Sparta and Fascism

You knew this was coming, didn't you?

Modern-day fascism has been a short-lived phenomenon. Mussolini, first of the fascists, came to power in 1922 and was dismissed in 1943.  Even considering Italian fascism to have endured to the end of the war, it continued less than 25 years.  Hitler came to power in 1933 and fell in 1945, a period of 12 years.  All other possible fascist regimes were puppets installed for a brief time during WWII.  All of which means that, while we have seen what Communism looks like when its revolutionary fervor is spent, no one knows what mature fascism would look like.*  Sparta has been called communist or socialist.  Could it be taken as an example of what mature fascism would look like?  To answer the question, we would have to look not just at classical Sparta, but at the origins of the regime to see to what degree they resemble the origins of fascist governments.  Given that the origins of the Spartiate regime come from a time before reliable records, when history is extremely difficulty to distinguish from legend, this calls for a lot of guesswork.

Please take all this with the strong qualification that there is at least one very important difference. Fascism as we have known it was a dictatorship.  Mature fascism might have taken the form of a continued dictatorship, or an informal oligarchy.  Mature, post-Stalinist Communism is probably better described as an informal oligarchy than a true dictatorship.  Sparta was a formal oligarchy.  As such, it allowed a degree of democracy within its narrow citizen body that would not be allowed in a dictatorship or an informal oligarchy masquerading as a dictatorship.

So, here goes.

A middle class populist movement that predominantly kicks down, but also punches up:  Clearly the citizen body was "middle class" in the sense of being above the large population of non-citizens and therefore had people to kick down at.  And clearly the regime was based on kicking down at non-citizens.  Did it also punch up?  To some degree, yes, at least according to the legend, the Spartan aristocracy was divided by extreme inequalities in wealth, but Lycurgus, founder of the Spartiate regime, distributed it equally and instituted a radically egalitarian lifestyle among all citizens.  But did Lycurgus punch up and kick down in a populist style?  In other words, did he rabble rouse?  Did he fire the poorer citizens up, both against the richer citizens and against the helots and Messenians?  Nothing in the legend suggests it.  Presumably if he had done so, he would have forfeited the admiration of classical historians, who did not approve of rabble rousing.  I will finally note that classical Sparta was not noted for its populists, but I would expect a mature fascism to lose its populism over time.  Rabble rousing pays off for a while, but the rabble gets tired over time.

Driven by both fear and ambition, but mostly fear:  It is my opinion that fear was what lay at the whole basis of Spartan society, specifically fear of rebellion from below.  This is its single most fascistic trait.  Perhaps its founding was also based on the ambition of the poor members of the elite for equality with the richer ones.  Nothing suggests that Lycurgus had any particular lust for power.

A paramilitary party that has seized (or aspires to seize) power and claims (or aspires to claim) an effective monopoly on political power:  It seems implausible that Lycurgus could have imposed such radical measures on a society without resorting to force, and, indeed, there are stories of his having lost an eye in one such scuffle.  But the legend makes him king, not some rabble-rousing politician contesting matters through the usual political process but playing unfair and using a private paramilitary to intimidate opponents.  Most likely it was revolts and the threat of destruction that led to such a measure.  In classical Sparta, the eligible participants formed the elite core of the army, with demoted citizens and subject people as lesser troops.  This army had to devote a great share of its resources to domestic security and might in that sense be considered a paramilitary.  To the extent that it was a secret police, the crypteia might be considered a paramilitary.  But Sparta did not have anything like a paramilitary party.  They had contested elections and factions, but never a faction using force to intimidate the others.

Fascist negations:

Anti-radical:  Well, the Spartiate regime's origins were very radical in the sense of upturning well-established lifestyles and distribution of wealth.  But to the extent that anti-radical means the fear of a dominant, or semi-dominant class of revolution from below (and this has been a major factor in modern fascism), then it is fair to say this was a constant theme running throughout Sparta's history, from the regime's origins to its classical form.  

Anti-liberal: I take this to mean opposition to expanding the circle of people who morally matter, opposition to placing justice to outsiders ahead of loyalty to insiders, and opposition to any openness to new ideas.  By any of these standards, the Spartiate regime was anti-liberal both in its origins and in its mature form.

Anti-conservative:  I would call the regime's origins right wing, in the sense of upholding the privileges of an entrenched elite, but not conservative in the sense of upholding traditional lifestyles. It made, after all, extremely radical changes, but all in the interest of preserving existing dominance. This would make the Spartiate regime's origins a genuine case of being simultaneously anti-radical, anti-liberal, and anti-conservative, which is quite unusual.  Of course, by the time we get to classical Sparta, the regime had been in power for a long time and become conservative.  Such is the fate of all successful revolutions.

Ideology and goals:

• Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state based not merely on traditional principles or models 
• Organization of some new kind of regulated, multiclass, integrated national economic structure, whether called national corporatist, national socialist, or national syndicalist 
• The goal of empire or a radical change in the nation’s relationship with other powers 
• Specific espousal of an idealist, voluntarist creed, normally involving the attempt to realize a new form of modern, self-determined, secular culture.

Except for the part about empire, these are anachronisms in classical times.  They are based on the assumption that the society and the citizenry are the same.  Spartan society was all about maintaining the dominance of citizens over non-citizens.

As for empire, the Spartiate regime is best seen as the end of empire, while fascism is the beginning.  Recall that what we call Sparta today was usually known to contemporaries as Lacedaemonia. The city of Sparta conquered the broad fertile plain of Laconia or Lacedaemon and then crossed over the mountains to conquer the fertile plain of Messenia.  It then found itself holding down a hostile population and had the sense not to expand any more.  Thucydides regularly speaks of the Spartans, not as aggressive and warlike, but as reluctant to go to war, sluggish, torpid, and perhaps even timid.


Style and organization:

Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political choreography, stressing romantic and mystical aspects:  I don't see anything to suggest they differed from other Greeks in this regard.  This is a populist trait, and Spartans appear to have lacked the populism of fascism.

Attempted mass mobilization with militarization of political relationships and style and with the goal of a mass party militia:  Yes, in the sense of turning the citizen body into an army, and of leaving its eligible participants no private life outside of service to the state.  This sort of forced participation and suppression of independent organizations outside the control of the state is a defining feature (perhaps THE defining feature) of modern totalitarianism.  So Sparta had some definite totalitarian features.  But it was not fully totalitarian in the modern sense in that it had genuine contested elections, referendums, etc.  And, needless to say,  mass mobilization was limited to the small citizenry.  Non-citizens were best kept as passive as possible.

Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use, violence:  The narrow citizenry was certainly willing to use violence to maintain its dominance.  But unlike modern fascism, the Spartan state did not use violence to intimidate the citizenry.  As for how the regime was established, well, see the part on paramilitary above.

Extreme stress on the masculine principle and male dominance, while espousing the organic view of society:  Sparta was actually less this way than the rest of Greece.

Exaltation of youth above other phases of life, emphasizing the conflict of generations, at least in effecting the initial political transformation:  No.  There was very strong emphasis on the education and training of the young, but respect for elders was also very strongly emphasized.

Specific tendency toward an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command, whether or not the command is to some degree initially elective:  Well, the origins of the regime are attributed (accurately or not) to a charismatic leader, but otherwise the Spartans deeply distrusted and discouraged charismatic leaders.  (Of course, I regard the charismatic leader as a left-wing phenomenon anyhow).

Robert Paxton's Nine Mobilizing Passions:

A sense of overwhelming crisis beyond the reach of any traditional solutions:  The whole Spartiate regime appears to have arisen out of a genuine crisis, a revolt by Messenia, so the sense of overwhelming crisis was accurate and the severity of the crisis no doubt goes a long way to explain the resort to non-traditional solutions.  Of course, this is one thing that would not be sustainable in a mature fascist state.  But the basic fear, real and rational, of revolt from below seems to have been constantly with the Spartans and informed their actions.

The belief that one's group is a victim, a sentiment which justifies any action, without legal or moral limits, against the group's enemies, both internal and external:  I don't think the Spartans established or maintained their regime out of a sense that they were victims so much as a fear that they might become victims if they ever let their guard down.

Dread of the group's decline under the corrosive effect of individualistic liberalism, class conflict, and alien influences:  Yes, very much so.

The need for closer integration of a purer community, by consent if possible, or by exclusionary violence if necessary:  Not in the same sense and modern fascism, but basically yes. Certainly, they sought a very closely integrated (citizen) community and were anxious to keep out anything that might be seen as polluting.  In fact, the Spartans ultimately made it so easy to take away citizenship and so hard to bestow it that they had serious problems with a shrinking citizen body.  They did not resort to exclusionary violence to keep their citizen body pure or tightly integrated, only to maintain its dominance.

The need for authority by natural leaders (always male), culminating in a national chief who alone is capable of incarnating the group's destiny:  Once again, no, the Spartans seem to have distrusted charismatic leaders.

The superiority of the leader's instincts over abstract and universal reason:  Certainly not in the sense of favoring one-man rule.  To some extent in the semi-despotic powers they gave the ephors to maintain law and order.  But definitely not in matters of relations with other states.

The beauty of violence and the efficacy of will, when they are devoted to the group's success:  Certainly they did not hesitate to use violence to maintain their dominance.  But I don't think there was anything like the semi-pornographic fascist glorification of violence and domination so much as deep seated fear.

The right of the chosen people to dominate others without restraint from any kind of human or divine law, right being decided by the sole criterion of the group's prowess in a Darwinian struggle: Certainly the Spartans believed in their right to dominate and were willing to resort to nefarious means that most Greeks would have seen as violations of human and divine law.  But this was on a domestic, rather than an international basis.  And I don't think this was glorified in the sense that fascists glorified it, so much as seen as a grim fact of life.

In short, I would say that the Spartans had some proto-fascist traits, particularly intense fear of revolution from below, militarization of society, and a circle-the-wagons sort of outlook and all that goes with it. But I don't think that they were populists, or that they trusted charismatic leaders, or that they had the sort of enthusiasm for all this that the fascists  had.  And, of course, there were genuine democratic features in their government within the confines of the oligarchy.

Now, I will once again give Ancient Greece a rest on this blog until I have reached the end of Thucydides.

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*Although some would suggest the Franco government in Spain or the government of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal.

Plataea, Corcyra, Megara and Fascism

Look, I know it is an an anachronism to apply an analysis of fascism in ancient Greece.  Fascism is a quintessentially modern phenomenon and calls for a whole different way of thinking than existed in ancient times.  Nonetheless, I am looking to see how far back proto-fascism goes, so here goes.

Middle class populist movement that punches up some but predominantly kicks down:  I think it goes without saying that anytime oligarchs overthrow a democracy, they are kicking down.  They are, at a minimum taking political power from people accustomed to having it.  They may or may not seriously oppress the people they have disenfranchised.  Oligarchs seeking to overthrow a democracy might punch up against some rival elite that they see as usurpers, as for instance an old landed aristocracy punching up against commercial classes that are richer, though less pedigreed, than they are.  However, Thucydides offers no evidence that the oligarchs of Plataea, Corcyra or Megara did so.  Nor do any of them appear to have kicked down in a populist manner, by stirring the middle class against the lower class.  Plataea was arguably done in by populism in the sense of a populist resolve to defy the Thebans and Spartans when it should have been clear that this was not a wise course of action.  Left-wing populist hatred of the oligarchs who had tried to seize power doubtless played a major part in tipping Corcyra over into civil war.  The Megarian democratic leaders seeking a deal with Athens were not being populist at all, but acting in the knowledge that the general public would not support their opposition to letting the oligarchic exiles return.

Driven by fear and ambition, but primarily by fear:  Actually the oligarchs in all three cities seem to have been motivated by ambition rather than fear.  Plataea met its doom because the people were not afraid enough of a powerful enemy.  The Corcyran oligarchs met their doom because they lacked a healthy fear of an angry population.  The only fear at work appears to have been in the Megarian democratic leaders, who feared the exiled oligarchs more than the Athenians.  These fears proved to be well-founded.

Paramilitary party claiming a political monopoly:  In all three cases, the oligarchs apparently claimed a monopoly on political activity, albeit on democratic terms within the oligarchy.  But there does not appear to have been a paramilitary in Plataea.  The Corcyran oligarchs may have had the beginnings of a paramilitary when they invaded the council chamber and killed democratic leaders. The people's response sounds more like spontaneous mob violence than a true paramilitary.  The exiled oligarchs returning as bandits could be called a paramilitary, but not a paramilitary party that participated in regular politics but played dirty.  The people opposing them were a regular military. Thucydides does not mention a paramilitary in Megara, but the act of forcing the people to convict 100 democratic leaders would seem to imply one.

And now for the standbys:

Fascist negations:
Anti-radical:  This is closely linked to fear, specifically, fear of radicals overturning the social order. I see no sign of it in any of these instances.

Anti-liberal:  An oligarchy seeking to overthrow a democracy is inherently anti-liberal, at by the definition of seeking to narrow the circle of people who matter.  Whether they partook of the anti-liberal ideology of the Old Oligarch Thucydides does not tell us.

Anti-conservative:  To the extent that the democracy was established in all these cities and the oligarchs were seeking to overturn the status quo, they might be called anti-conservative.  But my guess is that these oligarchs are better characterized as reactionaries  hearkening back to a time (probably quite recent in Megara, unknown in the others) when these cities were oligarchies.

Ideology and goals:

• Creation of a nationalist authoritarian state not merely on traditional principles or models
• Seeking "some new kind of regulated multiclass integrated national economic structure"
• Goal of empire or radical change in the nation's relations with other powers
• "Specific espousal of an idealist, voluntarist creed, normally involving the attempt to realize a new form of modern, self-determined, secular culture."

As discussed before, except for the empire or radical change in relations with other powers, these are modern notions that simply do not occur in a classical context.  (I don't even know what the last one means).  In terms of foreign policy, none of these states were imperialistic.  They were not powerful enough to even consider being imperialistic.  In Plataea and Corcyra, the oligarchs wanted a change in relations with foreign powers, not in the sense of dominating others, but in the sense of leaving the Athenian alliance.  In the case of Corcyra, this meant domination by Corinth.  In Plataea, it meant outright absorption by Thebes.  In Megara, oligarchs liked their current foreign policy just fine.  It was the democrats who were ready, out of fear and desperation, to seek alliance with Athens.

Styles and organization:

Aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political choreography, stressing romantic and mystical aspects:  This is really part of fascism's populist appeal.  Nothing in Thucydides suggests such measures.  Nor are they likely among oligarchs who are not trying to rile the people up.

Mass mobilization, militarization of political relations, and party militia:  Mass mobilization is not something any oligarchy cares to achieve!  Nor was it done in either Plataea or Megara. Arguably, in Corcyra there was a mass mobilization of the oligarchy, countered by a mass mobilization of the common people.  But mobilization was not a favored style.

Violence:  Yes, in all three cases.  The Plataean oligarchs, who used least, urged the Thebans to kill the democratic leaders. No doubt the Thebans later regretted not doing so.  In Corcyra, there was ample violence on both sides.  In Megara, it appears to have been more subdued and mostly on the oligarchic side.

Extreme stress on masculine principle and male dominance, organic view of society:  Nothing suggests any of these oligarchs differed from other Greeks in this regard.

Exaltation of youth, emphasis on conflict between generations:  No sign of it.

Charismatic leaders:  No charismatic leader is mentioned in any of these cities.

Mobilizing passions:

Overwhelming sense of crisis:  This is closely aligned with being motivated by fear.  None of the oligarchs seem to have been motivated by an overwhelming sense of crisis.  The only party driven by an overwhelming sense of crisis appear to have been the Megarian democrats, who acted out of desperation in seeking to betray their city to Athens.  Even the Corcyran democrats who went on the rampage slaughtering the oligarchs seem to have been acting out of anger and revenge rather than fear.

Primacy of the group over all other obligations:  Thucydides does not mention this factor.  It is certainly plausible among oligarchs seeking to establish domination over a hostile population, but the honest answer has to be that we don't know.

Sense that one's group is a victim and acting out of self defense:  Thucydides simply doesn't tell us enough to give us any sense of this, except that it is probably how the Corcyran democrats justified their slaughter of the oligarchs. It is probably  not too far-fetched to say that the Megarian oligarchs felt that way after being exiled.  And oligarchs can be that way when their power and privilege is threatened.  But the only honest answer has to be that we don't know.

Dread of the group's decline under the corrosive influence of individualism, class conflict or foreign influences:  If so, Thucydides never mentions it.  This is common in dominant elites who see their power threatened, but we simply do not know.

Seeking closer integration and a purer community:  I think this is probably true of any oligarchy seeking to establish itself as the ruling power, but not in the same sense that it is true of fascism.  Fascism want to draw the state closer together and exclude hostile elements.  But it does so in the sense that the state's inhabitants and its citizen body are the same or nearly so.  Oligarchs seek a more closely integrated and purer citizen body but take for granted that most residents will not be citizens.

Leader embodying the group's destiny:  No.

Reliance on the leader's instincts:  Since there was no strong charismatic leader, this is irrelevant.

Violence on behalf of the group's success:  Well, the Plataean oligarchs invited the Thebans to kill the democratic leaders, the Corcyran oligarchs did so themselves, and the Megarians oligarchs were more cool and calculating but intimidated the people into executing 100 prominent democrats.  So I would say yes, in all three cases.  Although the Corcyran democrats gave a lot better than they took.

Divine right of the chosen people to dominate others without restraint:  This is a bit strong, but yes, it does sound like about what the oligarchs in all cases were asserting.  Doubtless they would argue that they would rule better than the common people and that the whole state would benefit from their governance.  But they none were shy about killing anyone who disagreed.

Summing up all the fascist traits, so far as we can tell, these three cities and Pisistratus play out as follows:

Fascist trait	Pisistratus	Plataea	Corcyra	Megara
Middle class populist	Lower class populist	Oligarchs	Oligarchs	Oligarchs
Fear vs. ambition	Ambition	Ambition	Ambition by oligarchs, anger by democrats	Ambition by oligarchs, fear by democratic leaders
Paramilitary	Yes	No	Maybe	Probably
Anti-radical	No	No	No	No
Anti-liberal	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Anti-conservative	No	No	No	No
Foreign policy	Support other tyrants, avoid war	Leave Athenian alliance	Leave Athenian alliance	No change for oligarchs, democratic leaders consider Athenian alliance
Strong aesthetic	Yes	No	No	No
Mass mobilization	Only while seizing power	No	Only during the civil war	No
Violence	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Male dominance	No more than other Greeks	No more than other Greeks	No more than other Greeks	No more than other Greeks
Exaltation of youth	No	No	No	No
Charismatic leader	Yes	No	No	No
Crisis	No	No	No	By democrats only
Primacy of group	Probably no	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Victimization	Probably no	Probably no	By democrats only	Maybe
Fear of decline	No	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Closer and purer community	No	Yes, for citizens	Yes, for citizens	Yes, for citizens
Rule by leader’s instincts	No	No	No	No
Right of group to dominate	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

The main thing all have in common is the use of violence to get their way.  Pisistratus, the left-wing populist dictator, resembles fascism more than the oligarchs in its populist features -- his appeal to broad audiences, his aesthetic, his charismatic leadership, and even his contesting of power in the normal political process but at the same time playing unfair and using a paramilitary to intimidate his opponents.  But the oligarchs have different fascistic traits, particularly their belief that they have the right to dominate, and their wish to purge the body politic of undesirable members, albeit not in the same way as fascists.

One other remark is worth making.  I promised to consider the role of the victorious general in failures of democracy.  Pisistratus was probably a victorious general playing on his popularity as such to seize power.  But there is no sign of a victorious general playing any role in the failures of democracy in Plataea, Corcyra or Megara.  In Plataea and Corcyra, the oligarchs were flat out traitors acting on behalf of a foreign power.  In Megara, the democrats were the traitors, but the oligarchs were exiles and certainly not military heroes playing on anyone's sense of patriotism.

In Which I Analyze the Failures of Democracy in Plataea, Corcyra, and Megara

So, admitting that the accounts Thucydides gives are inadequate to get the full picture, what can we say from the sparse record we have about the failures of democracy in Plataea, Corcyra, and Megara? Let me again resort to my old analysis:

 General Traits:

Extreme Polarization:  Yes.  In all three cities and the oligarchs had become polarized to the extent that one was prepared to commit treason to prevail against its rivals.

Abandonment of Procedural Norms:  Committing treason is about as clear-cut a case of abandoning procedural norms as you can get.  In Plataea, the oligarchs not only opened the gates to the Thebans, the actually asked them to start killing the democratic leaders and seize the city by force.  (The Thebans probably regretted not doing so).  In Corcyra, the oligarchs came back as Corinthian agents and first charged the democratic leader with treason, then broke into the council chamber and started killing democratic politicians.  The popular faction, it should be noted, gave as well as it got, by imposing a ruinous fine on the oligarchic leaders and refusing to let them pay by installments.  When civil war broke out, both sides offered to free any slaves who would join them, a thing we may applaud, but a violation of the most basic Ancient Greek norms.  And the civil war was ghastly.  In Megara, the democrats had broken accepted norms by expelling a large portion of the oligarchic party, and the oligarchs retaliated with acts of brigandage.  It is revealing just how deep the hostility was that the popular leaders feared the exiles so much that they were prepared to let in the Athenians, who had been laying waste to their countryside for the past seven years.  Like the Plataean oligarchs, the Megaran democrats apparently expected bloodshed -- the smeared themselves with oil as a signal that they were not to be harmed.

Political violence or private paramilitaries:  As the preceding paragraph makes clear, there was plenty of political violence in all cases.  The Plataean oligarchs obviously did not have a paramilitary, hence their reliance on the Thebans.  The forces who drove the Thebans out were presumably not a paramilitary, but the normal citizen-army.  In Corcyra, the oligarchs who burst in on the council and started slaughtering, and who intimidated the assembly into breaking the alliance with Athens sound like at least the beginnings of a paramilitary, although we lack details.  So, too, does the oligarchic force that landed, set itself up in a fortress, and began raiding the countryside.  As for the popular party, in the initial clash they sound more like the citizen army and/or a spontaneous uprising (witness the women throwing things from the rooftops) that any sort of paramilitary, but it is hard to tell.  The second time around, the democrats were clearly in control of the apparatus of the state, making the resort to paramilitary unnecessary.  As for Megara, Thucydides seems to imply some sort of oligarchic paramilitary when he describes them sorting out a hundred opponents and "compelling" the people to sentence them to death.  But his account is too sparse to be clear.

Danger is on the right:  In all these cases, and throughout the city states in general, the struggle was between the oligarchs and the democrats.  If we define oligarchs as "right wing," as I believe we must, then doesn't that unfairly rig the discussion by defining democracy as "left wing" and make it axiomatic that danger can only come from the right?  I would say no, because looking upon the struggle solely as democrats versus oligarchs ignores a third possibility -- dictatorship.  So far as I can tell, in Classical times dictatorship was a decidedly left-wing phenomenon.  The normal pattern would be the people, oppressed by the oligarchs or in fear of such oppression, turning to a dictator for protection.*  In none of these cases does Thucydides mention anything like a dictator offering to save the people from the oligarchs.  In none of these cases was the popular party altogether innocent.  In Plataea, they slaughtered 180 Thebans soldiers after they surrendered, but were otherwise guilty mostly of a naive trust in Athens.  In Corcyra, the oligarchs started the fight, but the democrats finished it in a veritably orgy of bloodshed.  In Megara, the popular party banished its rivals and feared them so much that it was prepared to cooperate with an enemy laying waste to the country. Nonetheless, in all three cases, it was the oligarchy that wanted to overthrow the democracy (duh!)

Traits of a threat from the Right:

Driven by fear:  I predicted that the threat from the right would generally be driven by fear and the left by ambition.  The fear could take the form of an elite fear of loss of privilege or a middle class fear of displacement from below.  But that does not appear to have been the case in any of these examples!  Granted, Thucydides does not give an in-depth analysis in any of these cases, but nothing he says suggests that in any of these cases the popular party had undertaken any sort of measure that gave the oligarchy cause for alarm.  The only "fear" at work in Plataea appears to have been the fear that once the war started the city would be on its guard and could not be taken by surprise, so they would have to act quickly.  The Corcyran oligarchs clearly initiated the political upheaval and even when exiled refused to admit defeat but came back for revenge.  Megara is the least clear of these, but the only fear Thucydides mentions is the popular party's fear of what would happen if the exiles came back.  In short, the fear here seems to be on the side of the democrats and the ambition on the side of the oligarchs.

Middle class being squeezed out, inability to tell radical from moderate reformers:  There are sub-categories of fear.  See above.

Not dependent on a charismatic leader:  There is no suggestion of a charismatic leader in any of these cases.

Triggered by military defeat or economic crisis:  This does appear to have been the case in Megara.  The Athenians and exiles laying waste to the countryside created a simultaneous military and economic crisis that called for reconciling with one enemy or the other.  The difference was  which was to be feared more.  Furthermore, although the exiles established a narrow and tight oligarchy by treachery and murder, they do appear to have delivered on relieving the crises.  The takeover by the exiles necessarily meant that they were no longer ravaging the countryside.  The truce that soon followed, followed by peace, ended the ravages of the Athenians.  Perhaps the reason the oligarchy lasted so long was that the people identified the improvement in their fortunes with it.  Or because the democrats collaborating with the enemies laying waste to the countryside had discredited them even in the eyes of their would-be supporters.  In Plataea and Corcyra, there does not appear to have been any specific triggering event. The oligarchs simply saw an opportunity to make a bid for power and took it.

Types of failure:

I listed military coup, subversion from within, civil war, military conquest, and other.  Plataea was a military defeat by a vastly superior foe, largely the result of the Plataeans' foolish defiance when they should have backed down.  Corcyra was a civil war that occurred when exiles returned and tried to seize power by force.  In Megara, the exiles returned and were successful in seizing power by force. Unfortunately, Thucydides does not give enough detail for us to have any clear idea how they achieved this.  Interestingly enough, in all three cases the party that sought support from a foreign power lost.  This applies to Plataeans oligarchs seeking help from Thebes,** Corcyran oligarchs seeking help from Corinth, or Megaran democrats seeking help from Athens.  Either collaboration with a foreign power undermines a party's domestic legitimacy to a disastrous degree, or else domestic parties do not seek foreign support until their position is hopeless anyhow.

Conclusions:

Other than the dangers of polarization and abandonment of procedural norms, the danger coming mostly from the right, and the lack of charismatic leaders on the right, my predictions have not held up very well!  Particularly the part about the right being driven by fear and the left by ambition appears to be exactly backward in a Classical setting.  I believe it will hold good in modern times, but in Classical times, the pattern appears to be that the danger on the right is from the oligarchy's ambition to rule, and the threat on the left occurs when the people, driven by fear of the oligarchy, seek the protection of a dictator.  The part about confusing radical and moderate reformers and the middle class being squeezed out looks like a modern phenomenon.  And a triggering crisis seems less important than simply a chance to seize power.

One thing that seems to be at work here is an oligarchic mindset one is unlikely to encounter in modern times.  It is my opinion that elites everywhere have a most extraordinary skill at confusing their own privileges with the common good and seeing the concerns of the common people as special interests.  But the ancients' dismissal of the common people as simply not mattering is something one is unlikely to hear in this day and age.  I quote the Old Oligarch, one of democracy's harshest critics:

[T]he people do not want a good government under which they themselves are slaves; they want to be free and to rule. Bad government is of little concern to them. What you consider bad government is the very source of the people's strength and freedom. If it is good government you seek, you will first observe the cleverest men establishing the laws in their own interest. Then the good men will punish the bad; they will make policy for the city and not allow madmen to participate or to speak their minds or to meet in assembly. As a result of these excellent measures the people would swiftly fall into slavery.

Obviously, terms like "good government" and "bad government" are so vague that they could mean almost anything.  But is it such a stretch to assume that when the Old Oligarch says "good government" he means government for the benefit of people like himself, while by "bad government" he means government for the benefit of the common people?  Keep an eye on this Old Oligarch.  We will be seeing more of him.

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*With the notable exception of Sulla a right wingers seeking to impose oligarchy and sincerely opposed to dictatorship, but forced to resort to it as an emergency measure.
**Aside from the little detail of Plataea being destroyed altogether, of course.  But it succumbed to an external attacker, not to the domestic oligarchs.  

Failures of Democracy: Megara

I have barely mentioned Megara, but it, too, gets mentioned by Thucydides as a city in which democracy was overthrown and replaced by quite a narrow oligarchy.  Megara was a neighbor of Athens, on the Peloponnesian isthmus, and right across the Saronic Gulf.  The two cities were longstanding enemies. Solon appears to have begun his career by inciting and winning a war with Megara over the island of Salamis that lay between the two.

At the time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Megara had apparently expelled its oligarchs and established a democracy.  It was nonetheless a member of the Peleoponnesian League and an enemy of Athens, showing that self-interest and power invariably trump ideology.  An Athenian blockade of Megara was one of the immediate causes of the war.

Megara suffered badly in the war.  The city was near to Athens and therefore vulnerable to attack. The Athenians invaded twice a year and laid wast to the countryside.  The exiled oligarchs roamed the countryside, harassing and plundering.  Within the city, the exiles still had sympathizers.  The general public was becoming exhausted from having to fight two foes at once.  In 424 B.C., the pro-oligarchic forces therefore proposed allowing the exiles to return and the democratic leaders, fearing that the war-weary public would agree, decided that a deal with the Athenians was the lesser evil.  This was not a case of a pro-Spartan oligarchic party and a pro-Athenian popular party.  The Athenians must have been thoroughly hated after regularly laying waste to the countryside for the past seven years.  Rather, it was a case of the democratic leaders so fearing the return of the men they had exiled that they decided that even the Athenians were preferable.

The leaders therefore agreed to open the gates to the Athenians.  But there were two obstacles to a quick Athenian takeover -- opposition from the Megarians who were not in on the plot, and a Peloponnesian garrison.  The pro-Athenian Megarians had smeared themselves with oil to mark themselves out, indicating that they expected the takeover to be bloody.  The Megarian traitors threw open the gates and killed the guards, and the Athenians, supplemented with some of the displaced Plateans, rushed in.  The Athenian herald called on the people to join the revolt.  The Peloponnesian garrison panicked and fled to Nisaea, a small outlying port connected to Megara by long walls.  What followed is a bit unclear, at least in translation, but it appears that the oligarchs were tipped off and rallied to the cities defense.  Once exposed, the conspirators dared not act, and so the Athenians were driven out.

The Athenians then began to besiege the outlying port of Nisaea, believing that if they captured it Megara would soon surrender, presumably because it was cut off from the sea. The people in Nisaea (once again, my translators disagree on whether this refers to the local residents or the Peloponnesian garrison) were cut off from supplies and quickly surrendered on condition that they could be ransomed if they left their arms behind.  The Athenians then tore down the long walls.

About this point Brasidas, the Spartan general, showed up, presumably on his march to the Chalcidice.  Brasidas knocked at the gate of Megara, but neither party dared let him in, the democrats for fear that he would restore the exiles and the oligarchs for fear that the democrats' fear could set off a civil war.  Battle ensued between Brasidas' forces and the Athenians, but the outcome was indeterminate and both sides withdrew.  But the oligarchs believed that Brasidas had won and let him in.  With the oligarchs firmly in command, both armies withdrew. The conspirators who had let the Athenians in fled. The exiles were restored and pledged to refrain from revenge.  However, they soon picked out about a hundred men, both conspirators and personal enemies, and "compelled the people to give sentence on them."  Presumably this means that the jury or assembly was coerced or intimidated by the presence of armed men.  The exiles then established a narrow oligarchy.  No details given.  Thucydides only comments, "And this change of government, made by a few upon sedition, did nevertheless continue for a long time after."  This is an expression of surprise.  I think it is also a mild expression of disapproval.  (The comments Thucydides attributes the the Thebans, together with some unfortunate experiences by the Athenians, suggest that he does not approve of very narrow and tight oligarchies).  Then again, it could be taken as a suggestion that the oligarchs must have governed well to hold onto power for so long.  Besides, the civil war came to an end with the institution of an oligarchy and a truce was soon reached for unrelated reasons that put an end to the general depredations of the Athenians.  This must have counted in favor of the oligarchy.

This account is rather bare-bones, but it is what we have to go on.  Thucydides says nothing further about the Megarian oligarchy.  Megara is briefly mentioned in Plato's Crito along with Sparta, Crete and Thebes as one of the oligarchies Socrates thinks is better governed than Athens yet unaccountably does not want to live in.*
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*I love this part of Crito, for a very childish reason.  The Dr. Demento piece, Religion and Politics is a very funny verse in which someone responds to all criticisms of our own country by telling the speakers they are full of shit and why don't they go live in Russia or China if they hate the US so much.  The speaker says:

I asked him just what did he mean we were all full of shit.
Was he making a statement of fact as he knew it,
And where was his documentation to back up his claim?
I think Socrates would've been proud of the way I refuted his argument.

The image of Socrates holding such a conversation is doubly delicious.  The thought of Socrates from the Platonic dialogues attempting to seriously argue such low invective offers the most charming incongruity.  Yet I have to think it is truer to life than Plato.  Socrates' conversation partners can't all have been such pushovers as Plato portrays.  Nor were they all philosophers debating at schools and other intellectual settings.  Socrates stood out in the Agora engaging any passer-by.  Someone, sometime in his career must have told Socrates that he was full of shit and if he hated is country so much, why didn't he go live in Sparta or Crete and see if they would let him stand out in the Agora all day criticizing. (Hint: They wouldn't).  And Crito offers a sort of hint that, yeah, Socrates probably did have such conversations sometimes.

Failures of Democracy: Corcyra

Remember Corcyra?  Modern day Corfu, island on the west side of the Greek peninsula, democracy, colony of Corinth, whose war with the mother country set off the chain of events that were the immediate cause of the war?  I have touched briefly on Thucydides' account of how great power intervention in a local war between western Greek places with names that began with A like Aetolia, Arcnania, and Ambracia managed to escalate the conflict and make it much more bloody than it otherwise would have been.  The story of Corcyra makes gives a similar account in the case of civil war, and once again emphasizes my point that the oligarchs could be quite dense in failing to understand why so many people preferred a democracy somewhat dominated by Athens to an oligarchy outside Athens' sway.

During the Corcyran/Corinthian war (c. 433 B.C.), the Corinthians had captured about a thousand Corcyrans.  Of these, about 800 were slaves, who the Corinthians sold.  But about 250 were prominent citizens, who the Corinthians cultivated in hopes of creating a pro-Corinthian oligarchic party.  In this they were successful. The prisoners returned in 427 B.C. and tried to persuade the Corcyrans to break their alliance with Athens and join forces with Corinth, but the assembly voted it down.  The pro-Corinthians then charged the democratic and pro-Athenian leader with treason for seeking to "enslave" Corcyra to Athens.  He was acquitted and retaliated by prosecuting them for sacrilegious trespass on the sacred grove and had an impossibly large fine assessed.  Fearing an offensive and defense alliance with Athens, the oligarchs then burst in on the council (dominated by the pro-Athenian faction) and killed the pro-Athenian leader and 60 others.  Only a handful escaped.  The oligarchs then summoned the assembly and told them that they had only acted to save Corcyra from Athenian "tyranny."  The assembly, presumably threatened and intimidated, voted to become neutral. Civil war soon broke out.

Both sides offered freedom to any slave who would join them.  The great majority of slaves joined the democratic side.  Thucydides reports this fact without comment, so we can only guess at the slaves' motives.  Did they calculate that if freed, the would be, at best, poor citizens and as such better off in a democracy than an oligarchy?  Or were they, too, moved by talk of democratic freedom and eager to share in it?  Full-scale fighting ensued, with the democrats triumphant.  Women joined in the fighting by climbing on roof tops and and throwing tiles; Thucydides praises their courage.  The oligarchs burned their arsenal and surrounding properties to cover their retreat.

About this time, twelve Athenian ships pulled into harbor, and their commander, not wanting upheaval in an important ally, arranged a settlement between them.  It proved short-lived.  The democrats asked him to leave five ships and crews behind to prevent another outbreak and offered to send five ships of their own as replacements.  The Athenians agreed.  The Corcyrans then sought to make the oligarchs serve on the five ships as a discreet way of exiling them.  The oligarchs feared they were being sent to an execution and refused to go.  The democrats sought to kill them but were restrained by the Athenian commander.  Over 400 oligarchs fled to sanctuary.

About this time the Corcyrans were distracted by the arrival of 53 Peloponnesian ships, to the Athenians' twelve.  Although the Corcyrans had 60 ships of their own, they were not much use because two deserted and the crews of many other began fighting among themselves.  The Peloponnesians prevailed in the naval battle, but the Athenians managed an orderly retreat, and the Peloponnesians failed to follow up with an attack on land.  Nonetheless, the Corcyrans were in such terror that they negotiated to allow some of the oligarchs to leave sanctuary to join in the city's defenses.  When 60 Athenian ships arrived, the Peloponnesians fled.  The Corcyran democrats then proceeded with a general massacre of the oligarchs, including some they had persuaded to leave the sanctuary and join the defense of the island. They persuaded some of the oligarchs who had taken refuge in the temple to leave and stand trial, but the verdict was predetermined as guilty and the sentence as death.  Many of the suppliants killed themselves or each other rather than submit.  A general slaughter prevailed, with many private grudges being paid off, while the Athenians passively allowed it to proceed.

About 500 oligarchs escaped. They settled down on the mainland, raiding and plundering, and blockading the island and seeking support from Sparta and Corinth to restore them to power.  Unable to procure such help, the oligarchs, joined by foreign mercenaries and numbering about 600, sailed back to the island and burned their boats to keep themselves from retreating.  They established a fort and made sallies forth, laying waste to the countryside.

This state of affairs continued for about two years.  By 425 B.C., Corcyra was suffering serious famine, and sixty Peloponnesian ships were on their way to support the oligarchs.  The Athenians ordered their admirals in the course of sailing to Sicily, to stop by and see what they could do for the democrats.  The Athenians  marched against the oligarchs' stronghold and captured it.  The oligarchs surrendered, agreeing to be sent to Athens for trial.  We will never learn what the outcome would have been because the trial never took place.  The Corcyrans, fearing that the Athenians would not execute the oligarchs, sent in a provocateur to convince the oligarchs to attempt to escape.  This broke the terms of their surrender, so the Athenians turned them over to the tender mercies of the Corcyrans.  The Corcyrans locked them in a large building and then led them out, twenty men at a time.  At first the prisoners simply thought that they were being taken to another prison.  When the realized that the men being removed were being killed, they barricaded the door and vowed to resist to the utmost.  The Corcyrans then took the roof off and began stoning and shooting arrows at the captives inside.  Many captives took their own lives.  There were also women captured at the fortress; the Corcyrans sold them as slaves. Thus, says Thucydides, did the civil war end, because one side ceased to exist.  Thucydides regards the Athenian commanders as much to blame.  They were on their way to Sicily and made clear that they did not want anyone else to get credit for taking the captives back to Athens.  As such, they rather strongly encouraged the Corcyrans to take the captives off their hands and winked at whatever they might choose to do.

Thucydides uses this ghastly civil war as the occasion for his famous comments (too long to quote in full) about how the war generally undermined basic morality:

When troubles had once begun in the cities, those who followed carried the revolutionary spirit further and further, and determined to outdo the report of all who had preceded them by the ingenuity of their enterprises and the atrocity of their revenges. The meaning of words had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought proper. Reckless daring was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness; to know everything was to do nothing. Frantic energy was the true quality of a man. A conspirator who wanted to be safe was a recreant in disguise. The lover of violence was always trusted, and his opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was deemed knowing, but a still greater master in craft was he who detected one. On the other hand, he who plotted from the first to have nothing to do with plots was a breaker up of parties and a poltroon who was afraid of the enemy. In a word, he who could outstrip another in a bad action was applauded, and so was he who encouraged to evil one who had no idea of it. The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan was more ready to dare without asking why.

Everywhere, rival factions in cities sought foreign intervention, the democrats from Athens and the oligarchs from Sparta.  All restraint was abandoned.  Corcyra, Thucydides makes clear, was the first city to experience such horrors, but by no means the last.  Thucydides never more clearly sets forth the ideological nature of the war, although it is possible that the ideological dimension was less strong at the beginning of the war than it later became.

A few points here are worth making.  It is entirely possible that the oligarchs in Corcyra, like the Thebans in Platea, were not just being self-serving, but sincerely believed that the people would be happy to submit to an oligarchy (and a pro-Corinthian or pro-Theban one at that) if only it would free them from the horrors Athenian hegemony.  If so, the oligarchs in both cases seriously miscalculated.

Thucydides makes clear that although Corcyra was the first city to experience the horrors of civil war, it was by no means the last.  Yet he gives no other examples, at least as far as I have read.  But he does recount at least one serious domestic atrocity by an oligarchy in shoring up its power, the previously mentioned preemptive massacre by the Spartans of some 2000 helots believed to be potential rebels. That massacre differs from the Corcyran massacres of oligarchs in that it did not take place in a civil war, and that it was undertaken out of fear rather than anger, and without provocation.  But most importantly, comparing the atrocities points up a certain asymmetry between democrats and oligarchs.  The oligarchs, at worst, can crush the democrats by brute force and reduce them to absolute subjugation.  The democrats can exterminate the oligarchs altogether.  The Spartans needed the helots because someone had to till the fields and for the oligarchy to do so would be the end of its status as an oligarchy.  The Corcyran people, when the chips were down, ultimately did not need their oligarchs.  Besides, the common people, being more numerous, can absorb greater losses.  In the first outbreak, the Corcyrans killed 400 oligarchs who had taken refuge in the temple and an undetermined number of others, while some 500 escaped.  Once these were killed, the oligarchs ceased to matter because there were none of them left.  By contrast, the slaughter of 2000 helots did not even put a serious dent in their numbers.  As the war grinds on, we will see Athens in adversity show a most extraordinary resilience, a resilience that has to come in large part from having a citizen body large enough to absorb major losses.

Finally, there was no happy ending here.  In Corcyra, the democrats prevailed.  But when democracy cannot stop a civil war from happening, then democracy has failed regardless of the outcome.  The democracy that survives by the extirpation of its rivals is not worth having.