting Musk's company in charge of air traffic control led to massive confusion and congestion at airports and led to more commercial plane crashes AND mass firings at Social Security led to payments not going out AND Trump tried to distract from these problems by massing troops on the border to prepare to invade Canada AND credible evidence emerged that Trump was really a Russian agent -- well, maybe.  

And hell, if it got that bad even Vance might get religion for a second time and decide that maybe this isn't such a good idea.  But thus far Trump has shown some degree of flexibility and willingness to backtrack when something proves unpopular enough, so this scenario still seems most unlikely.

The Secret to Donald Trump's Power

This article and the graph above explain the source of Trump's power very well.  It is generally assumed that Congressional Republicans do not dare defy Trump for two reasons.  One is the threat of a primary challenges, now financed by Elon Musk.  The other is the threat of actual physical violence by Trump supporters.  Both threats will diminish if Trump loses popularity.

And he has lost popularity, at least to some extent.  It has not been as rapid or as dramatic as our side would like to think.  The honeymoon, never very strong to begin with, is now over.  His popularity has declined and will presumably decline more.  

But the decline is primarily among independents.  Democrats hated the man's guts from the start and still do.  And, as beginning of the graph above shows, there has even been some decline among Republican -- from a net approval of 90% to a net approval of 85%.

As long as Trump remains that popular among Republicans, he is invincible among Republicans in Congress.